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Preface
In inception, this was to be a thesis on the creation of rights in security over
incorporeal assets in Scots law. It soon became apparent, however, that such was the
dearth of analysis on the voluntary transfer of the paradigm money claim that the
original topic of study would have to be postponed. The thesis has therefore
concentrated solely on investigating the principles applicable to the common-place,
voluntary transfer. I have endeavoured to be as thorough as possible in referring to
the available Scottish sources. The modern law of assignation in Scotland can be
traced back for some five hundred years. In that time, there has been little change in
the essentials of the Scottish approach. Sometimes the rules are old because they
cannot be improved. That there are few modern Scottish authorities is not, in itself,
an indication that Scots law is unworkable or impractical (indeed, I rather suspect the
opposite to be the case); we do well to remember that in English law, for example,
even the most recent cases on assignment continue to draw on old authorities which
are less adaptable to modern law than our own. In any system, the historical source
of a rule is usually lurking just below the surface. In the following thesis I have
sought to identify the sources of our law; and, above all, I have endeavoured to be
critical: what is important is not the age of a principle, but its utility. I have made
liberal references to comparative law for three reasons: first, the Scots law of
assignation was heavily influenced by developments on the continent; second, it is in
the continental materials that the most detailed discussions of cession are to be
found; third, due to the highly moveable nature of claims and their considerable
economic importance, the law of assignation/assignment/cession is a prime candidate
for harmonisation. It is only right, therefore, that Scots law is measured against the
benchmark of our European neighbours.
Many people have provided me with invaluable assistance in the preparation
of this thesis: to all of you, my thanks. In particular, I would like to thank: Alan Barr,
Jan Biemanns, John Cairns, Eric Clive, Scott Dickson, Jacques Du Plessis, Paul Du
Plessis, Christian Eckl, Sandra Eden, Stephan Festner, Philip Hellwege, Jan
Kleinheisterkamp, Jens Kleinschmidt, Gerhard Lubbe, Bill McBryde, Sonja Meier,
Ebhru Mercangoz, Ralph Michaels, Michael Milo, Kenneth Reid, Vincent Sagaert,
Thomas Schindler, Andrew Steven, Jens Sherpe, Andrew Tettenborn, Stephan
Wagner, Heinz Weidt, Jan Erik Windhorst, Scott Wortley, Niall Whitty and the staff
of the Edinburgh University Law Library.
There are two people and one patrimony to whom I wish to convey special
thanks. The patrimony is the Edinburgh Legal Education Trust. It was the generous
scholarship from this fund that made my research possible. The two people are
Reinhard Zimmermann and George Gretton. Professor Zimmermann generously
provided me with the opportunity to work for a year at the Max-Planck-Institute fur
auslandisches und internationales Privatrecht in Hamburg. This experience was
invaluable and memorable; and the opportunity to use the resources in the institute's
unrivalled library was a privilege indeed. He was an understanding and inspiring
mentor. For the kindness and generosity extended to me by all members of the
institute and, in particular, by Professor Zimmermann, I will be forever grateful.
My greatest debt of gratitude is to Professor George Gretton. He acted as the
primary supervisor of the thesis. He has read more drafts than I am sure he cares to
remember; and the many penetrating criticisms that he offered have improved the
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thesis immeasurably. I have learned much from him. Indeed, if there is any note of
sadness on completing this thesis, it is only that our regular and lively meetings must
come to an end. Again, my thanks.
With these acknowledgements I need hardly mention that I alone bear the
responsibility for remaining errors.
Finally, it would be remiss of me not to record my deep gratitude to Gilbert,
Mary, Murray and Keith: my family; for all the support that they, and only they,
could provide. Also, to Keirs: a special tapadh leat.
I have endeavoured to take account of legal developments in Scotland up to
1st May 2005, although it has been possible to include some later references.
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Abstract
The Transfer ofMoney Claims in Scots Law
Ross Gilbert Anderson
University of Edinburgh PhD, 2005
The transfer of money claims (debts) is of the utmost practical importance. In Scots
law this is achieved by an 'assignation' (also known as 'assignment' or 'cession').
The first part of the thesis (chapters 2 and 3) places the Scots law of assignation in its
comparative and historical context. At the outset, the differences between an
assignation and other juridical institutions are highlighted. Assignation is but one -
albeit important - method whereby a debt relationship may be utilised. With these
distinctions in mind the accepted history of the law of assignment is considered. The
development of the law, from Roman law through the jus commune, and the apparent
reception of the French approach in Scots law, is traced.
The following three chapters deal with three important elements in a modern
assignation. The constitutive role that debtor notification plays in Scots law is the
subject of chapter 4. Chapter 5 looks as at the so-called 'assignatus utitur jure
auctoris'1 rule, i.e. the defences available to the debtor in an assignation against the
assignee. Particular reference is made to the set-off pleas of compensatio and
retention. Finally, chapter 6 is concerned with issues of validity. Does Scots law
subscribe to the abstract theory of transfer? If so, what are the consequences?
Particular reference is made to the effect of a contractual prohibition on assignment
(pactum de non cedendo), including its effect on creditors, and the so-called 'offside
goals' rule.
It will become apparent that, despite the relative paucity of recent litigation on the
subject, the Scottish jurisprudence on assignment is rich. The sources show an
unbroken path of legal development stretching over half a millennium. Although
often characterised as unnecessarily formal, Scots law has a strikingly liberal attitude
to the assignability of claims and other incorporeal assets. Clear general principles
have been distilled. On matters of detail the position is less certain. The thesis
identifies the relevant sources of the law of Scotland, many of which have been
ignored. These are critically analysed, often from a comparative perspective.
xvii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
"...it is probable that a branch of the law which comes at the meeting
place of the law of property and the law of obligations can never be
anything other than difficult to apply."1
I. The Subject
Assignation, assignment, cession: three different English words; but, usually
at least, only one underlying concept. The difference in the use of language is
indicative of deeper conceptual difficulties. Cession (in Scots law, an 'assignation')
seeks to achieve a relatively simple result: the transfer of a personal right. Transfer is
a concept well known to lawyers. But we tend to think of corporeal assets as objects
of transfer. The tripartite situation in a cession, however, is more complex.
Assignation is just one of several methods by which debtor-creditor relationship can
be utilised, altered, discharged or circulated. The method chosen in any particular
transaction ought to depend on the particular incidents of the institutions that may be
employed. While this thesis is concerned with the detailed incidents of cession of
money claims, it is important to observe that the law provides other methods which
are functionally similar. Unfortunately, in the modern Scottish authorities at least, the
relatively clear principles set out in the earlier sources have become confused; the
distinctions between the different principles blurred. The law of
cession/assignation/assignment is one of those subjects in Scots law to which Walter
Ross's appraisal is apposite: 'The frequent mistakes, defects and weaknesses in our
authorities, discovered in the course of our examination sufficiently prepare the mind
for an amusement so conducive to the enlargement of its faculties'.
1 W.S. Holdsworth, 'The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law' (1919-
20) 33 Harvard L Rev 997 at 1030.
2
Ross, Lectures vol I, xxi.
1
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II. Nature of Assignation
'It is said that this point has never been decided. Points never decided are the
strongest and most certain in our law': so observed Lord Monboddo in McDonnells v
Carmichael? This comment could well have been directed to the very juridical
nature of an assignation. No decision can be cited where a satisfactory description of
'assignation' will be found, though assignations in Scottish case reports are
ubiquitous. However, the precise nature of assignation4 is deeply engrained in the
jurisprudence of the European jurisdictions with which Scots law has much in
common; characteristics for which there is evidence in indigenous Scottish sources.
Assignation is the inter vivos consensual transfer of {inter alia) a money claim by the
cedent (the creditor in the claim) to a transferee (the assignee). The cedent must
intend to convey the claim, which must be identifiable. The assignee must accept the
delivery of the assignation. In Scots law, only on intimation to the debtor of the
delivery of the assignation, is the claim transferred to the assignee. Debtor
notification plays a constitutive role in Scots law. It is therefore an essential
requirement for a transfer. Intimation raises points of difficulty as much practical as
theoretical. These are discussed in detail in chapter 4 below.
One aspect of assignation must be highlighted: the debtor's consent to the
transfer is not required.5 While it is occasionally suggested that an assignation occurs
with the consent of the debtor,6 this is incorrect.7 For example, some claims that can
3
(1772) Mor 4974; (1772) Hailes 513 at 514. McDonnells is an important assignation case. It is
discussed in chapter 5 below. Cf Johnston v O'Neill [1911] AC 552 at 592-3 per Lord Dunedin and D
Daube, 'The Self-understood in Legal History' 1973 JR 126; (1973) 90 ZSS (RA) 1.
4 The historical development of the law, which sheds some light on the terminological differences, is
discussed in chapter 3, 'History' below.
5 Stair III.i.3. Cf. Hume, Lectures III, 1; C. Maynz, Cours de droit romain, (4th ed. 1877) vol 2, 87.
See also e.g. Prussian ALR I, 11, § 409 and P.M. Nienaber, 'Cession' in W.A. Joubert (ed.) The Law
of South Africa 2nd edn, vol 2, Part 2 (2003) para 6. Cf. McBryde, Contract para 12-02 and S
Woolman and J Lake, Contract, (3rd ed. 2001) para 11.4 who are equivocal on this point.
6 See for example Lord Karnes, Elucidations respecting the Common and Statute Law of Scotland
(1777) Art. 2, at 9-10; Art. 39, at 319. This opinion is discussed in detail in chapter 2. See too, H.L.
MacQueen, SME, vol 15, para 861. Taking the lease as the paradigm, he observes that in leases a
landlord can prevent assignation by refusing to consent to it {Duke ofPortland v Baird & Co (1865) 4
M 10). He continues: 'It is undecided whether this is a rule peculiar to leases or one which may be
extended to all contracts... it may be in other forms of contract there is an implied term that the
2
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be assigned are not based on a consensual relationship between the cedent and the
debtor. Claims for reparation in respect of wrongful acts, for example, are
assignable8 although they arise ex lege and not ex voluntate. Moreover, the relative
importance accorded to the doctrine of delectus personae9 in the Scottish sources is
not entirely consistent with the debtor's consent being required. Delectus personae,
like any implied term, can be overcome by agreement.10 A concept of delectus
personae would therefore be unnecessary if all transfers required the (even implicit)
consent of the debtor. Moreover, if assignation could not occur without the consent
of the debtor, express prohibitions on assignation would be unnecessary.11 Also, if
the cedent assigns a claim to an assignee that the debtor does not like, it is accepted
19
that the debtor cannot refuse to pay that assignee. This is the position in the major
European systems.13 Matters are further complicated where the claim transferred is
not a claim to payment, but a right to demand non-monetary performance. However,
for the purposes of this thesis, we will be primarily concerned with the transfer of
money claims.
consent will not be unreasonably or capriciously withheld'. With respect, this confuses the assignation
of a claim with the transfer of a contract in toto (confusingly, this too is often called an 'assignation').
A lease imposes obligations on the tenant as well as rights. In assigning the lease the tenant is
attempting to get shot of his obligation to pay rent. For this reason the consent of the landlord,
whether implicit or otherwise, is necessary. The consent of the tenant, however, seems to be irrelevant
to the right of the landlord to assign his income stream from rents. Cf. English law, where the House
of Lords has recently emphasised that assignment occurs without the consent of the debtor:
Mulkerrins v PricewaterhouseCoopers (a firm) [2003] 1 WLR 1937 at para [13] per Lord Millet.
7 See William Guthrie's criticisms, in his edition of Bell's Principles, (10th ed. 1899) § 1461, n. (f), of
Ritchie v McLachlan (1870) 8 M 815. In any event, Ritchie involved an order to pay, not a transfer of
a claim. This distinction is discussed below.
8 Munro v Wishart (1582) Mor 10337; Milne v Gauld's Trs (1841) 3 D 345; Traill & Sons v
Actieselskabat Dalbeattie Ltd (1904) 6 F 798, noted at (1905) 17 JR 240; Cole-Hamilton v Boyd 1963
SC (HL) 1. A right of action for damages for breach of trust is assignable: Liquidator of Larkhall
Collieries Ltd v Hamilton 1906 14 SLT 68 OH.
9 For which see below.
10 Some claims are unassignable by statute. Consent cannot render them assignable.
11 See chapter 6 below, 'Validity', Part V.
12
Assuming there is no delectus personae creditoris.
13 See e.g. in Germany, A. Perneder, Institutiones (Ingolstadt, 1565) who noted that cession occurred
'ohne Wissen und Willen des Schuldners', cited by Luig, Geschichte, 23. This reflects modern
German law where no debtor notification is required to effect a transfer. Cf. P. Gide, Etudes sur la
novation (1879), quoted in chapter 3 below. Guthrie, in his final edition of Bell's Principles, (10th ed.
1899), refers Scots lawyers to the civil law in this regard: § 1460, n. (f). Ironically, however, older
Scots law - and indeed French customary law - shared little in common with the civil law. See
discussion in chapter 3 below.
3
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Only the cedent's right to payment is transferred. If any of his obligations are
to be transferred or discharged, the consent of the debtor in the assignation (i.e. the
creditor in the cedent's obligation) is required. The point may seem self-evident, but
clear statements to this effect are scarce.14 Historically, where failure to pay a debt
could have deleterious personal consequences, there was apparently no free
movement of debts, on the ground that there was always delectus personae in the
person of the creditor.15 It may have been the case thereafter that claims were, at
first, only assignable with consent; but we cannot be sure.16 In any event, the law has
evolved. It is now held to be a matter of indifference to the debtor to whom he may
be required to tender payment.17 Crucially, where a transfer does take place, the
assignee can have no greater right vis-a-vis the debtor than was held by the cedent. In
Scots law, this is the principle labelled assignatus utitur jure auctoris. The principle
is sometimes thought to be peculiar to the law of assignation. It is therefore discussed
in detail in chapter 5 below.
As has been suggested, the debtor's consent is not required. What, then, is the
position if the debtor actually explicitly consents to the transfer? A common express
term in a loan agreement is that the creditor is entitled to assign his rights against the
debtor. The parties are here expressing what the law already provides. So, while the
debtor's consent is not required in an assignation, that the debtor does consent makes
no difference. The claim is still transferred. And the transfer is a cession.
What then of the 'claim' that is to be transferred? 'Claim' is not a popular
18
term in Scots law. Legal writers and judges have often referred to 'debts',
'obligations'19 and even 'contracts'20 as the objects of assignation. These are all
problematic. They have connotations which tend to focus on the negative side of the
14 Cf. G.L. Gretton and K.G.C. Reid, Conveyancing, (3rd ed. 2004) para 22.02: 'Only rights are
assignable, not obligations. This is common sense'.
15 F. Schulz, Classical Roman Law (1951), 628, cited by Zimmermann, Obligations, 59. The history
of the law of cession will be discussed in chapter 3 below. The Scottish history is perhaps unique.
16 See the discussion of the historical evolution of the law in chapter 3 below. Cf. Art 1122 Code Civil.
17 Laidlaw v Smith (1838) 16 S 367 affd (1841) 2 Rob 490 at 501 per Lord Cottenham. Compare the






Gloag, Contract, (2nd ed. 1929), 416.
4
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relationship. The point is a basic one. Yet it has caused innumerable problems in the
Scottish sources. It is worth quoting in full the passage with which Professor
Zimmermann opens his magisterial Law ofObligations:
"Nam fundi et aedes obligatae sunt ob Amoris praedium' said
Astaphium ancilla in Platus' play Truculentus (at 214), thus providing
us with the oldest source in which the word 'obligare' is used. The
substantive 'obligatio' can be traced back to Cicero. As to the literal
meaning of the term, its root Tig-' indicates that something or
something is bound; just as we are all 'bound-back' (to God) by virtue
of our 're-ligio'. This idea is still clearly reflected in the famous
definition which Justinian advanced in his Institutes, where he
introduced the subject of the law of obligations: 'obligatio est iuris
vinculum, quo necessitate adstringimur alicuius solvendae rei
secundum nostrae civitatis iura'. Today the technical term 'obligation'
is widely used to refer to a two-ended relationship which appears from
the one end as a personal right to claim and from the other as a duty to
render performance. The party 'bound' to make performance is called
the debtor (debitor, from debere), whilst at the other end of the
obligation we find the 'creditor' who has put his confidence in this
specific debtor and relies (credere) on the debtor's will and capacity to
perform. As far as the Roman terminology is concerned, 'obligatio'
could denote the vinculum iuris looked at from either end; it could
refer to the creditor's right as well as to the debtor's duty. This
obviously makes it somewhat difficult to render the Roman idea in
English, for the English term 'obligation' is merely orientated toward
the person bound, not towards the person entitled. With the words 'my
21 ^
obligations' I can refer only to my duties, not to my rights."
In many of the legal systems of Europe, the language employed by the law
makes clear that it is the claim, the right, the positive or active element in the
obligationary relationship that is being transferred. In French law, and systems based
on it, it is quite clear that cession de creance refers to the transfer of personal rights.
The same is clear from the language of Forderungsabtretung employed by German-
speaking lawyers; cesion de creditos in Spanish; and cessie van vorderingsrechte
(sessie van vorderingsregte) in Dutch (Afrikaans). As will be discussed below, Scots
substantive law has been bedevilled as much by imprecise language as a lack of
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describe either the concept of the transfer, or the object of it, is not easy. In a later
development in her history, Scots law spoke of the assignation of contracts. No
distinction was made between the rights and obligations that form the legal bond that
is a contract. This unhappy episode in the Scots law of assignation is discussed in
detail in chapter 2 below. This writer will therefore be careful to refer only to claims
or rights. 'Claims' is the better term. It implies relativity: a claim must usually be
exigible against another patrimony. 'Right' is much broader. It could conceivably
encompass real rights, intellectual property rights or even human rights. 'Assignation
of claims' also has some historical pedigree in Scots law. Hume entitled his chapter
on this area of the law, 'Assignation of Personal Claims'.22
III. Scottish Terminology
The transfer of a money claim in Scots law is effected by an 'assignation'.
However, the term assignation has more than one meaning. Assignation is the term
given to the contract to assign.23 Assignation is also the term used to describe the
transfer agreement,24 the conveyance. Most commonly, it also refers to the physical
deed which is delivered. Assignation, again, is used in two more general senses. One
25
is the description of the completed transfer of a claim. This incorporates - normally
- the contract (the obligationary agreement), the conveyance (the transfer agreement)
and the intimation to the debtor. Only on intimation does the transfer take effect.
Assignation is also the general term for transfer in the Scottish sources: it has been
applied to transfers of all types of property, not just claims; nor is it limited to
incorporeals.26 'Assignation', 'assignment', or 'cession' can be used in either a wide
22
Hume, Lectures, vol III, 1 Arguably the adjective 'personal' is unnecessary: a claim, by definition,
can refer only to another patrimony; rights, on the other hand, may be personal or real.
23 Brownlee v Robb 1907 SC 1303 at 1312 per Lord McLaren; Westville Shipping Co v Abram
Steamship Co 1922 SC 571 at 582 per Lord President Clyde; 1923 SC (HL) 68 at 71 per Lord
Dunedin.
24 This terminology will be discussed in chapter 6, 'Validity' below.
25 A claim may be donated. In such a case there will be no contract.
26 In particular, see Erskine III.v.l and the criticism thereof by Hume, Lectures vol III, 8; W. Ross,
Lectures, 189 (n). Cf. the following examples of this usage Henry v Robertson & Sime (1822) 1 S 399
(NE 375); Borthwick v Urquhart (1829) 7 S 420; Johnstone v Sprott (1814) Hume's Dec 448 and J.
Craigie, Scottish Law ofConveyancing: Moveable Rights (1894), 250 ff.
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or a narrow sense. This thesis is concerned with the narrow sense, i.e. the voluntary
inter vivos transfer of particular claims; one particular type of singular succession.
However, assignation can also be used in a wider sense to denote a universal
97
succession. Moreover, sometimes an 'assignation' can transfer real rights:
"A disposition may, and sometimes doth, signify the alienation of any
right, whether real or personal; so the style and translation ordinarily
bears, the assignee to transfer and dispone: as assignation is
sometimes extended to the disposal of real rights, which are frequently
provided, not only to heirs, but to assignees; yet these terms are so
appropriated and distinguished, that disposition is applied to the
98
alienation of real rights, and assignation of personal rights."
'Assignation' is often used as a synonym for 'transfer' in the sources. It is
used to denote the transfer of all manner of assets, things and rights. While there is a
general idea of transfer, particular rules apply to the transfer of different assets. It is
of some interest that, in Scotland, cases involving the transfer of one particular asset
are referred to when dealing with other transfers. It is assumed that there are general
underlying principles which are universally applicable to all transfers.29 In other
words, at a conceptual and practical level one can identify a general theory of
transfer in Scots law. The idea of a 'general assignation' is perhaps just one
manifestation of this. The following seeks to build upon that heritage.
For the purposes of this thesis, we will be concerned primarily with
assignation as it is used in the specific sense, viz. the method whereby rights or
claims are transferred. The term 'cession' is the most desirable for etymological
reasons; 'assignment' is the standard English translation of the foreign equivalents;
however, since the Scottish usage of 'assignation' is old and recognised, we will here
prefer 'assignation' except where it is necessary to differentiate the modern transfer
27 See 'Universal Succession', in chapter 2, below.
28 Stair III.ii.pr. Erskine III.v.l extends 'assignation' to the transfer of corporeal moveables. Cf.
Mackenzie, Inst III.v.l.
29 See the third paragraph of the Advertisement to the second edition of Stair, reproduced in D.M.
Walker's Tercentenary Edition (1981), 64 and Inst.l.i.l'i. Professor Gretton has written of the 'abiding
influence' of Stair's unitary theory of transfer which allows assignation to be treated as "one particular
species of the genus 'transfer'": P.M. Nienaber and G.L. Gretton, 'Assignation/Cession' in R.
Zimmermann, D. Visser and K.G.C. Reid (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective:
Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004) 787 at 789.
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from one of its functional equivalents (also sometimes called an 'Assignation' in
foreign legal systems). As with previous writers on Scots law, it will not be possible
to look at the rules regulating the transfer of claims in isolation. Reference will be
regularly made, therefore, to the rules relating to the transfer of heritable property
and corporeal moveables.
IV. Transfer of What?
The traditional classification of the civil law is between persons, things and
actions.30 Although Stair departed from this classification, it has had an abiding
influence on the law of Scotland.31 In terms of this classification, property (res) is
divided into corporeal and incorporeal property. This classification can only be
understood in terms of the primary real right, ownership. A thing will only qualify
for classification if it is 'property', i.e. capable of being owned. Incorporeal property
concerns rights, both real rights and personal rights.313 This includes the real right of
ownership. Where, then, can one locate the real right of ownership in this
classification? It seems to be on both sides: it is always suggested that corporeal
things are 'property', i.e. that they can be owned; in other words, the object of the
primary real right, ownership. Being a 'right', however, ownership must be placed on
the incorporeal side of the classification; so too must any subordinate real rights as
well as personal rights. But, if this has the result that incorporeal side of the division
encompasses both all the real rights as well as personal rights, why is the category of
res corporales necessary? Everything with which the law is concerned is found
under the classification res incorporales. The real right of ownership is just one of
many types of rights.32 Therefore, as has been powerfully argued by Professor
Gretton,33 the traditional Gaian division of things into res corporales and res
30 This can be traced to Gaius, Inst. I, 8.
31 See, for example, Scotland Act 1998, s. 129.
31a Particularly interesting discussion of the development of the idea of claims as property is found in
B. Huwiler, Der Begriffder Zession in der Gesetzgebung seit dem Verniinftrecht (Zurich, 1975), 1-35.
32
Including other absolute rights, e.g., intellectual property rights.
33 The theory here enunciated is the, as yet unpublished, theory of Professor Gretton of the University
of Edinburgh. It was presented in abbreviated form to the Goederenrecht workshop at the Conference
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incorporates is flawed. The law of things may be better analysed as the law of real
rights; and the law of real rights is but one part, albeit a major part, of a wider law of
patrimonial rights. If this is so, then the importance of the law of assignation,
involving the transfer of personal rights is great. On this analysis, assignation is not
concerned with the transfer of ownership in anything. Only rights are held in
patrimonies. These may personal or real. Assignation, traditionally, is concerned
with the transfer of personal rights.
Personal rights are bilateral.34 They are relative. Relative rights are personal
rights, i.e. for every holder of a claim, there should be a concomitant debtor, and vice
versa.35 A law of relativity links the relationship between patrimonies: the law is
found in the obligationary relationship. Personal rights are like electrodes: for every
positive end (the creditor's patrimony), there is a negative end (the debtor's
patrimony). Assignation is primarily concerned with the transfer of the positive end
organised by the Ius Commune Law School, which took place on 28th November 2004, in Leuven,
Belgium.
34
Depending on the doctrinal basis of the third party right (jus quaesitum tertio), contractual rights
may be trilateral.
35 This is to oversimplify. One can conceive of debts which have, for the time being, no creditor.
Take, for example, the bearer bill which has been lost in the post. Whether it is possible to conceive of
claims or rights which have, for the time being, no ascertainable debtor is more difficult; yet, in
principle, there is no reason why this should not be possible. It should be added that it has never been
suggested that it is possible to abandon a right (i.e. for the right to remain in existence but the holder
renounces his creditorship). When corporeal property is abandoned (see Reid, Property paras 547 and
568), one view is that the former owner's rights are extinguished; the other view is that they are
transferred to the Crown (quod nullius estfit domini Regis). If the right is not embodied in a deed, can
there be abandonment when there is nothing to abandon? Whether an abandoned right would vest in
the Crown would depend on whether claims can be owned. Cf. generally, H. Dolle, 'Bermerkungen
zur Blankozession' in Festschriftfur Martin Wolff (1953) 23 at 28. However, the point is unlikely to
be of much importance. Claims are incorporeal. Where there is no document evidencing the right,
there can be no question - as with the finder of a corporeal moveable - of another appearing and
seeking to assert the abandoned right. In practice, a creditor can easily get rid of his rights either by
discharging the debtor (which, like a waiver, must be communicated: see Moodiesburn House Hotel
Ltd v Norwich Union Insurance Ltd 2002 SCLR 122 at para [45] per Lord Macfadyen) or simply by
doing nothing and allowing the prescriptive period to expire. Cf. generally, J. Kleinschmidt, Der
Verzicht im Schuldrecht (2003).
36 Although one could conceive of a personal right which has a patrimony at one end but not the other:
see n. 35 above. Real rights have a person at one end but not the other.
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of this relationship. These are difficult issues of considerable depth and
jurisprudential complexity. Unfortunately, they cannot be further explored here.37
V. Constituent Elements in Transfer.
It was observed above that there are, usually,38 three stages in an assignation. The
examination in the pages that follow will concentrate on the second and third stages,
i.e. assignation as a transfer. Stage one, being a contract, is no different than any
other.39
37 The literature on this issue is large. For a basic overview of the issues in the context of Scots law,
compare K.G.C. Reid, 'Property and Obligations: Exploring the Border' 1997 Acta Juridica 225 with
G.L. Gretton, 'Owning Rights and Things' (1997) 8 Stell LR 176.
38 See n 25 above.
39 For which, the chapter on 'Assignation' in McBryde, Contract, is the leading treatment. This
fundamental contribution is written from a contractual perspective.
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Chapter 2
The Paradigm Incidents and some Analogous Institutions
I. Paradigm Incidents
A. Assignation and Accessory Rights
The assignation of the claim will carry all rights which are properly accessory
to it.40 For example, D owes CI £100 for which P is cautioner. If CI transfers his
claim against D to C2, the assignation will carry the accessory cautionary obligation.
This is not so much a principle of the law of assignation, but of rights in security and
cautionary obligations. Accessory rights cannot exist in the abstract.41 Subject to one
important exception,42 they are parasitic to debt. A right in security necessarily
presupposes a debt. The debt is the principal. Where the principal goes the accessory
must follow: accessorium sequitur principale 43 The received position is that the
40 Stair III.i.17; Erskine III.v.8; Bankton II, 191, 7; Anderson v Scottish NE Rly Co (1866) 1 SLR 116;
Edinburgh Entertainments Ltd v Stevenson 1926 SC 363 at 368 per Lord Blackburn (Ordinary) and
386per Lord Anderson; Trotter v Trotter 2001 SLT (Sh Ct) 42.
41 Jackson v Nicoll (1870) 8 M 408; Cameron v Williamson (1895) 22 R 293; Edinburgh
Entertainments Ltd v Stevenson 1926 SC 363 at 368 per Lord Blackburn (Ordinary). Cf. § 1250 I (2)
BGB; Art 3: 7 BW.
42 i.e. the case of a right in security granted for 'all sums due and to become due'. At a particular point
in time the debtor may not owe the creditor any money. The security is not, however, discharged. It
continues to exist in respect of contingent indebtedness.
43 A.J.M. Steven, Pledge and Lien in Scots Law, (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh,
1997) para 53 argues that the assignation of a claim secured by a pledge does not carry the creditor's
secured right. He argues that the assignee only acquires the security on the transfer of possession. But
this would mean that in the interim period between intimation of the assignation and the transfer of
possession that there is a 'pledge' securing nothing. This is contrary to principle. The assignee is
entitled to exercise secured rights on the completion of the transfer of the claim. Formailities may
have to be complied with, such as the transfer of possession. The Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek provides
generally that accessory rights follow the claim: Art 3: 82 BW; where the claim is secured by a pledge,
the cedent is bound to hand over the pledged article to the assignee, but only where the cedent is
assigning the whole claim secured by the pledge: Art. 6: 143(3) BW. Cf. §§ 1250-1252 BGB and F.
Terre and P. Simler, Droit civil: Les biens, (5th ed. 1998) para 201. For the history, see R. Feenstra,
'La caractere accessoire des differentes types de cautionnement verbis en droit romain classique' in
Etudes offertes a Jean Maquerons (D'aix en Provence, 1970), 301.
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creditor in the principal debt and the secured creditor cannot be different parties.44 So
where there is a transfer of a claim, all accessory rights are also transferred even if
there is no express mention of accessory rights in the transfer of the principal right45
It has been held that the statutory preference enjoyed by Customs and Excise for the
payment of arrears of VAT is also 'incidental' to the debt and transfers by an
assignation of the principal debt46 The principle that accessory rights follow the right
assigned is of the greatest importance. It is this incident of assignation that may be
decisive in structuring a transaction in terms of assignation. It is therefore of some
interest to note that other legal systems observe the same principle: France,47
Germany,48 Austria,49 Switzerland,50 Louisiana,51 Quebec,52 and South Africa.53 The
44
Compare the decisions in Waydale Ltd v DHL Holdings 1996 SCLR 391 OH (Lord Penrose) and
that of the Cour de Cassation, com D. 2000, 224 (note by L Aynes) (also noted at (2002) European
Review of Private Law 333) which suggest that cautionary obligations are not inherently assignable.
After a reclaiming motion on the issue of res iudicata (2000 SC 172), the Waydale case was remitted
again to the Outer House. This time Lord Hamilton came to the opposite conclusion, viz. that the
guarantee was assignable, though only in the 'transactional context' before him: 2001 SLT 224. The
writer's view is that not only are cautionary obligations inherently assignable, there is no need to
make express mention of the guarantee in the transfer of the principal obligation; for where the
principal goes the accessory must surely follow. Like any other claim, a cautionary obligation could
contain an express prohibition on transfer. Such a prohibition could also be implied.
45 Johnston v Jack, 12th December 1622, noted by Stair, III.i.4 and J.S. Sturrock (ed.) Conveyancing
according to the Law of Scotland, being the Lectures of the Late Allan Menzies (1900), 274; Beg v
Beg (1665) Mor 6304; Culty and Hunter v Earl ofAirly (1676) 2 Br Sup 197; 2 Stair 409; Wilson v
Burrel (1751) Kilkerran 1; Stewart v Kidd (1852) 14 D 527; Edinburgh Entertainments Ltd v
Stevenson 1926 SC 363 at 386 per Lord Anderson. In Anderson v Provan (1665) Mor 6235 and 10377
and Wedderburn v James (1707) Mor 10399 it was held that the assignee of a landlord's right to rent
can exercise the landlord's hypothec. A clause of registration entitling the creditor to summary
diligence also passes to an assignee: Lord Yester v Lord Innerwick (1635) Mor 10321.
46 Villaswan Ltd v Sheraton Caltrust (Blythswood) Ltd 1999 SCLR 199 OH. The distinction drawn by
the Lord Ordinary between 'incidental' statutory preferences and 'ancillary' securities cannot,
however, be correct. See discussion in R.G. Anderson and S. Eden, 'Transfer of Preferences on
Payment' (2003) 7 Edin LR 297. Cf. R. Macpherson, 'Are Preferences Preferable?' 2002 SLT (News)
257. While there may be public policy considerations which would suggest that such preferences
should not be exercisable by any party other than the Crown, there are older cases where such
preferences have been exercised by assignees: Cleland's Creditors Competing (1705) Mor 10397.
47 Code Civil Art 1250 (subrogation), Art. 1692 (cession); Ripert and Planiol, Traite pratique de droit





50 Art. 170 OR (Swiss Federal Code of Obligations). It may be noted in passing that, in the
codification movement at the end of the nineteenth century, the leading Scottish protagonist, Sheriff
(later Professor) John Dove Wilson, suggested that the Swiss, Obligationenrecht (being 'substantially
... a commercial code') would provide the best model for any codification of commercial law in the
British Empire: Dove Wilson, 'Concerning a Code of Commercial Law' (1884) 28 Journal of
Jurisprudence 337 at 341.
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principle is adopted in the modern European54 and international contract codes.55 If
the principle is clear, however, the practice is not. Take the example of a claim
secured by a standard security. The creditor assigns the claim. The accessory
principle holds that the security must be transferred with the claim. How does this
principle interact with the publicity principle? Must the assignee be registered as the
new security holder? Can the assignation be registered? The point has not been
discussed in Scots law.56 While Scots law jealously guards against any weakening of
the publicity principle, it is submitted that the assignee is entitled to exercise the
security rights of the cedent without registering the transfer of the security. This is
the position in other European jurisdictions.57 If the security is valid the original
creditor must have registered. Arguably, the requirement of publicity has been
fulfilled. Of course, we have now the possible situation that the register will be
inaccurate at least in the interval between the assignation and registration. But
51 Louisiana Civil Code Art. 1826 (subrogation) and Art. 2645 (cession); S. Litvinoff, The Law of
Obligations (2001) § 11.1.
52 Code Civil du Quebec Art. 1638 (cession). The right to accessories by virtue of subrogation
personelle is not clear from the code but is axiomatic: J-L Baudouin and P. G. Jobin, Les obligations
(5th ed. 1998) para 910.
53 J.G. Lotz (rev'd J J Henning) in W.A. Joubert (ed.) The Law of South Africa vol 26 'Suretyship'
(reissue 1997) para 205; P.M. Nienaber, 'Cession' in W.A. Joubert (ed.) The Law ofSouth Africa, 2nd
edn, vol 2, Part 2 (2003) para 49. Cf. Liefv Dettman 1964 (2) SA 252 (A).
54 M.L.R. Gandolfi (ed.) Academie des Privatistes Europeens, Code Europeen des Contrats, Livre
Premier, (Preliminary Draft, 2001), Art. 122 (7); Principles ofEuropean Contract Law (Part III, 2003)
Art 11:201 (1) (b). Cf. H McGregor, Contract Code (Milan, 1993) Art. 661 (2), which makes no
express provision for accessory rights.
55 UNCITRAL Art. 12.
56 What of the converse situation: can a security be assigned? Cf. G.L. Gretton, 'Assignation of All-
Sums Standard Securities' 1994 SLT (News) 207; W. Lucas, 'Assignation of Floating Charges' 1996
SLT (News) 203; and § 1153 II BGB: 'Die Forderung kann nicht ohne die Hypothek, die Hypothek
kann nicht ohne die Forderung ubertragen werden'.
57 Importantly, § 835 Schweizeriches Zivilgesetzbuch (Swiss Civil Code) provides that registration of
the security in the name of the assignee is not essential to the validity of the transfer of the security to
him: 'Die Ubertragung der Forderung, fur die eine Grundpfandverschreibung errichtet ist, bedarf zu
ihrer Gultigkeit keiner Eintragung in das Grundbuch'. In French, the article reads, 'L'inscription au
registre foncier n'est pas necessaire pour valider la cession des creances garanties par une
hypotheque'. But compare the position in Belgian law, where registration of the security in the name
of the assignee seems to be required in terms of the law of rights in security, see P. van Ommeslaghe,
'La transmission des obligations en droit positif beige' in Transmission des obligations (1980), 95,
para 17; idem, 'Le Nouveau regime de la cession et de la dation en gage des creances' [1995] 114
Journal des tribunaux 529 at 530; P.A. Foriers and M. Gregoire, 'Die Forderungsabtretung im
belgischen Recht' in W. Hadding and U.W. Schneider, Die Forderungsabtretung, insbesondere zur
Kreditsicherung, in auslandischen Rechtsordnungen (1999), 136. See generally, discussion by K.H.
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creditors are no more prejudiced in this case than in any other. That a name appears
on the register is never determinative of the position. The registration may, for
example, be void (e.g. for forgery) or challengeable for a host of reasons that are not
ascertainable from the register. What a creditor can ascertain from the register is that
there is a creditor with a standard security. Creditors of the cedent are not prejudiced:
although the register bears that the cedent holds a standard security, any security can
only be held in respect of debt. If there is no debt owed to the creditor, the security is
meaningless; indeed, with one exception, it is invalid. The exception is the 'all sums'
security.
Where someone other than the debtor has paid the debt, the payer is entitled to an
assignation of the creditor's rights against the debtor.58 It is a general principle that a
creditor cannot be forced to assign a security where this would be prejudicial.59 In
any case, therefore, where the cedent of a particular claim holds an all sums security
against the debtor, the cedent cannot be made to assign the whole security. Arguably,
in this situation, registration by the assignee is not even an option. Nevertheless, the
accessory principle can still be given effect. The assignee is entitled to the preference
enjoyed by the cedent. The assignee will rank proportionally with any 'all sums'
creditor for the sum assigned.60
What, then, if there is compliance with the formalities of registration but not of
assignation? In other words, the security is registered in the name of the assignee but
the assignation is not intimated.61 It is clear as a matter of authority in Scots law that,
generally, registration in the Sasine or Land Register is not an equipollent of
intimation.62 But there is a logical reason in principle why this must be so: although
Neumayer, 'La transmission des obligations en droit compare' in Transmission des obligations (1980)
at 199-200, n. 16bis.
58
By virtue of the so-called beneficium cedendaram actionum. The subject is difficult. If the payer has
paid the debtor's debt, the creditor should have nothing to assign. See generally the opinion of Lord
President Rodger in Caledonia North Sea Ltd v London Bridge Engineering Ltd 2000 SLT 1123,
especially at 1143.
59 Sligo v Menzies (1840) 2 D 1478; Ewart v Latta (1865) 3 M (HL) 36.
60 See discussion in R.G. Anderson and S. Eden, 'Transfer of Preferences on Payment' (2003) 7 Edin
LR 398.
61 This is a complex issue in other jurisdictions: see P van Ommeslaghe (1980) op. cit., n. 57 above at
95.
62 Tod's Trs v Wilson (1869) 7 M 1100.
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it is a general principle that accessorium sequitur principale, it is not a principle of
law that the principal follows the accessory.
In other jurisdictions, the cession of a claim to payment for goods sold and
delivered also transfers any benefit in a clause retaining title to the goods. However,
although it is very often used as such, ownership is not a true right in security: it is
not a jus in re aliena. That said, in such a situation, ownership seems to be parasitic
to the debt: on payment of the price of the goods, ownership will pass to the buyer.
This is very much like a security. On this basis it could be argued that ownership,
though not a jus in re aliena, is nevertheless accessory to the claim. But there are
difficulties. Seller Co enters into a contract of sale with Buyer Co. The contract
contains a retention of title clause. Seller Co then factors all of its debts to Factor Co.
If ownership is treated as an accessory security right, Factor Co becomes the owner
of the goods; yet, in terms of the contract, Seller Co is bound to transfer property in
the goods to Buyer Co. How can this be achieved if Seller Co is no longer the owner
of the goods when Buyer Co tenders payment? These are issues of considerable
complexity. It seems to this writer that there are great, perhaps insuperable,
difficulties with the idea that ownership can ever be viewed as an accessory right,
even where it is being used as a functional security right.
B. Partial Assignation
'The simpler the proposition is', one lawyer has wryly observed, 'the harder
... it is to find a precise authority upon it'.63 Whether there can be a partial transfer of
a claim is a simple question. In principle, so is the answer: there can be. However,
the dearth of solid authority for this proposition in Scotland, coupled with the
proscription on partial cession in some other legal systems, raises the issue to one of
some importance. In Scots law, it has never been suggested that a partial assignation
is invalid on the basis that it is prejudicial to the debtor, and thus offends the
63 W.A. Ashburner, Principles ofEquity, (2nd ed. 1933), vii. Cf. Panama & South Pacific Telegraph
Co v India Rubber, Gutta & Telegraph Works Co {1875) 10 Ch App 515 at 526 per James LJ.
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assignatus utitur jure auctoris principle, as in some legal systems.64 Indeed, there
never seems to have been any argument in Scots law that partial assignation is not
competent.65
In Solamon v Morrison's Trs,66 a beneficiary assigned her rights under the
trust in security for advances. Her beneficial interest was an unvested right to a one
twentieth share in the residue of the trust estate. Intimation of the assignation was
made to the trustees. The assignees sought to compel the trustees to exhibit the trust
accounts to them. The trustees refused. They argued that 'a person who holds an
assignment of a beneficial interest in a trust estate is in an entirely different position
from that occupied by his cedent, so far as regards the right to see the trust accounts.
The maxim assignatus utitur jure auctoris had no application, unless the cedent
transferred his whole right out and out to the assignee... an assignee of a part only of
his share could not each simultaneously possess and exercise the same right of
ffl
inspection. A right cannot be assigned and at the same time retained'. The trustee
defenders sought to emphasise that since the assignation was in security, if the
assignees were allowed to demand to see the trust accounts, the number of people so
64 Such as South Africa, for which see S. Scott, The Law of Cession, (2nd ed. 1991), 192 ff; R.H.
Christie, The Law of Contract in South Africa, 4th edn (2001), 539; 'N.O.T.', 'Cession of a Portion of
a debt' (1929) 46 SAU 270; 'J.H.L.', 'Cession of a Portion of a debt' (1937) 54 SAU 40; E.M.
Burchell, 'Partial Cession' (1952) 69 SALT 131; W. Rosenthal, 'Ceding a Portion of a Debt' (1971) 88
SALJ 236. It is not possible to execute a legal assignment of part of a debt under English law: Foster v
Baker [1910] 2 KB 636; Conlan v Carlow County Council [1912] 2 IR 535; Re Steel Wing Co [1921]
1 Ch 349. See also Sir Roy Goode, 'Are Intangible Assets Fungible?' in P. Birks and A. Pretto (eds)
Themes in Comparative Law: Essays in Honour ofBernard Rudden (2002), 97 at 103, also at [2003]
LMCLQ 74. In Louisiana, although partial cession is envisaged by Art. 2643 of the Civil Code, the
debtor's consent is required for partial cession: Salter v Walsworth (1936) 167 So 494.
65 On the contrary, all discussion assumes that partial cession is competent: George Dallas of Saint-
Martins, A System ofStiles as now Practised within the Kingdom ofScotland (1688, published 1774)
vol I, at 7, comments that, where there is partial assignation, the warrandice should be carefully
restricted. A.M. Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing, (3rd ed. 1882), 1181 assumes that partial assignation
of a claim is competent. J. Burns, 'Bond' in Viscount Dunedin et al (eds) Encyclopaedia of the Laws
ofScotland vol 2 (1927) para 749 states, 'If the assignation is partial only, the extent must be stated'.
One important case on cession in Scots law, Fraser v Duguid (1838) 16 S 1130 (for which, more
below), involved a partial cession. It has been cited with approval at the highest level: Caledonia
North Sea v London Bridge Engineering Ltd 2000 SLT 1123 at 1140A, per Lord President Rodger.
For the right of an assignee to pursue in the name of the cedent (with which Fraser v Duguid is
concerned), see Part I, C, below.
66 1912 2 SLT 499; (1912) 50 SLR 584 OH. See also AvB (1534) Balfour, Practicks, 517; Cairns v
Leyis (1533) Mor 827; Balfour, Practicks, 169.
67 As reported by the Lord Ordinary (Skerrington) 1912 2 SLT 499 at 500.
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entitled would be doubled at a stroke. The beneficiary could execute a score or more
of partial assignations and thus 'multiply indefinitely the expense of managing the
trust and the duties of the trustees'.68 Lord Skerrington peremptorily rejected such an
argument:
"These arguments [of the defenders] overlook the fact that a share,
whether vested or unvested, in the capital of a trust estate is in law
assignable in whole or in part... The defenders' counsel expressly
conceded that if the action had been at the instance of the pursuer's
cedent there would have been no good defence to it. But the right to
examine the accounts is just as valuable, and indeed necessary, to a
partial assignee as it is to an original beneficiary; and if one denies it
to the former, one gratuitously deprives this species of property one of
its natural incidents, with the result that it becomes less marketable
and consequently of less value to the beneficiary. Does any valid
reason exist why a partial assignee should not be entitled to take the
best means of satisfying himself that the trust is being properly
managed, and of ascertaining the true value of the trust estate? I am
aware of none."69
It was held, however, that, since a beneficiary could not involve the trust in
unnecessary expense, neither could an assignee. The latter could therefore be
compelled to cover the costs of procuring accounts. As for the hypothetical situation
of multiple partial assignation, '[the assignees] must either appoint a single
representative to inspect the accounts on their behalf, or they must indemnify the
trust by paying for the extra expense occasioned by repeated inspections of the
accounts'.70 Although Solamon deals with the situation of an obligation ad factum
praestandum it is thought that the same reasoning applies a fortiori to the money
claim, payment of which should not involve additional expense over and above the
principal sum.70a It is instructive that in France, from where the law of Scotland
relating to assignations was derived, partial cession is accepted.71 On the insolvency
68 ibid.
69 ibid.
70 ibid. The solution adopted by Lord Sherrington is that favoured in the Principles of European
Contract Law (Part III, 2003) Art 11:103 and the UNIDROIT Principles ofInternational Commercial
Contracts (2004), Art. 9.1.8.
70a See too R.. Gaffney & Son Ltd v Davidson 1996 SLT (Sh Ct) 36 at 39 per Sheriff Principal Hay.
71 See e.g. A. Rey 'Cession de Creance' in P. Raynaud and J.L. Aubert (eds) Dalloz Encyclopedic
Juridique (2eed. 1986), Tome III, para 539. See also UNCITRAL Art. 9.
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of the debtor in a partial assignation, the assignee and cedent will rank proportionally
for their shares.72 Where an assignation purports to convey more than is actually
owed to the cedent, the assignation will be effectual to the extent of the amount
73 •owed; the assignee will then have a claim in warrandice against the cedent for the
balance.
C. The Right of the Assignee to Pursue in the Name of the Cedent
'Nothing is more common in law', Lord Karnes observes, 'than effects kept up after
their causes cease'.74 The apparent right of the assignee to sue in the cedent's name
can only be explained on a historical basis; and, as will be discussed in the following
chapter, that historical basis is not entirely firm. Despite admitting the transfer of
claims from an early stage in the development of the law, Scots law has retained the
style of procuratio in rem snam as a functional equivalent of an assignation.75 The
historical development of the law will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.
In summary, however, the procurator was appointed as the creditor's representative.
Originally, the procurator's position was precarious. As Roman law developed, his
position was improved. Nevertheless, the fact remained: strictly speaking there was
no transfer. As a representative, therefore, the assignee had to bring the action in the
name of the cedent.76 This is analogous to English law. There, it was not possible to
transfer a debt from one person to another until the Judicature Act in 1873. The
Courts of Equity circumvented this rule by giving effect to agreements to assign.
Under an equitable assignment, the assignee always sued in the name of the assignor.
Equity would protect his right to the proceeds. Moreover, the Courts of Equity could
72 Cf. Code Civil du Quebec Art. 1646.
73 British Linen Co Bank v Carruthers and Fergusson (1883) 10 R 923 at 926-7 per Lord President
Inglis; at 928 per Lord Shand.
74
Kames, Elucidations, Art. 22, 'litiscontestation', at 144.
75
See, in particular, the opinion of Lord President Rodger in Caledonia North Sea v London Bridge
Engineering Ltd 2000 SLT 1123.
76 Stair Ill.i. 18 and see discussion in Chapter 3, Part I, below.
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compel the assignor to allow the assignee to use the assignor's name.77 Scots law has
never had a separation between law and equity. As with ownership of a thing, a
person is either the creditor of a debtor or he is not. If a claim is transferred, it is
henceforth held in the patrimony of the assignee. Transfer is instantaneous. There is
no
no halfway house.
Generally speaking, if A tries to bring an action on the basis of a right which
7Q
he holds in the name of B it can be met with a plea of no title to sue. The apparent
rule in the law of assignation is, therefore, peculiar. It is an historical hangover from
the days when cession was thought (perhaps erroneously) to be prohibited and the
mandate in rem suam had to be invoked. Yet the title of the assignee to sue in his
own name has always been accepted.80 The right to sue in the cedent's name is an
anachronism. As will be seen, however, it is difficult to see how a mandate in rem
suam actually effects a transfer. There are two avenues that can be followed where
parties to a transaction wish to allow one of them to exercise rights held by the other.
77 The history of the assignment of choses in action in England is perhaps even more complex than in
the civil law. It is treated briefly in chapter 3 below, especially at n. 400 f. It should be noted,
however, that there is a further distinction to be made in English law. Choses in action may be legal or
equitable. The courts of equity always exercised exclusive jurisdiction over equitable choses. These
include some paradigm money claims, e.g. interests in the estates of deceased persons. Where such
choses in action were assigned, the assignee was always entitled to sue in his own name. This is
somewhat at odds with the accepted rationale of the assignee having the right to sue in the name of the
assignor or, in the case of subrogation, the apparent rule that the subrogee must sue in the name of the
payee. This would depend on whether there was subrogation to an equitable or legal right. Cf. A.M.
Tettenborn, An Introduction to the Law of Obligations (1984), 202: 'The assignment of things in
action is an unplanned area in English law, straddling Common Law and Equity, property and
obligation'.
78 Cf. the bizarre argument for the pursuers before the House of Lords in Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v
Hall Russell & Co Ltd 1988 SLT 874 at 882A: "there is only an equitable assignation by the
indemnified person to the indemnifier, the latter can deal with this problem in England since the
Judicature Act 1873 by joining those with the legal right to sue as co-defendants in the action and in
Scotland by convening them as parties if the defender tables a plea of 'all parties not called'." There is
no such thing as an equitable assignation in Scots law.
79
Wyper v Harveys (1861) 23 D 607 at 613 per Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis. Indeed, in two other mixed
legal systems, it is clear that the assignee must sue in his own name: Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure Arts 697(2) and 698(2) (West Group, 2001); Code de Procedure Civile Art. 59 (Quebec).
For the history, see Brunner, 'Inhaberpapier', 535 ff.
80 Munro v Wishart (1582) Mor 10337. Cf. Jacksons (Edinburgh) v Constructors John Brown 1965
SLT 37 where Lord Fraser followed Duncan v Town of Arbroath (1668) Mor 10075. As the late
Professor Wilson, Introductory Essays on Scots Law (1978), 77 commented, 'This case is found in the
collected works of Sir George Mackenzie in his Pleadings in some remarkable Cases before the
Supreme Courts of Scotland (1673), the fourth of which is Carmichael against the Town of
Aberbrothock and is in fact the same case, Duncan being Carmichael's assignee'.
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The first is to transfer the claim outright. This is a transfer like any other. If it is a
transfer, there no basis on which the assignee should be able to sue in the name of the
cedent: the assignee is now the creditor and the cedent no longer has any rights
• R1
against the debtor. The second is to constitute the putative 'assignee' as a
procurator in rem suam. This gives the assignee a mandate to uplift the creditor's
claim on his behalf. This is a clear basis in which to raise an action in the name of the
creditor. This is the same basic principle that allows a solicitor to raise an action in a
R9
client's name. However, the consequences of these actions will be different,
especially where the cedent becomes insolvent.
The position has recently been thrown into sharp focus in the context of
01
insurance, and the right of the insurer to be 'subrogated' to the rights of the insured.
The specialities of the law of insurance and subrogation cannot be discussed here.
For present purposes it is sufficient to note that Lord President Rodger held that the
principle that an assignee can sue in the name of his cedent is deeply rooted in the
84
law of assignation. The basis of this proposition is to be found in Fraser v Duguid:
"...it is an established principle in our law, that Ker the assignee may
sue in the name of the cedent. What objection can there be to such a
proceeding? Even as to expenses, Ker the assignee removes every
possible objection by coming forward and offering to sist himself.
That was more than was necessary, as a mere mandate from him
or
would have been enough."
This passage is hardly illuminating. On a pragmatic level, there seems to be
little point in objecting to an action proceeding where both the assignee and the
cedent are parties to the process. The debtor can thereby be sure he is indeed granted
81 Cf. Scottish Iron and Steel Co Ltd v Gillieaux & Collinet (1913) 30 Sh Ct Rep 42 at 44 per Sheriff
Lees: 'In their condescendence, the pursuers found upon an assignation ... but from the instance it
does not appear that the pursuers are assignees. On the contrary, they sue with the consent and
concurrence of the original [creditor] which, if it is not to be wholly meaningless, appears to be
inconsistent with the title to sue having been passed by assignation'.
82 Although, in this case, since the mandate is not in rem suam, the solicitor cannot retain the proceeds
for himself.
83 Esso Petroleum v Hall Russell 1988 SLT 33 (1st Div) affd 1988 SLT 854 HL; Caledonia North Sea
v London Bridge Engineering Ltd 2000 SLT 1123 (1st Div) aff d 2002 SC (HL) 117.
84
(1838) 16 S. 1130. Cited by Lord Rodger, 2000 SLT 1123 at 1140A.
85 Per Lord Corehouse at 1131.
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a discharge. As to expenses, the fact that the assignee is also sisted means that there
is no need for the debtor to raise another action for payment of expenses, as the Court
will be able to decern against the dominus litis at the conclusion of proceedings.
More generally, however, what is the position where the assignee raises proceedings
in the name of the cedent, but the latter is not sisted?86 According to Lord Corehouse,
the minimum required was 'a mere mandate from him'. But to whom does the 'him'
refer? Only a mandate from the original creditor, the cedent, would have been
sufficient to allow proceedings to be brought in the cedent's name. Bizarrely,
however, the 'him' in Lord Corehouse's opinion refers to the assignee. But what use
is it for an assignee to produce a mandate from himself? John cannot randomly bring
proceedings in the name of Jessica because he (John) has granted himself a mandate
to that effect. Such a proposition is nonsensical. The objection against such a
proceeding is two-fold. Firstly, even if it were the position that an assignee suing in
the name of the cedent must produce a mandate from the cedent, that is somewhat
different from saying, as Lord Corehouse initially suggests, that as a matter of
87
general principle an assignee can sue in the name of the cedent without one.
Indeed, the right of the 'assignee' will depend on the form of the transaction. If the
form of the transaction is a mandate in rem suam, the 'assignee' is a mere mandatory
86 What if the assignee sues in the cedent's name but is unsuccessful? The cedent could then be found
liable for expenses. It is for this reason that J.P. Wood, Lectures on Conveyancing (1903), 582
cautions all cedents to insert a clause prohibiting the assignee from suing in the cedent's name. In this
writer's opinion, this is well-advised; but it should be unnecessary in a true cession: suing in the
cedent's name being inconsistent with transfer. This raises issues analogous to seeking an award of
expenses against the so-called dominus litis. The locus classicus of the doctrine is found in the opinion
of Lord Rutherford in Mathieson v Thomson (1853) 16 D 19 at 23-4. He gives the case of an assignee
suing in the name of his cedent as the paradigm situation where the defender can demand that the
assignee be sisted. Cf. Waddel v Hope (1843) 6 D 160 and Stevenson v Sneddon (1900) 38 SLR 138.
The authorities are fully canvassed in Cairns v M'Gregor 1930 SC 84 and Cole-Hamilton v Boyd
1963 SC (HL) 1. See, most recently, Aitken v Financial Services Compensation Scheme Ltd 2003 SLT
878 and O'Connor v Bullimore Underwriting Agency Ltd [2005] CSOH 90.
87 It is interesting to note that in Gloag and Henderson, The Law ofScotland, (10th ed. 1995) (of which
Lord Rodger was one of the editors) it is stated at para 11.16 only that 'An assignee may sue in his
own name, or may sist himself as pursuer in an action commenced by his cedent' (emphasis added)
citation of Fraser v Duguid then follows. Nevertheless, Grier v Maxwell (1621) Mor 828; Hope Maj
Pr 11.12 §22 (though the reports are too brief to be useful), Paxton v Hunter (1749) Kilkerran 581;
Marshall v Grant and Sillers, 31st May 1864, noted at (1864) 8 Journal ofJurisprudence 360; Traill v
Dalbeattie (1904) 6 F 798, Goodall v Mclnnes Shaw 1912 1 SLT 425 at 428 per Lord Skerrington
(Ordinary) and Ryan v McBirnie 1940 SC 173, maintain the right of the assignee to sue in the name of
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rather than a transferee. Consequently, he must bring the action in the name of the
cedent. If there has been an outright assignation the position is different. The
assignee, properly so-called, is now the creditor. To bring an action in the name of
the cedent would be irrelevant: the named pursuer (the cedent) has no title to sue; he
oo
has no right which he can authorise the transferee to exercise.
The most conservative of the institutional writers,89 Erskine, well
distinguishes a conveyance from a mere procuration:
"It would seem, that by our ancient law all obligations were
intransmissible, from a notion that no creditor could compel his
debtor, contrary to the precise terms of his obligation, to become
debtor to another, where the obligation did not expressly bear to
assignees. And it was perhaps upon this ground, that by the old style
of assignations, which is sometimes continued to this day, the assignee
was made a mandatory and procurator in rem suam; which mandate
empowered him to sue for, recover, and discharge the obligation, as
the creditor himself could have done; but our later customs have
considered assignations, not barely as mandates, but as conveyances,
by which the property of the subject assigned is, without any such
clause, fully vested in the assignee; and the general rule is, that
whoever is in the right of any subject, though it should not bear to
assignees, may at pleasure convey it to another, except where he is
barred, either by the nature of the subject or by immemorial
custom."90
Erskine here makes a clear distinction between the effect of a procuration and an
assignation as a conveyance. Although he does not fully articulate the consequences
of it, the point is important. If the consequences are followed to their logical
conclusion, then we reach the second objection. Take an assignee who sues in the
cedent's name. The defender takes no plea to the relevancy. The pursuer is
successful. Decree is granted in the pursuer's name, i.e. the cedent. What, then, if the
the cedent. Cf. the doubts expressed about this by A.M. Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing, (3rd ed.
1882), 304.
88 Stewart v Kidd (1852) 14 D 527, in so far as it suggests that an assignee can sue in the name of the
cedent if he produces a special mandate to that effect must be wrong. Following the assignation, only
the assignee will have title to sue. To bring the action in the name of the cedent would be irrelevant.
89 The description is Lord Reid's: 'The Judge as a Law-Maker' (1972-73) 12 JSPTL 22 at 24.
90 Erskine III.v.2, emphasis added. For Erskine's statements about the history of the law, see the
following chapter.
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cedent becomes insolvent? Who is entitled to enforce the decree against the debtor:
the cedent's trustee in sequestration or the assignee? Even if there is mandate in rem
saam, there is no reason why this will confer a preference on the mandatory over the
other creditors of the insolvent cedent.91 There is little discussion of the effect of
insolvency on a mandate. But first principles must rule. It is a contract. The rights
arising out of this relationship are personal. There may have been protection in
classical Roman law, on the basis that the procurator became the true creditor by
novation of the debtor/creditor relationship on litis contestatio, or on the procedural
development which awarded the procurator an actio utilis. Yet even by the time of
Q9
Justinian, the extinctive effect of litis contestatio had disappeared. More
importantly, it has been denied that litis contestatio continues to have this effect in
Scotland by the House of Lords, as well as the First Division while Lord Rodger was
QT
Lord President. Indeed, it has been held that the effect of decree being pronounced
in another's name is to judicially assign the original pursuer's claim to the person
91 It also raises the question of what happens if the assignee sues in the name of the cedent and loses
and it is the assignee that becomes insolvent. Does this mean that the cedent, who may have had
nothing to do with the proceedings, is fixed with liability for not just expenses (the doctrine of
dominus litis is limited to expenses) but to the principal sum on any counterclaim? It may be noted
that a beneficiary may only bring actions against third parties in the name of the trustees where
sufficient caution is found for any expenses that may be awarded against the trustees: Morrison v
Morison's Exrx 1912 SC 892\Brown's Tr v Brown (1888) 15 R581.
92 H.F. Jolowicz, Roman Foundations of Modern Law (1957), 88. For discussion of the litis
contestatio in Roman law, see discussion in chapter 3 below, Part I.
93 Stewart v London, Midland & Scottish Railway Co 1943 SC (HL) 19 at 25 per Viscount Simon LC;
Dick v Burgh ofFalkirk 1976 SC (FIL) 1 cited with approval by Lord Rodger in Coutts' Tr. v Coutts
1998 SC 798 at 804 D-1. Lord Rodger is well-acquainted with the doctrine of litis contestatio: see A.
Rodger, 'Procurator Restitutus' in C. Krampe (ed.) Quaestiones Juris, Festschrift fur Joseph Georg
Wolfzum 70. Gesburtstag (2000), 207-220. For litis contestatio in older Scots law, see G. Ross (ed)
Bell's Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland (1882), 601, s.v. 'litiscontestation' and the
arguments in Sir John Meres v York Buildings Company (1728) 1 Kames Rem Dec 193. Cf. L.R.
Caney, A Treatise on the Law of Novation, (2nd ed. 1973), 66 ff. Even if there were some sort of
novation, the decree would still be in favour of the now bankrupt insured. His trustee would take the
proceeds. Also, novation extinguishes the original obligation. Consequently, any accessory security
rights will also be extinguished. In classical Roman law accessory cautionary obligations were thus
discharged: see P.F. Girard, Manuel elementaire de droit romain, (6th ed. 1918), 745, n. 5; (8th ed.
1929), 774, n. 5. This would mean that the assignee suing in the name of the cedent might lose
accessory security rights to which he would otherwise be entitled. This would be a major factor in
deciding whether to exercise the apparent right to sue in the name of the cedent. Admittedly, by the
time of Justinian, litis contestatio had ceased to have any novatory effect: see the preceding note. Cf.
Muhlenbruch, Cession, § 4, 35-37, n. 64 for the distinction between delegation and litis contestatio.
For the remarkable survival of the litis contestatio in modern American law, see R. Helmholz, 'The
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named in the decree.94 This is the opposite of what the creditor who constitutes
another as his procurator in rem suam wants to achieve. In the other situations where
a person is allowed to bring an action in the name of another, anything recovered will
benefit the party in whose name the action was brought and decree recovered.95 The
law is therefore clear in principle if not authority. Only a pursuer, who is expressly
constituted as a procurator in rem suam, can sue in the name of the cedent. If the
cedent becomes insolvent the right to recover will fall into the cedent's sequestration.
Indeed, on analogy with the well-known case of Redfearn v Sommervails,96 by
allowing the decree to pass in the cedent's name, the assignee may be personally
barred from recovering. As to whether the pursuer, who holds a procuratory in rem
suam, can sue in his own name, the position is unclear. While the right of an assignee
to sue in his own name has never been doubted, there are no cases where a
transaction in the form of a mandate in rem suam has allowed the mandatory to sue
in his own name. If the cedent becomes insolvent the right to recover will fall into
the cedent's sequestration.
The issue has also in arisen on the appointment of a receiver. The receiver has
97 •the power to ingather debts owed to the company in receivership. However, in
whose name should the receiver pursue for payment? His own?98 The name of the
company in receivership? Or the name of the creditor holding the floating charge?
The courts have swayed between the first two alternatives, finally falling on the side
of the second.99 However, the basis for this view is not clear. A floating charge
litis contestatio: Its survival in the Medieval ius commune and Beyond' in M. Hoeflich (ed.) Lex et
Romanitas: Essaysfor Alan Watson (2000), 73 at 80 f.
94 Brand & Co and WT Craig v Cummings (1913) 30 Sh Ct Rep 26 at 28. (A case involving the right
of an agent disburser to take a decree for expenses in his own name). Indeed, it is on this basis that the
right of the so-called 'agent disburser' developed: the agent takes decree in his own name. The effect
is to assign judicially the award of expenses to the agent: Gordon v Davidson (1865) 3 M 939;
Fleming v Love (1839) 1 D 1097.
95 For example, the right of a beneficiary to bring an action in the names of the trustees to vindicate
trust property. It is accepted that any benefit enures to the trust, not directly to the beneficiaries.
96
(1813) 1 Dow 50 HL, discussed in Chapter 5 below 'Assignatus', Part V.
97
Insolvency Act 1986, s. 55 and Schedule 2; Companies Act 1985, s. 471 (1 )(f).
98 McPhail v Lothian Regional Council 1981 SC 119 OH.
99 As was held in Taylor v Scott and Universal Newspapers Ltd 1981 SC 408 OH, Macphail v
Cuninghame District Council 1983 SC 246 and Myles J Callaghan Ltd (in receivership) v Glasgow
District Council 1987 SC 171 OH all declining to follow Lothian RC above.
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attaches to incorporeal moveables 'as if it were a fixed security, i.e. an assignation
in security.100 Lord Prosser has suggested that the attachment cannot be exactly the
same as an assignation in security; otherwise the receiver would be able to sue in his
own name, which he cannot.101 However, this seems to confuse the receiver with the
creditor. Surely if the attachment of a floating charge is equivalent to an assignation
in security, the assignee must be the creditor who holds the floating charge. This
creditor is quite separate from the receiver, although the receiver acts for his benefit.
It seems, then, that the only person with a good title to sue is the creditor (though a
receiver may collect payment as the creditor's agent).
It is noteworthy that, when a right is assigned on which diligence has
followed, the assignee cannot execute the diligence in the name of the cedent.102 If
the cedent has applied for a warrant to use diligence, and providing execution has not
begun, the diligence can be issued in the name of the assignee.103
D. The (irrelevance of 'delectus personae' to Assignation.
1. Rights and Liabilities
It is axiomatic that assignation is the conveyance whereby claims or rights of
a creditor against a debtor can, on intimation of the assignation to the debtor by the
assignee, be transferred without the consent of the debtor. Rights or claims are to be
distinguished from obligations or liabilities. A person cannot escape his obligations
without the consent of his creditor.104 This much seems clear. Yet the so-called
100 Forth & Clyde Construction Ltd v Trinity Timber & Plywood Co 1984 SC 1.
101
Myles J Callaghan Ltd (in receivership) v Glasgow District Council 1987 SC 171 OH at 181. Cf.
Fraser v Dunbar (1839) 1 D 882; 6th June 1839 FC.
102
Hay v Stewart (1745) Mor 834 and 8123; Elchies, Assignation No 6; Horning No 3; Kilkerran 331;
Foggo and Galloway v Scot and Oliver (1769) Mor 3693; Hailes 319 at 320 per Lord Pitfour.
103
Young v Buchanan (1799) Mor 8137.
104 A point recognised by McBryde, Contract para 12-65, n. 74: 'Obviously if any debtor could assign
a debt, without the consent of the creditor, to any person the debtor chose, there would be the end of
commercial life as we know it'. This is preferable to his statement that, (Contract para 12-89): 'The
assignation may transfer rights and obligations...'. Cf. K.G.C. Reid and G.L. Gretton, Conveyancing,
(3rd ed. 2004) para 22.02 quoted at n. 14 above. Surprisingly, it was suggested in the 'Halliday
Report', Report by the Working Party on Security over Moveable Property (1986) at 9 that one of the
25
Transfer ofMoney Claims in Scots Law
'classic cases' on the subject in Scotland constantly refer to the assignation of
contracts, and the doctrine of delectus personae; the presence or absence of the latter
being the decisive factor in the determination of whether a contract can be the object
of assignation.105
There are two points to be made. First, to speak of the assignation of
contracts is inaccurate.106 Contracts are, by definition, at least bilateral. They contain
rights. But mutual contracts contain correlative obligations. To say that a contract is
assignable necessarily admits that it is possible to alienate one's liabilities without
the consent of the creditor.107 Rights are the proper subjects of assignation. Secondly,
reference to delectus personae contributes only confusion to the question of what can
be assigned. It will be seen that almost all the references to delectus personae are
actually instances of liabilities. These, ex hypothesi, are not transferable (without the
consent of the creditor) anyway.
2. Delectus Personae and Assignation of 'contracts'.
The transfer of a mutual contract108 necessarily supposes the transfer of
liabilities as well as rights;109 and a paradigm assignation is a transfer without the
consent of the debtor. But liabilities cannot be transferred without the consent of the
creditor. Yet, on one reading of the authorities, Scots law appears to disregard this
important rule. The textbook statements are based, essentially, on two cases: Cole v
problems with an assignation in security was that the assignee could become liable for the obligations
of the cedent. That is not correct. For a better view, see H.L. MacQueen, 'Assignation' in SME, vol 15
(1995) para 858. Further discussion is found in 'Transfer of Contracts', Part II, H below.
105 Cole v Handyside 1910 SC 68 at 73 per Lord Dunedin and the opinion of the Lord Ordinary. Cole
was approved most recently in Scottish Homes v Inverclyde District Council 1997 SLT 829 OH and
Karl Construction Ltd v Palisade Properties pic 2002 SC 270 OH.
106 F. Terre, P. Simler and Y. Lequette, Droit civil: les obligations, (8th ed. 2002) para 1304.
107 It is probably possible in Scots law to transfer a contract in toto. However, since this requires the
consent of all the parties, this is not an 'assignation' in the strict sense of the term, see 'cession de
contraT below.
108
Gloag, Contract, (2nd ed. 1929), 416-422; McBryde, Contract para 12-50; Reid, Property para 600.
See also D.M. Walker, The Law of Contracts and Related Obligations in Scotland, (3rd ed. 1995) para
29.23.
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Handyside110 and Anderson v Hamilton.H1 The rubric in a third and oft-cited case,
Asphaltic Limestone Concrete Co Ltd v Glasgow Corporation 12 contributes further
to the confusion. The factual situations in the cases are almost identical. A enters into
a mutual contract with C for the delivery of certain goods or provision of services. In
Cole there was no performance by A; in Anderson and Asphaltic Limestone, A had
partially performed. In all the cases, A then became insolvent. The question for
decision in both cases was whether B, the trustee or insolvency administrator of the
insolvent estate, could 'adopt' A's contract with C, tender performance and thereby
become entitled to payment. In Cole, C was held bound to pay B. In Anderson the
adoption came too late. In Asphaltic Limestone, the question was whether the
insolvency administrator could adopt one contract but repudiate another. 'Adoption'
is a difficult concept, but it is distinct from an assignation. Confusion arises because
often the trustee will be an assignee of the rights (although a liquidator is not, since
there is no vesting as a result of liquidation113). It is by 'adoption' that he performs
the debtor's existing obligations and undertakes new liabilities. The right to 'adopt'
is peculiar to trustees in sequestration114 and executors on death. There is no
assignation of the obligations to deliver the goods, so reference to the assignation of
contracts is inaccurate.115 The concept of adoption will be discussed in more detail
below.
109 J. Ghestin, 'La transmission des obligations en droit positif frangais' in La transmission des
obligations (1980), 7-8: 'La cession de contrat synallagmatique contient necessairement une cession
de dettes', i.e. the transfer of an obligation in toto without it being discharged.
110 1910 SC 68.
111
(1875) 2 R 355. See, for example, W.M. Gloag, The Law of Contract in Scotland (1914), 458 ff;
(2nd ed. 1929) at 416-422. Gloag's tripartite distinction at 416 is utterly confused. Though not
infrequently cited, (e.g. it is adopted by T.B. Smith, Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland
(1962), 785 ff.) none of those examples in his division can be the object of assignation. Indeed
Gloag's suggested trichotomy directly contradicts his treatment of delegation at 258 (2nd edn, 1929).
In a similar vein, sec also D.M. Walker, The Law of Contracts and Related Obligations in Scotland,
(3rd ed. 1995) para 29.28.
112 1907 SC 463.
11
Vesting in a liquidator, though uncommon, is possible: Insolvency Act 1986, s. 145; Titles to Land
(Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1868, s. 25.
114 Or his corporate equivalent, i.e. a liquidator, receiver or administrator.
115
Although the egregious terminology is widespread: see e.g. Scottish Iron & Steel Co Ltd v
Gillieanx & Collinet (1913) 42 Sh Ct Rep 42; Scottish Homes v Inverclyde District Council 1997 SLT
829 OH; Karl Construction Ltd v Palisade Properties Pic 2002 SC 270 OH.
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Asphaltic complicates matters by characterising the liability of the insolvent
company to perform its obligations as a right to perform and thus claim the money.
This is a fatal trap into which to fall. Simply formulating an obligation or liability
positively, in terms of an entitlement to the pecuniary award payable on performance
of the obligation, cannot be allowed to cloud the legal situation.
Whether the creditor is bound to accept performance from someone other
than the debtor is a proper question of delectus personae. And it may be that the
assignee of rights wants to perform the cedent's outstanding obligations, as in
Asphaltic. The presence or absence of delectus personae will determine whether the
creditor is bound to accept the performance. If there is delectus personae, the
assignee cannot perform the cedent's obligations, even if he wants to; if there is no
delectus personae, the assignee may perform if he wants to, but he is never bound to
do so by virtue of the assignation.1153 What is not clear, however, is what most of this
discussion has to do with the law of assignation. Indeed, Nienaber and Gretton have
gone so far as to suggest that:
"One pessimistic view would be that Cole has reduced the Scots law
of cession to a hopeless morass of confusion between assignation,
delegation and sub-contracting, and the role of delectus personae in
all three. But the essential principles should, notwithstanding Cole, be
clear enough."116
It is interesting to note that in English law, where references to the assignment of
contracts were common, the House of Lords has now accepted that only rights
117
arising out of a contract can be assigned.
I15a Some historical antecedents to Asphaltic Limetone are: Logan v Hamitlon (1627) Mor 9207;
Murdoch v Dick (1673) Mor 9209; Shearer v Cargill (1686) Mor 9210; Lord Lyon v Feuars of
Balveny (1672) Mor 5076; Shaw v Forbes (1687) Mor 4381. Not of these cases render the assignee
liable for the cedent's obligations; but the assignee may be entitled to perform the cedent's obligations
if the debtor will not otherwise pay.
116 P. Nienaber and G. Gretton, 'Cession/Assignation' in R. Zimmermann, D. Visser and K.G.C. Reid
(cds) Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and
South Africa (2004), 807.
117 Pan Ocean Shipping Ltd v Creditcorp Ltd, the Trident Beauty [1994] 1 WLR 161. Strangely, the
Lord Ordinary in Scottish Homes v Inverclyde District Council 1997 SLT 829 OH suggested that the
underlying reasoning of the House of Lords was inconsistent with the principles of Scots law.
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3. What is delectus personae?
1 1 o
It is often said that the presence of delectus personae will bar assignation.
Delectus personae is of two sorts: delectus personae creditoris and delectus
personae debitoris. The former bars assignation of the right; the latter prevents the
debtor sub-contracting. What, then, is delectus personae?119 It has been said that
there is delectus personae where the parties to the contract selected each other on the
basis of personal qualifications or suitability,120 or where there is 'deliberate choice
as opposed to mere caprice'.121 In the first edition of his work on Contract, Gloag
suggests the following:
"It is submitted that in contracts where the element of delectus
personae consists in the fact that reciprocal obligations are undertaken
on each side though not assignable by voluntary assignation admit of
being adopted and carried out by the trustee in bankruptcy."122
Here, Gloag confounds the three concepts of assignation, sub-contracting
and adoption and the respective role of delectus personae in each. Indeed, if delectus
personae bars assignation, but delectus personae can consist in 'mutual obligations
118
McBryde, Contract para 12-39. See also Reid, Property para 600; J.C. Carmont KC, 'Delectus
Personae' in Lord Dunedin et al (eds) Green's Encyclopaedia of the Laws ofScotland, (2nd ed. 1928)
vol 5 para 1172 ff. This analysis has been employed by the House of Lords: International Fibre
Syndicate Ltd v Dawson (1901) 3 F (HL) 32. Cf. P. Nienaber, 'Cession' in W.A. Joubert et al (eds)
The Law ofSouth Africa, 2nd edn, vol 2, Part II, (2003) para 38.
119 In the context of assignation, the formulation can be traced to Erskine III.v.2. Erskine's Institute
first appeared (posthumously) in 1773. Until the nineteenth century, however, the terminology is only
found in leases cases: see e.g. Lord Monboddo in Locheil's Trs v Alexander, Duke of Gordon (1772)
Mor 15050; Hailes 472 at 472 and 475. Atchison v Benny (1748) Mor 10405 refers to 'electio
personae' in the tenant of an urban dwelling. The earliest use of the term, 'delectus personae', traced
by this writer, is in Nairne v Freeburn (1737) Mor 10403. Cf. W.C. Smith, 'The Sources of the Law
of Scotland' (1904) 16 JR 375 at 387 who suggests that the term delectus personae was first invoked
in an arbitration case, Buchanan v Muirhead (1799) Mor 14593 (which refers to 'dilectus personae'),
and that, 'ever since nobody has been quite able to understand it'.
120 W. Trotter, The Law of Contract in Scotland (1913), 269. There seems no reason why there cannot
be delectus personae on only one side of the contract, thereby allowing sub-contracting by one party
but not by the other. See Goodwin Stable Trust v Duchex (Pty) Ltd 1998 (4) SA 606 (C) at 618E per
Selikowitz J quoted below. This is preferable to the dicta of Lord McLaren in Berlitz School of
Languages v Duchene (1903) 6 F 181 at 185 - he states that delectus personae bars the assignation of
a contract; a fortiori, there can be no assignation of any particular rights under that contract. This is
incorrect.
121
Gloag, Contract, (2nd ed. 1929), 416. Cf. F. Valleur, L'Intuitus personae dans les contrats (Paris,
1938), 7.
122 Contract (1914), 466.
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undertaken on each side', then, since this is the essence of a contract, on Gloag's
own argument, contracts cannot be assignable.123 In the second edition of his work,
Gloag adopts an oft-cited dictum of Bramwell B:124
"Where a contract is made in which the personality of the contracting
party is or may be of importance, as a contract with a man to write a
book, or the like, or where there might be a set-off, no other person
can interpose and adopt the contract."125
There are a number of problems with this explanation. We will deal with the
126
most problematic. If the possibility of set-off is fundamental to delectus personae,
then there must be delectus personae in every contractual relationship where the
possibility of set-off has not been excluded. But the most commonly assigned right is
the right to payment arising out of a contract. It is incontrovertible that such rights
are transferable. Since the debtor may plead compensation against the assignee
(assignatus utitur jure auctoris), a potential plea of compensation is entirely
irrelevant to both assignation and delectus personae}21
Where there is delectus personae in a contract, the chosen person is not usually
debarred (subject to some special cases addressed below) from assigning his right to
payment. A person cannot transfer his obligation to perform without the consent of
123 See too the title on 'Delectus personae' by J.C. Carmont KC in Lord Dunedin et al (eds) The Laws
ofScotland, vol 5, (2nd ed. 1928), especially at para 1189.
124 At 416 and again at 418.
125 Boulton v Jones (1857) 2 H & N 564; 157 ER 232 (emphasis added). Admittedly, Gloag later
rightly criticises (at 422) the Second Division for their approval of Boulton in Grierson, Oldham & Co
v Forbes, Maxwell & Co (1895) 22 R 812. Boulton was cited by Sheriff Lees in Scottish Iron & Steel
Co Ltd v Gillieaux & Collinet (1913) 30 Sh Ct Rep 42 at 45. That judgment preceded the publication
of the first edition of Gloag on Contract. See too the criticism in Bell, Principles, (10th ed. by W
Guthrie, 1899) § 1459, n (h).
126 The other issues being the relative state of English law when the statement was made, the reference
to 'adoption', and that delectus personae is not a term of English law; it is not mentioned in Boulton
or, as far as the writer is aware, any other English case. Boulton is really an authority for the
proposition that an offer to contract addressed to X cannot be accepted by Y: see McBryde, Contract
para 6-110; cf. Hersch v Nel 1948 (3) SA 686 at 691 (A) per Schreiner JA. For English law see
generally: Sir Guenter Treitel, 'Assignment' in P. Birks (ed.) English Private Law (2000), vol II, para
8. 343.
127
Gloag's passage at p. 418 contradicts his treatment of the assignatus rule at 429.
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the other party because it is a liability. This prohibition has nothing to do with the
fact that he is especially skilled.128
"The restriction on the cession of rights in a contract because it
involves delectus personae is tested with reference to the nature of the
debtor's obligation vis-a-vis the cedent, and not the nature of the
cedent's obligation vis-a-vis the debtor129... In this case the nature of
the obligation which allegedly rests on the applicant is the obligation
to make payment. It is not affected by the change in the identity of the
creditor."130
An employee in a contract of employment is a useful example. Such a person
may or may not be considered as skilled. The point is not relevant to the assignability
of the employee's wages. They are assignable: they are simple money claims and,
consequently, arrestable (to the extent that they are not alimentary).131 In the case of
a contract for professional services where there will usually be delectus personae vis¬
a-vis the contractor, the contractor's fees are assignable as well as arrestable.132 As
the example of the contract of employment shows, however, there may be exceptions
to this principle: e.g. the right of an employer to the service of an employee is said to
be a right coloured by delectus personae and as such unassignable (remembering
111
always that 'assignable' means transfer without the consent of the debtor). Certain
128 Cf. S. Woolman and J. Lake, Contract, (3rd ed. 2001) para 11.4 and H. Weber, Einfuhrung in das
schottische Recht (1978), 81. Both works conflate the concept of transfer of rights (which does not
require the debtor's consent) and the transfer of contracts (which requires the consent of the creditor
in the liability to be assigned).
129 See Densam (Pty) Ltd v Cywilnat (Pty) Ltd 1991 (1) SA 100 (A) at 112.
130 Goodwin Stable Trust v Duchex (Pty) Ltd 1998 (4) SA 606 (C) at 618E per Selikowitz J. See also
T. Hue, Traite theorique et pratique de la cession et de la transmission des creances (1891) para 186,
at 268: 'II est done demontre par tout ce qui precede, que les droits de creance, meme lorsque leur
creation legale ou conventionnelle a ete certainement determinee par la consideration de la personne,
sont pleinement cessibles comme les autres. Comment done se fait-il qu'on lise souvent dans les
auteurs et dans les arrets qu'un droit constitue intuitu personae ne peut etre cede? C'est uniquement
par l'effet d'une equivoque qui s'est produite quant a la maniere d'envisager le droit. On a confondu
Telement passif avec l'element actif, e'est-a-dire la dette avec la creance.'
131 Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987, Part III, ss 47-50 and sch 2. But, unusually, if the employee becomes
bankrupt, his wages do not vest in the trustee: Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1986, s. 32(1) although the
trustee can apply (s. 32(2)) to the sheriff for an order that the bankrupt pay over income that exceeds
the alimentary level; see too Brown's Tr v Brown 1995 SLT (Sh Ct) 2.
132 J. Graham Stewart, Diligence (1898), 100.
133 The subject is large and cannot be discussed here. It is usually examined only in the context of
employment law with little consideration of the basic juridical nature of the transfer. Often, where a
business is transferred, the transferee may wish to enforce restrictive covenants against former
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rights under a lease are also problematic.134 Yet, neither of these examples are
paradigm situations of the assignation of a money claim. Nevertheless, this is not to
say delectus personae is meaningless. In particular, when used in its proper sense, it
will be relevant in two cases: (i) sometimes delectus personae will prevent claims
from being assigned (delectus personae creditoris); (ii) it will determine whether a
debtor can sub-contract an obligation (delectus personae debitoris).
4. When is delectus personae relevant?
There are certain claims which are inherently non-transferable. Numerous
1 T S
statutory provisions state that a purported assignation of the claim will be void.
This is an express prohibition. The so-called pactum de non cedendo is commonly
i -jz:
expressed in contract. These prohibitions will be discussed in detail below.
Alternatively, however, it is possible to view these prohibitions from the point of
view of the right assigned: there is delectus personae creditoris and, as result, the
right is non-transferable. Conversely, however, one can expressly override what the
1 T7
law would imply, i.e. one can contract out of delectus personae. At common law,
certain rights are deemed to be unassignable because the debtor has a recognised
interest in retaining a particular creditor; other rights are prohibited by statute. The
express agreement of the parties cannot override legislative provisions rendering a
claim unassignable.
There are important implications for the delectus personae rule if the holder
of the right becomes bankrupt. A trustee in sequestration is a judicial assignee.
employees: Berlitz School ofLanguages v Duchene (1903) 6 F 181; Fraser & Son v Renwick 1906 14
SLT 443. Cf. V. Bertrand, Transfert des contrats de travail et cession d'entreprise (1988).
134 These cannot be considered here. Some long leases are deemed to be assignable, while shorter
leases are held to be unassignable. The usual provision is that the lease is assignable with the consent
of the landlord, which shall not be unreasonably withheld. See generally A. McAllister, Scottish Law
ofLeases (3rd ed. 2002), 151.
135 See McBryde, Contract para 12-54.
136 See chapter 6, Part II, A, 2 below.
137 Cf. S. Woolman and J. Lake, Contract, (3rd ed. 2001) para 11.4: 'Most contractual rights are
assignable when consent is given'. Almost all contractual rights are assignable where consent is given.
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Arguably, therefore, such a non-assignable right cannot fall into the right holder's
sequestration.138 A fortiori, it will not be arrestable. What claims, then, cannot be
assigned on the basis that they are personal to the holder? It has been held in South
Africa that the entitlement of the State to payments of tax is personal to the Revenue
and cannot be ceded.139 However, in Scotland, it seems to be the case that the
Revenue can transfer claims owed to it. Moreover, the statutory preference enjoyed
by the Revenue seems to be accessory to their claim; consequently, it can be
exercised by the assignee.140 Social Security claims cannot be assigned. It has not
been decided whether a right held under a contract by virtue of a jus quaesitum tertio
can be assigned, but it is thought that where that right is a right to payment of a sum
of money, it can be assigned. Intimation to the primary debtor should be sufficient. It
has been held that a right accorded by statute is not assignable if the statute does not
expressly authorise assignation;141 but these authorities cannot be taken to have
established a general principle. Whether a right created by statute is assignable will
depend on the particular legislative provisions and the intention of the legislature.
While there is a presumption that money claims to payment are assignable without
the debtor's consent, it has been suggested that obligations ad facta praestanda, are
owed only to a particular creditor and, to that extent, the debtor is not required to
perform to an assignee of the creditor:
Rights arising out of an illegal contract and rights deemed unassignable by statute are perhaps the only
exceptions.
138
Mulvey v Secretary of State for Social Security 1996 SC 8 affd 1997 SC (HL) 105. But see
discussion in chapter 6, Part V, C.
139 Namex (Pty) Ltd v Commissionerfor Inland Revenue 1922 (2) SA 761 (C). It could be argued that
the change of creditor places a greater obligation on the debtor, and any right on the part of the
Revenue is to be construed restrictively: Cf. Lord President Clyde in Ayrshire Pullman Motor Services
v Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1929) 14 TC 754: 'No man in this country is under the smallest
obligation, moral or other, so to arrange his legal relations to his business or to his property as to
enable the Inland Revenue to put the largest shovel in his stores'. A fortiori, why should an assignee
be able to enforce a preference which could be seen as personal to the Crown?
140 Villaswan Ltd v Sheraton Caltrust (Blythswood) Ltd 1999 SCLR 199 OH discussed by R.G.
Anderson and S. Eden, 'Transfer of Preferences on Payment' (2003) 7 Edin LR 398. The Crown
preference for Revenue arrears has been abolished: Enterprise Act 2002, s. 251. The point may still be
relevant: see e.g. Jackson and Long, Noters 2004 SC 474 OH. Some of the Roman-Dutch writers treat
other ancillary benefits as accessory, e.g. Voet, Commentarius 11.4.12 (insolvency preference of
funeral expenses). Cf. Hood v Pedden (1829) 8 S 208.
141
MacKnight, Petr (1875) 2 R 667 at 668 per Lord President Inglis; Goodall v Mclnnes Shaw 1912 1
SLT 425 at 428 per Lord Skerrington (Ordinary).
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"It is the same to me, whether I pay money to my creditor or to his
mandatory; but is not the same to me, whether I perform personal
service to my superior or to his mandatory. If I obliged myself to lend
my horse to John, there is a delectus personae, and I am not obliged to
lend it to another."142
The employer's right to service from an employee is perhaps the paradigm example
of this doctrine.143 However, like statutory rights, whether a particular obligation ad
factum praestandum is assignable by the creditor will depend on the obligation.
Some are assignable, others are not.
II. Assignation Distinguished from other Legal Institutions.
A. Succession: Universal and Singular; Transfer and Transmission.
The inter vivos transfer of claims by assignation is a species of singular
succession. This can be contrasted with the concept of universal succession. This was
held to occur on death, with the heir succeeding to the universality of the deceased's
assets and liabilities. Stair describes the difference between singular and universal
succession thus:
"Heirs in law are called universal successors, quia succedunt in
universum jus quod defunctus habuit, they do wholly represent the
defunct, and are as one person with him, and so they do both succeed
to him active, in all the rights belonging to him, and passive, in all the
obligations and debts due by him; and when they do not orderly enter,
they become successors passive, liable to the defunct's debt, but not
heirs active, having power to claim his right, till they be entered
according to law: other successors are called singular successors, as
assignees and purchasers, but heirs only are universal successors."144
That universal succession can render the successor actively liable for debts is a major
difference from singular succession. The idea of universal succession is
complicated.145 It has not been properly studied in Scotland. Indeed, the succession
142
Kames, Elucidations, Art. 2, at 8
143 Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014 at 1026 per Lord Atkin; Ross v
McFarlane (1894) 21 R 396.
144 Stair III.iv.23. See too Erskine Il.vii.l.
145 Cf. Reid, Property para 598 and T. Hue, Traite theorique et pratique de la cession et de la
transmission des creances (1891) vol 1, para 42 ff, 'De la Transmissibilite' .
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of liabilities is not as complete as it might sound. For example, since Justinian's time,
the heir can opt to limit his liability to the extent of the deceased's assets. There is
much to be said for the view that on death there is neither a 'succession' of assets nor
a cessation of legal personality. However, the point cannot be discussed here. In
modern law, the concept has been developed beyond the limits envisaged by Stair; it
being regularly invoked in business transfers. There is considerable authority for the
proposition that where there is a transfer of all the assets of a business which
continues trading under the same name, the transferee of the assets becomes jointly
and severally liable for the debts of the transferor.146 This principle is particularly
important in any nationalisation process. It has been observed in the House of Lords
that the concept of universal succession is a concept Scots law shares with other civil
law countries; although it is unknown to English law.147 However, in the last hundred
148
years or so, the Court of Session has been more reluctant to admit the principle.
For present purposes it is sufficient to note that the inter vivos voluntary assignation
of claims is a form of singular succession. Such an assignation is to be distinguished
from a 'general' assignation which may, in fact, be a form of universal succession. In
the Scottish sources, this conceptual distinction is sometimes expressed in a
nomenclature which distinguishes transfer (singular succession) from transmission
(universal succession).149
146 McKeand v Laird (1861) 23 D 846 at 855 per Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis; Miller v Thorburn (1861)
23 D 359; Thomson & Balfour v Boag & Son 1936 SC 2 at 10 per Lord President Normand; Miller v
McLeod 1973 SC 172; Ross, Harper & Murphey v Banks 2000 SC 500 OH.
147 Metliss v National Bank of Greece and Athens [1958] AC 509 at 530 per Lord Keith of Avonholm
quoting Stair III.iv.23. For the comparative history, see generally, L. Sedatis, 'Universalsukzession' in
HRG vol. 5 (1998), 490. Cf. the old German law under § 419 BGB which was repealed by the InsO in
1999. The corresponding Austrian provision, § 1409 ABGB remains in force.
148 Smith's Trs v AD Smith (1899) 6 SLT 263 OH at 267; Ocra (Isle ofMan) Ltd v Anite Scotland Ltd
2003 SLT 1232 OH.
149 Cf. Riley v Ellis 1910 SC 934. As for Lord Dunedin's dissent in Riley v Ellis, see G.L. Gretton,
SME, vol 8, 'Diligence' para 261. In German law, an inter vivos transfer, i.e. singular succession, is
seen as just one part of the general concept of succession which may be universal as well as singular:
see K.W. Norr, R. Scheyhing and W. Poggeler, Sukzessionen, (2nd ed. 1999). Cf. T. Hue, Traite
theorique et pratique de la cession et de la transmission des creances (1891), 70 ff.
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B. Novation 150
1. General
B owes obligation xy to his creditor A. It is agreed, however, that it would be
mutually preferable for B to owe A obligation yz. A discharges B from his obligation
x, while B agrees to undertake to A obligation z. There has been the extinction of one
obligation on the creation of another. There are still only two parties. The only
difference in the relationship between the parties is the content of the obligation
owed by the debtor to the creditor.151 A new obligation has been created with the
consent of both parties. Of first importance, however, is the fact that there has been a
discharge of the antecedent obligation.152 If there is no intention to discharge the old
obligation then there is no novation but only corroboration, i.e. the creation of an
1 ST
additional obligation. Importantly, where there is a discharge of the principal
obligation, any accessory rights will also be discharged.154 This incident of novation
may considerably limit the practical application of the doctrine.155 Where such a
substitution of obligations occurs in a continuing contractual relationship between
two parties, there is said to be novation:
150 Or 'innovation': see the title in Morison's Dictionary. Cf. J. Chisolm (ed.) Green's Encyclopaedia
ofScots Law, (2nd ed. 1909), vol 8, 560, s. v., 'Novation'. We will be concerned only with 'voluntary'
novation. The Romans contrasted this with novatio necessaria, which occurred on litis contestatio.
This will be ignored here on the grounds that this is not really a true form of novation at all: see
Coutts' Tr. v Coutts 1998 SC 798; I.G. Farlam and H.W. Hathaway, Contract: Cases, Materials and
Commentaty, (2nd ed. 1988) at 733; L.R. Caney, A Treatise on the Law ofNovation, (2nd ed. 1973) 66-
67.
151 Cf. De Montfert Insurance Co v Lafferty 1997 SC 335 OH; Baxter Clark & Paul v Tidloch
Construction Group Ltd 1999 GWD 37-1789.
152 Erskine, III.iv.22; Bankton I, 495, 37; Blyth & Blyth v Carillion Construction Ltd 2002 SLT 961
OH. Cf. F. Terre, P. Simler and Y. Lequette, Droit civil: les obligations, (8th ed. 2002) at para 1417:
'La specificate de la novation reside dans son effet extinctif, plus precisement dans le lien
indissociable etabli entre l'extinction de l'obligation primative et la creation de la nouvelle
obligation'. For the history, see R. Feenstra, 'L'Effet Extinctif de la Novation' (1961) 29 TvR 397 at
414.
153
Ulpian D. 46, 2, 1, 1; h.t. 2; Stair I.xviii.8; Gloag and Irvine, Rights in Security, 653; MRS
Distribution Ltd v DS Smith (UK) Ltd 2004 SLT 631 OH at 635.
154 Erskine, III.iv.22; Bankton, I, 495, 37. Cf. J-L Boudouin, Les obligations, (5th ed. 1999) para 881;
Louisiana Civil Code Art. 1884.
155 P. van Ommeslaghe, 'La transmission des obligations en droit positif beige' in La Transmission
des obligations (1980) at 84.
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"Obligations are also dissolved by novation or innovation, which, in
the strict acceptation of the word, denoted the change of one
obligation to another in such manner that both debtor and creditor
continue the same."156
Novation is a method of extinction of obligations between the same debtor
and creditor. It is different from assignation. An assignation requires the continued
existence of the claim.1562
Where there is a change of debtor with the creditor's consent there is said to
be a delegation:
"Innovation is the turning of one obligation into another; and if it be a
third person becoming debtor for relief of the former debtor; it is
called Delegation."157
There is seldom any distinction made between novation and delegation. It is common
for the terms to be used interchangeably. Since however there is the tendency to
confuse, in particular, sub-contracting and delegation, it is important to be clear that
delegation is a method of extinction of obligations where three parties are involved.
Delegation is a species of novation. For present purposes, however, it is delegation
that is the more relevant of the two.
2. Substitution of Liabilities: Delegation
'Delegation' has more than one meaning. In everyday usage 'to delegate' is
to entrust the performance of a responsibility to another e.g. an ability to delegate is
156 Erskine III.iv.22.
I56a
Compare the bizarre, if not nonsensical, passage in I.M. Fletcher and R. Roxburgh, Greene and
Fletcher, the Law and Practice of Receivership in Scotland, (3rd ed. 2005) para 4. 07: 'A deed of
novation is the deed under which a contracting company in receivership, subject always to the consent
of the employer as delectus persona is involved in such contracts, assigns its rights and obligations
under a building contract to another contractor who takes over the role of contractor and completes the
work'. Novation can only occur by consent, so references to delectus personae are meaningless. If
what is happening is novation, why is there a reference to 'assign'?
157 Stair I.xviii.8; see also Mackenzie /nst.III.iv.8; Erskine III.iv.22; Bankton I, 486, 5; Bell Prin §
576; Pothier, Traite des Obligations (1761) §§ 584 and 600 in M Bugnet (ed.) Oeuvres de Pothier
(Paris, 1861) vol 2, at 319; Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas 46.2.2 (trans. Gane, The Selective Voet,
Being the Commentary on the Pandects vol 7, (1957), 73); Ulpian D. 46, 2, 11, h.t. 13.
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an attribute of a competent manager.158 In Scots law, however, delegation is a term of
art. Delegation is the method whereby a liability owed by B to A, can be substituted
for a liability undertaken by C. It is a fundamental principle that a debtor cannot
liberate himself from his obligations without his creditor's consent. Crucially,
therefore, B's liability to A can only be substituted for C's, if A consents to B's
discharge and to C becoming liable in B's place.159 Delegation therefore effects a
change of debtor. If the creditor does not obtain a right against the new debtor, there
cannot be delegation.160 While it is convenient to speak of the 'transfer' of liabilities
as the converse of the assignation of rights,161 delegation is Scots law transfers
nothing. Although the introduction of the new debtor may be at the instance of the
• • 169
original debtor, juristically speaking there is no 'transfer' of the obligation. Rather
B is discharged on the constitution of an obligation between A and C (perfect
delegation); alternatively, A acquires C as a new debtor without relinquishing his
rights against B (imperfect delegation).163 There are no Scottish cases where A
discharges B but the obligation remains in force, to be performed by C. As will be
158 It is in this sense that the prohibition delegata potestas non potest delegari applies in public law. In
private law it is also relevant to e.g. a mandatory. He cannot give to another the authority conferred
upon him by the mandant. Compare the issue of non-delegable duties in delict: see e.g. W. Stewart,
Reparation (2000) para 3-3 ff.
159 Cf. § 415 BGB\ '...so hangt ihre Wirksamkeit von der Genehmigung des Glaubigers ab...'. In
German law, although B is discharged from his liability, the debt itself is not discharged; rather, there
is a genuine transfer of the debt (Schuldiibernahme). The German code contains no provisions on
novation. Rather the applicable principles are found under the guise of the Anweisung which
developed from the principle of delegation: see Part C, below. But note that some accessory rights are
still extinguished: § 418 BGB.
160 Pollock & Co v Murray and Spence (1863) 2 M 14 at 16 per Lord President McNeill. Cf. Calders
Ltd v Inland Revenue 1944 SC 433 where the First Division held that although there was an intention
to delegate and a new debtor, there was no discharge of the debt as this was contrary to the intention
of the parties. Lord Mackenzie was alone in understanding the nature and effect of delegation: see p.
444. See too MRS Distribution Ltd v Smith (UK) Ltd 2004 SLT 631 at 635 K-L.
161 As Bankton, I, 495, 37, does.
162 See Pothier, Traite des obligations (1761) § 583 and § 414 BGB. Cf. N. Whitty, 'Indirect
Enrichment in Scots Law' 1994 JR 200 and 239 at 261, n. 45.
163 For this reason there is no equivalent of the rule assignatus utitur jure auctoris in a case of
delegation. See e.g. the arguments for the pursuer in Hamilton v Earl ofKingdom (1674) Mor 2602.
This causes some problems in French law which requires a justa causa for a binding obligation.
However, where the new debtor is delegated by the original debtor, the delegated party can raise those
exceptions (although not compensation) which the original party could have raised against the
creditor, see § 417 I BGB. It should be remembered that German law does recognise the transfer of an
obligation. Scots law is somewhere between the French and the German: our law of proper delegation
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discussed below, however, there seems no reason in principle why this should not be
allowed. Further, there seems no reason in principle why the creditor cannot
discharge the original debtor conditionally, e.g. subject to a resolutive condition
should the new debtor fail to pay.164
To reiterate, then, delegation can only occur with the creditor's consent. At root
is the solvency of the debtor. Insolvency is endemic. If the debtor were allowed to
transfer his liabilities to another, without the consent of the creditor, the creditor
would be forced to bear the risk of the transferee's insolvency. 165 However, while
this rationale is appealing, the rule cannot be based purely on considerations of
solvency; after all, a delict creditor has no choice but to accept his debtor, whether
solvent or not. So, while in contract a creditor can carefully select solvent debtors, in
delict or enrichment, the creditor may be stuck with a quite impecunious debtor.
Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly the law that a debtor cannot alienate his obligations
without the consent of his creditor:
"Generally, all obligations are intransmissible166 upon either party
directly without the consent of the other party, which is clear upon the
part of the debtor, who cannot, without the consent of the creditor,
liberate himself and transmit his obligation upon another, though with
the creditor's consent he may, by delegation."167
The Scottish sources are not without their problems. Gloag apparently
recognised the proper usage of delegation, quoting verbatim the above passage from
is like the French; but Scots law also recognises the Anweisnng. Cf. PECL Art. 12: 102 (4). For the
Roman law, see W. Buckland, A Textbook ofRoman lawfrom Augustus to Justinian (1921), 566.
164 This is essentially the position in Scots law on payment by cheque, for which see n. 195 below.
165 Cf. Gloag, Contract, (2nd ed. 1929), 416: 'Prima facie, there is always delectus personae in the
choice of a debtor'. It must be remembered that Gloag's treatment of this area of the law is not
coherent and must be treated with caution.
166 I.e. inter vivos.
167 Stair III.i.2; See also Erskine III.iv.22; Bell Principles § 576; Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas
(trans Gane The Selective Voet, vol 7, at 83) 46, 2, 11; Ulpian D. 46, 2, 11. Cf. P. Gide, Etudes sur la
novation et le transport des creances en droit romain (1879) at 436: 'II existe, en effet, une difference
profonde entre le transfert de la creance et le transfert de la dette: si le changement de creancier est a
peu indifferent au debiteur, on ne peut pas dire que, a l'inverse, le changement de debiteur soit
indifferent au creancier, car il se peut que le nouveau debiteur soit moins solvable que l'ancien. Ce
changement ne peut s'operer par une simple convention entre l'ancien debiteur et le nouveau; il y faut
encore le consentement d'une troisieme personne, le creancier, en sorte que tout transfert de dette est,
de sa nature, une operation de trios acteurs, c'est-a-dire une delegation'.
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168Stair. However he conflates the concept with sub-contracting and admits of the
assignation of contracts, i.e. the transfer not only of rights without the consent of the
debtor, but also liabilities without the consent of the creditor.169 McBryde accepts
that delegation can mean sub-contracting as well as the 'transfer' of an obligation
where a new debtor is substituted for the old with the consent of the creditor.170 With
respect, this is as unhelpful as it is infelicitous. One of the great problems in this area
of the law is a lack of conceptual clarity. That a layman may mean sub-contracting
though he labels it 'delegation' should not be allowed to confuse matters of
• • 171
principle. The distinguished former Chief Justice of South Africa lucidly
articulates the distinction:
"There is no doubt that, generally speaking, a contractual obligation
cannot effectively be transferred from the debtor to a third person by
agreement unless the creditor consents thereto and agrees to accept the
third person as his debtor in substitution for the original debtor. Such a
transfer, therefore, involves the concurrence of the three parties
concerned and is properly termed a 'delegation', which is a species of
novation. Although the term 'cession' is sometimes used with
reference to a transfer of obligations, particularly in cases where it is
sought to substitute some third person for a party under a contract
containing reciprocal rights and obligations, this is strictly a misnomer
in that 'ordinarily rights can be ceded but obligations cannot'."172
168
Gloag, Contract, 258.
169 His paragraph at 418 headed 'Assignation and delegation of work' is particularly unintelligible. He
is hopelessly confused as to the distinctions between assignation of rights, delegation of liabilities and
sub-contracting.
170
McBryde, Contract para 12-14. In any event, delegation is a method of extinguishing obligations,
not transferring them. Admittedly, there seems no reason why transfer of obligations, providing
always that the creditor consents, should not be allowed.
171 Indeed McBryde, para 12-14, concedes, in footnote 24, that his usage has led to confusion, noting
the disapproval of the treatment of delegation in the first edition of his work by Lord Justice-Clerk
Ross in W. J. Harte Construction Ltd v Scottish Homes 1992 SC 99 at 111. Only Lord Murray in
Harte Construction seems to have had a clear view of the distinction between sub-contracting and
novation/delegation. See also the references to 'delegation' in Scottish Homes v Inverclyde District
Council 1997 SLT 829 OH; sub-contracting is what is meant. Cf. E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on
Contracts, (2nd ed. 1998; with Supplement 2000) § 11.1: he describes 'delegation' as, 'an obligor's
empowering of another to perform the obligor's duty is known as a delegation of the performance of
the duty. By a delegation, the obligor as delegating party (B) empowers a delegate (C) to perform a
duty that the delegating party owes to the obligee (A)'. This is a reference to sub-contracting not
delegatio. Cf. the opinion of Pound J in Langel v Betz 250 NY 159 (1929).
172 Froman v Robertson 1971 (1) SA 115 (A) at 122 per Corbett AJA (references omitted). See also
Dage Properties (Pty) Ltd v General Chemical Corporation Ltd 1973 (1) SA 163 (A); Milner v Union
Dominions Corporation (SA) Ltd 1959 (3) SA 674 (C) at 676F per Watermeyer J.
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3. Burdens of Proof and Business Transfers
In practice, there are likely to be two situations where a party will seek to
argue that a delegation has occurred. The first is the classic case of a debtor seeking
to argue that he has been discharged. In this case it will be difficult to argue that the
discharge was implicit. Normally, the intervention of the new debtor will have been
at the behest of the original. The delegation will only have occurred because the
original debtor wants to be discharged by the creditor (perfect delegation). The
second case is where the creditor is seeking to argue that there has been a
'delegation' (imperfect delegation). This most commonly occurs on business
transfers, or between the creditors of a partnership and a retiring partner for pre¬
retirement debts.174 For example, A Ltd has a contract to provide services to Origins
Co. The entire property and undertaking of the Origins Co is sold as a going concern
to New Co. For the services rendered by A Ltd to Origins Co, the latter had an
obligation to pay. After the transfer, the services are rendered to New Co. New Co
accepts performance. Is New Co liable in contract to A Ltd? Are the terms of the
contract the same? Here the pursuer will be A Ltd. A Ltd will seek to argue that New
Co has been 'delegated' and is now liable for the contractual obligations of Origin
Co. There is has usually been no intention on the part of A Ltd to discharge Origin
Co. Indeed, Origins Co's liabilities are rarely a live issue: by the time the dispute
occurs, Origins Co may no longer exist. The question is whether A Ltd now has an
extra, rather than a substitute, debtor.
When can consent to a delegation be implied? Some sources suggest that the
consent of the creditor to discharge the debtor in a case of perfect delegation may be
readily implied.175 So Stair tells us that novation is 'ordinarily inferred' where a
173 MRS Distribution Ltd v Smith (UK) Ltd 2004 SLT 631 at 636D-E per Lord Drummond Young
(Ordinary).
174 See generally Anon, 'Partnership Liability Questions' (1925) 41 Scottish Law Review 65, 149 and
184.
175
Dunlop's Tr v McKechnie (1845) 7 D 494 approved in Campbell v Cruikshank (1845) 7 D 548;
MRS Distribution Ltd v Smith (UK) Ltd 2004 SLT 631. Cf. Code Civil, Arts 1273 and 1275; Code
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posterior security bears 'in satisfaction of the former obligation' or where a posterior
bond bears to be 'in full satisfaction of the sum for which the former was granted',
1 7 f\
though there be no express reference to discharge, novation or the former security.
Hume states that 'We admit of evidence, if in itself clear and satisfactory,177 that
such was truly the purpose of the parties - to innovate the claim of debt, though there
be no explicit clause of discharge on the face of the new voucher; but the purpose
appears only in the whole circumstances of the transaction and of the situation of the
conduct of the parties'.178 And, further, that 'In general and ordinarily it may,
perhaps, be said that novation is to be inferred from redelivery of the original
1 7Q
document of debt to the original party debtor'.
The most recent case in Scotland distinguished between expromissio and
adpromissio.180 These terms are equivalent to perfect delegation and imperfect
delegation respectively. The court readily inferred the consent of the new debtor
(New Co) to be liable to the creditors of the old debtor (Origin Co). Hitherto, the
181issue of implication has been whether there was a discharge. In MRS Distribution
what was implied was not whether there had been a discharge of the original debtor,
but whether the New Co had undertaken the debtor's contractual obligations by mere
fact of accepting goods and paying for them. The Lord Ordinary held that New Co
Civil du Quebec, Art. 1661; Louisiana Civil Code, Arts 1880-2; Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht,
Art. 116(1).
176 Stair I.xviii.8 citing Chisolm v Gordon (1632) Mor 16472 and Lawson v Scot ofWhiteslade (1633)
Mor 11519 respectively. In an attempt to clarify the opinions of the classical jurists, Justinian
determined by statute that the intention to novate had to be explicit: Inst. 3.29.3a, for which see D
Daube, 'Novation of Obligations giving a bonae fidei Iudicium' (1948) 66 ZSS (RA) 91; R. Feenstra,
'L'Effet Extinctif de la Novation' (1961) 21 TvR 397 and A. Watson, 'D.12.1.32 and Delegatio'
(1966) TvR 175, partly reproduced in A. Watson, Studies in Roman Private Law (1991), 219. Like
Stair, Voet also departed from this rule: Commentarius 46.2.3. Cf. Heritable Securities Investment
Association Ltd v Wingates (1891) 29 SLR 904 at 907 per Lord Wellwood (Ordinary) and Anon,
'Partnership Liability Questions' (1925) 41 Scottish Law Review 65 at 71.
177 Cf. Fox v Anderson (1849) 11 D 1194 at 1197 per Lord Fullerton: 'clear evidence' is required;
Pollock & Co v Murray and Spence (1863) 2 M 14 at 16 per Lord President McNeill: 'I think, in a
case where delegation is pleaded, that it is necessary to make a very clear case'.
178 Lectures, vol. Ill, 61.
179 Ibid.
180 MRS Distribution Ltd v Smith (UK) Ltd 2004 SLT 631 OH.
181 Ibid.
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become bound to perform Origin Co's contractual obligations on the same terms that
Origin Co was bound to perform.
Where the new debtor comes in as an additional debtor (adprommisor), the
analogy here is closer to caution than novation. Like imperfect delegation, the
creditor has an additional debtor. There is no discharge of the original obligation.
Here, it is the creditor who is seeking to argue that he has a new debtor by virtue of
an agreement between Origin Co and New Co, to which the creditors of Origin Co
182
were not a party. In this type of case, the creditors often seek to argue that there
has been a universal succession of rights and obligations.183 As far as delegation is
1 84
concerned, however, there is no obvious need for a presumption in this case.
Difficulty arises on the insolvency of the new firm or business and the creditors seek
to hold the original debtor liable. It is in this case that the categorisation of the new
debtor as an expromissor or adpromissor will become important. If he is an
expromissor, the old debtor will have been discharged; if an adpromissor, the old
debtor will remain liable. In a partnership case, the retiring partner will remain liable
(on a joint and several basis) for all the debts of the partnership prior to his
retirement. It is thought that it is in such business transfer cases that it can be said
that delegation (expromissio) is not to be presumed.185 'The mere fact that a new
agreement was made' (between the Origin Co and New Co) is not enough to infer
that the creditors discharged Old Co.186 However, to continue to refer to dicta which
state that in such a situation 'delegation is not to be presumed' takes us little further.
In most of these cases, delegation in the orthodox sense of the term is not at issue.
182 It is an interesting point whether the creditors of the retiring partner could enforce an indemnity
granted to the retiring partner by the continuing partners by way of a jus quaesitum tertio, cf. Hill's Tr
v Gowans (1872) 9 SLR 397.
183 See, inter alia, McKean v Laird (1860) 23 D 846; Miller v Thorburn (1861) 23 D 359; Ireland v
Montgomery (1883) 10 R 974; Heddle's Exrs v Marwick (1888) 15 R 698; Stephen's Trs v McDougal
(1889) 16 R 779; Henderson v Stubbs (1899) 22 R 51; Smith's Trs v A.D. Smith (1899) 6 SLT 263
OH; Ocra (Isle ofMan) Ltd v Anite Scotland Ltd 2003 SLT 1232 OH.
184 MRS Distribution Ltd v Smith (UK) Ltd 2004 SLT 631 at 636A per Lord Drummond Young
(Ordinary).
185 Mackenzie, Inst. III.iv.9; Erskine III.iv.22; Dudgeon v Reid (1829) 7 S 729; Campbell v
Cruikshank (1845) 7 D 548; Buchan, Wilson & Co v Adam (1833) 11 S 762 at 770 per Lord Gillies;
Mowbray v White (1824) 3 S 146; Pollock & Co v Murray and Spence (1863) 2 M 14 at 16 per Lord
Curriehill; Mclnotsh v Ainslie (1872) 10 M 304 per Lord President Inglis.
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There is no issue of discharge. In the case of an additional or corroborative obligation
(adpromissio), reference to delegation at all is confusing. While every delegation
must give rise to a new obligation, it is thought that a concomitant discharge of prior
obligation is required for a delegation. Where the question is simply whether there is
an additional obligant, cases referring to the implication of consent to discharge are
simply not relevant.
4. Insolvency
The creditor bears the risk of the new debtor's insolvency. The original debtor's
liability does not revive if the delegated debtor becomes bankrupt.187 The original
debtor may incur liability only on the grounds of fraud.
5. Validity of the Original Obligation
There can be no delegation of a void obligation. However if the original
obligation is voidable only and it is delegated before rescission then consent of the
creditor to the delegation may amount to a waiver of his right to rescind the original
obligation.188
C. Delegation of performance.
One can delegate rights as well as liabilities.189 This is just another method of
achieving what is usually done by assignation. One of the differences is the effect on
186 Holmes v Gardiner (1904) 12 SLT 668 at 669 per Lord Stormonth Darling (Ordinary).
187 Bankton I, 486, 5. Cf. Art. 1206 of the Spanish Codigo Civil'. 'La insolvencia del nuevo deudor,
que hubiese sido aceptado por el acreedor, no hara revivir la accion de este contra el deudor primitivo,
salvo que dicha insolvencia hubiese sido anterior y publica o conocida del duedor al delegar su
deuda'. Art. 1276 Code Civil is in similar terms.
188 L.R. Caney, A Treatise on the Law ofNovation, (2nd ed. 1973), 13.
189 See the excellent discussion in Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No 95, 'Recovery of
Benefits Conferred under Error of Law' (1993) vol II, 162. Much of this reflects the expertise of Niall
Whitty, then one of the commissioners. There is, however, a typographical error in para 2.170. A
corrected version in quoted by R. Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment vol 1, Enrichment by
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existing obligations. Delegation is an instance of extinction of obligations through
substitution. Assignation is a method of transfer of rights; assignation per se does not
discharge anything.190 References to delegation of performance are common.
However, care is needed. As we have seen, 'delegation' is rarely used precisely. It
can mean many things. 'Delegation of performance' can refer to at least two types of
case: proper delegation (which imports an immediate discharge of the original
obligant, delegatio obligandi). In proper delegation, the new debtor undertakes a new
obligation to the creditor which the creditor accepts in lieu of the original creditor's
obligation. As a result, the original debtor is discharged. The introduction of the new
debtor can occur without the consent of the original debtor.191 Alternatively, the
introduction of the new debtor may be instigated by the original debtor. He can order
one of his own debtors to pay the creditor (which does not involve the immediate
discharge of the original obligant, delegatio solvendi). So, if X is indebted to R, and
P to X, X may order P to pay R. If R accepts this obligation in lieu of X's obligation,
X will be discharged. In other words, there must still be an intention to discharge X.
This notion can be traced to the Roman notion of delegation. Alternatively, there is
192
no immediate discharge of X. His discharge is conditional on P paying R. In this
case, no new obligations are created, but two are discharged. This proceeding is the
basis for the order to pay. It is important to make these distinctions at the outset, as
there has been little consideration in the Scottish sources.193
Deliberate Conferral (2003) para 8.37. Cf. L.R. Caney, A Treatise on the Law relating to Novation,
(2nd ed. 1973), 2, 37.
190 Erskine III.iv.22. This is a matter for agreement between cedent and assignee. Where the cedent is
obliged to assign, the assignation will discharge that obligation. Cf. Purnell v Shannon (1894) 22 R
74.
191
E.g. Art. 1274 Code Civil.
192 Cf. Art. 1277 Code Civil. As will become clear below there is little difference between this
conception of delegation and the Anweisung.
193 See, in particular, the caution urged by J. Domat, Les loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel, (2nd ed.
1695) III.iv.pr, vol III, 582. See too, R.J. Pothier, Traite du contrat de vente (1762) §§ 551-552 who
articulates the distinction particularly clearly.
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D. Mandates to Uplift.
Roman law did not recognise a general concept of cession. Instead a type of mandate
was resorted to. By this proceeding, the creditor would authorise the 'assignee' to
uplift the claim and grant the debtor a discharge. Importantly, the mandate was in in
rem suam. The assignee could retain the proceeds for his own benefit. Also, because
the 'assignee' was a procurator and representative of the cedent, his position was
precarious. The Scottish history of the law of assignation is confused. Regular
parallels have been drawn between assignation and the mandate in rem suam; indeed,
an assignation has been described as nothing more than a mandate in rem suam.ma
These issues will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.
E. Mandates to Pay (Anweisung).
If X is indebted to R, and P to X, X has a number of options to discharge his debt to
R. He could assign his claim against P to R. R will intimate this to the debtor. P's
consent is not required. But although creditors often accept a cession of a right
against another instead of payment, the cession will not necessarily194 extinguish the
cedent's obligation to the assignee. This will always depend on the underlying
contractual relationship of the parties. In any event, a cession may occur even
although there is no pre-existing obligation to grant one. The order to pay, however,
is different. It is based on the basic principle of delegation of performance. The
intermediate creditor (X) directs his debtor (P) to pay his (X's) own creditor, R. On
payment by P to R there is a double discharge: P-X and X-R. Before payment,
however, the obligations of the respective parties remain unchanged. The order to
pay is normally reduced to a writing delivered by X to R which is presented to P. A
commonplace example would involve X drawing a cheque on his bank P in favour of
his creditor R. The effect of the drawing of the cheque on the underlying obligation
l93a Carter v Mcintosh (1862) 24 D 925 per Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis.
194 It will always depend on the contract between the parties. The following assumes that there is no
agreement.
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at common law is controversial.195 Particular provisions of the Bills of Exchange Act
1882, which apply only to Scotland, complicate matters.196
195
Gloag, Contract, (2nd ed. 1929), 273 suggests that payment by cheque discharges the debt subject
to a resolutive condition that the cheque is honoured, citing Leggat Bros v Gray 1908 SC 67. See too,
Glasgow Pavilion Ltd v Motherwell, (1903) 6 F 106 at 119 per Lord Young to the same effect. Cf. W.
Forbes, Bills ofExchange, (2nd ed. 1718), 107; Richardson v Fenwick (1772) Mor 678; Hailes 471 per
the Lord President (Dundas of Arniston): 'After a bill is accepted, the drawer is only subsidiarily
liable'; Herries &Cov Crosbie (1775) Mor 2577; February 22nd 1775 FC; Hailes 616 at 617 per Lord
Elliock: 'all bills are in effect in security, never in solutitm; for the indorsee has recourse against an
indorser. This would not be the case if they were in solutum'-, Walker & Watson v Sturrock (1897) 35
SLR 26, and McLauchlin v Allied Irish Bank 2001 SC 485. See too the recent case of Whitbread
Group pic v Goldapple Ltd (No. 2), 2005 SLT 281, per Lord Drummond Young (Ordinary) at para
[28]. Importantly, the Lord Ordinary states that once a creditor has received a cheque, the underlying
debt cannot be enforced unless the creditor receives notice that the cheque has been dishonoured. Cf.
Decret-loi du 30 octobre 1936, Art. 62 (France) to the same effect, now found in Art. L 131-67 Code
monetaire et financier (2005): 'Le remise d'un cheque en paiement, acceptee par un creancier,
n'entraine pas novation. En consequence, la creance originaire, avec toutes les garanties qui sont
attachees, subsiste jusqu'au paiement du cheque'. In Re Charge Card Services Ltd [1987] Ch 150;
[1989] Ch 497 it was held that payment by credit card amounted to an absolute discharge of the
obligation to make payment. The seller had no claim against the buyer when payment was not
forthcoming from the credit company.
196 In particular, s. 53(2) and s. 75A, 1882 Act.
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Fig. 1: Debt relationship in Anweisung.




Based on delegation, the order to pay is well-known to the law. Indeed, in the Code
Civil there are no special provisions on the order to pay; while, even in the
systematic BGB, one must move between the provisions on Schuldiibernahme and
Anweisung to get a full picture: there is no paragraph of the BGB which is dedicated
to the novation or delegation.197 Where it is reduced to writing, however, it has the
potential to circulate as an item of credit. Indeed, in modern German law, the
Anweisung must be embodied in a deed.198 It occurs on a daily basis. X will normally
draw an order on P in favour of R. X will deliver this to R. R will then present this to
P either for acceptance or for payment. Not only is a cheque an order to pay, many
197 H. Hahn, Die Institute der Biirgerlichrechtlichen Anweisung der §§ 783 BGB und der 'Delegation'
der Art 1275f C. Civ in Rechtsvergleichender Darstellung (Thesis, Munich, 1965), 11.
198
§ 783 BGB. Cf. Windscheid, Pandektkenrechts, vol 2, § 412, at 812, n. 13.
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other banking transactions can be analysed in similar terms.199 There are some
differences between an order to pay and a cession. These must be highlighted, since
the concepts have become confused in the Scottish sources. For example, statute now
designates the effect of a presentment (which, or course, may not be accepted) by P
as a cession rather than in terms of an order or mandate to pay.200 The majority of the
famous nineteenth century Scottish cases ostensibly dealing with 'assignation'
actually involved mandates to pay.201 Importantly, where this order is accepted by P,
909
this document can then be subsequently transferred. This transfer operates as a
transfer of the rights against the debtor.
The German jurist, Carl Friedrich Miihlenbruch203 highlights at least six differences
between the order to pay and a cession:
(i) In a cession the debtor must be indebted to the cedent. It is his
right against the debtor that the cedent transfers. This is not the
case in an order to pay. P need not be X's debtor.204
(ii) With an order to pay, R obtains a right against P only on P
accepting.205 R does not get a right against P by intimation (as in a
Scottish assignation) or on presentation (as with a bill of
exchange206).
199 Detailed discussion is outwith the scope of this work, but compare Mercedes-Benz Finance Ltd v
Clydesdale Bank pic 1997 SLT 905 and P Marburger, 'Anweisung' in Staudingers Kommentar zum
BGB (Neuarbeitung, 2002) § 783, Rn 33-58.
200 Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, s. 53(2).
201 See the discussion in chapter 3, 'History' below, Part IV, D.
202
§ 792 BGB.
203 Miihlenbruch, Cession, § 18, 226- 229. See also idem, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts (1840) vol 2,
§ 496. Miihlenbruch had an abiding influence on the German private law generally and the law of
cession in particular. Klaus Luig has described him as the 'Father' of the German law of cession:
Luig, Geschichte, 47.
204 See e.g. R.J. Pothier, Traite du contract de change (1763) § 226.
205 Cf. D. Medicus, Schuldrecht II, Besonderer Teil, (11th ed. 2003) § 119, n. 583 (1)
206 See Bills of Exchange Act 1882, s. 53(1). This statutory provision was based on the common law.
The common law, however, had confused the mandate to pay with the mandate in rem suam which is
a mandate to uplift: see generally G.L. Gretton, 'Mandates and Assignations' (1994) 39 JLSS 175.
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(iii) Fundamentally, an Anweisung does not involve the entry, or
substitution, of R into the relationship of P and X, or a change in
the existing debt relations of the parties.207
(iv) The Anweisung, of itself, does not give to R those rights that X
held against P. It transfers nothing.208 As a result, P cannot raise
any defences against the R that he could have raised against X. R's
right comes into existence only on acceptance by P. Because P is
essentially paying on X's behalf, however, P can raise those
defences that X could have raised against R.209
(v) Acceptance by P has no effect of the relationship between the
parties.210 The existing obligations (i.e. usually the X-R and the P-
X obligations) remain in force until P makes payment.
(vi) An Anweisung to the order of R can be further transferred.
Admittedly, it is not clear how Miihelenbruch's sixth point differentiates the
Anweisung from cession. Point (v) is controversial. Some authorities suggest that
207 See, in particular, Muhlenbruch, Cession § 18, n. 433.
208 See e.g. Rechten en Coutumen van Antwerpen (1582) Tit 64, 'Van Bethalinge, bewijsinghe etc'
(2): '...midts dat bewijsinghe gheen betalinghe en is'; ALR I, 11 § 380: 'Die bloBe Anweisung einer
Schuldforderung ist noch fur keine Abtretung derselben zu achten'; C.J.A. Mittermaier, Grundsatze
des Gemeinen Deutschen Privatrechts, (7th ed. 1847) vol 2, § 561, at 816.
209 This point, though difficult, is important. Even the great Max Kaser did not appreciate the
subtleties at the first attempt. In the first part of the first edition of his magisterial work, Das romische
Privatrecht (1955) Part I, § 152 II, at 544, he wrote: 'Der Schuldner hat dem Neuglaubiger gegenuber
zwar die Exceptionen, die er dem Altglaubiger dem neuen entgegensetzen konnte'. In other words, the
debtor (P) can plead those defences he had against the old creditor (X) against the new creditor (R).
That is not correct. Compare the revised, and correct, approach in the second edition: Kaser, RPR I, §
152 II 3, at 652. In Scots law, the principle is properly articulated in Dirleton's report of the Court of
Session's decision in Grant v Lord Banff (1676-1677) Mor. 1654 at 1657: '...if the suspender had
been content to give bond to him, it would have been delegatio, in which case the exceptions
competent against the delegantem would not have been competent against the person in whose favours
the delegation was made'. The reference here to delegatio is to imperfect delegation. Cf. modern
German law in § 417 I BGB\ 'Der Ubernehmer kann dem Glaubiger die Entwendungen
entgegensetzen, welche sich aus dem Rechtsverhaltnis zwischen dem Glaubiger und dem bisherigen
Schuldner ergeben'). In French law, the new debtor cannot plead the defences that were available to
the original debtor against the creditor: Neumayer, 'La transmission des obligations en droit compare'
in La transmission des obligations at 231-232. Cf. the decision of the Cour de Cassation in Ste
Calberson International c Ste Trans Ouest 1998 La Semaine Juridique 11-10050.
210 But see the view to the contrary of R.T. Troplong, Des privileges et hpotheques ou, Commentaire
du titre XVIIIdu livre IIIdu code civil, (4th ed. 1845) at 527-528.
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acceptance effects a cession of sorts; others, that the double-discharge P-X and X-R
occurs, that discharge being subject to the resolutive condition if P fails to pay R.
Additionally, a mandate to pay is revocable prior to acceptance;211 a mandate to
uplift is irrevocable. There are also some difficult cases:
(a) Is P bound to pay R if ordered to do so by X? This will depend on
the contractual relationship between X and P. In the standard
example of a bank customer relationship, P will be bound to pay R
providing X is in funds or has a suitable overdraft facility.
(b) Is R bound to accept performance from his debtor's debtor? R is
probably bound to accept payment of X's debt from P. However,
if the payment is in anything other then legal tender, some sort of
consent, probably implicit, is probably required. The position
would be the same if X offered R payment in anything other than
legal tender; the general principle being that creditors need only
accept payments in legal tender.212
(c) What is the patrimonial effect of an order to pay compared to an
assignation? This issue is best focussed with the question: what is
the effect of the order on the insolvency of X?213 Until payment
there is no discharge either of the P-X debt or the X-R debt. If
there is only an order to pay, which is retained by R, then there is
also no transfer of any claims. If presented with the order after the
211 C.J.A. Mittermaier, Grundsatze des Gemeinen Deutschen Privatrechts, (7th ed. 1847) vol 2, § 561,
815. See too Morrice v Sprot (1846) 8 D 918 at 924 per Lord President Boyle and Strang v Ross,
Harper & Murphey (Sh Ct) 1987 SCLR 10 to the same effect. Strang characterised the mandate to
pay as an assignation. However, the result was correct: the mandate was revoked by the death of the
granter. An uninimtated assignation is not revoked by the death of the cedent: Confirmation Act 1690
(72mo c. 26; APS, c. 56). See further n 539 below.
212 Cf. Waterston v City of Glasgow Bank (1874) 1 R 470 at 474 per the Sheriff-Substitute (Gillespie
Dickson).
213 It has been suggested that since a delegation of rights is a dispositive act, it can be challenged by
creditors if the delegating party subsequently becomes insolvent in the prescribed period: L Aynes, La
cession de contrat (1984) at 50-51, notes 119 and 124. If P subsequently becomes insolvent, it is
thought his payment could also be challenged since the effect of the payment was also to discharge his
liability to X. Note, however, that it is only on acceptance or, failing which, payment, that X's liability
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insolvency of X, P can and should refuse to accept. If X breaks
after acceptance by P, P is nevertheless liable to pay R. Similarly,
if P becomes insolvent, or fails to satisfy X's debt to R, X remains
liable. After acceptance by P, however, it is probably the case that
creditors of X can no longer arrest in the hands of P. This would
suggest that the effect of acceptance is to discharge P's obligation
to X subject to a resolutive condition which is triggered on P
failing to perform to R.
(d) What of P's defences? It seems that in cases of orders to pay, P is
paying to discharge X's debt. This is different from the case of a
cession. In a cession, the debtor, P is paying R to discharge his
own debt: R is P's creditor. In the cession case, P can raise all
defences he would have had against X, against R. In the order of
payment situation, however, P is paying to discharge X's debt.
The instruction is from X to P. There is no question of transfer.
The difference to P is that he cannot raise any defences that he has
in his relationship with X against R.214 Similarly, if P overpays to
R, or if it transpires that the relationship between X and P was
void, P cannot recover from R. This is because R has received
only that which is owing to him. The debt between X and R has
91 S
been discharged. It is X who has then been enriched.
(e) Competition. X orders P to pay his (X's) creditor R. Thereafter, X
assigns his claims against P to a third party, Y. If Y intimates this
assignation to P before P pays R, or P accepts the order to pay R,
Y becomes P's creditor. Does this necessarily mean, however, that
to R is discharged. Until then, creditors of X can arrest in P's hands: cf. F. Roger, Traite de la saisie-
arret, (2nd ed. 1860) at 193, para 209.
214
Although it is not clear whether P can raise defences based on the relationship between X and R.
As we will see, this is probably not permitted.
215 Detailed discussion of three party enrichment situations is outwith the scope of this work, but see H
L MacQueen, 'Payment of Another's Debt' in D. Johnston and R. Zimmermann (eds) Unjustified
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P cannot still pay R or X. It could be argued that, since X ordered
P to pay R, X's instruction can be raised against Y on the basis of
the assignatus rule. However, the better view is that by virtue of
the assignation (completed by intimation), X has thereby revoked
his order. Unlike an assignation or mandate to uplift (which are
irrevocable), the order to pay is inherently revocable before
acceptance.216 P must therefore now pay Y. Since P has never paid
R, X will remain liable to R. A similar issue will arise if another
creditor of X lays an arrestment in the hands of P after X has
ordered P to pay R but before acceptance.
(f) Can an unaccepted order to pay be transferred? The matter was
somewhat controversial in the drafting of the German provisions.
As has been stressed above, until there is acceptance by P, R has
no rights against him to transfer.217 After acceptance, R has an
independent right against P. Indeed it is questionable why a
specific provision in the codes dealing with Anweisung is required
to state that such rights can be assigned.
Although there are few modern cases dealing with the order to pay, they are - at any
rate, were - commonly used in Scottish practice. Private lawyers seldom reflect on
the effect of taxation regimes on the development of private law. But the influence
can be considerable. Take, for example, a contractor, A Ltd, employed by a local
authority. There are a number of ways A Ltd may utilise its rights to payment. Prior
to 2003,218 a common method in practice was to instruct the local authority to pay
such sums that were owing (rather than a particular sum) to a named creditor or
Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (2002), 458 and S. Meier, 'Mistaken Payments in
Three-Party Situations: A German view of English Law' (1999) 58 CLJ561.
216 Morrice v Sprot (1846) 8 D 918 at 924 per Lord President Boyle. Cf. Crockat v Brown (1743)
Elchies, Assignation No 5 and ALR I, 16 § 275.
217 See U. Hiiffer, 'Anweisung' in Miinchener Kommentar zum BGB, (4th ed. 2004) § 792, Rn 2.
218 When Stamp Duty was abolished.
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219order. The reason was simple: such an instruction was not liable to stamp duty; an
990
assignation would have been.
F. Sub-Contracting.
While it is not possible for A to transfer his liabilities to B without the consent of
his creditor (C), it is possible for A to enter into an agreement with B whereby B
undertakes to perform A's obligations to C. Sub-contracting obligations is generally
unobjectionable because the rights and obligations of the original parties (A and C)
221 222remain unchanged. A, therefore, bears the risk of the insolvency of B. Where
there is no personal choice in the agreement between A and C, then C will be
contractually bound to A to accept any satisfactory performance tendered on A's
behalf.223 C probably also has no title to sue B, or vice versa. If there is personal
choice, i.e. delectus personae, then A cannot enter into such a sub-contract; to do so
would probably breach his contract with C (although it is difficult to see what loss
merely entering into such a contract occasions C). In any event C would not be
bound to accept the performance of anyone other than A. There will always be a
practical question of what loss has actually be occasioned to C by performance of
A's obligations by another. A clause in a lease barring assignation does not bar sub-
219
'Stamp Duty on Mandates' (1926) 42 Scottish Law Review 190; 'Mandates' (1938) 54 Scottish
Law Review 37. It should be remembered that Stamp Duty was not a mandatory tax. However, non-
stamped instruments could not be relied upon in court proceedings: see Henty & Constable Brewers
Ltd v IRC [1961] 1 WLR 1504 at 1511 per Donovon LJ. For a recent case involving an assignment,
see Coflexip Stena Offshore's Patent [1997] RPC 179.
220
Stamp Act 1891, schedule 1 (as amended); M.J.M. Quinlan, Sergeant and Sim on Stamp Duties,
12th edn (1998), 225 and 268.
221 See e.g. Hodge v Brown (1664) Mor 2651. Cf. D.M. Walker, The Law of Contracts and Related
Obligations in Scotland, (3rd ed. 1995) para 29.34. Walker's passage is confused: he would admit the
assignation of obligations without the consent of the creditor. Cf. § 267 I BGB.
222 Borders Regional Council v J Smart & Co (Contractors) Ltd 1983 SLT 164 at 168 per Lord
Justice-Clerk Wheately: 'The fact that someone else was actually doing the work did not alter that
legal responsibility. Although the hand which was doing the work for them was chopped off when the
sub-contractors went into liquidation and went out of business, the legal liability to see that the works
were completed to the satisfaction of the architects remained with [the original contractor]'.
223 West Stockton Iron Co Ltd v Neilson & Maxwell (1880) 7 R 1055 at 1060 per Lord Gifford
followed in Johnson & Reay v Nicoll & Son (1881) 8 R 437; Stevenson & Sons v Maule 1920 SC 335.
To plead a relevant case of delectus personae, see Ian McLaren Building Maintenance Ltd v Gordon
1995 GWD 31-1629.
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224
contracting. Some of the sources refer to the right of a contractor to 'delegate'
performance of his obligations to another. This is a common and every-day usage of
the term 'delegation'.225 However, the term is apt to mislead. In Scots law,
'delegation', properly so-called, is a method of extinguishing obligations.
G. Adoption of Contracts on Insolvency.
One of the problems with the law of assignation in Scots law has been the continued
reliance on cases that have nothing to do with transfer of claims. Three classic cases
which accorded such importance to the principle of delectus personae in assignation,
226Anderson v Hamilton, Asphaltic Limestone Concrete Co Ltd v Glasgow
997 998 •
Corporation and Cole v Handyside, were not assignation cases. All involved
insolvency administrators. The question was whether the liquidator or trustee was
entitled to 'adopt' contracts of the insolvent. This principle is of crucial practical
importance, particularly in corporate insolvency.
Generally speaking, where a debtor has become insolvent, the insolvency
administrator (including for present purposes liquidators, receivers and
administrators) appointed on his estate has a choice as to whether to continue to
perform the insolvent's obligations under a contract.229 He may wish to do so in
order to claim the counter-performance. But there may be no incentive for the
administrator to perform. For example the insolvent may have an obligation to
deliver goods which were paid for in advance. There is no adoption merely by
claiming an accrued debt.230 And the insolvency administrator may have little to gain
224 For a case involving a lease, see Rochead v Moodie (1687) Mor 10392. See also Lady Binnie v
Sinclair (1672) Mor 10382 (where sub-letting was prohibited).
225 Central Motors (Glasgow) Ltd v Cessnock Garage & Motor Co 1925 SC 796; W.J. Harte
Construction Ltd v Scottish Homes 1992 SC 99.
226
(18 75) 2 R 355.
227 1 907 SC 463.
228 1 9 1 0 SC 68.
229 For the general effect of insolvency on obligations, see D. Hutchison and F. Reid, 'The Exercise of
Contractual Rights or Powers Against an Insolvent Estate' (2003) 120 SALJ 116. This writer would
not agree with all of the authors' conclusions.
230 Sturrock v Robertson's Tr. 1913 SC 582; Craig's Tr. v Lord Malcolm (1900) 2 F 541.
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from adopting that contract (save from where the administrator is seeking to keep the
business alive as a going concern and wishes to protect goodwill). But if the
insolvency administrator decides to undertake performance of the insolvent debtor's
obligations, this is known as 'adoption'. It has nothing to do with assignation. Nor is
it likely to be a novation or delegation:231 the other party is not discharging the
debtor. Adoption is an independent concept. It allows the administrator to perform
the debtor's obligations. While an insolvency administrator can decide to adopt one
contract with a particular creditor but not another,232 it seems that he cannot 'cherry-
pick' particular rights in an individual contract.233
In English law, receivers were not, at common law, agents of the company.
They were therefore personally liable on contracts. Court-appointed receivers were
usually expressly appointed as agents of the company. Consequently, they had no
liability on contracts which they either adopted on entered into on behalf of the
company.234 The present law, in both Scotland and England, is that the liquidator,
receiver or administrator is personally liable on adopted contracts of employment.
Employees under such contracts therefore do not have to rank as creditors in the
insolvency: they can sue the receiver himself for payment of wages, pension
contributions and the like.235 As for other contracts, appointment of a receiver, per
se, does not affect the existence of the contract; but the receiver does not adopt by
231 Cf. R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, (2nd ed. 1997), 243 ff. J. St. Clair and Lord
Drummond Young, The Law of Corporate Insolvency in Scotland, (3rd ed. 2004) para 6-22 provide no
guidance as to the juridical nature of adoption.
232
Asphaltic Limestone Concrete Co Ltd v Glasgow Corporation 1907 SC 463.
233 Powdrill v Watson [1995] 2 AC 394 at 449 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
234 The history is recounted by Nicholls LJ in Re Atlantic Computer Systems [1992] Ch 505.
235
Insolvency Act ('IA') 1986, ss 57(1A) and (2A). The receiver is entitled to be indemnified out of
the property in respect of which he was appointed. It is not immediately clear whether an adopted
contract falls under the 'pr0Perty *n respect of which he was appointed'. This raises the issue of
whether future property is attached by a floating charge. In Ross v Taylor 1985 SC 156, the Inner
House held that future property is covered by a floating charge. However, since a floating charge
attaches as if it were a fixed security (in the case of claims, an assignation in security) such future
property must be assignable. Contracts can only be transferred in their entirety with the consent of the
original parties. There are difficulties with the idea that a contract in toto can be assigned in security:
the creditor would be taking on a liability. Admittedly, in English law at any event, the House of
Lords has ignored such conceptual niceties: Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8)
[1998] AC 214. Crystallisation of a floating charge does not affect the assignatus principle; where the
company is insolvent, balancing of accounts in bankruptcy will additionally be available to the debtor.
See discussion in chapter 5 below, Part III, A.3.
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mere reason of his appointment.236 Curiously, however, the legislation does not
237
provide for the effect of adoption of a contract that is not an employment contract.
238A receiver has fourteen days to decide whether to adopt a contract of employment.
By statute, the effect of adoption of a contract of employment by an administrator or
receiver is prospective in effect only.239
The Scots law of adoption of contracts was further confused as a result of the
introduction of receivership in 1972.240 A floating charge attaches 'as if it were a
fixed security. For debts due to the company in receivership the relevant 'fixed
security' is an intimated assignation in security.241 It was suggested that this view
was problematic in the case of mutual contracts: a floating charge holder could thus
949
become liable for the company (in receivership)'s obligations:
"Many contracts would contain an element of delectus personae and
would not be assignable. For example, if the effect of the appointment
of a receiver to a construction company is to assign its contracts to the
security holder, then a bank, while it would be able to recover certified
payments, could be liable to complete the construction of a motorway
or housing scheme. If, on the other hand, the suggestion is that only
the company's rights are assigned, while its obligations remain
incumbent upon it (cf. Gloag, Contract (2nd ed.) p. 416), so as to
enable the bank to recover the payments even though the company
may be unable to fulfil its outstanding obligations, the result is plainly
inequitable."243
This opinion exemplifies the confusion in the Scottish authorities between the
transfer of contracts and the assignation of claims. It is indeed absurd that an
236 IA 1986, s. 57(4).
237 Cf. Re Newdgate Colliery Ltd [1912] 1 Ch 468. Where a receiver retains property of another
without paying hire charges and the like, the receiver is not liable for adopting the contract. There is
nothing to stop the true owner retaking possession of the goods: Re Atlantic Computer Systems [1992]
Ch 505 at 524C-G. But compare the older Scottish authorities cited in n. 246 ff, below. Where a
company is in administration, the position may be different: IA1986, s. 19.
238 IA 1986, s. 57(5). This overrules the decision in Nicoll v Cutts [1985] BCLC 322. Cf. Jamieson,
Petr 1997 SC 195 and Re Antal International Ltd [2003] 2 BCLC 406.
239 For administration, see s. 19 (6); for receivership, see ss 57 (2) - (2D), IA 1986.
240
Companies (Floating Charges and Receivers) (Scotland) Act 1972, s. 13 (7).
241 W.A. Wilson, 'The Receiver and Book Debts' 1982 SLT (News) 129; Forth & Clyde Construction
Co Ltd v Trinity Timber & Plywood Co Ltd 1984 SC 1.
242 R.J. Reed (now Lord Reed), 'Aspects of the Law of Receivers in Scotland' 1983 SLT (News) 237.
243 Reed, ibid, 239.
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assignee of receivables could be liable to construct a housing scheme. But the idea
that an assignee of a claim can become liable for any of the cedent's liabilities is
absurd. Assignation transfers only rights. Moreover, the result is not 'inequitable'.
The debtor is not bound to make additional payments for what has not been
performed. This is a basic application of the assignatus rule. In any event, where
there is insolvency, unfairness is no argument; insolvency, by definition, ensures
only unfairness.244 Where there is an existing contract, the insolvency administrator
may voluntarily wish to perform the obligations incumbent on the debtor company
for the simple reason that until the obligations are performed there will be no right to
payment. The insolvency administrator can do this by adoption. However, if there is
delectus personae in the company in receivership, the insolvency administrator
himself - or, for that matter, the charge holder - cannot perform (without the
debtor's consent). In this respect, adoption is like sub-contracting. Of course, where
there is apparently delectus personae in a jurisitc (as opposed to a natural) person,
the concept is emptied of much content. Legal persons have a personality only in the
legal sense. Directors, shareholders and employees come and go. Therefore, if, in our
example, the administrator is of the view that the contract may be of value, he can
have the contract performed by employees or officers of the company.
The general principles of adoption of contracts at common law are even less clear
than under statute.245 The issue is not limited to administrators and receivers. It will
apply to the trustee in sequestration over the estate of an individual; to the judicial
factor acting on the estate of, for example, a partnership; or a trustee acting under a
trust deed for creditors.246 Moreover, adoption is not, for that matter, limited to
contracts of employment. Many of the older Scottish authorities deal with the
244 See, in particular, G.L. Gretton, 'Ownership and Insolvency' (2004) 8 Edin LR 389.
245Edinburgh Heritable Security Co Ltd v Stevenson's Tr (1886) 13 R 427 at 428 per Lord McLaren
(Ordinary): "The ground of action is that the trustee has 'adopted' the subjects as his property. I am
not sure that I understand exactly what is meant by this expression. It is a metaphysical expression
borrowed from a different branch of the law; and after hearing argument I am still unable clearly to
represent to myself what is the legal obligation whereby the defender is supposed to have rendered
himself responsible for the payment of the heritable debt."
246 Ford & Sons v Stevenson (1888) 16 R 24.
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adoption of leases by trustees for creditors.247 Adoption is not to be implied where
the trustee has entered only into tentative possession,248 nor indeed if the trustee sells
the lease subject to conditions, without having entered into possession himself.249 It
has been the law since Ross v Monteith250 that a trustee who adopts a lease is
personally liable for arrears of rent. And, further, since the trustee cannot possess
without paying, the landlord need not rank on the tenant's bankrupt estate for arrears
since these are expenses incurred by the trustee and, as such, expenses of the
9 S1
insolvency. But where, for example, the landlord has acceded to the trust deed or
conducted himself in such a way that he intended to claim as an ordinary creditor
upon the funds, the preference may be lost.252
The concept of adoption is a fascinating one. It cannot be further discussed here.
What should be evident, however, is that there is a long tract of authority dealing
with this concept. Adoption and assignation are often confused. Many of the cases
deal with leases where the law is anyone's guess. In any event, assignation of claims
is distinct from the concept of the assignation of a lease. Finally, some of the cases
are not consistent with the modern view of adoption handed down by the House of
Lords in the context of the modern statutory framework applicable to administration
9S9
and receivership and adoption of contracts of employment.
247 See e.g. Kirkland v Gibson (1831) 9 S 596 affd (1833) 6 W & S 340 HL; Kirkland v Cadell (1838)
16 S 860 (Whole Court); Cf. the brief discussion by Professor Halliday in the Scottish Law
Commission Memorandum Examination of the Law Relating to Insolvency, Bankruptcy and
Liquidation in Scotland (SLC Memo No 16, 1971). There is neither reference to authority nor
identification of the principles involved.
248 Dundas (Lord Strathmore's Tr.) v Hood (Kirkaldy's Tr.) (1853) 15 D 752.
249 Imrie's Tr. v Clader (1897) 25 R 15.
250
(1786) Mor 15290. This can be contrasted with adoption of contracts of employment under modern
insolvency legislation which is prospective only.
251 Nisbet and Company's Tr., Petr. (1802) Mor 15268 at 15270. See also Dundas (LordStrathmore's
Tr) v Hood (Kirkaldy's Tr.) (1857) 20 D 225. Cf. Lachlan MacLean's Tr. v MacLean of Coull's Tr.
(1850) 13 D 90 at 96 per Lord Mackenzie.
252 Lachlan MacLean 's Tr. v MacLean of Coull's Tr. (1850) 13 D 90. Interestingly, in Lachlan there
was a suggestion that a trustee for creditors who adopts the lease may be liable only up to the value of
the estate. Cf. Wilson v Magistrates of Dunfermline (1822) 1 S 417 (389 NE) and Moncreiff v
Ferguson (1896) 24 R 47.
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H. Sub-Participation and other Contractual Arrangements.
Only rights, and not obligations, are assignable. In the agreement between the
'cedent' and 'assignee', however, there may be a term that the assignee is to be
responsible for the fulfilment of the obligations of the cedent towards the debtor. In
so far as this imposes a contractual obligation upon the assignee towards the cedent
the term is unobjectionable. While it is not inconceivable that the debtor could have a
jus quaesitum tertio so as to allow him to require the assignee to fulfil the obligations
in the agreement between cedent and assignee, the cedent will remain primarily
liable for his obligations.254
As has been observed, in Scotland, the transfer of a claim is, usually, a three-step
9SS
process. The contract to assign, like any other contract in Scotland, does not
require consideration; strictly speaking, neither does the conveyance. In some
other systems the contract and transfer are inseparable. In French-based systems,
cession is seen as a sale. The sale becomes effective between the parties thereto on
agreement being concluded. This will have effect with third parties on notification to
the debtor. In Scotland, the contract and conveyance are separate. But whatever the
consideration, transfer occurs only on intimation of the delivery of the transfer
agreement. What, then, if there is a mere 'sale' of claims without assignation? What
is the effect of an agreement to assign, which is never implemented by the cedent (by
delivery of the transfer agreement) or by the assignee (by intimation)? In modern
253 Powdrill v Watson [1995] 2 AC 394, discussed in R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency
Law (2nd ed. 1997), 243 ff. Powdrill was followed by the Inner House in Lindop v Stewart Noble &
Sons 1999 SCLR 889.
254 Cf. A. Rey, 'Cession de Creance' in P. Raynaud and J.L. Aubert (eds) Dalloz Encyclopedic
Juridique (2e edition) Tome III, (1986) para 536 and J. Ghestin, 'La Transmission des Obligations en
droit positif fran9ais' in La transmission des obligations (1980), 59, No 78 : 'II peut y avoir tout
d'abord, « cessionnaire » s'engage a l'egard du son « cedant» a payer la dette de ce dernier. Ce
contrat reste tout a fait etranger au creancier, qui ne peut s'en prevaloir et qui garde la possibility
d'exiger le paiement du debiteur initial, s'il n'est pas paye par le « cessionnaire »'.
255 There may not be an initial contract as, for example, in a gratuitous assignation: consequently, the
assignation would be a two-stage process consisting of delivery of the real agreement and intimation
thereof.
256
But, it should be noted, a gratuitous conveyance may have serious transfer consequences. See the
discussion in chapter 6 below, 'Validity', Part IV, A.
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financial practice, non-notification debt factoring is termed 'sub-participation'.257
The claims are sold to the debt factor. There will either be an unintimated assignation
in favour of the financier or the seller will purport to hold the receivables in trust for
the factor. As for the first case, an unintimated assignation has few transfer
consequences in Scots law. In other legal systems, special provisions are applicable
to the sale of receivables. For example, in French law, the Loi Dailly gives third
party effect to the sale agreement.258 Notification to the debtors is not required. In the
second case, it has been held that the trust will effectively protect the beneficiary (i.e.
the buyer or factor) against the insolvency of the seller.259 There are serious
problems, however, with the view that a trust can be validly utilised for the stated
purpose of defeating the rights of lawful creditors.260 In other situations, such
behaviour would be categorised as fraudulent.
257 Cf. D. Desjardins, 'Assignment and Sub-Participation Agreements - A Basic Overview' (1986) 65
Canadian Bar Review 224. See R. Goode, Commercial Law (3rd ed. 2004), 146, Fig. 4.5 for a
diagrammatic distinction between sub-participation and assignment.
258 Loi facilitatant le credit aux enterprises of 2.1.1981, the so-called Loi Dailly, (taking its name from
Senator Etienne Dailly who introduced the legislation), now found in the Code monetaire et financier
(2005) Art. L 313-23 sqq.
259
Tay Valley Joinery Ltd v CF Financial Services Ltd 1987 SLT 207.
260 G L Gretton, 'Ownership and Insolvency: Burnett's Tr v Grainger' (2004) 8 Edin LR 389 at 394;
K.G.C. Reid and G.L. Gretton, Conveyancing 2004 (2005), 80 ff. There are also more technical
reasons why a trust in favour of the 'assignee' should not defeat the rights of a creditor of the trustee
holding a floating charge, for which see K.G.C. Reid, 'Trusts and Floating Charges' 1987 SLT
(News) 113. Also, as is pointed out by A.J.M. Steven and S. Wortley, 'The Perils of a Trusting
Disposition' 1996 SLT (News) 365 at 367, declaring a trust in favour of the putative transferee is the
converse of transferring to the buyer; see too a case they cite: Ewart v Hogg (1893) 1 SLT 63 OH.
Interestingly, J.G. Birrel gave no reasoned response to this argument in his reply at 1996 SLT (News)
395. Cf. J. Chalmers, 'In Defence of the Trusting Conevyancer' 2002 SLT (News) 231 and I.M.
Fletcher and R. Roxburgh, Greene and Fletcher, the Law and Practice of Receivership in Scotland,
(3rd ed. 2005) para 5.22: 'While there has always been resistance to the introduction of equitable
principles into the law of Scotland, it seems clear that the courts in Scotland will be prepared to
examine the reality of the transaction. If the right to payment of debts is truly vested in another person,
even although a formal assignation of that interest has not been intimated to the third party, the court
will apparently be prepared to give effect to the arrangement'. But that is no argument. There is no
obligation to intimate an assignation, although the 'assignee' who does not takes a risk. Fletcher and
Roxburgh argue that assignees who do not intimate should be absolved of that risk. That is a policy
issue to be addressed by the law reformer, not the judge. In any event, compare Fletcher and
Roxburgh, para 8.18. There the authors expressly state that in Scotland intimation is a prerequisite for
a valid assignation.
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I. Transfer of debts and contracts.
1. Introduction.
Assignation/cession is the transfer of rights against the debtor without the
consent of the latter. Delegation is the discharge of an existing obligation on the
undertaking of a new obligation by a debtor of the original debtor toward the original
debtor's creditor. All parties must consent and there must be an intention on the part
of the creditor to discharge. A double discharge of two debts by one payment can be
achieved by an order to pay. This is all good and well in principle. But what if the
parties wish to transfer both rights and liabilities, or just the liabilities? An
assignation of the rights and a delegation of the liabilities would necessitate a
discharge of the original liabilities followed by the constitution of new debts. This
will have implications, for example, in matters of prescription and for any accessory
securities. Logically, however, a further alternative should be available: transfer of a
liability or a contract in toto. But though a logical possibility, such a concept raises
difficult questions of legal principle.261 We will here concentrate on the transfer of
entire contracts rather than of debts, since the former is of greater practical
importance, and the same principles apply mutatis mutandis. Although the Scottish
sources are confused, it seems (albeit by default rather than as a product of critical
reasoning) that Scots law recognises the possibility of the transfer of an entire
contract.262 There are, however, very few examples of a pure assignment of contract
261 Cf. A.F. Schnitzer, Vergleichende Rechtslehre, (2nd ed. 1961) vol II, 626: "Die neueste Etappe der
Entwicklung ist nun, ob nicht nur eine einzelne Forderung abgetreten, nicht nur eine einzelne Schuld
iibernommen wird, sondern ein ganzes Vertragsverhaltnis iibergehen kann. Die theoretische
Begriindung macht auf romisch-rechtlicher Grundlage Schwierigkeiten. Es sind verschiedene
Theorien aufgestellt: Abtretung der Forderang und Novation der Schuldverbindlichkeiten,
Globalzession, Renovatio contractus, and der Berichterstatter iiber das Problem auf dem Kongrefl zu
Barcelona, auf dem dieses Problem einer Gegenstande war, hat vorgeschlagen, die Moglichkeit zu
schaffen, einen Vertrag an Ordre zu Stellen." To make sense this suggestion must mean that
contractual debtors can undertake that they or their order will perform. The classic conception of order
clauses involves a debt being payable to a named creditor or his order. For the history of an obligation
to be undertaken by a debtor or his order, a so-called 'passive;' order clause, see discussion by L
Goldschmidt, Universalgeschichte des Handelsrechts (1891), 400. Goldschmidt argued that an
understanding of this concept was 'the key to the hitherto mysterious evolutionary history of the Bill
of Exchange'.
262 Some of the cases are discussed above at n. 105. See also McBryde, Contract paras 12-49 to 12-50.
Only E.M. Wedderburn, 'Assignation' in Lord Dunedin et al (eds) Encyclopaedia of the Laws of
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in Scots law. Most of the cases which mention the assignment of contracts are
hopelessly confused with the assignment of claims. There are also many dozens of
cases of the assignation of leases.2633 This, it seems, is the transfer of an entire
contract. The discussion of leases is, however, outwith the scope of this work. Leases
of heritage in Scots law bear some of the hallmarks of a real right. Although the term
'assignation' is used for the transfer of this and some other real rights (except
ownership) a distinction can be drawn between the transfer of personal rights and the
transfer of real rights. This thesis is concerned with the assignation of personal
rights; and, in particular, money claims. This is a classical bipartite transfer. While it
will affect a third party (the debtor), there is still only one transferor and one
transferee. The transfer of contracts - cession de contrat in French - is different. 4 It
is difficult to formulate the juridical structure of this proceeding in terms of the law
of transfer. Indeed, there are some fundamental theoretical difficulties with the
concept of a 'transfer' of an obligation or liability. It seems to be the only type of
transfer which, of its very nature, affects the patrimonies of more than two parties
Scotland (1928) vol 2, 12 correctly draws the distinction between assignable rights and assignable
contracts, the consent of the creditor in the assigned obligations being required in an assignation of
contract.
263 But see Scottish Homes v Inverclyde District Council 1997 SLT 829 OH. Karl Construction Ltd v
Palisade Properties Pic 2002 SC 270 concerned a purported assignment of a contract under Art 19.1.1
of the JCT Standard Form Building contract. These contracts are standard in the construction industry.
Cf. Brown v Doctor (1852) 1 Stuart 269.
263a The cases are collected in A. McAllister, Scottish Law ofLeases (3rd ed. 2002), 143 ff.
264 See L. Aynes, La cession de contrat (Economica, 1984), 59. However, this writer would not agree
with all of the learned author's analysis. See also Art 12:201, Principles of European Contract Law
(2003), which refers to 'Transfer of Contract' and UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts (2004), Art. 9.3.1. There is little discussion of the concept in English; most
references to 'assignment of contracts' are actually references to the assignment of claims. The
position is better on the continent: see, e.g., Lehmann, 'Die Abtretung von Vertragen' in E. Wolff
(ed.) Deutsche Landessreferate zum III Internationalen Kongress fur Rechtsvergleichung in London
1950 (1950); (Professor T.B. Smith, then of the University of Aberdeen, was present at this
conference: 1951 SLT (News) 37). G. Teles, 'La Cession de Contrat' (1951) Revue internationale de
droit compare 217; J. Becque, 'Vertragsabtretung im franzosischen Recht' (1953) 18 RabelsZ 631;
idem, 'La Cession de Contrat' in Etudes de droit contemporain, Contributions franqaises aux IIP et
IV6 Congres internationawc de droit compare, (Paris, 1959) vol II, 89. The most detailed discussion is
found in the various papers in La Transmission des obligations, Travawc des 9 Journees d'etudes
juridiques Jean Dabin (Centre de Droit des Obligations de l'Universite Catholique de Louvain,
Brussels & Paris, 1980). Of existing European Codes, only the Italian Codice Civile fully recognises
the concept of assignment of contract in the codal provisions: see H.P. Bottger, 'Die
Vertragsabtretung nach italianischem Recht (1971) 72 Zeitschrift fur vergleichende
Rechtswissenschaft 1 and (1972) 73 ZvergRW 1 (2 parts).
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(ordinarily the transferor and transferee).265 In the case of cession de contrat there is
no change in the existing contract which is the object of the transfer (like assignation
but unlike a delegation); what changes are the parties to the relationship and the
patrimonies in which the rights and obligations are held. If there is to be the transfer
of a liability, the consent of the creditor in that liability, as in delegation, is crucial.
Absent such consent the creditor will not be bound to accept any performance
rendered by a third party but only from the original debtor;2653 the original debtor
remains bound. If there is consent, there remains the further question as to what is the
effect of this consent on the liability of the original debtor.266 Crucially, for the
purposes of juridical classification, a cession de contrat seems to be achieved entirely
by contract. In this respect it is similar to delegation or novation, but differs from
cession, which is a conveyance. A conveyance requires a transfer agreement and
perfection (by intimation of delivery of the transfer agreement). Only on the
completion of all the formalities is there a transfer of the thing or claim. In a case of
cession de contrat, however, rights and liabilities can move from patrimony to
patrimony as a result of the agreement of the three parties. Nevertheless, while
participation of the debtor is an equipollent to formal intimation of an assignation,267
this can give rise to problems of transfer. It may be difficult to establish the precise
date at which the transfer occurred.2673 This can only be achieved by some public or
extraneous act. In Scotland, an obvious of way of ensuring that the transaction is of a
265 L. Aynes, La cession de contrat (1984), 96. Indorsation of an accepted bill of exchange does not
affect the patrimony of the drawee. He is still indebted. The only uncertainty is the personality of his
creditor. This is like cession. Presentment for acceptance, by virtue of s. 53 (2) of the Bills of
Exchange Act 1882, seems to affect an assignation of funds. Acceptance, therefore, seems to be
deprived of much patrimonial effect (although it remains important for the holder's remedies).
265a Where there is no delectus personae, a creditor may be bound to accept performance which is
tendered on his debtor's behalf. See discussion at 25 ff above.
266 See below.
267 See criticism of this rule in Chapter 4, 'Intimation' below.
267a The transfer of employment contracts under the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of
Employment) Regulations 1981 (implementing the Acquired Rights Directive 77/187/EC: see H.
Kotz, Europdisches Vertragsrecht (1996) § 14, at 410, n. 29; in English as European Contract Law
(1997, trans. T. Weir). The necessity of establishing a certain date of transfer in such cases has been
recently highlighted by the European Court of Justice in C-478/03 Celtec Ltd v Astley [2005] ECR I-
4389.
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certain date would be to register the agreement in the Books of Council and Session
or in the relevant Sheriff Court Books.
2. International Recognition of Transfer of Contracts
Where a creditor transfers a claim to payment, the debtor's consent is not
required. With the transfer of an entire contract, however, the third party's consent
(i.e. the debtor in the claims; creditor of the liabilities) must be obtained. Were it
otherwise, all debtors could alienate their overdrafts to men of straw.268 It is therefore
universally accepted that if a legal system admits the concept of transfer of entire
contracts, the consent of both parties to the original contract, as well as between the
transferor and transferee is required. Unlike in the cession of claims, therefore,
(where a debtor may have a new creditor imposed upon him), in the assignment of a
ORQ .
contract, a creditor cannot have a new debtor imposed upon him. In practice,
standard contractual terms will seek to elicit the consent of the other party to the
contract to a transfer of a contract or obligation in advance. Both the Principles of
European Contract Law270 and the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts271 expressly sanction this. However, bringing the agreement
to the attention of the third party will be necessary in practice. Moreover, a date of
transfer will be required. It is thought that the only way of properly achieving this is
by registration in the Books of Council and Session. As in a cession of claims, where
the debtor has consented in advance, but has not been informed of the transfer, the
268 Cf. W.M. Gloag, Contract (2nd ed. 1929), 416, whose comment that, 'There is no general principle
of law by which a party who has entered into a contract can get rid of the liabilities it may involve by
assigning it to a third party' raises rather than answers the question of whether consent is required.
Normally, the transfer of an asset for no consideration may be subsequently attacked under ther actio
pauliana. With the transfer of a liability, however, any payment would be made by the transferor,
while if there is no consideration, the transferor's general creditors would not be prejudiced: the
transaction leaves one less creditor to pay.
269 Cf. Y.M.J.V. Boon, Assignment of Contract: a Study in Comparative Law (Unpublished M Litt
Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1972), 12. There are problems with Boon's analysis. For example, he
describes (at 7 and 14) the concept of 'assignment' generally as 'the act of one party without the
concurrence of the other party to the contract'; yet, he accepts that in the 'assignment' of a contract,
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third party will be protected if he performs to the original party in good faith. This
point highlights the problems of attempting to achieve by private agreement the
transfer of rights and obligations without at least the passive participation of the
parties to the rights or obligations to be transferred. Whatever legal regime governs




There is no meaningful discussion of these concepts in the Scottish
274
sources; moreover, the existing sources are problematic. Much of the modern case
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law in Scots law on 'assignation' is couched in terms of assignation of contracts.
The litmus test of assignability, according to these cases, is delectus personae. Yet
these two ideas are incompatible. Delectus personae is an implication in fact what
the parties are free to express in any situation. On occasion it can, therefore, be
relevant to the assignation of claims. Assignation may occur without the debtor's
consent. Although there may be no express provision in the relationship between
debtor and creditor that a claim is not assignable, the law holds by implication that it
272 See discussion of this principle in chapter 4, 'Intimation', below, Part IV.
277 Cf. the code edited by Professor M.L.R. Gandolfi, Academie des privatistes europeens, Code
europeen des contrats, Livre Premier, (Preliminary Draft, 2001), Arts 118-120. This is based, to a
large extent, on Italian law. An English version has been published, including revisions by Professor
Harvey McGregor QC, in a special issue of the Edinburgh Law Review. (2004) 8 Edin LR 4-89. This
translation poses some difficulties for the Scots lawyer. For example 'set-off replaces
'compensation', although the former term is wider than the latter in Scots law. 'Non-opposability' is
also dropped, although this is a helpful translation of the well-known term of art in Scots law, 'ad
hunc ejfectum\
274 For comparative discussion, see Y.M.J.V. Boon, Assignment of Contract: a Study in Comparative
Law (Unpublished M Litt Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1972). Although Boon's English style is
not always fluent, this thesis is nevertheless of considerable value, providing an English language
introduction to the sources of French, Belgian, Dutch and German law. This writer would not agree
with Boon's analysis of the Scottish sources.
275 For example, the leading comparative study suggests that Scots law recognises the assignment of
contracts, citing Cole v Handyside 1910 SC 68: K.H. Neumayer, 'La transmission des obligations en
droit compare' in La transmission des obligations (1980), 260, n. 350. Cole involved adoption not
assignment, whether of claims or an entire contract.
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may not be assigned. Social security payments are perhaps the most obvious
example. However, since delectus personae is merely an implication of what the
parties can express, delectus personae cannot override the parties' manifest intention
to transfer. Since the transfer of an entire contract, by its very nature, requires the
consent of all the parties, this consent must trump the implied term. All the
authorities in Scots law which refer to the concepts of assignment of contracts and
delectus personae are, therefore, of limited utility. Either they sanction the
assignment of contracts, in which case delectus personae is not relevant; or they
refer to delectus personae. If so, they are cases dealing with assignation of claims or
sub-contracting. The confusion is exemplified in Gloag and Henderson. It is
suggested that 'where a contract is assigned the assignee acquires the right to sue and
in some cases may be saddled with the liabilities arising under it'.276 But if
'assignation' is the transfer without the consent of the debtor this is problematic, as
the authors recognise:
"In cases where both the contracting parties consent to the assignation
there is no difficulty, but it is a question of some complexity how far
777
one party to a contract can assign without the consent of the other."
This conflates the transfer of contracts with the transfer of claims. If the
principles applicable to each are kept in view, the complexity to which the authors
refer cannot arise: for a valid transfer of a contract, both parties to the original
contract, as well as the assignee, must consent.
(b) Effect of transfer
In principle, if all the parties have consented to the transfer, the new debtor
becomes liable for the obligation. There need only be an intention to transfer; an
778
intention to discharge the original debtor is not required. This is self-explanatory:
276 W.M. Gloag and R.C. Henderson, The Law ofScotland, (11th ed. by H L MacQueen et al, 2001)
para 11.16 (emphasis added).577 ibid.
278 See text at n. 159 above.
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the debt is not being discharged but transferred. Therefore, on the transaction taking
effect, the original debtor is no longer liable under the contract. The flip-side is that
the transferee is liable. The transferee also becomes the creditor of the other party to
the contract. Numerous points, however, are not clear. What is the warrandice in
such a transfer? Is there a guarantee that the transferee is solvent? Or does the
consenting party take that risk by actively consenting? The UNIDROIT Principles
thus articulate a number of possibilities regarding the effect of the transfer on the
transferor's liability: '(T) The other party [i.e. the creditor in the contractual
obligations being transferred] may discharge the assignor; (2) The other party may
also retain the assignor as an obligor in the case the assignee does not perform
properly; (3) Otherwise the assignor remains as the other party's obligor, jointly and
severally with the assignee."279 The position in the Principles ofEuropean Contract
Law is that consent to substitution of a new debtor is the same as consent to
discharge of the original debtor.280 No account is taken of the third possibility, which
appears in the UNIDROIT Principles, that the creditor may consent to a new debtor
performing the original debtor's obligations without intending to discharge the
original debtor. The third possibility is that the creditor may hold the old debtor
jointly and severally liable with the new. It seems to this writer that any of the
possibilities articulated in the UNIDROIT principles would be open to Scots law.
The differences are important. If the original debtor remains jointly and severally
liable, the creditor may accept performance from the new debtor but hold the original
debtor responsible for any non-performance.
(c) Defences.
Where there is a transfer of claims, it is clear that the assignation cannot
prejudice the position of the debtor: assignatus utitur jure auctoris.2Sl What then in
the case of the transfer of a contract? In German law, for example, the new debtor
280 Art. 12:101(1).
281 See chapter 5 below.
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can raise those defences against the creditor which arise out of the original
contractual relationship between the original parties to the transferred contract. The
creditor will also be able to raise any defences arising out of the original relationship
against the new debtor.
(d) Executed and Executory contracts: an alternative approach?
There is perhaps another way of analysing assignment of contract. One can
distinguish between executed, or partially executed, contracts on the one hand; and,
on the other, those on which performance is yet to occur, i.e. executory contracts.
Arguably, in the case of the executory contract, the purported assignment of the
whole contractual relationship by the debtor to another cannot prejudice the creditor.
If the creditor is not satisfied with the performance of the new debtor he can simply
• 989
refuse to perform his own obligations on the basis of the principle of mutuality.
The problem is whether the creditor would be bound to accept the new debtor,
though the creditor has not consented to a new debtor, leaving the entire regulation of
the relationship between the creditor and the new debtor to the law of mutuality. This
is where the problems start. Suppose, for example, that it is the so-called creditor
who is bound to perform first, e.g. to tender goods or services. The person, to whom
performance is to be tendered, then purports to assign the contract in toto (including
the obligation to pay the price) to another party. The original party knows nothing of
this new debtor's solvency. Can it really be the case that the original creditor is
bound to perform to this new party and hope that he gets paid? Would the original
creditor even have a title to sue this new debtor? It seems to this writer that such a
282 This is the approach suggested S. Woolman and J. Lake, Contract, (3rd ed. 2001) para 11.4 for the
assignation of rights. See too, H. Weber, Einfuhrung in das schottische Recht (1978), 81. However,
like Gloag, the approaches of both Woolman and Weber are contradictory. They admit of the transfer
of claims, not liabilities, without the consent of the other party; yet, in the same breath, suggest that
contracts may be assigned in toto, the determinative factor being the presence or absence of delectus
personae. In other words, they have confused the concepts of cession and sub-contracting. No
mention is made of whether all the parties must consent. Since they view assignment as occurring
without the consent of the debtor, in admitting assignment of contracts, they are admitting the
assignment of liabilities without the consent of the creditor which, on their own analysis, is not
permissible.
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case exemplifies the problems of trying to find the basis of conveyances in the
distinction between executed and executory contracts.
(e) Conclusion.
Assignation of contracts is important. The differing concepts of assignation of
claims, delegation of liabilities, orders to pay, sub-contracting etc, are confused in
the modern Scottish sources. There are numerous possible applications of the
doctrine of assignment of contracts. Many statutory transfers can be analysed in
terms of an assignment of a contract.283 The importance of this institution to
commercial lawyers is great. Curiously, it has been entirely ignored by English
lawyers. In English law, there are only two possibilities: assignment of claims or
novation of liabilities.284 The development of this institution is therefore of great
interest. But Scots law, in its underdeveloped state, has not yet grappled with the
283 For example, the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations, 1981.
Nevertheless, previous consideration in the United Kingdom of these provisions has tended to adopt a
novation analysis. Importantly, however, the vesting provisions in Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, s.
31 are not such an example.
284 Don King Productions Inc v Warran [2000] Ch 291 at 318 per Morritt LJ: 'It is not possible (save
pursuant to statutory authority) without a novation to transfer the burden of a contract to a third party'.
See too Sir Guenter Treitel, 'Assignment' in P. Birks (ed.) English Private Law (2000), vol II, para
8.346.
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Chapter 3
History.
"If we were asked - Who made the discovery which has most deeply affected
the fortunes of the human race? We think, after full consideration, we might
safely answer - the man who first discovered that a Debt is a Saleable
Commodity."285
"Assignations are more frequent with us than anywhere; there is scarce
mention of them in the civil law."286
The ability to transfer claims is of considerable economic importance. Yet, in law as in life,
before a revolutionary step is actually taken, that which seemed radical and impossible one
day, may appear obvious and irreplaceable the next. With the circulation of debt, the law was
slow to develop. Indeed, despite the commercial desirability of transfer, the law provided
more hindrance than assistance. The laws of assignation, cession or assignment, from Rome
to Scotland, are perhaps particularly striking examples of Alan Watson's thesis on the
dysfunctional nature of legal rules.287 It is only with some idea of the historical development
of the law, in Scotland and abroad, that the reasons for this arrested development can be
properly appreciated - if not always entirely understood.
I. Roman law.288
A. Background.
The lasting influence of Roman law on the concept of cession of claims in the civilian
tradition proved almost unshakable, with thoroughly unhelpful consequences. Classical
Roman law did not admit the transfer of claims. The relationship between debtor and creditor
was deemed inherently personal. 'The creditor could not be forced to accept another debtor
285 H. MacLeod, Principles of Economical Philosophy, (2nd ed. 1872), 481, quoted in E Allan Farnsworth,
Farnsworth on Contracts, 2nd edn (1998, with Supplement, 2000) vol III, § 11.2, n. 1. Cf. Stryk, De litterarum
cambialium acceptione (1698) who confidently stated that the development of the bill of exchange was the fifth
element without which the modern world could not exist! Quoted by G. Schaps, Zur Geschichte des
Wechselindossaments (1892), 4. Cf. Bell, Commentaries, ( 7th ed. 1870) I, 411.
286 Stair III.i.3.
287
See, in particular, A. Watson, Society and Legal Change, (2nd ed. 1994), 5 and 130; also idem, Legal History
and a Common Lawfor Europe (2001), 101.
288 What follows is necessarily a selective summary of the Roman position. Of primary concern here is the
influence of the probable Roman position on later legal development. For detailed discussion of the Roman
position from pre- to post-classical times, and for references, see Kaser, RPR I §§ 152 and 153; II, §§ 275-276.
See also Luig, Geschichte, 2-9 and Grosskopf, Geskiedenis, 1-23.
73
Transfer ofMoney Claims in Scots Law
nor the debtor to submit to another creditor'.289 This is unsurprising. In Roman law,290 and for
centuries thereafter, failure to perform one's obligations had personal consequences: enforced
servitude and perhaps even death;291 although the deleterious consequences of non-payment
have perhaps been overemphasised:
"The details of personal execution are uncertain. It seems unlikely that a deeply
obscure provision of the Twelve Tables (3.6) - 'let them cut up their shares'
(partes secanto) actually referred, as used to be believed (perhaps by those who
had recently read A Merchant of Venice), to the creditors actually carving up
the debtor's body rather than his assets. But what personal execution did mean,
was that the debtor, although not enslaved, was in the power of the creditor and
could be imprisoned. It may be that this continued until he worked off his debt,
although this is not certain."292
From the debtor's point of view, then, the person of the creditor could be particularly
relevant. If the creditor were allowed to transfer his rights without his debtor's consent, the
debtor could have found himself subjected to a harsher creditor. And a harsher creditor could
spell ready imprisonment, enslavement or worse.
In modern law, cession is the transfer of a claim without the consent of the debtor. In
the civil law, however, even if the debtor did consent, there was simply no mechanism to
achieve transfer. Functional equivalents were possible. There were two. The first was
delegation. This had the opposite effect from transfer. By delegation, the original debt was
discharged and the debtor undertook his obligation to a new creditor.293 The consent of the
parties removed the objection based on the personal nature of the obligation.294 Secondly, a
form of procedural representation was invoked. The 'assignee' was constituted as the
procurator of the cedent. The procurator was empowered to uplift the claim from, and
discharge, the debtor on the creditor's behalf, i.e. in the original creditor's name. However,
the procurator was also entitled in terms of the agreement to retain the proceeds for himself:
the mandate was in rem suam.295 The constitution of the putative assignee as a procurator was,
289 C. Maynz, Cours de droit romain, (4th ed. 1877) vol 2, 78: 'le creancier ne peut etre force d'accepter un autre
debiteur, ni le debiteur de subir un autre creancier'. See too Windscheid, Pandektenrechts § 329.
290 For the Roman concept of obligation, see G. Long, ' Obligationes' in W. Smith (ed.) A Dictionary of Greek
and Roman Antiquities (London, 1875), 817-821. Compare the position in Jewish law: I. Herzog, 'Assignment of
Rights in Jewish Law' (1931) 43 JR 127.
291
Zimmermann, Obligations, 2. Cf. J.A. Crook, Law and Life in Rome, 90 B.C. - 212 A.D. (1967, Cornell
University Press Paperback, 1985), 172-178.
292 D. Johnston, Roman Law in Context (1999), 108-109.
293 See generally, W. Endeman, Der Begriff der Delegatio im klassischen romischen Recht (Marburg, 1959);
Kaser, RPR I, § 152.
294 C. Maynz, Cours de droit romain, (4th ed. 1877) vol 2, 78.
295 Gaius II, 38 and 39.
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of itself, insufficient to protect the assignee's position. It remained precarious. The cedent was
still the creditor. He could revoke the mandate at any time.296 Further, the mandate would be
revoked by the death of the cedent. Only on litis contestatio297 would the procurator become
creditor of the debtor. This effect was an incident of the formulae system. The debtor was
condemned to pay the procurator rather than the cedent: 'whatsoever the debtor ought to have
paid to [the original creditor], he is condemned to pay it to [the new creditor].'298 There was
some juridical difficulty in this proceeding. The ordinary contract of mandate in Roman law
was supposed to be both gratuitous and, importantly, for the benefit of the mandatory.299
Arguably, then, the use of procedural representation to effect a transfer of a claim owed little,
initially at least, to the mandate in rem suam, but rather everything to the novatory effect of
litis contestation The procuratory in rem suam, at this stage, provided only minimal
assistance. It allowed someone other than the original creditor to claim from the debtor and to
retain the proceeds; but that was all. There was no protection from the insolvency, or even
from voluntary acts, of the original creditor. Only by instituting proceedings against the
debtor could the assignee ensure he would not be disappointed. Such conditions were not
conducive to the free circulation of claims.
From the time of Antoninus Pius, (the middle of the second century) the cessionary
was, in certain respects, protected. He was accorded an actio utilis, which allowed him to sue
the debtor in his own name; further, and importantly, the cedent's demise would no longer
have any adverse effect on the cessionary's position.301 Moreover, because the cessionary's
actio utilis was not transferred from the cedent, but was accorded to the cessionary in his own
right, the cedent could not revoke it. Initially, the action was awarded only on the sale of an
inheritance.302 Subsequently, it was extended to the sale of other claims and the giving of a
296
Luig, Geschichte, 4. This factor seemed to support the proposition that claims were not transferable, see Luig,
at 14.
297 For the litis contestatio, see generally J.M. Kelly, Roman Litigation (1966), 5 and M. Kaser and K. Hackl,
Das romische Zivilprozessrecht, 2nd edn (1996) §§ 41 and 42. For litis contestatio in the context of procuratio,
see Muhlenbruch, Cession § 6, 48.
298 J-P Levy and A. Castaldo, Histoire de Droit Civil (2002), 1009.
299 Zimmermann, Obligations, 61.
300
Luig, Geschichte, 4; Cf. L.R. Caney, A Treatise on the Law ofNovation, (2nd ed. 1973), 66 ff.
301 M Kaser, RPR I, § 153, 654. But see C. 4, 10, 1, cited by G.H. Maier, 'Zur Geschichte der Zession' in H.
Dolle et al (eds) Festschrift filr Ernst Rabel, vol II (Tubingen, 1984) at 207 which suggests that the cessionary
was only protected from the cedent's death if litiscontestatio had occurred.
302 D. 2, 14, 16, pr
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claim in discharge of a debt. 3 While the cedent lived, however, the cessionary's position
remained invidious. The cedent, after all, continued to hold the actio directa; as a result, the
cedent could still discharge the debtor. Therefore, by intimating (denuntiatio) to the debtor
that he (the procurator), not the original creditor, was to be paid, the debtor could no longer
validly pay the cedent.304 It has been suggested, therefore, that on notification the cessionary
was in the same position as a transferee.305 It has been said that the denuntiatio took the place
of the litis contestation06 Both destroyed the cedent's actio directa, or at least emptied it of
307
content: the debtor who paid a cessionary after intimation of the procuratio had the
exceptio doli against the cedent.308 Since the existence of a defence of good faith payment in
Roman law is disputed,309 the exceptio provided some measure of debtor protection. If there
had been no intimation, then the debtor was still entitled - indeed obliged - to pay the cedent.
It is not entirely clear whether intimation to the debtor was a constitutive requirement of
transfer or whether it was merely required to place the debtor in bad faith. There is no
indication in the sources that there were any prescribed formalities for intimation.310 In this
311
respect, Roman law was more liberal than modern Scots or French law.
Instead of intimation, the cessionary could also obtain a part payment from the debtor.
This was often achieved by an acknowledgement from the debtor that the procurator was the
new creditor.312 Again, this removed any rights the cedent would have had to claim payment
from the debtor. By a constitution of Gordonian, the cessionary was given direct protection
303 C. 4, 39, 8; C. 4, 10, 2; C. 4, 15, 5. Constitution of the 'assignee' as a procurator in rem suam did not continue
to be necessary for the assignee to entitle the assignee to an actio utilis: Windscheid, Pandektenrechts, § 329, n.
6. Mandate was seen, in Roman law, as just one method of achieving a cession: Windscheid, § 329, n. 11.
304
Quite when this practice began is not clear. C. 8, 41, 3 (Gordonian, AD 239) and C. 8, 16, 4 (Alex, AD 225)
are often cited as examples of the practice in late classical law. However, it is difficult to understand their
relevance.
305 See Luig, Geschichte, 7: he disagrees with the argument that intimation was required only to place the debtor
in bad faith (see D. 2, 14, 16, pr); rather it was required to nullify the cedent's 'lingering' right and constitute the
assignee as the sole creditor in the claim. Cf. C. 8, 41, 3, pr. and Luig, at 14. There are perhaps some parallels
between this so-called 'lingering' right and the problematic so-called 'radical right' doctrine which bedevilled
the Scottish law of property in the nineteenth century: see G.L. Gretton, 'Radical Rights and Radical Wrongs'
1986 JR 51 and 192 (2 Parts). Both doctrines arise from a difficulty in conceptualising a unitary transfer and its
consequences.





309 Cf. Kaser, RPR II, § 277, at 452, n. 9. For good faith payment in Scots law, see chapter 4, 'Intimation' below.
310 C. Maynz, Cours de droit romain, (4th ed. 1877) vol 2, 90.
311 See chapter 4 below.
312 This continues to be a recognised equipollent to intimation in modern Scots and French law: see chapter 4
below, 'Intimation'.
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against the cedent who fraudulently sold the same claim twice.313 The cessionary was given
an independent right, an actio utilis, by reason alone of the fact that he had been granted a
mandate in rem suam.
B. Post-classical Roman law.
In post-classical times, however, the cessionary was given greater substantive
protection. Justinian's awarded the cessionary an actio utilis where a claim was donated.314
With the lapse of the formula system, it was no longer satisfactory to explain the cessionary's
position on the basis of the litis contestatio. Moreover, enigmatic references to actiones after
the formulae system's demise clouded the substantive position. For most scholars, the
combined effect of these references to actional law was that, by the fifth century, Roman law
O 1 c
in the west had reached the position that claims were transferable.
C. Problems with the Roman position.
For the modern lawyer, there are two issues which give cause for concern. First, the
procedural nature of Roman law: the Roman jurists spoke in terms of actions. Abstract rights
or claims were not concepts with which they concerned themselves. The second problem is
the Roman sources. The Corpus Iuris Civilis was compiled in the sixth century. The Digest is
made up of writings of the classical jurists. The last jurists belonging to the classical period of
Roman law, however, had stopped writing in the middle of the third century. The law that is
presented in the Digest, therefore, was some three hundred years out of date. The sources
speak exclusively in terms of actions and of the procurator in rem suam. There is nowhere any
discussion, never mind recognition, of the paradigm transfer of a money claim. There are,
313 The double sale is an age-old problem for the law. For a discussion of the position in modern Scots law, see
chapter 6 below, 'validity', Part IV, B.
314 C. 8, 53, 33 (AD 528) is usually cited although C. 8, 54, 33 seems to be the relevant text. It is strange that
gratuitous transfers were singled out for protection; the law is usually suspicious of transactions for no
consideration.
315
Miihlenbruch, Cession § 16; Luig, Geschichte, 5: 'Die weitere Entwicklung, die bei Justinian ihren
RechtsschluB findet, fuhrt dazu, daB die actio utilis auf Grand aller Rechtsgeschafte gegeben wird, die nach dem
Willen der Parteien eine Ubertragung der Forderangen zum Ziele haben. Dies ist als Regel im Corpus iuris nicht
ausgesprochen, wird aber von der herrschenden Meinung angenommen.' (The further development, which
occurred under Justinian, consisted of an actio utilis being given on the basis of any transaction by which the
parties intended to achieve a transfer. This rale is not expressed in the Corpus Iuris; however, it is accepted by
the prevailing opinion'); Grosskopf, Geskiedenis, 22; Zimmermann, Obligations, 63. For the position in the East:
see, E. Levy, Westrdmisches Vulgarrecht, Das Obligationenrecht (1956), 149-155
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however, several examples in the Roman sources which indicate that there was, at least, no
abstract prohibition on cession in Roman law:
The Lex Anastasiana,316 The Lex provided that the buyer of a litigious claim could only claim
from the debtor the sum that the buyer had paid the cedent, plus interest.317 But why was there
specific provision prohibiting the sale of litigious claims if it were the case that claims were
not assignable at all?318 What does 'sale' in this context mean? Did the sale of an incorporeal
comprehend transfer or merely a contractual right to transfer? As will become clear below, we
just do not know the answer to these questions. What can perhaps be asserted with greater
certainty is that the very existence of the Lex might indicate that the fundamental objection
that another, perhaps harsher, person could not exercise the rights of the original creditor no
longer held sway.
319* • 320Universal succession. This could occur on death or in the cessio bonorum. In a universal
succession, the transmission is of everything in the transferor's patrimony; so, if there were
claims, these would also transmit:
"Si la creance se transmettre avec 1'ensemble du patrimoine, pourquoi ne
pourrait-elle pas tout aussi bien faire l'objet d'un transfert special? En general,
tous les droits qui se transmettent a titre universel peuvent se transmettre
egalement a titre particulier."321
316 C. 4, 35, 22 (Anastasianus, 506). See too subsequent development by Justinian: C. 4, 35, 23.
317 C. 4, 35, 22.1. See Miihlenbruch, Cession § 53; Kaser, RPR, II, § 277 at 453. Cf. Anon, 'Lex Anastasiana'
(1913) 30 SAU 290 at 291: 'It would appear from the preamble of the Lex that [...] there came into existence a
class of persons (perhaps legal practitioners of the baser sort) who made a practice of pestering creditors who
were taking legal proceedings against their debtors, until the creditors reluctantly ceded their rights of action to
such persons for a sum less than the original amount that was owing, and the cessionaries would then worry the
debtors in various ways till they got paid the full amount. To this practice the Lex was calculated to put a stop'.
318 The civilian prohibitions on cession on the grounds of public policy have some parallel with the English rules
on champerty and maintenance. See also the discussion in Johannes Sande Commentary on the Cession of
Actions (trans. P.C. Anders, 1906), 201 ff; Miihlenbruch, Cession § 31, 383.
319 See too e.g. G. Kobler, Lexikon der europaischen Rechtsgeschichte (1997) v. 'Universalsukzession'; and L
Sedatis, 'Universalsukzession' in HRG vol 5 (1998) col 489 and references there cited.
320 See P.F. Girard, Manuel elementaire de droit romain, (8th ed. 1929), 776.
321 'If the claim is transferred with the entirety of a patrimony, why can it not also be transferred individually? In
general, all the rights that can be transmitted by universal succession can equally be transferred by singular
succession': P. Gide, Etudes sur la novation et les transport des creances en droit romain (Paris, 1879), 238. Cf.
A.F.J. Thibaut, System des Pandekten Rechts, (6th ed. 1823) § 77 who says of the alleged general principle that
'cessibel ist, was vererbt; nicht cessibel, was nicht vererbt werden kann, ist falsch'. The example he gives was of
litigious claims. These passed by universal succession on death, but they were not freely assignable as a result of,
for instance, the Lex Anastasiana. However, as J. Barr Ames observes ('The Inalienability of Choses in Action'
in Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History (1909) vol III, 580 at 581), universal succession 'was hardly a
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The beneficium cedendarum actionum: in Roman law the right of the payer of the debt of
another (most often a cautioner) to step into the shoes of the principal creditor was
recognised. This was called the beneficium cedendarum actionum. It was this principle which
gave rise to the general principle of cessio legis (subrogation) in civil law systems. But the
sources are not clear as to whether the beneficium operated a transfer. Indeed, the Roman texts
analyse the payment by the third party as a sale of the creditor's rights. Again, we are
brought back to the difficult issue of sale. In Roman law, sale was a consensual contract. It
was concluded by mutual stipulation. For corporeal moveable property, a physical
conveyance of the property to the transferee (traditio) was required to transfer ownership.
Such a proceeding is evidently ill-suited to claims.
Sale of spes successionis. It was accepted in Roman law that rights to inherit could be sold.
There is an entire title in the Digest dealing with this.323 Since these rights could be sold, it
has been suggested that it must have been supposed that the claims would be transferred to the
buyer.324 The problem with this position is threefold. First, the language of sale is notoriously
imprecise. Even in modern Scots law, 'sale' can mean many things.325 But a contractual right
to a transfer is not the same as a transfer. Second, a buyer may be perfectly content to 'buy'
and pay for an asset without the asset thereupon being transferred to him. Indeed in modern
practice, this is common: non-notification debt factoring is an obvious example. Such a
proceeding often takes place where the buyer is content to bear the risk of the cedent's
insolvency. Third, modern research is hampered by the fact that there was curiously little
discussion in Roman law of the effect of insolvency. It is on insolvency that the difference
between the contract to transfer and the transfer itself becomes crucial. This is not the
appropriate place to discuss this curious lacuna in Roman legal literature. For present
purposes it sufficient to stare into the abyss. The juristic sources that have survived simply do
departure from the rule, since the representative was looked upon as a continuation of the persona of the
deceased'.
322
Paulus, D. 46, 1, 36, discussed by Lord President Rodger in Caledonia North Sea v London Bridge
Engineering 2000 SLT 1123.
323 D. 18, 4, De heredatae vel actione vendita. Cf. the authorities cited in n. 334 below, which suggest that rights
to inheritance could be transferred by in jure cessio.
3"4 T. Hue, Traite theorique etpratique de la cession et de la transmission des creances (1890) vol 1, 193.
325 Cf. Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 17 and s 18, rule 1; Lord Advocate v Caledonian Railway Co 1908 SC 566 at
575 per Lord President Dunedin; Gibson v Hunter Home Designs Ltd 1976 SC 23 and Sharp v Thomson 1995
SC 455 rev'd 1997 SC (HL) 66.
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not consider the abstract question of transfer. Their concern was exclusively with actiones. It
was this focus that would bedevil much subsequent development.
Perhaps the most important argument about the position in Roman law is at one and
the same time the strongest and the weakest: from a modern view, it is almost inconceivable
that Roman society could have functioned without claims being transferable. Claims are
important assets. Roman society was, on one view, a commercial one.326 Practical necessity,
it is argued, would have demanded that claims be exercisable other than by the original
creditor. While the Roman sources seem to indicate that cession in the modern sense of the
term was not admitted, 'it is, however, obvious that no society in which commerce plays even
a minor role can do without it'.327 Tempting as this conclusion may be, it must be
remembered that it has been repeatedly shown that Roman law was dysfunctional in other
"joe
areas. It is perhaps not sufficient to throw one's hands up in exasperation at the prospect
that a sophisticated and commercial society like Rome could have functioned without the
concept of cession. We must be careful not to look at third century Rome or sixth century
Constantinople from an unimaginative modern perspective. In particular, the commercial
329
development of Rome at the time the classical jurists were writing can be overemphasised.
In any event, by way of delegatio and procuratio, almost identical results could be achieved
without a concept of cession. We do well to remember that the industrial revolution did not
seem to be unduly hampered by the failure of English law to admit the assignment of choses
330in action at law until the Judicature Act in 1873.
325 D. Johnston, Roman Law in Context (1999), 77 ff; idem, 'Law and Commercial Life in Rome' (1997) 43
Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 53; F.P. Walton, 'The Growth of Commercial Law at Rome'
(1893) 5 JR 332. Compare the statement by Bell, Commentaries, (7th ed. 1870) I, 506, writing in the context of
the law of agency: 'In Rome, commerce and its relations and facilities were discouraged or not regarded with
favour'.
327 P. van Warmwlo, 'Male Fide Cession, Stare Decisis and Abrogation by Disuse' (1974) 91 SAU 298 at 301.
328 See, above all, A. Watson, Society and Legal Change (1977) chapters 2-4.
329 J.A. Crook, Law and Life in Rome, 90 B.C. - 212 A.D. (1967), 206: "Roman economic life remained
overwhelmingly based on agriculture as its primary product; no industrial revolution, no 'take-off, ever
occurred and no significantly big-business ever appeared. And the law both reflected this situation and
reciprocally helped to condition and maintain it." See also Crook's comments at 207 regarding the primitive
nature of Roman accounting practices.
330 See discussion at n. 403 below. It is, of course, impossible to know how a different legal regime would have
affected economic development. Until recently, the development of legal norms occurred with remarkably little
reference to economics. Nevertheless, the history of the law of cession demonstrates that an economy can find
quite workable functional equivalents. The point is important. Some property law theorists, for example, assume
that a concept of cession is indispensable: see e.g. W. Mincke, 'Property: Assets or Power? Objects or Relations
as Substrata of Property Rights' in J.W. Harris (ed.) Property Problems: From Genes to Pension Funds (1997),
83: 'We need to be able to transfer obligations. Our economy would come to a halt without that possibility. So
we have to model our legal tools according to that need. The outcome seems clear. It must be something like the
general concept of property or propriete as it is found in English or French law'. The reference to 'obligations' is
80
Transfer ofMoney Claims in Scots Law
Others have not been so cautious. It has been argued that the omission of cession from
the Roman texts does not necessarily mean that claims were not transferable in Roman law.
There are two main reasons for this position. First, the compilers of the Digest misunderstood
Gaius (obligationes nihil eorum recipient) This does not mean, according to Gide, that
claims are not transferable at all. Rather, it must be taken in context; claims are simply not
transferable either by the usual conveyances, i.e. mancipatio, in jure cessio, or traditio, or
even by mere stipulatioP2 When the compilers of the Digest encountered this fragment of
Gaius, they forgot that the rule that claims were not assignable had since been superseded by
piecemeal and incremental intervention by the praetor. In taking Gaius at face value they then
sought to excise all the material on cession from the Digest.333
The next point follows from the last: it was because the recognised conveyances were
unsuitable for transferring claims that an artificial analysis had to be employed; this turns the
received interpretation on its head, i.e. the reason that 'cession' could be effected only by
artificial means indicated that economic development had outpaced legal development. The
special proceeding of constituting the assignee as a procurator in rem suam, Gide argues,
occurred because claims had to be, and were, transferred in practice. There was no abstract
prohibition on transfer, simply no other recognised conveyance. The existing institutions of
mancipatio, in jure cessio and traditio were simply of no use in the case of the transfer of a
claim.334
What conclusions can be drawn from these arguments? It seems to this writer that if it
was the case that there was no proper legal mechanism whereby a transfer could be brought
about, then one cannot even begin to suggest that Roman law recognised cession. It is not
sufficient to say that there were suitable functional equivalents. Moreover, much discussion of
the Roman sources is predicated on the modern view of cession, viz. that it occurs without the
consent of the debtor. But there was still no way to bring about a transfer of the claim, even if
ambiguous: modern English law, for example, still does not recognise the transfer of obligations, as opposed to
claims: Pan Ocean Shipping Ltd v Creditcorp Ltd, the Trident Beauty [1994] 1 WLR 161 HL; Sir Guenter
Treitel, 'Assignment' in P. Birks (ed.) English Private Law (2000) vol II, para 8.346.
331 Gaius, Inst. II, 38.
332 T. Hue, Traite theorique etpratique de la cession et de la transmission des creances (1890) vol 1,210.
333 P. Gide, Etude sur la novation et le transport de creances en droit romain (1879), 240-242.
334 It should be noted that there are also two difficult passages in the Roman sources which suggest that
inheritance rights could actually be transferred outright in jure cessio: G. II, 35; Ulpian D. 19, 13 and 14. Cf. H
Home, Lord Karnes, Principles ofEquity, (2nd ed. 1767), 206: 'In our later practice an assignment has changed
its nature, and is converted into a proper cessio in jure, divesting the cedent funditus and vesting the assignee'.
Kames is referring to cessio in jure literally; he is not to be taken as suggesting that Scots law received the
Roman process of in jure cessio.
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the debtor did consent. Only delegatio was available. This would have destroyed the claim,
not transferred it.335 The temptingly forceful argument that the debtor could not have another
creditor imposed upon him without his consent is, therefore, emptied of much content. Even
where there was to be no imposition of a new creditor (because the debtor consented), there
was still no mechanism to achieve a transfer.
D. Post-Classical Roman law to the Glossators and Commentators.
As the law developed, it seems some claims were accepted as transferable. For
example, claims which were held in respect of a thing that was transferred. Grosskopf draws
attention to an example in a Lombard deed of A.D. 789 where rights of action for
compensation for death were transferred to the buyer of slaves.336
A revival of the study of the Roman law found in Digest occurred in the west at the
turn of the twelfth century. Beginning with Irnerius, (c. 1055-c. 1130) the so-called
Glossators337 sought to elaborate and expound on the law in the Digest. Their glosses on the
original text contained much learning and, importantly, cross references without which the
Digest would have remained largely impenetrable. Their work was consolidated by Accursius
(who died in 1260) in the gloss ordinaria,338 The approach was rigorous but academic. They
were unconcerned with the practice of law. Consequently, their views on cession were
conservative and true to the Roman sources. The later Glossators were unequivocal that the
actio personalis held by the creditor could not be transferred to another. Their approach
was preserved for posterity with Accursius' striking comparison of the action-obligation
relationship to the bond between spiritual soul and mortal body: 'the action arising from the
obligation hinges on the bones and entrails of the creditor and can no more be separated from
his person than the soul from his body.'340 It is to this literary quality (or 'dans leur langue
335
Windscheid, Pandektenrechts, § 329, 361.
336
Grosskopf, Geskiedenis, 31-32.
337 For the Glossators and Commentators generally, see: P. Stein, Roman Law in European History (1999). For
their views on cession, see R. Frankel, 'Zur Zessionslehre der Glossatoren und Postglossatoren' (1910) 66 ZHR
305-348; (1911) 67 ZHR 79-126 (2 parts).
338 For a concise introduction see B. Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (1962), 46-47.
339
Grosskopf, Geskiedenis, 50 ff.
340
Zimmermann, Obligations, 58. The paraphrase was first invoked by the Glossators: Azo, Sum. Cod. 4.10 Nr.
19: Si aliquis earn vult omnino a se separare per cessionem, non potest, adeo inhaeret ossibus eius\ Accursius,
Gloss in nominibus on D. 15, 1, 16: Quae nomina sivc actioncs non possunt scparari a domino, sicut nec anima
a corpore\ Accursius, Gloss on D. 17, 2, 3, pr: ossibus...inhaerent, cited by Luig, Geschichte, 12 and Grosskopf,
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energetique et bizarre',341) that Luig and Grosskopf attribute the later acceptance in the ius
commune of the principle that claims were not transferable.342 Indeed, of the otherwise
practically orientated Commentators,343 even such great figures as Baldus (1327-1400) and
Bartolus (1313-1357) were seduced by the poetic appeal of Accursius' exposition; as were
many other scholars of renown in the centuries that followed. In the Glossators' opinions, the
actio directa remained with the original creditor. A third party could only exercise these rights
indirectly by way of a procuratio in rem suam. It was this view which coloured much
subsequent legal development; in Scotland, it clouded investigations of the history and
confused much of what came after.
II. National Developments
A. General
There are some difficulties in tracing the development of the concept of cession. The
concept (or functional equivalents), it will be seen, is universal and ubiquitous. The sources
are numerous. How should differences between case law and juristic writings be evaluated?
The former is necessarily pathological, perhaps unrepresentative of non-contentious general
principles; the latter, on the other hand, may be, and often are, detached from practical
reality.344
B. French Customary Law.
The evolution of the law of cession in France is of particular interest to Scots lawyers.
The French sources evidence the first and most important departures in the European sources
from the strictures of Roman law. Heinrich Brunner has trawled the older French sources in
his research on reified obligations in French law.345 Many of the sources touch on the law of
Geskiedenis, 50. See too, E. Genzmer, 'Nomina ossibus inhaerent' in Universite de Lausanne, Melanges
Philippe Meylan vol 1 (1963), 159-165 and W. Ogris, 'Abtretung' in HRG, vol 1 (1971).
341 P. Gide, Etudes sur la novation et les transports de creances en droit romain (1879), 233.
342
Luig, Geschichte, 18-21; Grosskopf, Geskiedenis, 51.
343 See Grosskopf, Geskiedenis, 44 ff and references there cited.
344 This fundamental problem for legal history is identified by Alan Watson, Ancient Law and Modern
Understanding (1998), 89: 'Evidence for legal history is the written record, occasionally archaeology, but never
the spoken word not recorded in writing. So often the evidence for legal history misrepresents what actually
happened',
345 H. Brunner, 'Das franzosische Inhaberpapier des Mittelalters und sein Verhaltnis zur Anwaltschaft, zur
Zession und zum Orderpapier' originally published in H. Brunner (ed.) Festschrift im Namen und Auftrage der
Berliner Juristen-Fakultat zum 50jdhrigen juristischen Doktorjubildum von Heinrich Thol (Berlin, 1879) but
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cession; otherwise, the basic concept of cession was not regularly invoked. Rather, obligations
to pay were more often reified in a moveable bond.346 These were initially in the form of
undertakings on the part of the debtor to pay the creditor. Sometimes the promise would
include a clause that it was payable to order; sometimes that it was payable to bearer; in other
cases, transfer seems to have been possible even without such a reference.347
However, Brunner has traced several cases from the early thirteenth century which
deal expressly with issues arising out of cession.348 Take, for example, a decision of the
Normandy Exchequer in 1219. The creditor transferred his claim against the debtor. The
assignee then sought payment. The debtor countered the demand by producing a discharge
from the cedent. However, this discharge was held to be ineffectual since it postdated the deed
of cession. The debtor was therefore ordered to pay the assignee. It is not clear whether this
was a double payment. There is also an example of a debtor arguing that he had agreed to pay
the original creditor and the original creditor only; he should not be compelled, therefore, to
enter into proceedings with an assignee.349 In another case of 1298, the assignee was
constituted as a procurator in rem suam350 while there is another referring to a mandate to
uplift.351 It seems, however, that in those areas where cession was admitted, where there was
352
an intention to transfer, the style was irrelevant: a complete transfer was effected. No
distinctions were made, in the sources available, between the different types of mandate or
between transfer and mandate. Apparently, Italian notaries,353 due to their focus on the Roman
actiones, had originally invoked the language ofprocuratio. This practice had spread beyond
Italy; others copied their styles as a precautionary measure. Drafters took what modern
reproduced in K Rauch (ed.) Abhandlungen zur Rechtsgeschichte, gesammelte Aufsatze von Heinrich Brunner
(1931) vol I, 487. All further references to Brunner are to the pagination in the latter collection. There is much
background to be gained from J.P. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law (1968). Grosskopf, Geskiedenis, chapter 5
is, to a large extent, based on Brunner's work: see 78, n. 1.
346
Brunner, 'Das franzosische Inhaberpapier', 494.
347
Brunner, op. cit., 497 observes that the Coutumes du Beauvoisis (1283) 35, 19 recognise the transfer and
transmission of moveable bonds.
348
Brunner, op. cit., 495 ff.
349
Brunner, op. cit., 496. At this time, it seems that the parties would have to consent to entering into
proceedings with each other. Cf. the further examples adduced by Brunner, especially at 498, n. 2, a case
involving a mandate to uplift which he distinguishes from cession.
350
Brunner, op. cit., 496.
351
Brunner, op. cit., 498, n. 2 ('Einkassierungsmandaf). Both the procuratio in rem suam and the
Einkassierungsmandat are mandates to uplift. A procuratio in rem suam is, as the name suggests, in rem suam\
and Einkassierungsmandat may be in rem suam\ but it need not be.
352 Brunner op. cit., 501, n. 345.
353 For whom, see Grosskopf, Geskiedenis, 34-42.
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commercial practice calls the 'belt-and-braces' approach.354 Indeed, many deeds even
purported to constitute transferees of immoveable property as procurators, though the transfer
of immoveable property was not based on any theory of procuratio in rem suam?55 For
Brunner, since such a disponee of immoveables was always considered as a transferee or
singular successor and not merely as a procedural representative, so too should an assignee.356
C. The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: France and the Netherlands
The so-called 'practical' French Romanists, Petrus Rebuffus357 and Andreas Tiraquellus358
held that following a cession the cedent no longer had any claim against the debtor, though
both jurists held that the actio directa remained with the cedent.359 As a result, a claim could
only be transferred once.
The French Humanists, in their attempts to reconstruct the law of Justinian by close
textual analysis, naturally took a more orthodox view of cession. By a mandate in reum suam
a third party could exercise the cedent's actio directa in the cedent's name; by cession, the
cessionary could pursue in his own name by virtue of the actio utilis. But their views were not
always intelligible. When the leading French Humanist, Cujacius, conceded that issues
involving cession were a 'quaestio subtilis, et satis di/fidUs',360 he was at least honest; his
treatment of cession was contradictory. On the one hand, he said that there was no difference
between cession and a mandate in rem suam; on the other, he elaborated different results that
followed from each. Further, he asserted in one place that after cession the actio directa
remained with the cedent; elsewhere that after cession the cedent could no longer claim from
the debtor.
354
Brunner, op. cit., 502: 'Die Sitte der Notare, die Klausel des procurator in rem suam den verschiedenartigsten
Urkunden einzufugen, hat ihren Ausgangspunkt in Italien. Schon die italienischen Notare liebten es, der
Ubertragung des Rechts vorsichtshalber die 'cessio actionum' anzuhangen, eine Klausel, die dann ihrerzeits
wieder den procurator in rem suam hinter sich nachzog'.
355
Brunner, ibid. Although some feudal grants could, admittedly, be construed in terms ofprocuratio.
356 Note Brunner's reference (at 499) to a small compilation of the law of the office of justice in Poitou dating
from the second half of the fourteenth century. This seems to suggest that at that time there were thought to be
two ways to effect a cession: one was by a mandate to pay, the other by a true cession. The latter effected a
transfer of the claim on the debtor becoming aware of the cession; the former was a functional equivalent.
Interestingly, it is stated that a cession must be in writing.
357 P. Rcbuffuo (Pierre Rcbuffi), Tractus dc cessionibus in idem, Commcntarii in constitutionis seu ordinationis
regias (1554) Art. II. Rebuffus was born in 1487 and was Professor in Paris in 1557.
358 A. Tiraquellus, de retrait lignagier § 26 in idem, Opera Omnia (1588). Tiraquellus was born c. 1488 and died
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In the southern Netherlands of the sixteenth century, there was a greater inclination to
accept cession. It was admitted that the cessionary had the right to claim in his own name
from the debtor. The cessionary was also entitled to use diligence, although it was uncertain
whether the cessionary could do this in his own name.361 The Grote Raad van Mechelen also
accepted that cession was a transfer.362 The form, it seems, was derived from the Roman, with
the cessionary being surrogated and substituted into the position of the cedent.363 This is more
consistent with a theory of representation than with the idea of outright transfer. Writing was
always required. It was also suggested that a claim could be ceded only once;364 why this
should be so, however, is not articulated. It is consistent with the understanding that claims
could not be transferred: the 'cessionary' was a mere representative and therefore could not
'delegate' to another what had been 'delegated' to him.365
Under the Humanist influence at the Leuven law school, the Dutch jurists of the day,
such as Gudelinus,366 Zoesius367 and Perezius,368 continued to hold that the actio directa held
by the cedent was not transferable. The cessionary could only make use of the cedent's right
as a procurator in rem suam; as a result, the action had to be brought in the name of the
cedent. The cessionary could sue in his own name only by virtue of the actio utilis.
In the northern Netherlands there were two different approaches. In Friesland, Roman
law was more strictly adhered to than elsewhere in the Netherlands. The two best-known
Frisian jurists, Ulrik Huber369 and Johannes van den Sande370 adopted the conservative view
that claims were not transferable; only the mandate in rem suam was available. This can be
360 J. Cujacius (Jacques Cujas), Opera, ad C. 4, 10, 1, 2, quoted by Grosskopf, Geskiedenis, 91, n. 288.
361 P. Peck (Petrus Peckius), Opera Omina (Antwerp, 1679) 3.6, cited by Grosskopf, Geskiedenis, 100 and
Y.M.J.V. Boon, Assignment ofContract: a Study in Comparative Law (Unpublished M Litt Thesis, University of
Aberdeen, 1972), 183-184.
362 Grosskopf, Geskiedenis, 101, n. 288.
363 H. Coing, Europaisches Privatrecht, Vol 1 (1985), 446-447.
364 See the opinion of Christinaeus (Paul van Christynen) cited by Grosskopf, Geskiedenis, 100.
365 'Delegation' in used in a loose sense. It should not be confused with delegatio.
366 P. Goudelin (Petrus Gudelinus), Commentarium de jure novissimo (Arnhem, 1643) IV.4.
367 H. Zoes (Henricus Zoesius), Commentarius ad D. 44, 7, 67 (Brussels, 1718).
368 A. Perez (Antonius Perezius), Praelectiones in C. 4, 10, 13 (1639). Perezius was born in Spain. See
discussion of these writers in Grosskopf, Geskiedenis, 103, n. 288.
369
Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt (originally published, 1686; 4lh edn enlarged and revised by Z. Huber,
Amsterdam, 1742), in English as The Jurisprudence ofmy Time (P. Gane trans. Durban, 1939). See discussion in
Grosskopf, Geskiedenis, 111 ff.
370 Commenatrius de actionum cessione (1623), in English as Commentary on the Cession of Actions (P.C.
Anders trans. 1906). See discussion in Grosskopf, Geskiedenis, 105-110. Van den Sande's de actionum cessione
has been cited in Scotland: see Ewart v Latta (1863) 1 M 905; while his Theatrum practicantium, hoc est
decisions aurae sive rerum in suprema Frisiorum curia judicatarum (originally published in 1615) is referred to
by Karnes, Principles ofEquity, (3rd ed. 1778) II, 183 in the context of arrestment; Friesland being 'the country
from whence we borrowed an arrestment'.
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contrasted with the opinions of the Roman-Dutch jurists, such as Groenewegen, van Leeuwen,
371and Voet, who were more receptive to the idea that cession effected a transfer. By virtue of
the cession, the right of the cedent was transferred to the cessionary. No notice was required.
The debtor would be protected if he paid the cedent in good faith. The basic principles
enunciated by these writers are reflected in the law that is today found in South Africa.
The influence of these writers on the substantive law of assignation in Scotland does not
appear to have been great; however, all of the works referred to in this section are to be found
in the Advocates' Library.
D. French Law after the Coutumes
It was the Coutume de Paris of 1510 that contained the well known provision: ' le
simple transport ne saisit point'.372 Interestingly, this provision is found in the title on
execution, not cession or sale. In 1580, the provision was supplemented with important
practical details: 'et faut signifier le transport a la partie et en bailer copie auparavant que
d'executer'.373 It is with these provisions that one could now speak of transfer of a claim only
on intimation.
In the late fourteenth century and into the fifteenth there are cases dealing with good
faith payment where the debtor pays in ignorance of the cession; but there seems to have been
no good faith defence where the debtor had private knowledge of it.374 Under the Coutumes of
Anjou and Maine of 1437, the debtor was accorded the right to demand evidence of the
cession from the putative cessionary.375
It is under the heading of 'Subrogation' that Domat first touches on the issue of
transfer of claims.376 He observes that the 'transport' could take two forms: universal
succession or singular succession. Singular succession divided, again, into two: gratuitous or
onerous. Like earlier sources, however, Domat is not specific about the nature of the
371 See discussion in Grosskopf, Geskiedenis, 103, n. 288, (Sande); 118-122 (van Leeuwen and Voet). For
information on the life and works of these well-known jurists, see D.H. van Zyl, Geskiedenis van die Romeins-
Hollandse Reg (Durban, 1979), 356-357 (Groenewegen); 357-359 (van Leeuwen); 362-365 (Voet).
372 Art. 170. Cf. the Coutume de Xaintonge of 1520, IV, 873, eh 42: 'transport simple sans apprehension de fait





Brunner, 'Inhaberpapier', 498. This is similar to the position that had been reached by Roman 'vulgar' law in
the East: Kaser, RPR II, § 276, at 452.
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'transport'.377 Pothier, on the other hand, identifies that there is a difference between a
transport-cession, as he calls it, and transport de simple delegation ou indication,378
Interestingly, the language of assignation is evident:
« Le transport de simple delegation ne contient point de vente ; c'est une
simple indication que je fais a mon creancier, unde ipsi solvam, en lui assignant
un de mes debiteurs, et lui donnant pouvoir d'exiger de lui, en mon nom, ce
qu'il me doit, pour etre par lui re^u en deduction de ce que je lui dois. »379
If P is indebted to X, and X is indebted to R, Pothier oberves that in delegatio solvendi, the
intermediate creditor X bears the risk of the insolvency of P: until P pays R, neither P nor X
O OA *7 O 1
are discharged. This is carried forward into the Code Civil. However, in suggesting that
R pursues P in X's name, Pothier seems to confound the procuratio in rem suam and the
mandate to pay.
E. Early Codifications
It was natural law that strongly influenced the Codex Maximalinus Bavaricus
(1753), the Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht (ALR) (1794), and the Austrian Allgemeines
Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (181 1).385 They all admitted the free transfer of claims. In so doing,
the provisions on cession evidenced a fundamental shift away from the conservative view that
376 J. Domat, Les Loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel, (2nd ed. 1695) III. 1 .vi (vol. II, 261).
377 Ibid, 552-556 and 584.
378 R.J. Potheir, Traite du contrat de vente § 551-552 in M. Bugnet (ed.) Oeuvres de Pothier (1861) vol 3, 218.
379 Ibid § 551. Cf. idem, Traite du contrat de change (1763) § 226.
380 ibid § 551.
381 Code Civil Art. 1277: 'La simple indication faite, par le debiteur, d'une personne qui doit payer a sa place,
n'opere point novation. II en est meme de la simple indication faite, par le creancier ne les expressement
reserves'. The Belgian provision is identical.
382 For some general remarks on the history of these codifications, see O.F. Robinson, T. Fergus and W. Gordon,
European Legal History, (3rd ed. 2000), 256 ff; H. Schlosser, Grundziige der Neueren Privatrechtsgeschichte,
Rechtsentwicklungen I, europaischen Kontext, (9th ed. 2001) § 5.
383 Part 4, Cap. 15, § 7. For the Bavarian code generally, see K. Luig, 'Die Grundsatze des Vertragsrechts in
Kreitmayers Codex Maximilaneus Bavaricus Civilis von 1756' in idem, Romisches Recht, Naturrecht,
Nationales Recht (1998), 437 ff.
384 ALR I, 11, § 382: "Alle Rechte, welche nicht an die Person des Inhabers gebunden sind, konnen anderen
abgetreten werden"; §§ 376/77: "Die Abtretung der Rechte setzt einen Vertrag voraus, wodurch jemand sich
verpflichtet, einem Andem das Eigenthum seines Rechts, gegen eine Bestimmte Vergeltung, zu iiberlassen. Die
Handlung selbst, wodurch das abzutretende Rechte dem Andern wirklich ubertragen wird, wird Cession
genannt." § 393: "Durch die Erklarung des Cedenten, dass der Andere das Abgetretene Recht von nun an als das
seinige auszuiiben befugt sein soli, und durch die Annahme dieser Erklarung, geht das Eigenthum des Rechts
selbst auf den neuen Inhaber iiber."
385 ABGB § 1392: "Wenn eine Forderung von einer Person an die andere ubertragen und von dieser angenommen
wird, so entsteht die Umanderung des Rechts mit Hinzukunft eines neuen Glaubigers"; § 1394: "Die Rechte des
Ubernehmers sind mit den Rechten des Ubertragers in Rucksicht auf die uberlassene Forderung eben dieselben."
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claims could not be transferred without the consent of the debtor. Moreover, they also allowed
transfer to occur without debtor notification. This was a radical change.
F. The German Pandectists
The German Historical School of the nineteenth century with its advanced and scientific study
of Roman private law has had an enduring impact. However, much of this
Begriffsjurisprudenz was criticised (most famously by Otto von Gierke) for ignoring practical
realities in the relentless quest for dogmatic and scientific elegance. This criticism is
particularly apposite with regard to the treatment of cession. Whatever the level of
commercial development at Rome, it was hardly similar to the conditions of nineteenth
century Prussia or Austria. Arguably, this was a case of lawyers presenting law 'out of
10 c
context'. It has been observed that, for any commercial society, the basic concept of cession
is desirable. Indigenous Germanic law,387 as well as the Prussian ALR and the Austrian ABGB,
provided for the transfer of claims. The Allgemeine Deutsche Wechsel Ordnung - which had
been adopted by all the states in the German Bund in 1848388 - also admitted the transfer of
claims. The German Pandectists did not. Such was their fanatical adherence to the Roman
■7 oq
texts, they denied that there could be a change of creditor without the consent of the debtor:
the Roman texts simply did not acknowledge the concept of a transfer of a claim.390 This led
391
to a conflict of theory and practice and, frankly, an approach to cession that was incoherent.
A major shortcoming with the Pandectist approach was that it did not consider whether
transfer would be possible if the debtor did consent.
Ultimately, it took the most famous of the Pandectist scholars, Bernard Windscheid, to
drag academic lawyers from the toil of trying to apply old sources couched in terms of actions
386 See A. Watson, Law Out ofContext (2000).
387 Cf. O. Stobbe, 'Zur Geschichte der Uebertagung von Forderungsrechten und der Inhaberpapiere' (1868) 1 1
ZHR 397 at 399. G. Dahm, Deutsches Recht (1951) suggests that the highly developed law of the central and
northern cities was often considerably more advanced than the equivalent Roman law. For general discussion of
the influence of Roman law in Germany, see J.P. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law (1968), 148-262.
388 AD WO §§ 9-10. It came into force in all the states of the Bund - with the exception of Austria, where it was
adopted in 1850 and remained in force until 1938 - on 1 May 1849. It was expressly provided that the right to
draw a bill was not limited to merchants. Indeed, anyone with contractual capacity could draw a bill: ADWO § 1.
389
See, e.g. C.F. Puchta, 'Cession' in J. Weiske (ed.) Rechtslexikon fur Juristen aller deutschen Staaten
enthaltend die gesammte Rechtswissenschaft (Leipzig, 1840) vol 2, 636 ff.
390
Muhelnbruch, Cession, § 4.
391 See e.g. A.J.F. Thibaut, System des Pandektenrechts, (6th ed. 1823). At § 79 he states that cession transfers the
entire right to the cessionary; yet, at § 78, he had pointed out that while cession can occur against the will of the
debtor, the debtor remains bound to the cedent after cession; and the cedent can still validly demand payment.
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to modern problems. His essay on Die Actio des romischen Civilrechts vom Standpunkt des
heutigen Rechts in 1856 was a crucial development in nineteenth century German scholarship.
The Roman sources were concerned primarily with actiones. This was a natural result of the
formulae system in which the jurists worked. However, actiones were of little relevance to
modern civil procedure. How, then, were modern lawyers to approach the sources?
Windscheid sought to show that it was evident from the Roman sources themselves that, by
the time of Justinian, claims were to all intents and purposes fully transferable.392 Crucially,
he asserted that the change of creditor did not destroy the nature and content of the
393
obligation. Actions were the be-all and end-all for Roman lawyers. They were not
concerned with the transfer of rights.394 For this reason no distinction could be made between
action and right. He who held the action held the right.395 Moreover, a change in the person of
the creditor need not destroy the content of the underlying obligation.396 Whether
Windscheid's theory was entirely coherent need not be discussed here.397 For present
purposes it is sufficient to note that it was his contribution that galvanised other jurists into
reconsidering the traditional approach that claims were intrinsically non-transferable.
However, it was only with the promulgation of the BGB - which came into force in 1900 -
that free transfer of claims became accepted throughout Germany.
G. The German Code.
The BGB represented a major departure from the 'heutiges romisches Recht' with which
civil law jurists had previously busied themselves. The first draft of the BGB explicitly stated
398that Forderungsabtretung was the transfer of a claim without the consent of the debtor. By
the final draft, however, Forderungsabtretung was described merely as the transfer of a claim.
392
Literally, that claims were 'nicht uniibertragbar': B. Windscheid, Der Actio des romischen Civilrechts vom
Standpunkte des heutigen Rechts (1856), 168.
393 B. Windscheid, Actio, 182. For which see generally Luig, Geschichte, 90 ff; C. Hattenhauer, '§§ 398-413
Ubertragung einer Forderung' in Historisch-Kritischer Kommentar zum BGB vol 2 (2006, forthcoming).
394 See generally Luig, Geschichte, 92-95.
395 Cf. Windscheid, Pandektenrechts, § 329, n. 7.
396 Windscheid, Actio, 169. As Hattenhauer, § 24, n. 142, points out, however, Windscheid later retreated from
this view: Pandektenrechts, § 329, n. 2. A claim would only be unassignable if the content of the obligation went
to the root of the obligation; in other words, if the debtor would be prejudiced. Mere change in the person of the
creditor, although it changed the nature of the obligation, did not prohibit cession: Windscheid, Pandektenrechts
§ .329, n. 10.
397 Cf. J. Schmidt, "Actio'. 'Anspruch'. 'Forderung'." in M. Martenik (ed.) Vestigia Iuris: Festschrift fur
Giinther Jahr zum 70 Geburtstag (1993), 401 ff.
398 Erster Entwurfeines Burgerlichen Gesetzbuches fur das Deutsche Reich (1887) § 293.
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There was also a change in direction with regard to intimation. The requirement that only
certain knowledge would interpel the debtor from paying the cedent was departed from in
favour of a simple requirement of good faith. Private knowledge of cession therefore became
relevant.399
H. English law.
It was not possible to transfer a claim (in English legal terminology, a 'chose in action') from
one person to another at law until the Judicature Act in 18 73.400 There were essentially two
ways in which this prohibition was circumvented. One was similar to the civil law concept of
appointing a procurator in rem suam\ the assignor could appoint an 'attorney' to collect from
the debtor, in the creditor's name.401 Secondly, the Courts of Equity circumvented the
apparent prohibition by giving effect to agreements to assign. There are two ways at looking
at the enforcement of these agreements in equity. One is on the basis that equity holds as done
that which ought to have been done.402 In so doing, the distinction between contract and
conveyance is collapses. Private agreements can have third party effect. However, how could
the Courts of Equity have been able to 'hold as done that which ought to have been done' if
assignment was not recognised at common law?403 It is probably the case, therefore, that the
development of the equitable assignment of choses in action owes its development to the
399 See generally Luig, Geschichte, 118-141 and, in particular, F. von Kiibel, Kommission zur Ausarbeitung eines
biigerlichen Gesetzbuches, Entwurfeines biirgerlichen Gesetzbuches fur das Deutsche Reich (1882) Book 2, Part
1, tit 4, 'Abtretung der Forderungen' on § 15, especially at 34 ff. The textual amendments can be traced in H.FI.
Jakobs and W. Schubert (eds) Die Beratung des Burgerlichen Gesetzbuchs, Recht der Schuldverhaltnisse I, §§
241-432 (1978) especially at 757-769.
400 See n. 403 below.
401 See S.J. Bailey, 'Assignments of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century' (1931) 47
LQR 516; (1932) 48 LQR 248 and 547 (3 parts).
402 J. McGhee, Snell's Equity, (30th ed. 2000) para 3-25. Cf. FEW. Elphinstone, 'Chose in Action: What is it?'
(1893) 9 LQR 311.
403 F.C.T. Tudsbery, The Nature, Requisites and Operation ofEquitable Assignments (1912), 6-7. Sir Guenter
Treitel, The Law of Contract, (11th ed. 2003), 672 ff. It is probably going too far to say that there was a
prohibition on assignment in English law. The legal history of the assignment of choses in action is perhaps even
more complex than in the jus commune. The subject cannot be discussed here. Fortunately, some of the best legal
minds in the Anglo-American tradition have addressed the subject. See, in particular, J. Barr Ames, 'The
Inalienability of Choses in Action' in Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History (1909) vol III, 580 ff;
W.W. Cook, 'The Alienability of Choses in Action' (1915) 29 Harvard LR 816; S. Williston, 'Is the right of an
Assignee of a Chose an Action Legal or Equitable?' (1916) 30 Harvard LR 97; W.W. Cook, 'The Alienability of
Choses in Action; A Reply to Professor Williston' (1917) 30 Harvard LR 449; S. Williston, 'The word
'equitable' and its applicability to assignment of Choses in Action' (1918) 31 Harvard LR 822; W.S.
Holdsworth, 'The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law' (1920) 33 Harvard LR
997; idem, History ofEnglish Law vol 8 (1926), 113 ff; A.L. Corbin, 'Assignment of Contractual Rights' (1926)
74 U Pa L Rev 207; S.J. Bailey, 'Assignments of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century'
(1931) 47 LQR 516; (1932) 48 LQR 248 and 547 (3 parts).
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trust: on assignment, Equity recognises that the assignor is holding for the assignee. Equity
recognises that the assignee is beneficially entitled to the claim. Where there is a double sale
of the same claim, the first assignee to notify the debtor is preferred.404
III. 'Assignation': the Terminology
In Scots law, the transfer by a creditor of his claim against his debtor, without the consent of
the latter, is usually called 'assignation'. The terminology calls for some explanation; not least
because the term is used in a confusing multitude of senses. In Austria, 'Assignation' refers to
the similar, but conceptually distinct, institution of Anweisung405 'Assignment' is also not
uncommon in the Scottish sources.406 This is the terminology used in England. The English
term dates from the fourteenth century and could also mean 'an order, request or directive'.407
The usage of 'assignment' to connote a transfer dates from the fifteenth century.408 The term
'cession' is also regularly used in Scots law. In particular, the assignee is frequently
designated as the 'cessionary' in the Scottish sources 409
The etymological roots of the term 'assignation' are not clear. The word 'cession' is
derived from the Latin 'cedere' ('cessio'). This was used in the Roman legal sources.410
Importantly, however, this never seems to have meant more than mere agreement, not
transfer.411 'Assignment' and 'Assignation' come, through old French, from the Latin
404 Dearie v Hall [1823-34] All ER Rep 232.
405 Cf. W. Schubert (ed.) Die Vorlagen der Redaktoren fur die erste Kommission zur Arbeitung des Entwurfs
eines biirgerlichen Gesetzbuches (15 unnumbered vols, 1980-1986) II, 4, 2, 'Anweisung'; 9, 'Terminologie'; A.
Tobler (ed.), Tobler-Lommantisch Altfranzosiches Worterbuch (1925) vol 1, 598, lines 18-28; Brockhaus
Enzyklopddie (17th ed. 1966) vol. 1, 597. Cf. the Dutch 'assignatie' or 'aanweijzen': see Winkler Prins
Encyclopaedic, (6th ed. 1948) vol 1, 542. This title is somewhat abbreviated in the 7th edn of 1966; and V.G.
Hiemstra and H.L. Gonin, Drietalige Regswoordeboek/Trilingual Legal Dictionary, (3rd ed. Johannesburg: Juta,
1992), 11-12 s.v. 'assignment': (1) aanwysing, toewysing, vasstelling, bepaling... assignasie van skuld
(skuldenaar A versoek sy skuldenaar B om regstreeks aan A se skuldeiser te betaal; deur De Groot en Van
Leeuwen aanwysing genoem; ook: die dokument waarin die reeling verval is (veroudered)'.
406 See McBryde, Contract para 12-05 for references. See too the 'Deeds of Assignment' of 22nd July 1786 and
17th April 1789, granted by the poet, Robert Burns, of his share in his farm at Mossgiel, Ayrshire and the
copyright in his works, in G. Ross Roy (ed.) Letters of Burns (1985) vol I, 33-34; and Karnes, Principles of
Equity, (3rd ed. 1778) 11, 190.




410 Cf. Windscheid, Pandektenrechts, § 329, n. 11; See C. 4, 35, 22 cited by Zimmermann, Obligations, 58, n
108. For further references, see H.G. Heumann, Handlexicon zu den Quellen des romischen Rechts, 5th edn
(1879), 66, 'cedere'.
411
Kaser, RPR II, 454, n. 4.
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'assignare' (assignatio)',4n in the Roman sources the term expressing the same idea is
'adsignatio' 4X^ Assignatio or Adsignatio means to allot, appoint or to make over to. This is
the meaning of the verb 'assign' in English.414 In old French, 'assignation' could mean an
order to pay money.415 The French traditionally always used the term fransporf to refer to
what is designated in modern French law as cession de creance.416 The first reference to
'transport' in French law that Brunner traced is to an Ordinance of the fair of Champagne in
1334.417 In France, 'cession' originally referred only to the cessio bonorum. It is only with the
writings of Pothier, that the term cession began to be used for the transfer of claims,418
although the language of cession had been used for some time to designate the debtor (the
debiteur cede) and the assignee (the cessionnaire) respectively.419 In modern French law,
'assignation' refers to the proceeding whereby notice is given of legal proceedings. The word
'assignaf is one of the best known in European economic history. This was the instrument
drawn on the French State in favour of their creditors or their order. (Unfortunately, there
does not seem to be any connection between this usage and the important role played by the
Scot, John Faw, in the development of the French banking system). In the older sources, the
'assignaf is the person who is directed to pay, i.e. the drawee. There is a recent example of
the Scots law of cession borrowing French terminology. Regulations dealing with the
412 C.T. Onions (ed.) The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (1966), 56. Cf. D. du Cange, Glossarium
mediae et infamae latinitatis (1698) vol 1, 437, 'assignatus'; H.G. Heumann, Handlexicon zu den Quellen des
romischen Rechts, 5th edn (1879), 42, 'assignatio'.
413 H.G. Heumann, Handlexikon zu den Quellen des romischen Rechts, (5th ed. 1879), 42, v. 'assignare'; (9th ed.
1907), 18, v. 'adsignare'. Cf. I.J.G. Scheller, Ausfiihrlichs und moglichst vollstandiges lateinisch-deutsches
Lexicon oder Worterbuch, (3rd ed. 1804), vol 1, 351 s.v. 'Adsignatio' cited by Muhlenbruch, Cession, 228, n.
437. Scheller's dictionary has been translated into English as Lexicon totius Latinitatis = A dictionary of the
Latin language: originally compiled and illustrated with explanations in German (OUP, 1835) s.v. 'Adsignatio'.
414 J.A.H. Murray, H. Bradley and W.A. Craigie, The Oxford English Dictionary (1933) vol 1, 508.
415 See R.J. Pothier, Traite du contrat de change (1763) § 226; D. Lalande, Lexique de chroniqueurs franqais
(XlVe depuis du XVe siecle) (1995), 30, v. 'Assignation' : 'Mandate, ordre pour recevoir une somme assignee sur
un certain fonds' (although, admittedly, this sounds like a mandate to uplift). Examples of the use of
'assignation' in this sense of an order to pay are cited from the early fifteenth century: E. Baumgartner and P.
Menard, Dictionnaire etymologique et historique de la langue franqaise (1996), 52.
416 A. Rey et al, Le Grand Robert de la langue franqaise, (2nd ed. 2001) vol 6, 1421 suggests that 'transport' was
used for 'cession de droits' as early as 1312. Cf. D. Lalande, Lexique de chroniqueurs franqais (XlVe depuis du
XVe siecle) (1995), 66, v. 'cession' ; 523 v. 'transport', who provides examples of the use of 'transport' in
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
417 H. Brunner, 'Das franzosische Inhaberpapier', 487 at 498.
418
Compare J. Domat, Les loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel, (2nd ed. 1695) writing at the end of the
seventeenth century and Pothier writing in the middle of the eighteenth. Domat, vol II, 587 refers to 'cession'
only in the context of the cessio bonorum.
419 See e.g. J. Domat, Les loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel, (2nd ed. 1695) vol III, 261. Interestingly, R.T.
Troplong, De la vente ou, Commentaire du titre VI du livre III du code civil, (4th ed. 1845), vol 1, para 878,
observes that cession is the generic term, transport, delegation, subrogation and / 'indication de paiement being
species.
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controversial right to collect toll moneys payable for crossing the Skye Bridge refer to the
assignee as the 'cessionnaire'.420
There are perhaps two points that can be taken from terminological confusion. Firstly, it
may be that in Roman law, and for a long time thereafter, the different modes of effecting a
transfer were not clearly demarcated. Roman law did differentiate between a delegatio (a
form of novatio) and a mandate. However, the subtle distinctions between an outright transfer,
the procuratio in rem suam (a mandate to uplift), and the mandate to pay, were never properly
distinguished. The prevalence in the sources of the term adsignatio would support this. A
general notion of 'making over' is consistent with all three of the concepts. Further refinement
came only later. And, when it did come, the umbrella term of adsignatio gave its name to
different species in different jurisdictions. In the Germanic areas of Austria and Hungary, the
general concept of'adsignare' can be traced directly to the order to pay, the Anweisung or, in
the language of the ABGB, 'Assignation'. In Scotland, as will become clear below,
'assignation' was always used to refer to transfer. In France, too, adsignatio developed
eventually into a transfer (transport, subrogation).421 In France, Germany and Austria, the
different concepts seem to have been relatively clearly distinguished. In any event the
terminology in each jurisdiction has been consistent. This leads us to the second point. In
Scots law, the terminology has varied. While varied Scottish usages may reflect the diverse
influences on Scots law, and a practical rather than theoretical approach, the substantive law
in Scotland has also been reasonably clear. Nevertheless, some of the deeper
misunderstandings, in particular with regard to the difference between a mandate to pay and a
mandate to uplift, are manifest in our imprecise and liberal use of language.
420
Assignation Statement (Prescribed Information) (Scotland) Regulations 1991, SI 1991/2152 (S 177). For the
most recent attempt to argue that the there is no valid right to collect the tolls, based on two charters granted by
William the Lion in 1180 and James VI in 1587: see Sheriff Principal Sir Stephan Young QC's note in
Procurator Fiscal v Robbie the Pict, 2004 GWD 31-643. The tolls were finally abolished on 22nd December
2004.
421 J. Domat, Les loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel, (2nd ed. 1695) Ill.i.vi. But see discussion of Pothier, Traite
du contrat de change (1763) § 226, in n. 454 below.
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IV. Mandates to pay: Anweisung
The German, Austrian and Swiss Civil Codes contain provisions on Anweisung.422 An
Anweisung is essentially an order to pay. Suppose X is indebted to R. P is indebted to X. X
(the assignant or Anweisender) can order P (the assignat or Angewiesender) to pay R (the
assignatar or Anweisungsempfanger). Such an order has no effect on the respective rights of
the parties until P either accepts the order or pays R. Crucially, the effect of this payment is
two-fold: it extinguishes the debt P-X as well as the debt X-R. The concept is old.423 It is
recognised in both Scots424 and South African law.425
In the jus commune, 'assignation' was the original term for Anweisung 426 Importantly,
for present purposes, it has been accepted for many centuries that on acceptance by P, R
obtains an independent right against P. R can transfer this right. If so, then this is a clear
example of a transfer of a claim. The doctrine of Anweisung is crucial to the development of
this area of the law since it is a functional equivalent of cession. Indeed, it seems that in
Assyrian and Babylonian law, and in Egyptian law, the concept of the order to pay was used
to facilitate a circulation of claims.427 Fundamentally, an Anweisung is a mandate addressed to
422 See generally, chapter 2, Part II, C above; BGB §§ 783 ff; ABGB §§ 1404 ff; OR Art. 466. It should be noted
that this doctrine draws on the Roman principle of delegation. It is under this heading that the doctrine is found
in French law. In the Austrian ABGB, Anweisung is alternatively styled 'Assignation'. This should not be
confused with the Scottish notion of 'assignation' which corresponds to Forderungsabtretung in German. For a
helpful introduction see, D. Medicus, Schuldrecht II, besonderer Teil, 11th edn (Munich, 2003) § 119; R. Welser,
Grundriss des Biirgerlichen Rechts vol II, (12th ed. Vienna, 2001), 148 ff; see too G. Ertl, 'Anweisung' in P.
Rummul (ed.), Kommentar zum Allgemeinen Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch (2002) vol 2, § 1399 ff. In South African
law too, 'assignation' is the term given to orders to pay, not transfer; 'cession' being the institution
corresponding to the Scottish assignation: see S. Scott, The Law of Cession, (2nd ed. 1991), 193. The older, i.e.
pre-OR, codes, that were in force in the individual cantons of Switzerland, are of particular interest. For example,
the Code du canton de Berne (1831) contained some twelve provisions on the Anweisung, yet only three on
cession: see Arts 980-982 (cession) and Arts 983-995 (Anweisung). The Code is found (in French translation) in
the helpful compilation by M.A. de Saint-Joseph, Concordances entre les codes civiles etrangers et le code
Nepoleon (Paris and Leipzig, 1840), sheet 89 ff. As usual, however, the Prussian ALR contains the largest
number of provisions on Anweisung, no fewer than forty-eight: ALR I, 16, §§ 251 -299.
423 Cf. W. Schubert (ed.) Die Vorlagen der Redaktoren fur die erste Kommission zur Arbeitung des Entwurfs
eines burgerlichen Gesetzbuchs (15 unnumbered vols 1980-1986, originally 1874), II, 4, 2, 'Anweisung', 14.
424 See Earl ofMar v Earl of Callander (1681) Mor 2927. See also, Annotations on Stair's Institutions (1824),
40-41, generally attributed to Patrick Grant, Lord Elchies. Although Elchies does not mention the Earl ofMar
case, the example he gives uses the exact facts of the Earl ofMar case, with the Lord of Gloret, the Earl of
Callander and the Earl of Mar substituted for Caius, Seius and Titius respectively. I am grateful to Niall Whitty
for this reference. See also Wallet v Ramsay (1904) 12 SLT 111 OH. These two cases are discussed in R. Evans-
Jones, 'Identifying the Enriched' 1992 SLT (News) 25.
425 See P.M. Nienaber, 'Cession' in W.A. Joubert et al (eds) The Laws of South Africa, 2nd edn, vol 2, Part II
(2003) para 17.
426 Cf. § 1404 ABGB; Ross, Lectures, 188-189(n) is the only Scottish writer to have appreciated this point: 'the
very word assignation in its original import, does not mean a conveyance, as Lord Kames supposes, but an
appointment or constitution for a particular purpose'.
427 U. Wesel, Geschichte des Rechts: von den Fruhformen bis zum Vertrag von Maastricht, (2nd ed. 2001), 91, n.
78; A.H. Preussner, 'The Earliest Traces of Negotiable Instruments' (1928) 44 American Journal of Semantic
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the debtor (P) to pay R. This can be distinguished from the historical development of cession
in most countries which evolved from the mandate in rem suam. This was a mandate
addressed to the 'assignee' (R) to uplift the claim from the debtor (P). While it is disputed
whether the mandate in rem suam can be viewed as a transfer,428 it is undisputed that an order
to pay, of itself, transfers nothing; rather it effects a double discharge of the debt relationships
P-X and X-P by a single payment P-R.
Admittedly, however, there is a subtle difference for the plea of delectus personae
creditoris in the case of (i) cession and (ii) Anweisung. In the first case, the cessionary obtains
a right against the debtor irrespective of the debtor's consent. The debtor may, therefore, be
sued by the assignee. In the case of the Anweisung, P has the option of whether to accept the
mandate. If he refuses, R will have no independent right against P. P can always refuse the
order to pay. If R has no independent right, then he cannot obtain any judgment that can be
forcibly executed on the debtor. Any right obtained by R, therefore, can be said to be based on
P's consent.
What then of Roman law? It was the idea that there was always delectus personae
creditoris in any debt in Roman law that necessitated the development of the procuratio in
rem suam. Surprisingly, perhaps, it has been suggested that the Roman law knew nothing of
the Anweisung-, rather, the order to pay was only subsequently re-constructed in terms of the
Roman contract of mandate.429 While this may explain subsequent Romanisation of the order
to pay, it seems to this writer particularly unlikely that the idea was not recognised in Roman
law, even if clear examples are not found in the sources. It was known to less developed legal
Languages and Literatures 92 (cited by O.R. Keister, 'Commercial Record Keeping in Ancient Mesopotamia'
(1963) 38 Accounting Review 371); A.T. Olmstead, 'Materials for Economic History of Ancient Near East'
(1930) Journal ofEconomic and Business History 224; W.L. Westermann, 'Warehousing and Trapezite Banking
in Antiquity' (1931) Journal of Economic and Business History 49. Orders to pay were current in Ancient
Greece, see L. Beauchet, Histoire du droit prive de la Republique Athenienne (1897) vol 6, 507-508; moreover,
there was also no prohibition on cession there: see ibid, 537-41 and H.J. Wolff, 'Zur bedeutung der
altgreichischen Rechtsgeschichte fur die Rechtswissenschaft' in E. von Caemmerar (ed.) Xenion: Festschrift fur
Pan J. Zepos (1973) vol I, 757 at 763. The reader with Ancient Greek can peruse examples of such orders
reproduced and discussed by L. Goldschmidt, 'Inhaber-, Order- und executorische Urkunden im classischen
Alterthum' (1889) 10 ZSS (RA) 352. See also G.R. Driver and J.C. Myles, The Assyrian Laws (1935); C.H.W.
Johns, Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, Contracts and Letters (Edinburgh 1904; rprinted 1987), 334-335. F.W.
Maitland, 'The Mystery of Seisin' (1886) 2 LQR 481 at 489-90 argued that even at a comparatively late stage in
English law, lawyers were incapable of conceptualising incorporeals, as opposed to corporeal things, being the
object of transfer. That is overstated. From its inception, Scots law has allowed claims to be transferred. Cf. R.H.
Lowie, 'Incorporeal Property in Primitive Societies' (1928) 37 Yale LJ 551.
428 Cf. Luig, Geschichte, quoted in n. 315 above; A.M. Bell, quoted in n. 583 below; and Hue quoted in n. 543
below.
96
Transfer ofMoney Claims in Scots Law
systems than Rome, and has been found in almost every system since. In any event, active
delegation (delegatio solvendi), as recognised in classical Roman law, provides much of the
conceptual basis of the Anweisung43® Although there is little trace of the Roman doctrine of
delegatio solvendi in western vulgar law, in practice the order to pay was utilised: the
reification of an obligation in a bond (cautio) was a known method of circulating debt.431
In any event, the Romans did recognise an order to pay of sorts; moreover, an order
drawn on one not necessarily debtor to the drawer. The letter of credit drawn by Cicero on a
friend in Athens in favour of his son, who was studying there, is frequently cited.432 And there
are many other examples of orders to pay being used in commercial situations in Roman
times.433 Further, early forms of orders to pay have been found similar to modern cheques.434
Of course, the admission of the order to pay does not, per se, mean that claims were
transferable. That the Romans recognised the concept is a quite neutral piece of evidence
which relating to the transferability of claims.
The crucial confluence between the distinct concepts of Anweisung and cession is
found at the point of legal evolution when the Anweisung was admitted as transferable. If the
Anweisung has been accepted, and an accepted Anweisung can be transferred, then every
transfer of the Anweisung is a transfer of the rights of the holder against the drawee.435 Some
have adduced evidence that the transfer of claims, by way of a transferable order to pay, did
429
See, W. Schubert (ed.) Die Vorlagen der Redaktoren fiir die erste Kommission zur Arbeitung des Entwurfs
eines biirgerlichen Gesetzbuchs (1980-1986) II, 4, 2, 'Anweisung' at 1. Cf. the references to the Roman law by
R.J. Pothier, Traite des obligations (1761) § 446.
430 Kaser, RPR I, § 152 III.
431 E. Levy, Westrdmisches Vulgarrecht, Das Obligationenrecht (1956) § 58; Kaser, RPR II, § 276, 452;
Grosskopf, Geskiedenis, 22 citing, inter alia, the Theodosian Code, 2, 13, 1 (although this text seems to suggest
that an attempt to transfer the cautio to another would result in the debt being discharged) and ibid, at 30 ff with
examples from the seventh and eighth centuries.
432
XII.24.1; XII.27.2; XV.20.4; XV. 1.5 in D.R. Shackelton Bailey (ed. and trans.), Cicero's Letters to Atticus
(1999), vol 3, 308-309; 314-315; vol IV, 261-262; 308-309 respectively. See A. Fruchtl, Die Geldgeschafte bei
Cicero (1912), 25 and J. Andreau, Banking and Business in the Roman World (trans. J. Lloyd, 1999), 20-21;
Ulpian, D. 38, 4, 1,5. See also D. 38, 4, 3 and D. 36, 2, 7. Fruchtl, 26 refers to a passage where Atticus 'uberlieB
dem Cicero seine Forderung an Xenon'.
433 A. Fruchtl, Die Geldgeschafte bei Cicero (1912), 20 ff.
434 See J. Andreau, Banking and Business in the Roman World (trans. J. Lloyd, 1999) 42-43. Cf. idem, La vie
financiere dans la monde romain (1987), 561-563 and 702-703. The English version is not a complete
translation of the much larger French original.
435
Fruchtl, op. cit., at 27 concedes that the written orders to pay used by Cicero were not bills of exchange;
however, they do seem to have allowed a circulation of credit. Compare examples of transferable orders taken
from sixteenth century Italy by G. Schaps, Zur Geschichte des Wechselindossaments (1892), 78 ff.
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occur in Roman times.436 Once this is admitted, the assertion that the Romans prohibited
transfer is exposed as erroneous. In reality, claims could be transferred.
There remains, then, only one possible difference between the transfer of an accepted
order to pay, and cession in the modern sense of the term. This writer has suggested that
cession is the transfer of a claim without the consent of the debtor. By definition, however, an
Anweisung requires the consent of the drawee (assignat). In Scotland, 'Assignation' is the
term used for cession. 'Assignation' is also used in the European sources. The Bavarian code
of 1756 contains provisions on 'assignation'.437 It also contains provisions on 'delegation' and
• 4T8
'expromission'. The Bavarian provisions on assignation are a curious amalgam of the
concepts of cession and Anweisung. For instance, the code provides that the debtor's consent
is not required: it is immaterial whether he pays his creditor or his creditor's order439
Moreover, there is no possibility of good faith payment where there has been notification to
the debtor.440 This is the language of cession, not Anweisung. It should be remembered that
any right that the payee may ever have against the debtor based on Anweisung is based on the
consent of the debtor. Even if he has obliged himself to accept, he need not do so. In all other
respects, however, the provisions in the Bavarian code are couched in terms of Anweisung. In
mid-eighteenth century Bavaria, then, lawyers had not yet completely differentiated the order
to pay {Anweisung) from cession. It is only with the Prussian and Austrian provisions at the
turn of the nineteenth century that 'assignation' is clearly invoked to mean the order to pay,
441
not cession.
436 R. Beigel, Rechnungswesen und Buchfiihrung der Romer (1904), 214 cited by Friichtl, op. cit., 27. Cf. H.
Blumner, Romischen Privataltertiimer (1911), 654. Admittedly, these works are not by lawyers. However, shorn
of burdensome knowledge of the Roman formulae system, these writers may actually provide a more realistic
picture of reality than that found in works by legal writers. Cf. the Roman law references in M.S. Lipmens,
Wetboek van Koophandel, Vergeleken met het Romeinsche en Fransche Regt (Amsterdam, 1839), 46.
437 See Codex Maximilaneus Bavaricus Civilis (1756) Part IV, cap 15, § 7.
438 Ibid., §§ 5 and 6.
439 Codex Maximilaneus Bavaricus Civilis (1756) Part IV, cap 15 § 7, sexto: '1st die Einwilligung des Debitoris
assignati hierzu nicht erforderlich, weil ihm allzeit gleichgultig seyn ran, ob er Assignantem oder Assignatarium
bezahlt'. ('The consent of the debtor is not necessary because it is of no consequence to him whether he pays the
original creditor or the assignee').
440 Ibid § 7, 17mo and 18vo.
441 ALR I, 11 § 380; ABGB § 1400 ff.
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V. Commercial law.
A. Bills of Exchange in International Commerce.
Bills have been used for centuries. Early traces of the bill can be found in the period
that the glossators, commentators and later writers of the jus commune were asserting that
claims were intrinsically non-transferable. Yet, every endorsement transfers the holder's
rights against the drawee. And there is a transfer without intimation to the debtor. This further
suggests that the received position, that claims were originally not transferable is wrong.
Indeed, it seems that there may be an interesting parallel here between the history of cession
in the jus commune and the history of the assignment of claims in the English common law.
James Steven Rogers has shown that the evolution of the bill of exchange in English law
occurred to circumvent the common law prohibition on assignment.442 This analysis
contradicts the orthodox position that the attraction of the bill of exchange was the privileges
accorded to an onerous bona fide transferee (a so-called holder in due course), who can obtain
greater rights than those held by his author. In particular, the drawee cannot plead defences
that he could have pled against the drawer, especially compensation Yet, in English law the
defence of set-off was not admissible in the common law courts until 1729.444 Therefore, the
most common defence which the holder in due course principle elides, did not appear in
English commercial law for several centuries after bills had been in widespread use. Whether
or not Rogers' analysis is accepted, his work highlights that traditional explanations of the
genesis of the rights of the holder in due course are not satisfactory answers to what has been
termed the most important question in the entire law of negotiable instruments.445
Others have recognised that the incidents peculiar to the bill of exchange were
twofold: (1) summary diligence and (2) transfer without intimation. The first allowed holders
to avoid prolonged court proceedings. Summary diligence (anglice: 'execution') has been
available on a bill of exchange from early times 446 If so, the holder's freedom from the
442 J.S. Rogers, 'The Myth of Negotiability' (1990) 31 Boston College Law Review 265 especially at 277 and 285
et seq. This article is reproduced in R. Cranston (ed.) Commercial Law (1992) p. 287. See also J.S. Rogers, The
Early History of the Law of Bills and Notes (1995), ch. 8. Cf. F. Pollock and F.W. Maitland, The History of
English Law before the time ofEdward I (2nd ed. 1898, repr. 1968) vol. II, 227.
443 See n. 972-973 below.
444 See Chapter 5 below, 'Assignatus utitur jure auctoris', n. 1132.
445 G. Schaps, Zur Geschichte des Wechselindossaments (1892) § 20, 117.
446 G.F. von Martens, Versuch einer historischen Entwicklung des wahren Ursprungs des Wechselrechts (1797,
reprinted 1966) § 3, at 15 emphasises that this privilege was accorded to bills at the fairs and markets of
continental Europe in the fourteenth century. A.J. Mackenzie Stewart, 'Moveable Rights' in Stair Soc,
Introduction to Scottish Legal History (1958), 203 suggests that, in Scots law, registration for preservation and
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debtor's defences (the so-called assigntus utitur jure auctoris rule) is obvious. Summary
diligence is the equivalent to the warrant found in a court decree ordaining the debtor to pay.
At this point it is clear beyond doubt that the debtor cannot belatedly raise a defence that he
has a liquid claim against the creditor (or his assignee). It is simply too late. The point is a
simple one. Yet it is completely at odds with the received history of the development of the
bill of exchange. Those who emphasise that the holder in due course can take a better title
than the transferor make little reference to the privilege of summary diligence.447 The holder
in due course's freedom from the debtor's defences can also be explained in terms of an
equally basic principle: the Anweisung. If the bill evolved from the basic concept of
Anweisung, freedom from the debtor's defences is not exceptional; rather, it is a natural
incident of the Anweisung. X orders P to pay R, P's creditor. P pays in X's name. As a result
P cannot raise defences against the payee (R) which he might have had against X. Moreover,
on acceptance by P to pay R, the discharge of the original debtor X is conditional on R being
discharged. Therefore, R's so-called of right of recourse against X is unexceptional. The right
to payment against X is the principal obligation which, if not discharged by P, continues to
subsist.448 That these arguments do not seem to have been advanced before, perhaps
underlines the lawyer's tendency to compartmentalise. First, academic lawyers seem to have
ignored the substantive importance of what might be seen as an aspect of procedure: summary
diligence. Second, commercial lawyers have ignored the basic principles of a foundation
subject: those concerning the mandate to pay (Anweisung). Other sources, particularly in
Scots law, when highlighting the privileges of the bill of exchange, focus on the transfer of
execution grew out of the practice of the church, citing the acts of 1449, c. 12; 1535, c. 9; 1551, c. 16; however,
these acts are inconclusive. It appears more likely that summary diligence grew from the practice of preserving
documents in court books, which gave them the same effect as a decree of the court. As a result, diligence could
follow. Over time, these registrations became known as the Books of Council and Session: see generally J. Imrie,
'Public Records and Registers' in SME, vol 19 (1989), especially paras 837 ff and references there cited.
Summary diligence was made available to the holder of a bill of exchange against the drawee by the Acts of
1681, c. 20 (foreign bills) and 1696, c. 36 (inland bills). This privilege is retained by the Bills of Exchange Act
1882, s. 98. Although Bell, Commentaries I, 411 (7th ed. 1870) and GWW, 'The Bills of Exchange Act 1882 and
Summary Diligence' (1891) 7 Scottish Law Review 182 at 184, thought that summary diligence was 'peculiar to
our law' and that there were no similar provisions on summary diligence in English law. In fact, there was an
ingenious common law method whereby an identical result was achieved: by way of the 'warrant to confess
judgment'. Here the debtor in a bill would appoint the creditor or bearer to act as the debtor's agent in any action
for payment. The Scottish experience is reasonably consistent with R. de Roover and L. Laubenberger,
'Wechsel, Wechselrecht' in HRG, vol 5 (1998) at 1182, who suggest that it was only in the seventeenth century
that the bill of exchange evolved to facilitate the free circulation of claims by excluding the debtor's defences.
447 Cf. Byles on Bills of Exchange (27th ed. 2002) para 1-06; D.V. Cowen and L. Gering, Cowen's Law of
Negotiable Instruments in South Africa (5th ed. 1985), 32; J. Milnes Holden, History of Bills of Exchange in
English Law (1955) has no entry for 'execution' in the index; nor does he look at the historical basis of the rule,
cf. 182-183. In Scots law, the first case that authoritatively decided that the onerous bona fide indorsee was not
subject to defences was Stuart and Gordon v Campbell (1699) Mor 1497.
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claims without the need for intimation.449 For our purposes, however, to what extent does the
admission of transfer of claims by way of bills of exchange affect the history of the law of
cession?
The genesis of the bills of exchange in Europe has been the subject of detailed
debate 450 The received history of the bill of exchange is that it originated in Italy. It was a
response to the needs of merchants. They were naturally wary of sending money long
distances. The bill of exchange, therefore, evolved in the thirteenth century as a means of
settling large-scale international accounts.451 In the fourteenth century they became
widespread, particularly at the fairs of Champagne and Lyon, where there were a useful
mechanism for merchants from foreign lands with different currencies to effect payment.452
Some continental writers have also noticed the similarities between the bill of
exchange and the doctrine of Anweisung.453 For example, Pothier refers to older methods of
payment on behalf of another (rescriptions). Strangely, however, he suggested that they were
no longer in use. Yet, as can be seen from his own observations, the basic
Anweisung/recription seems quite indistinguishable from the bill of exchange:454
«Le principal espece de rescription est celle par laquelle un debiteur mande a quelqu'un
de payer une certaine somme pour lui a son creancier entre les mains duquel il remet a cet
effet la rescription.
C'est ce qu'on appelle adsignatio.
Cette espece d'affaire se passe entre trios personnes:
1. Le debiteur, adsignans, qui indique a son creancier une personne de qui il recevra une
certaine somme qu'il doit;
2. La personne qu'on indique au creancier pour recevoir d'elle la somme, adsignatus ;
3. Le creancier a qui on a fait assignation, adsignatarius.
448 Cf. L. Goldschmidt, Universalgeschichte des Handelsrechts (1891), 401 ff.
449 W. Forbes, A Methodical Treatise concerning Bills ofExchange (2nd ed. 1718), 80 ff and 212-227; W. Glen,
Treatise on the Law ofBills of Exchange, Promissory Notes and Letters of Credit (2nd ed. 1824), 137 ff; Bell,
Commentaries (7th ed. 1870) I, 413: 'The two great privileges of bills and notes are summary execution and
transmission by endorsation'; R. De Roover, L'Evolution de la lettre de change XIV - XVIIf siecles (Paris,
1953), 83 ff.
450 The leading treatment is in L. Goldschmidt, Universalgeschichte des Handelsrechts (1891), 383 ff.
Goldschmidt was a remarkable figure. A brief synopsis of his life in English can be found in R. Zimmermann,
'Was heimat hiefi, nun heiBt es Holle' in J. Beatson and R. Zimmermann (eds) Jurists Uprooted, German-
Speaking Emigre Lawyers in Twentieth Century Britain (2004), 1 at 23. See too, K. Otto Scherrer,
'Goldschmidts Universum' in M. Ascheri et al (eds.) 'Ins Wassergeworfen und Ozeane durchquert': Festschrift
fur Wolfgang Norr (2003), 859-892.
451 E. Jenks, 'Early History of Negotiable Instruments' (1893) 9 LQR 70; W. Holdsworth, 'Origins and History
of Negotiable Instruments' (1915) 31 LQR 12, 173 and 376 (3 parts); J.M. Holden, History of Negotiable
Instruments in English Law (1955).
452 P. Huvelin, Essai historique sur le droit des marches et des foires (1897), 534 f.
453 G.F. von Martens, Versuch einer historischen Entwicklung des wahren Ursprungs des Wechselrechts (1797,
reprinted 1966) § 9, at 30 and § 12, at 36.
454 Traite du contrat de change (1763) § 225.
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Le personne indiquee, adsignatus, est ordinairement quelqu'un des debiteurs de
l'indiquant; mais ce peut etre aussi quelqu'un de ses amis, qui, sans etre son debiteur,
veut bien avancer cette somme pour lui. »455
Modern writers have also emphasised the link between ancient law and modern payment
456
instruments.
Indeed, the most common, every-day instance of the order to pay in modern law is the
cheque. The definition ofAnweisung in the modern codes is almost identical to the definitions
of a bill of exchange.457 If so, the attribution of the development of the bill to Italian
merchants is only part of the story. As was noted above, the concept of the order to pay is old.
It seems that in Arabia458 and in India459 this concept was developed for commercial purposes.
Other writers have noted early examples of the order to pay.460 Therefore, although Italian
merchants may be rightfully credited with the development of the modern bill of exchange in
the thirteenth century,461 the trail of development is much older. This seems to turn much of
the accepted civil law history of the law of cession on its head. Many legal traditions have
admitted that an obligation to pay, reified in a document, may be transferred. If so, it admits,
contrary to the detailed teachings of the civil law, the concept of cession.
There are a number of examples of a transferable order or bill that are usually cited as
the precursors to the modern development of bills: Pothier gives an example of a bill drawn
during Louis' Crusade in 12 5 6 462 Von Martens refers to one drawn by Pope Gregory IX in
1233;463 while, in 1307, Edward I ordered certain money collected for the Pope to be remitted
455 Ibid. § 226.
456 P. Ourliac and J. de Malofosse, Droit romain et ancien droit (1957), 217-218.
457 Cf. the modern Wechselgesetz, § 1 and Scheckgesetz, § 1 (both introduced by the Nazis in 1933,
implementing the Geneva Convention, itself largely based on the AD WO) and the provisions on Anweisung
under § 783 ff BGB. A cheque can only be drawn on a bank: ScheckG § 3. The main difference between a bill/
cheque and the general concept of an order to pay is that the former can be granted only for money; an ordinary
order to pay may encompass money, ' Wertpapiere' or other fungible goods.
458 R. Grasshoff, Die sufta 'ga und hawala der Araber: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Wechsels, Dr Iuris.
Albertus-Uiversitat zu Konigsberg, (1899) [EUL Sp Col Serj. Coll. P. 2977 Gra], But compare the doubts
expressed by L. Goldschmidt, Universalgeschichte des Handelsrechts (1891), 410, n. 76 about an Arabian
genesis. See also A. Cheron, 'Le transport de dette ('Lewala') en droit musulman (1919-20) 59 Bulletin de la
societe de legislation compare 571.
459 L. Levi, International Commercial Law (1863) vol 1, 351 hints at this, but does not elaborate.
460
E.g. A. Heeren, Ideen ueber die Politik, den Verkehr und den Handel der vornehmsten Voelker der alten Welt
(1815) vol 1,41-43.
461 Pothier, Traite du contrat de change (1763) §§6-7 suggests that bills of exchange were not known to Roman
law. He gives the example of 4, § 1 de Naut foen [D. 22, 2, 4, 1], saying that this would not have been necessary
had the Romans known bills. All Pothier says with certainty is that bills have been in common usage since the
14th century.
462
Pothier, Traite du contrat de change (1763) § 7, n. 1.
463 G.F. von Martens, Versuch einer historischen Entwicklung des wahren Ursprungs des Wechselrechts (1797,
reprinted 1966), 24.
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by bill rather than coin or bullion.464 James Buchan points to the assets left in 1268 by Ranieri
Zeno, Doge of Venice, a large proportion of which was in 'city bonds' 465 Admittedly, the
most distinguished writer on the subject, Levin Goldschmidt, dismisses suggestions that the
discovery of bills of exchange can be attributed to any individual group, whether the Jews,
Genoese, or Florentines, as fantasy.466 The fascinating area of comparative legal history that is
the genesis and evolution of the bills of exchange is outwith the scope of this work. For
present purposes, however, this writer would draw similar attention to the development of the
civil law as Rogers has done for Anglo-American law,467 that there are important links
between the history of cession, the concept of the order to pay and the law of bills of
exchange. There were several methods known to various peoples, from diverse legal
traditions, which enabled either the transfer of claims or a functional equivalent to be effected.
If this is so, the standard history of the civil law of the jus commune, which was all too often
divorced from practical reality - including the everyday practice of commercial law - is both
flawed and misleading. There is perhaps some parallel here between the accepted history of
the law of cession and the accepted history of the law of usury: prohibited by canon law yet
actively practiced by the church 468 So too with cession: what was actively and fanatically
prohibited by the jurists of the civil law, from post classical Rome to nineteenth century
Prussia, was not only easily circumvented, but wantonly and profitably practised in
commercial law. The only possible difference lay in the role of the consent of the debtor.
However, as has been pointed out, the civil law apparently knew no mechanism of transfer,
even with the consent of the debtor 469
B. Bills in England.
In England, meanwhile, all bills were originally taken to a named creditor 'or his assigns'.
There is little discussion in the English sources of the possibility of other functional
equivalents or the order to pay. All bills were originally non-transferable. Subsequently, they
were held to be transferable if they contained the direction that the obligation was payable 'to
464 L. Levi, International Commercial Law (1863), 350.
465 J. Buchan, Frozen Desire: An Inquiry into the Meaning ofMoney (1997), 60. Buchan even goes so far as to
describe them as 'negotiable', but this is probably not used in technical legal sense.
466 L. Goldschmidt, Universalgeschichte des Handelsrechts (1891), 409.
467 J.S. Rogers, An Early History ofthe Law ofBills and Notes (1995).
468 R. Zimmermann, The Law ofObligations (1996), 172 f.
469
Miihlenbruch, Cession § 4, 28 ff.
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the order of the payee' or 'to bearer'. The absence of this clause would render the bill non¬
transferable, though it remained valid.470 This clause was never deemed to be necessary in
Scotland.471 As has been noted above, once it is accepted that a bill could be transferred, this
that claims are indeed transferable. If this can be asserted with some degree of confidence, the
implications of this point for the accepted history of the law of cession, assignation and
assignment can only be guessed at. For example, in English law it seems that although
merchants were drawing bills to settle complex international transactions, ordinary
Englishmen could not transfer claims among one another. To say, as the accepted history of
the English law of assignment does,472 that the law evolved from the elaborate to the easy,
does not appear to be at all likely.473 In a modern context one could scarcely imagine a
securitization industry emerging without the basic concept of assignment.474 As is so often the
case, it could be that English law was peculiar. European merchants developed the bill of
exchange. English merchants traded with Europe. It could be argued that the concept was thus
introduced to English law by way of mercantile interaction. Rogers' argument is that the bill
of exchange evolved in England simply to facilitate the transfer of claims.475 Yet, this does
not explain the general point for the history of the bill in international terms. It is still asserted
that in Europe the bill evolved before the more mundane concept of transfer a claim by
cession, or the transferable Anweisung, had been accepted.
470 Smith v Kendall (1794) 6 TR 123; 101 ER 469 cited by L. Levi, Manual of the Mercantile Law of Great
Britain and Ireland (1854), 243, § 297. The modern position is found in the Bills of Exchange Act 1882, ss 8 (4)
and (5).
471 Crichton v Gibson (1726) Mor 1446; 1 Kames Rem Dec 154; 1 Ross LC 51(n) and authorities discussed in n.
504 below. In MacWilliam v Mediterranean Shipping Co [2005] 2 AC 423, Lord Rodger, observes (at para [67])
that the Bills of Lading Act 1855 was introduced to address problems of transfer of straight bills of lading in
English law. It is interesting that when Lord Rodger examines Bell, Commentaries (3rd ed. 1821) I, 453, n. 3; (7th
ed. 1870) I, 590, n. 5, Bell makes no mention of the need to address a bill of lading expressly to 'assigns' to
render it transferable. This is unsurprising: in Scotland rights were always freely transferable.
472 See W.S. Holdsworth, 'The Origins and Early History of Negotiable Instruments' (1915) 31 LQR 12, 173 and
376 (3 parts).
473 W.T. Baxter, 'Credit Bills and Bookkeeping in a Simple Economy' (1946) 21 The Accounting Review 154 at
160, cited by J.M. Holden, The History ofNegotiable Instruments (1955), 2.
474
Ironically, however, the subtleties of the English law of equitable assignments means that it is difficult to
conceptualise any transfer of assets in a securitization: there is never debtor notification. If there is no
notification, there is no transfer at law; but there is an equitable assignment. This is perfectly acceptable for the
purposes of a securitization transaction. In Scottish terms, in so far as there is no debtor notification, there is
simply no transfer of the assets to the single purpose vehicle (SPV).
475 J.S. Rogers, The Early History ofBills and Notes (1995).
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C. Evolution of the concept of indorsation.
The history of indorsation reflects the complexity in the history of cession. There has been
considerable debate about the nature of indorsement, especially of bearer bills, and how it
interacted with the relevant procedural law.476 Importantly, most authors who have considered
the subject of indorsation since conclude that an indorsement encompasses a cession of the
claim.477 However, since cession is often seen as transfer without the consent of the debtor,
AHO
some authors have dissented from this view. Again, the important point for present
purposes is that bills of exchange, being indorsable, allowed claims to be transferred, albeit
with the consent of the debtor.
VI. Assignation in Scots Law 479
A. Introduction.
In one of the most extensive litigations in Scots law in modern times, Caledonia North Sea
Ltd v London Bridge and Engineering Ltd,4S0 Lord President Rodger embarked on a historical
tour de force through the history of the law of assignation. He observed that,
"Nowadays we think of the cedent transferring rights to the assignee. That
causes us no difficulty since modern legal systems tend to recognise that rights
are transferable. At an early stage in its history, however, Scots law regarded
contractual rights as being, of their very nature, personal to the creditor and as
therefore not capable of being transferred to other people. One device, which
was adopted to avoid the resulting practical problems and to give the effects of
a transfer, was for the creditor to agree that the other party could take
proceedings to enforce the right, using the creditor's name but keeping any
sum which was recovered. In other words the creditor made the other party a
procurator in rem suam. See, for example, Stair, Institutions, III.i.3; Bell's
Principles (10th ed. 1899), para 1459. As Lord President Inglis remarked, a
procuratory in rem suam 'is just one of the definitions of an assignation':
British Linen Company Bank v Carruthers and Fergusson at (1893) 10 R. 926.
476 See Brunner, 'Das franzosische Inhaberpapier', 533-546. The holders of bearer bills often had considerable
difficulty before the French courts to establish that they were suitably authorised by the original creditor.
477 R.J. Pothier, Traite du contrat de change (1763) § 23; G. Schapps, Zur Geschichte des Indossaments (1892),
131-133 (France) § 40, at 179 (England); cf. § 32, at 158 (Germany). In Scots law, see in particular the
anonymous case decided sometime in the 1720s reported at 1 Karnes Rem Dec 190.
478 See e.g. L. Kuhlenbeck, Von den Pandekten zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch (1899) vol 2, 162: 'Flier ist nur zu
bemerken: Das Indossament ist keine Cession'.
479 For a recent overview, see generally, K. Luig, 'Assignation' in K.G.C. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds) A
History ofPrivate Law in Scotland (2000) vol 2, 399 ff.
480 2000 SLT 1123 aff d 2002 SC (HL) 117.
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Signs of this approach survive today in the rule that an assignee may sue either
in his own name or in the name of the cedent."481
There is much truth in what the Lord President says here. His comments certainly seem to
reflect accurately the historical development in Europe, on which he drew heavily.482 The
considerable influence exercised by the civil law and the jus commune on the Scots law of
property and obligations was such that it is certainly tempting to draw the conclusion that
Scots law developed in parallel with continental law. As will become clear, however, such a
conclusion would be misleading. There is no evidence in the early Scottish sources, for
example, of an argument that claims are personal to the creditor ever being sustained. Indeed,
there is nowhere a genuine example of this point even being argued. Moreover, although the
institutional writers referred to the position in Roman law in passing, there are relatively few
references to the procurator in rem suam in the Scottish sources. Simple references to an
assignation are not just common but ubiquitous. Where references to procuratio do appear,
they were late on in the development of Scots law: few can be found prior to the nineteenth
century. By this time the law of assignation in Scotland was settled. It is this writer's
contention that Scots law had developed a general theory of the transfer of claims
independently of ideas ofprocuratio in rem suam 483 The ancient order to pay was also part of
Scots law before the reception of Roman law. As Scots lawyers began to take heed of the civil
law, however, they sought to engraft the principle ofprocuratio onto their existing notion of
transfer. The reasons for this are unclear; it may be variously ascribed to ignorance, a need for
authority, or to open legal borrowing. This contributed more confusion than clarity to the
Scots law of assignation 484 And it has come close to erroneously re-writing the history of this
chapter of Scots law. In any event, the style of procuratio never impinged upon the general
481 2000 SLT 1123 at 1139L-1140A.
482 2000 SLT 1123 at 1140F-J; 1143K-1144B referring to R.J. Pothier, Coutumes des Duche, Bailliage et
Prevote d'Orleans (1740) 20.5.1-2; Traite des obligations (1760), 2.6.4 and 3.1.6.2. Pothier's Commentary on
the Coutumes des Duche, Bailliage et Prevote d'Orleans found in M. Bugnet (ed.) CEuvres de Pothier (1861)
vol. 1, § 103, 672, chapter 20 is entitled 'du droit de execution', title 5, 'des opposition des creancers'. There is
comparison of subrogation and procuratio in rem suam in Bugnet's edition at § 84, 667. M. Bugnet, Oeuvres,
vol 2, contains the Traite des obligations. The section corresponding to 2.6.4 is entitled 'Pour Qui envers qui,
pour quelle, et comment le cautionnement peut-il etre fait'; however, there is discussion of the beneficium
cedendarum actionum at § 440, 237. The passage cited 3.1.6.2 is found in Bugnet's edition beginning at § 551,
290. See in particular, §§ 556-557, 291-296. Lord Rodger also cites Art. 1251 Code Civil (subrogation legale); §
774 (cessio legis) and § 426 II BGB (the creditor's obligation to assign his rights against a joint-obligant on
payment by another).
483 Klaus Luig has taken a similar view in K.G.C. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds) A History ofPrivate Law in
Scotland (2000) vol 2, 419.
484
See, again, Luig, ibid at 419.
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theory of transfer. This continued, uninhibited by Stair's purported Romanization of Scots
law.
B. Early references to Assignation in Scottish Sources.
It is not clear exactly when, or how, there was a reception of the Roman law notions of
procuratory in rem suam in Scots law. The assignation sources are of considerable antiquity.
Some of them are contemporaneous with the main reception4843 of Roman law in Scotland. It
should be remembered that it is in the law of moveable property where the Roman influence
was most keenly felt. Yet, even after the reception, there is remarkably little reference to the
notion of procuratio in rem suam. Where these references are made, it is to explain the
susceptibility of the assignee to the debtor's defences: compensation or other claims that
would have been prestable against the cedent 485 There is no evidence that claims were non¬
transferable.
The earliest reference to assignation seems to have been found by Professor
MacQueen who refers to an undated grant by Fergus, Earl of Buchanan (who died before
1212) which is addressed the grantee, 'his heirs and assignees'.486 However, this may not be
of great importance if it is the case that 'assignee' is being used to refer to a grant of corporeal
property. The first reference to an assignation of a personal right is to be found in an
487instrument in the Abbey of Couper Angus which has been dated to 1297. Regiam
Majestatem says that homage has to be done for services and returns assigned in money and
other things.488 Sir William Craigie refers to a deed dating from 1400 which refers to
'assigneiis'.489 Ross refers to a bond granted by James, King of Scots to Henry VI of England
'his heirs, successors or to their certain attorney or depute', dated 8th March 1424.490 There are
numerous examples of the use of the words 'assign, 'assignees' in Scottish deeds in the
484a
Dating the reception of Roman law in Scotland is, admittedly, controversial.
485 As in Henderson v Birnie (1668) Mor 1653 and McDonnells v Carmichael (1772) Mor 4974; (1772) Hailes
513.
486 Professor H.L. MacQueen, SME, vol 15, 'Obligations' (1995) para 854, n. 1 referring to the deed in J.
Robertson (ed.) Collections for a History ofthe Shires ofAberdeen and Banff (Spalding Club, 1843), 407.
487 See D.M. Walker, A Legal History of Scotland, vol 1 (1988), 381 and K. Luig, 'Assignation' op. cit., who
points out that the assignation was in security.
488
III, 60 cited by D.M. Walker, A Legal History ofScotland vol 1 (1988), 381.
489 Sir William Craigie, A Dictionary of the Older Scottish Tongue, from the twentieth century to the end of the
seventeenth (1937) vol 1, 122, v. 'assigne'. The deed in question is found in W. Fraser (ed.) Memoirs of the
Maxwells ofPollok (1863), 141.
490
Ross, Lectures I, 27.
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fourteenth century.491 The second oldest case in Morison's Dictionary, in 1492, is an
assignation case;492 and there is another reported in 1493.493 Similarly, even the most
superficial browse through Morrison's Dictionary will produce innumerable incidental
references to assignations and assignees in cases on quite unrelated topics.494
C. Bonds, Mandates to pay, Procuratio in rem suam and Assignation.
In Stair's opinion, obligations were of their nature originally intranssmissible and non¬
assignable without the consent of the parties. As a result, only obligations taken expressly to
assignees were assignable.495 Hume makes a similar point:
"The notion that the obligation was to be ruled, in that respect, strictly and
literally, by its own terms; so that the creditor in a bond (for instance) could as
little devolve his claim and right of action upon another, as the debtor in the
bond can free himself, and substitute another person as debtor in his room. It
was thought that the conveyance of claims of debt, and rights of action, was
rather unfit to be countenanced, as giving encouragement to litigation, and
being often, in effect, the buying of a lawsuit."496
Karnes suggests that claims were only transferable where the obligation was taken
expressly 'to assignees';497 Erskine, however, is more decerning.498 On this basis it seems that
claims could be transferred if there was consent to that effect in the obligation. This is not
dissimilar to an Anweisung. The debtor agrees to pay his creditor or his creditor's order. When
the styles are examined it seems that the debtor almost always undertook to pay the creditor
'or assignees'. It may be, therefore, that few ever considered whether an obligation was a
personal tie between two parties. The right of the creditor to assign without the consent of the
debtor was never important: as a matter of course, the debtor consented to a transfer. The
491 Sir William Craigie, A Dictionary of the Older Scottish Tongue, from the twentieth century to the end of the
seventeenth (1937) vol. 1, 122 v. 'assign', n. 2; at 122 s.v. 'assigna', 'assignatioun'. Cf. ibid, at 474, v.
'cessionar, cessioner'.
492 Drummond vMuschet (1492) Mor 843; Balfour, Practicks, 169.
493 Countess Crawfurd v Athilmer (1493) ADC I, 313, cited in D.M. Walker, A Legal History ofScotland vol 2
(1990), 710.
494 Cf. D.M. Walker, A Legal History ofScotland vol. 2 (1990), 710: 'It seems that by the later fifteenth century,
rights created by contract were recognised as having a proprietary character so as to be assignable'. The
rerference to 'proprietary' is perplexing. Contract rights are not real rights, but personal rights.
495 Stair III.i.2.
496 Lectures vol. Ill, 1.
497 H. Home, Lord Karnes, Elucidations respecting the Common and Statute Law ofScotland (1777) Art. 39, at
319. But see discussion of these opinions at n. 504 below.
498
Compare his approach at II.viii.7 and III.v.2.
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balance of the evidence seems to point to this being the established practice.499 The important
point to note, however, is that all the writers recognise that Scots law had a concept of
transfer, even with the consent at the beginning of the nineteenth century, unlike the civil law
which lacked a general concept of transfer by cession, even with the consent of the debtor.
The ubiquitous moveable bond500 is of particular interest. As in France, it seems that it
was almost universal practice in Scotland to reify debts into bonds if transfer was desired. The
original Scottish term was 'ticket'.501 Normally the bond would bear to be granted in favour
of the creditor, 'his heirs, executors or assignees'502 or 'his heirs, executors, assignees, or any
having his order'.503 Such a clause would leave it open to the creditor to 'make over' his claim
against the debtor to another either by outright transfer or by ordering the debtor to pay.
Indeed, such a clause seems to recognise expressly that universal succession on death ('heirs
and executors'), singular succession by inter vivos voluntary transfer ('assignees') and the
order to pay ('any having his order'), as distinct concepts. As for whether this recital was
actually necessary, however, Stair, at least, was quite explicit. That an obligation did not
mention assignees was immaterial. The creditor could still transfer by assignation.504 Indeed it
499 The styles will be examined below. Cf. Code Civil, Art. 1122: 'On est cense avoir stipule pour soi et pour ses
heritiers et ayant cause, a moins que le contraire ne soit exprime ou ne resulte de la nature de la convention'.
500
Macvey Napier, Lectures on Conveyancing 1843-44 (Typescript in EUL taken from MS in Royal Faculty of
Procurators in Glasgow), Lecture 10, 135 points out the difference between the moveable bond and the bill:
bonds could be granted for obligations ad factum praestandunr, bills were used only for money obligations. See
also Sharp v Harvey (1808) Mor 'Bill of Exchange', App. 1, No. 22 and A.M. Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing
(3rd ed. 1882), 486.
501 Bundie v Kennedy of Culzean 11th June 1708, Forbes Dec; Mor 4907; Ross, Lectures I, 25 and 45. Fie also
suggests that the term 'bond' is of Swedish or Gothic origin. This seems far-fetched. See also A.J. Mackenzie
Stuart, 'Moveable Rights' in Stair Society, Introduction to Scottish Legal History (1958), 203, para 13; Macvey
Napier, op. cit., at 136.
502 Sir George Dallas of St Martin, Juridical Stiles (1688, published 1774) vol I, 5, Dallas is described by W.
Ross op. cit., 2 as the 'Father of Scottish Forms'. See also Juridical Society of Edinburgh, Juridical Styles (3rd
ed. 1794) vol III, 18. Ross, Lectures, op. cit., 45, cites a deed from 'Carruther's Styles' which is in similar terms.
The authoriship of this work is mysterious. The Sweet and Maxwell, Bibliography of the Commonwealth of
Nations, vol 5, Scottish Law to 1956 (2nd ed. 1957, L.F. Maxwell ed.) attributes the Compend or Abreviat of the
most important ordinary securities of and concerning Rights Personal and Real, redeemable and irredeemable
of common use in Scotland (1702) to one Carruthers. The copy of this anonymous work in the Edinburgh
University Library (EUL Sp Col E.B. .34 (4107)), is attributed to Sir Andrew Birnie of Saline, Lord of Session.
Professor D.M. Walker, 'Judicial Decisions and Doctrine in Scots Law' in J. Dainow (ed.) Judicial Doctrine and
Precedent in Civil Law and Mixed Legal Systems (1974), 207-208 attributes the title published in 1702 to
Carruthers; the title of 1709 to Andrew Birnie. Cf. the respected bibliophile, historian and lawyer, David Murray,
who, in his Legal Practice in Ayr and the West ofScotland in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries (1910), 34, n.
4, records both claims to authorship, but prefers neither.
503
Ross, Lectures I, 64. Compare the deed cited by Sir William Holdsworth, where the granter binds himself
thus: 'I the said Thomas Thorne bynd me myne ayres executors and assignes and all my goods' (Holdsworth,
'Origins and Early History of Negotiable Instruments' (1915) 31 LQR at 378). This is an example of nonsensical
material appearing in styles. That the granter purports to bind his assignees to pay his obligations cannot have
meant that he could transfer his liability to someone else without the creditor's consent.
504 Stair, III. i. 16; see also W. Forbes, Bills ofExchange (2nd ed. 1718), 80 citing Stewart v Stewart (1669) Mor
4337; Erskine III.v.2; III.ii.27: 'Some foreign writers have maintained, that a bill which is taken payable only to
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is notable that styles of other bonds, such as bonds of annuity, were not taken expressly to
assignees,505 yet annuities seem to have been assignable.506 Further, one study of notarial
protocols has indicates that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, bonds were not grated to
creditors at all; instead the debtor would appear before a notary and bind himself to make
payment.5063 Walter Ross, moreover, enters into detailed discussion of the reasons that
obligations were granted to 'heirs, executors and assignees'. However, he does not once
mention the personal nature of obligations; rather, the importance lay in the law of succession:
executors were liable for the moveable debts of the estate.507 Therefore, a bond payable to X,
'his heirs, executors and assignees' could be distinguished from one payable to X, 'secluding
508executors'. The latter type of bond was treated as a heritable debt. Consequently, it would
not be subject to the legitim claims of the assignee's issue.
Although recognised by them, the distinct concept of Anweisung, is not, however,
fully discussed by the institutional writers. Stair, for example, focuses instead on the blank
bond. This instrument seems to have been particularly fashionable in France and Scotland.509
the creditor, and not also to his order, is not indorsable; but if all rights, though they should not specially bear to
assignees, pass by assignation, which is at least a general rule in commercial states, bills by the same rule,
though they do not bear to order, must be transmissible by indorsation'; Bankton II, 193, 16: 'All personal rights
may be assigned, tho' they mention not assignees'. In the same paragraph, Bankton observes - as do the other
institutional writers - the anaomolous position with reversions. These, apparently, had to bear expressly to
assignees to be assignable; reversions, 'being against the nature of property... are to be most strictly observed;
and are strictissimi juris': Mackenzie, Inst. (2nd ed. 1688) Il.viii, at 165-166. As Mackenzie himself observes,
however, reversions could be arrested though not expressed to assignees. Importantly, Erskine Il.viii.7 doubts the
view that reversions had to expressly mention assignees to be assignable; the distinction, in his view, appeared
'to be without a real difference': there are many types of right that are assignable though they do bear to be
granted to assignees. Erskine observes that reversions are adjudgable (rather than arrestable); and adjudication is
merely a 'legal assignment'. Cf. Karnes, Principles of Equity (2nd ed. 1767), 78. For judicial authority, see
Steuart v Steuart (1669) Mor 30, sub nom Stewart v Stewart Mor 4337; Barber v Barber (1705) Mor 10327;
Fountainhall II, 259, (both cases dealing with transmission); Crichton v Gibson (1726) Mor 1446; 1 Karnes Rem
Dec 154; 1 Ross LC 51(n); Boswell v Arnott 7th February 1759 FC; Mor 12578. Some two hundred years after
Stair, in Johnstone-Beattie v Dalzell (1868) 6 M 333 at 344, Lord President Inglis made the same point: "It rather
appears to me that when a right is conceived in favour of a party and his assignees, or a party or his assignees,
which, without mention of assignees, would still have been assignable, the expression of assignees does not alter
the nature of the right ... It is an unnaturally forced construction to say that the words 'or to his assignees' make
the right anything better or worse than it would otherwise have been without them."
505 Juridical Society of Edinburgh, Juridical Styles (3rd ed. 1794) vol III, 24.
506 A style assignation of the annuity follows the style for a bond of annuity in the Juridical Styles cited in the
previous note.
506a D. Murray, Legal Practice in Ayr and the West ofScotland in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries (1910),
24.
507 See Macvey Napier, Lectures on Conveyancing 1843-44, op. cit., at 137 ff. Cf. Erskine Il.viii.5-8.
508 See Macvey Napier, Lectures, 199.
509 For the developments in France, see H. Brunner, 'Das franzosische Inhaberpapier', 544-545; L. Goldschmidt,
Universalgeschichte des Handelsrechts (1891), 397, n. 2; J. Brissaud, History of French Private law (trans. R.
Howell, 1912) § 394; W. Holdsworth, 'Origins and Early History of Negotiable Instruments' (1915) 31 LQR 12
at 24. Although there are examples in English law of the problems that arise where bills are drawn in favour of
fictitious payees, they come much later: see e.g. Tatlock v Harris (1789) 3 TR 174; Vere v Lweis (1789) 3 TR
182; Minet v Gibson (1789) 3 TR 482; 100 ER 689 affid (1791) 1 Ross Lead Comm Cases 76; Lord Mansfield's
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The debtor would give a receipt of his indebtedness to the creditor. However, the name of the
creditor would be left blank. The creditor could then transfer this bond by delivery. The
debtor has granted what is in essence a bearer bill. Importantly, no mention is made in the
bond that the debtor is granting the bond in respect of a debt to a particular creditor. As a
result, the debtor in the bond was prevented from refusing payment to the holder by
compensating the claim with a claim owed to the debtor in the bond by the original
creditor.510 Moreover, the bond could be transferred by mere delivery. No intimation was
necessary,511 only presentment for payment. Yet the basic concept of Anweisung, where there
is an order to pay a particular creditor, seems a basic pre-requisite for recognition of a blank
bond. Drawing on the debtor to pay, but leaving the name of the ultimate payee blank, is just
another way of reifying the debtor's obligation in such terms that he is to pay the creditor 'or
his assignees'. Indeed, it is hard to believe that Scots law did not recognise the concept of the
ordinary order to pay, whereby X asked his debtor, P to pay X's creditor R, 'or his order' or
'R, his heirs, executors or assignees' before it developed the concept of the blank bond.
Again, however, the primary reasons for the use of the blank bond seem to have had
more to do with the political climate of the time and the legal penalties of forfeiture, than with
circumventing any rule preventing the transfer of claims:
"The escheats or forfeitures of the moveable goods of individuals, so frequent
and so distressing among our forefathers, together with the embarrassments
occasioned by the private prohibatory diligences of inhibitions and arrestments,
etc put the ingenuity of people to work to discover means of defeating the
effects of these legal evils. The most effectual method devised for the purpose
proved to be the execution and delivery of bonds blank in the creditor's name,
which like the old tickets to bearer, went from hand to hand, without bearing a
trace of their transmission; and consequently, eluded the effects of diligence of
all kinds. The practice, it seems, increased with the internal commerce of the
country, and grew up to a dangerous length towards the end of the seventeenth
century."512
speech in Stone v Freeland is reported in a footnote to Collis v Emett (1790) 1 H B1 313 at 317; 126 ER 185 at
187 and was quoted in Lord Herschell's speech in Bank ofEngland v Vagliano Bros [1891] AC 107 at 152. Cf.
Gibson v Hunter (1794) 2 H. B1 187 and 288; 126 ER499 and 557. See now Bills of Exchange Act 1882, s. 7(3).
For the incidence of this form in German law, see H. Dolle, 'Bemerkungen zur Blankozession - Beitrag zur
Lehre von der subjectlosen Rechten' in E. von Caemmerer et al (eds) Festschriftfur Martin Wolff(1953), 23 ff.
510 See, in particular, the arguments for the respondent in Grant v Lord Banff(1676-1677) Mor 1654 at 1655. See
also Grant v Mcintosh (1681) Mor 1653.
511 See e.g. Grant v Lord Banff (1676-1677) Mor 1654 and Stair III.i.5. Telfer v Geddes (1665) Mor 1664 and
Brown v Henderson and George (1668) Mor 1665 are cases of good faith payment. However, there are
numerous cases which indicate that intimation was required to transfer the claim in the bond: Crawford v
Crawford & Kniblo (1627) Mor 1661; McCulloch v Cleland (1684) Mor 1666; Campbell v Murray (1697) Mor
970.
512
Ross, Lectures I, 65.
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Only a debtor who was not in a strong bargaining position or who was ignorant of the
law would have granted one. The blank bond had several disadvantages for the debtor. First, it
seemed that in so doing he would lose any right to plead compensation.513 Secondly, it is not
clear whether the defence of good faith payment applied to blank bonds.514 The problem of
blank bonds was serious enough to provoke the Scottish Parliament into passing the Blank
Bonds and Trusts Act 1696.515 In France, the Parlement of Paris prohibited blank bonds and,
in 1716, instruments payable only to bearer (except those issued by the state or by the bank
founded by the Scot, John Law) were declared illegal.516 With the increase in use of the bill of
exchange at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the French realised that bearer bills were
economically necessary. As a result, the edict of 1716 was repealed in 1721.517
In Scotland, the first cases reported under the title of Bills of Exchange in Morison's
Dictionary do not appear until after 1696.518 Prior to then, the decisions on moveable bonds
are collected under 'Blank Writ' or 'Assignation'. The 1696 Act proscribed bonds 'blank in
the person or persons name in whose favors they are conceived'. It was not clear whether
bearer bills fell within this definition; or, indeed, whether they fell within the exception at the
end of the Act that 'this Act shall not extend to the indorsation of bills of exchange or the
notes of any trading company'. Arguably bearer bills did not fall within this exception (they
are not indorsed) and there is at least one case where a bearer bill was held void by the 1696
Act.519 A bearer bill is functionally identical to a blank bond. Remarkably, the 1696 Act was
513 Henderson v Birnie (1668) Mor 1653. In Monteith v Earl ofGloret (1666) Mor 832, the fact that the assignee
had taken gratuitously seems to have influenced the court.
514 Stair, Institutions (1st ed. 1681) Part II, title xxiii, at 6. The debtor would have had to have been so stupid as to
have paid his original creditor without demanding the bond back. Cf. S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of
the Common Law (2nd ed. 1981), 250.
515
Cap. 25 (both 12mo and APS).
516 See J.B. Brissaud, History of French Private Law (trans. R. Howell, 1968) § 396; W. Holdsworth, 'The
Origins and Early History of Negotiable Instruments' (1915) 31 LQR 12 at 24.
517 Ibid.
518 The one exception being Kennedy v Hutchison (1664) Mor 1496. It involved an English debtor. Compare
T.C. Smout, Scottish Trade on the Eve of Union 1660-1707 (1963) 117 who observes that from 1660 bills
'became a regular feature of Scottish commercial life... Between 1660 and 1707, bills were common on the
trades to England, Holland, France, Germany, Danzig and much of Scandanavia...'. This may have had much to
do with the Money Act 1663 (APS, c. 29; 12mo c. 11) which prohibited the export of money from Scotland
except for payment for Norweigian timber or for corn in times of famine. However, Scottish merchants were
initially suspicious of bills of exchange. As late as 1705, one Glasgow merchant could still write: 'I abhorred to
send a ship in her ballast to purchase the goods on credit, which hath destroyed many unthinking men, when
Bills of Exchange came upon them like an Thunder-Clap; although I confess at times it cannot be evited': J.
Spreull, An Accornpt current betwixt Scotland and England in Miscellaneous writings ofJohn Spreull (commonly
called Bass John): with some papers relating to his history, 1646-1722 (1882), 49. See too J. Agnew, Belfast
Merchant Families in the Seventeenth Century (1996), 158-159.
519 Walkinshaw's Exrs v Campbell (1730) Mor 1684.
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only finally repealed in 1995.520 The danger of falling foul of the statute was a real one. For
example, one of the paradigm examples of the bearer bill, the low-value (relative to sterling)
bank note (which was pioneered by the Scottish banks), was originally always granted to a
named creditor or the bearer, presumably with the 1696 Act in mind.521 These would then be
indorsed in blank.522 Immediately thereupon, the bill would be transferable by mere delivery;
thus was the Act easily circumvented. Blank bonds did appear after the 1696 Act; however,
by then their original attributes (compensation not pleadable and no intimation required) seem
to have been forgotten.523 Furthermore, there is considerable authority for the view that where
a debt is reified in a bond, the debt must always be transferred by intimated assignation; mere
delivery of the bond will not transfer the claim: the bond is merely an accessory.524 However,
this ignores the position of the debtor. If he has executed a bond (and he may well have
consented to its registration for preservation and execution) he can withhold payment till it is
tendered.
Nevertheless, the Scottish sources from an early date seem to distinguish the concept
of Anweisung from assignation. Assignation is seen as a transfer (cession) of a claim. The
order to pay is recognised as something different. The second oldest case in Morrison's
Dictionary, reported in 1492, is an assignation case. It involved a question of intimation. The
report reads:
"Gif ony creditour makes and constitutis ony persoun his cessioner and
assignay to ony debt auchtand to him, the said assignay aucht and sould make
lauchful intimatioun of the said assignatioun to the debtour, utherwayis gif the
said debtour happinis to pay the creditour, or ony utheris in his name, havand
his richt and power before ony intimatioun maid to him he onnawayis sould be
compellit to mak ony payment to the said assignay be ressoun of his
assignatioun."525
520
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995.
521 W. Graham, The One Pound Note in the History ofBanking in Great Britain (2nd ed. 1911) reproduces copies
of such notes. There is also the interesting of question of whether the banks would have fallen under the
exemption in the 1696 Act for notes of a trading company. It is thought that the banks were financial companies,
not trading companies, so they would not have fallen within the exemption. See too Pentland v Hare (1829) 7 S
640 and Duncan's Trs v Shand (1872) 10 M 984 where promissory notes were held void for failing to name a
creditor.
522 In Scots law, there seems never to have been a prohibition on indorsement in blank. Compare the position in
France under the laws of 7 September 1660 and 9 January 1664: see G. Schaps, Zur Geschichte des
Indossaments (1892) § 22, at 124. No such prohibition was included in the Ordonnance de Commerce of 1673.
The position under the various laws in force in Germany was similarly hostile to blank endorsement: Schaps §
39, at 175, n. 1, though these provisions seem to have been much ignored in practice: Schaps, ibid.
523 See e.g. Baillie v Dawson (1733) Mor 1667; Elchies, Bill ofExchange No. 1; Compensation, No. 1.
524
Bell, Commentaries II, 24; Christie v Ruxton (1862) 24 D 1182 at 1186 per Lord Benholme, basing his
opinion on his notes of Hume's Lectures.
525 Drummond v Muschet (1492) Mor 843 (my emphasis).
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The case has always been referred to on the basis that it deals with the paradigm form
of cession, i.e. a transfer of a claim by a creditor against his debtor to a singular successor. On
a closer reading of the report, however, it seems that this case might actually have involved a
mandate to pay, i.e. a delegation of performance or Anweisung. The italicised passage is not
easy to follow as a result of the ambiguous use of the pronouns 'his' and 'him'. However, it
can be interpreted as referring to the case where the debtor was in double distress. The
creditor assigns his claim against the debtor, i.e. transfers it. The question is: what then
happens if the debtor is, before intimation of the cession, compelled to pay the original
creditor, or 'ony utheris in his name', i.e. there is a competing order to pay? It is only in the
case of such an Anweisung that payment is made in the creditor's name rather than in the
debtor's own name.526 The answer is that until intimation there is no transfer. Therefore, the
debtor remains obliged, and in good faith, to pay the cedent or the cedent's order. It is of
particular interest, then, that one of the earliest 'assignation' sources in Scots law recognises
both concepts. Moreover, 'assignation' is used to refer to the cession, and not the order to pay.
D. Development of Scots law
1. Assignation and mandates to uplift: Scots law and the Civil law
Stair recounted the history of the transfer of claims in Scots law thus:
"Yet, obligations may become the more useful and effectual, custom hath
introduced an indirect manner of transmission thereof, without the consent of
the debtor, whereby the assignee is constituted procurator; and so as mandatar
for the creditor, he hath power to exact and discharge, but it is to his own
behoof, and so he is also denominated donatar; and this is the ordinary
conception of assignations. The like is done amongst merchants, by orders,
whereby their debtors are ordered to pay such a person their debt, which indeed
is a mandate; but if it be to his own behoof it is properly an
assignation...Assignations are more frequent with us than anywhere; there is
scarce mention of them in the civil law."527
For Stair, assignation was the transfer of the right (and, importantly, a transfer without
the consent of the debtor), while the mandate to pay was an order among merchants. Stair
suggests that it was because of the inconveniences of the old rule that claims were not
transferable or transmissible that the law developed so as to admit of the assignation of claims
526 See chapter 1 above, v. 'Anweisung'.
527 III.i.3.
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in the modern sense.528 Stair suggests that the procuratio in rem suam was invoked to
circumvent the old prohibition. There are five points, however, which undermine Stair's
version of the historical development of Scots law. It will be shown that Stair's view of the
historical development of the Scots law of assignation was thinly veiled Romanization.529
First, he suggests that the old prohibition on transfer was circumvented by the device of
the mandate in rem suam. That statement certainly seems to be unarguable with regard to the
development of the civil law. Crucially, however, Stair then cannot help but comment on the
peculiarity of his own argument: 'Assignations are more frequent with us than anywhere;
there is scarce mention of them in the civil law'. Stair could not understand why, if Scots law
and the civil law shared the same history, assignations were so common here yet so seldom
encountered there.
Secondly, it is not immediately apparent why the old rule - assuming it was a rule -
proscribing transfer was so inconvenient. The use of the bond and, in particular, the blank
bond, seems to have successfully circumvented it. Indeed, many of the cases involving blank
bonds refer to their transfer by assignation. The introduction of the concept of procuratio
seems, therefore, to have confused rather than assisted matters. Bonds were still granted
debtors to the creditor, 'his heirs and assignees'. Moreover, until 1696, if a blank bond was
used, intimation was not required. According to Stair, this was one of the major motivations
for using blank bonds.530
Thirdly, despite Stair's assertion that the concept ofprocuratio in rem suam was invoked,
the relative lack of discussion of 'assignations' in terms ofprocuratio in the Scottish sources
is particularly striking. Indeed, the only substantive relevance that the characterisation of
assignation in terms ofprocuratio had for Scots law was to explain why the debtor was able
to plead defences he held against the cedent against the assignee531 (an incident that is not, as
it happens, dependent on the procuratio analysis);532 and, perhaps, the right of the assignee to
528 Stair III.i.2-3. In Muir v Ross' Exrs (1866) 4 M 821 at 826, Lord Curriehill accepted this account of the law
without question.
529 Professor Luig has written that 'the idea of a procurator in rem suam, which was borrowed from Roman law,
had no apparent consequences for the rest of Stair's exposition': K. Luig, 'Assignation' in K.G.C. Reid and R.
Zimmermann (eds.) A History ofPrivate Law in Scotland (2000) vol 2, 412. The French apparently had a similar
experience with jurists attempting to show that the provisions of the Coutume de Paris were consistent with the
Roman texts: see Grosskopf, Geskiedenis, 83-84.
530 Stair III.i.5.
531 See arguments in Ruthven v Gray (1672) Mor 31; Henderson v Birnie (1668) Mor 1653 and the opinions in
McDonnells v Carmichael (1772) Mor. 4974; (1772) Hailes 513.
532 See chapter 5 below.
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sue in the name of the cedent.533 That is not to say that the concept ofprocuratio was foreign
to Scots lawyers before then.534 However, wherever there is a characterisation of assignation
in terms of mandate, it is not because procuratio was necessary to circumvent a prohibition on
the assignation of claims. Rather these cases involved the incidental effects of characterising
assignation in terms of a mandate in rem suam. This is similar to the French experience where
although the transfer of claims was admitted, the language ofprocuratio was often retained.535
Fourthly, in Scots law an assignee was always viewed as a transferee.536 There are only
two possible elements of the substantive law that have been explained in the basis of the
procuratio theory. One is the right of the debtor to plead defences he held against the cedent
against the assignee. The other is the effect of the cedent's death on an assignation. In 1690,537
the Parliament of Scotland legislated so as to provide that, although intimation had not been
made in the cedent's lifetime, the assignation could still be intimated. The reason for the
legislation may have followed from a misunderstanding of the law: it was thought that an
unintimated assignation fell on the death of the cedent.538 The reason for this, it was said, was
that the assignation was a mere procuratio, and such a mandate was revoked by the death of
the cedent. In the Appendix to the Institutions, Stair refers to some Acts of Parliament passed
in the session while the second edition of the Institutions was with the printer. Of the Act of
on
1693, 'anent Procuratories of Resignation and Precepts of Sasine', he says:
533 Grier v Maxwell (1621) Mor 828 and Westraw v Williamson (1626) Mor 859. See also Shaw v Dunipace
(1629) Mor 3166 where the language ofprocuratio is invoked.
534 See, for example, the assignation reproduced by P. Gouldesbrough, Formulary ofOld Scots Legal Documents
(1985, Stair Society vol 36), 2. In this deed, dated 29th February 1659, the cedent 'makis, constitutes and
ordaines the said JE, his aires, executouris and assignais, my verie laufull wndowbtit [=undoubted] and
irrevocable cessioneris, assignais, donatouris and procuratouris in rem suam...'
535
Pothier, Traite du contrat de vente § 550.
536 See, for instance, an early case, Munro v Wishart (1582) Mor 10337 where the assignee of a delictual claim
sued in his own name.
537 Confirmation Act 1690, APS, c. 56; 12mo, c. 26.
538 See e.g. Erskine III.v.3; Hume, Lectures III, 4; Bell, Principles (10th ed. 1899) § 1467. It should be
emphasised, however, that there is no strong judicial authority for the proposition; quite the contrary. In Shaw v
Dunipace (1629) Mor 3166 it was held that payment by the assignee to the cedent had rendered the assignation
irrevocable. In Mcllwraith v Rigg and Lessils (1687) Mor 839 the assignee was entitled to raise an action after
the death of the cedent. In Ridpeth's Exrs v Hume (1669) Mor 2792 (see Gosford's report) part payment from the
debtor before death meant that the assignee was preferred to an executor-creditor. Analogously, Hamilton v Ross
(1622) Mor 1667 sanctioned the filling up of the name of the assignee in a blank bond after the death of the
cedent. Cf. the authorities which hold that an arrester who laid on the arrestment in the lifetime of the common
debtor, who dies prior to forthcoming, is preferred to an executor-creditor confirming prior to furthcoming:
Riddell v Maxwell (1681) Mor 783 and 2790; Hume v Hay (1688) Mor 2790 and Russell v Balincreiff (1688)
Mor 2791.
539 APS, IX, 331, c. 73; 12mo c. 35. Although the act mentions mandates in rem suam, it applies only, as the title
would suggest, to transfers of heritable property. See too the Confirmation Act 1690, (c. 26; APS c. 56), the
Registration Act 1693 (c. 15; APS c. 24) and the Registration Act 1696, (c. 39; APS c. 41) which were also
passed - in quick succession it must be observed - to declare the effect of death on various legal transactions.
116
Transfer ofMoney Claims in Scots Law
"...but procuratories of resignation and precepts of seasin are irrevocable
mandates in the behove of the mandatar; and they are no more revocable than
assignations, which by their nature and style are procuratories by the cedent to
the assignee in rem suam: for debtors are not obliged to pay any other but the
persons mentioned in the obligation, or their heirs, (which fictione juris are
esteemed the same persons with the creditors,) and therefore unless the
obligement bear especially to assignees, the debtor is not the assignee's debtor;
and so the assignee obtains payment as being the procurator or mandatar of the
creditor; yet the mandate is not revocable by the death of either cedent or
assignee, even by our own former custom."540
However, while such a theory is consistent the principles ofprocuratio in rem suam,
it is insufficient. It fails to explain, for example, why other transfers, such as dispositions of
heritage, also fell on the death of the disponer: the 1690 Act is not limited to assignations,
while the Precepts of Sasine Act 1693 does not purport to apply to assignations at all. Stair is
seeking to extend it by analogy. But, having done so, his conclusion - that obligations must
bear to assignees to be assignable - has no relevance to the Act. As he himself recognises,
before the 1693 Act assignations were irrevocable. The Act must have been merely
declaratory.
Similar difficulties are found in Karnes' discussion of the same Act. Karnes indicates
that 'An obligation for a sum of money, without mentioning assignees, is not assignable'.541
Where this was missing, the procuratory in rem suam could be invoked. However, one of the
problems with the procuratory, Karnes argued, was that it would fall on the death of the
granter; hence the need for the 1693 Act. Karnes opinion of the statute was not a good one; he
saw it as contrary to principle.542 Further, Karnes went on to suggest that the Act would have
been completely unnecessary had lawyers resorted to the simple expedient of taking
obligations expressly to assignees.543 Karnes opinion follows Stair's. It has the same
The flurry of legislative activity over this issue remains a mystery; all the more so since, as far as the writer is
aware, there has been no regulation of the matter in Scots law since. Further still because, contrary to their
preambles, the Acts appear declaratory of the common law.
540
Stair, Inst., 'Appendix' (Tercentenary edition, 1981), 1087.
541
Kames, Elucidations, Art. 39, at 319.
542
Kames, Elucidations, 320: 'To make this statute accord with principles, has not been attempted by any writer:
nor does it seem to be an easy task; for surely the legislature could not mean to empower one to act procuratio
nomine, without a constituent. I understand the statute as empowering these several acts to be done, not
procuratio nomine but by express authority of the statute'.
543 Ibid, 320-321. Kames was at least unequivocal that assignation effected a transfer: 'By our old law, derived
from that of the Romans and from England, a creditor could not assign his claim: all he could do was grant a
procuratory in rem suam, which did not transfer the jus crediti to the assignee ... In our later practice an
assignment has changed its nature and is converted into a cessio in jure, divesting the cedent funditus and vesting
the assignee': Principles of Equity (2nd ed. 1767), 206. The second part of this passage is borrowed from
counsel's argument in Sir James Carmichael v Carmichael ofMauldsly (1719) 1 Kames Rem Dec 35 at 38. It is
inconsistent with what Kames says about procuratio in his Elucidations. His passage in Principles of Equity,
however, is correct in so far as it highlights that procuratio and assignation are not identical. See too T. Hue,
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weaknesses. In particular, if obligations were of their nature intransmissibile (as Stair, in one
place, says544), why did the mere mention of assignees change that? It should be remembered
that in Roman law, there was no method of transfer even with the debtor's consent. It was for
that reason that the procuratio in rem suam was invoked. According to Stair, however,
procuratio must be used, even where an obligation bears to assignees. Further, as Walter
Ross545 has pointed out for Scots law, and as Heinrich Brunner546 has done for French law,
style transfers of many different types of asset bore to be to assignees or invoked the language
ofprocuration, such as heritable grants. Yet, it was not suggested that other types of property
would have to be transferred by the procuratio in rem suam merely because there was an
omission of the word 'assigns' in the grant. The inclusion of the words 'assignees' for one
purpose,547 was copied by conveyancers as a standard clause; and, as Walter Ross has wryly
remarked, this 'proves that conveyancers were more attentive to the practice of each other,
than to the sense of what they themselves were doing'.548
Finally, in the above-quoted passage,549 Stair seems to ignore everything he has said
in his own work about assignation. He had emphatically stated that claims were assignable,
even though the obligation was not expressly in favour of the creditor's assignees.550 In any
event, mere mention of an obligation being payable to 'X, his heirs or assignees' would not
make the debtor the assignee's debtor; intimation of an assignation or acceptance by the
debtor is required for this.551 Moreover, Stair's assertion that, by Scottish custom, mandates
were not revocable by the death of the cedent is puzzling: it would suggest, first, that the Act
was unnecessary; and, secondly, that the decisions of the Court552 - which he had himself
cited, as well as decided - were wrong. Moreover, all the 1690 Act says is that a deed
Traite theorique et pratique de la cession et de la transmission des creances (1891) vol I, § 151, 216 : 'II faut
cependant reconnaitre que le procuratio in rem suam ne realise pas veritablement le transfert de la creance dans
le patrimoine de Tacquereur ou cessionnaire, puisque ce debiteur agit seulement au nom d'autrui'. Compare the
modern South African authorities: Ex parte Kelly 1943 OPD 76 at 83; Kotsopoulos v Bilardi 1970 (2) SA 391
(C); Portion 1 of46 Wadeville (Pty) Ltd v Unity Cutlery (Pty) Ltd 1984 (1) SA 61 (A) discussed by S. Scott, The




Ross, Lectures I, 187-188n.
546 H. Brunner, 'Das franzosische Inhaberpapier', 502, 531 ff.
547 See notes 507-508 above.
548
Ross, Lectures, II, 169: 'The moment a new term was invented by any body, and known, the ordinary list
became enriched by it; in so much, indeed, that in many charters we find repetitions of the same thing, under
different words; which proves that conveyancers were more attentive to the practice of each other, than to the
sense of what they themselves were doing', cited by Reid, Property para 641, n. 4.
549
Stair, Inst, Appendix (Tercentenary edition), 1087.
550 Stair, Ill.i. 16. And see Erskine III.v.2 to the same effect, discussed below.
551 Stair, III.i.6.
552
E.g. Stuart v Stuart (1679) Mor 4337.
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delivered by the grantor who has since died can be intimated, in as much as a delivered
disposition can be recorded after the death of the granter. If, however, the granter died
bankrupt and his estate is sequestrated before intimation, the assignee will not be protected.553
A similar point was made by Kames. In Scots law, unlike Roman law, assignation operates as
a cessio in jure.554
Stair's entire treatment of assignation is a mess. His various statements on the matter
are contradictory: obligations are inherently intransmissible; therefore, a mandate in rem suam
must be invoked. But, although obligations are, of their nature, inherently intransmissble, they
can be assigned where they bear to assignees. Obligations to assignees are freely assignable;
yet, any 'assignation' must take the form of procuratio in rem suam: something that is
supposedly required only for non-assignable obligations. With the assertion that claims are
freely assignable, even where they bear not to assignees, Stair comes full circle. Put simply,
Stair's picture of the historical development of the law (unlike his discussion of the
substantive law, which is perceptive), is incoherent and unintelligible.5543
That Stair's treatment is simply wrong is evident from Erskine's decision, at least to
some extent, to depart from it. Erksine accepts the early history that obligations were
originally intransmissible. But in modern law, he notices, 'the general rule is, that whoever is
in the right of any subject, though it should not bear to assignees, may at pleasure convey it to
another.'554b
That the development of the law of assignation caused such confusion even for the
most distinguished of Scots jurists is remarkable. As he was wont to do, Walter Ross was
careful to emphasise the indigenous elements of Scots law; yet he too was forced to shake his
head in bewilderment at the effect of various influences - native, English, Roman and French
- on the evolution of the concept of assignation in Scots law: 'It is these changes in our law,
these mixtures of principles, which render the practice and decisions of our court...so
contradictory, and to us almost inexplicable'.555
2. Assignability of Non-Contractual Claims
553 Cf. the confused opinion of Sheriff Erskine Murray in Bank ofScotland vReid (1886) 2 Sh Ct Rep 376.
554 H. Home, Lord Kames, Principles ofEquity (2nd ed. 1767), 206.
554a Cf. Bell's comment (quoted in n. 1484 below) that he was often lost in some passages in Stair which he
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The civil law did not know any way by which claims could be transferred (except, perhaps,
with the debtor's consent by way of a reified obligation). In later European development, it
was clear that claims were regularly transferred, contrary to the position of many civilian
jurists. A combination of two factors underlies this development: (1) the tendency to reify
obligations into bonds; (2) the tendency for all obligations to be granted to a creditor, 'his
heirs and assignees'. It would seem, therefore, that whether the debtor consented to
assignation was often not relevant. The question rarely arose. In any event, the law developed
further. In modern legal systems, assignation occurs without the consent of the debtor.556
However, with regard to contractual claims, it is arguable that there is an implied consent to
any transfer.557 But many claims that are assignable in modern law are not based on the
consent of the debtor, such as damages claims for reparation. The history of the assignation of
such claims is important, since any such assignation cannot be based on the consent of the
debtor. Unlike the position in some continental systems, there has been no reception of the lex
Anastasiana557a in Scots law. As a result, the assignation of delictual or enrichment claims is
not uncommon; further, the assignee is not limited in the amount that he can recover from the
debtor. In some civilian systems, the transferee of a litigious claim can only recover from the
debtor what he paid the cedent for the transfer. So while claims for solatium have never been
assignable,558 delictual claims have long been assignable in Scots law.559
3. Cession Styles.
As was mentioned above, in the Scottish sources mention is made of assignment, assignation
and cession. This perhaps emphasises the hybrid nature of the Scottish position. No doubt
Scottish lawyers were aware of the prohibitions on cession in some parts of Europe.560
556 See e.g. H. Kotz, Europdisches Vertragsrecht (1996) § 14 (trans. T. Weir, European Contract Law (1997)).
557 See e.g. Code Civil Art. 1122: 'On est cense avoir stipule pour soi et pour ses heritiers et ayant cause, a moins
que le contraire ne soit exprime ou ne resulte de la nature de la convention'.
557a See n. 316 above.
558 In particular, claims for solatium. Discussion of this point is outwith the scope of this work. See generally,
Cole-Hamilton v Boyd 1963 SC (HL) 1; R. Black in SME, vol 15 (1995), para 605; D.M. Walker, The Law of
Delict in Scotland (2nd ed. 1981), 405 ff. Solatium claims do, however, now transmit on death: Damages
(Scotland) Act 1993, s. 3. See generally, S. Forsyth, 'Transmissible Solatium after Death: a Reappraisal' 1999
SLT (News) 45.
559 Wishart v Munro (1582) Mor 10337. Munro was the assignee of a spulzie claim. The wrongdoer was dead.
The question was whether the assignee could sue the wrongdoer's heir (who was eight years old!). It was held
that the heir remained liable to make restitution of the goods, but had no delictual liability.
560
Many Scots studied in France and, following the Reformation, in the Netherlands. Cession ('transport') was
permitted by French writers; but not by all the Roman-Dutch jurists.
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Moreover, they seem to have been aware of the equally underdeveloped English position. It is
not surprising, therefore, that there are styles where the assignee is constituted as the cedent's
procurator, or 'surrogated' and 'substituted' into the cedent's place. Perhaps Scots lawyers
wanted to ensure that the Scottish assignation would not fall foul of foreign prohibitions
should the deed have to be founded upon abroad. This is not beyond the realms of possibility.
The Scottish export trade to Europe was a vibrant one.561 Such traders would have frequently
have had the need to assign claims. Consequently, although all discussions of the substantive
law strongly indicate that an assignation in Scots law was an outright transfer, the language of
procuratio was often retained:
"Therefore wit ye me to have made, constitute and ordained, and by thir
presents make, constitute, and ordain the said W. G., his heirs and assigneys
my very lawful, undoubted and irrevocable cessioners and assigneys, in and to
the said sum of [X] ... in and to the foresaid bond, decreet interponed thereto,
and letters of horning, poinding, caption, inhibitions, arrestment, and others
following thereupon ... ; and I have surrogate, and by thir presents, surrogate
and substitute the said W. G. and his foresaids, in my full right...; with full
power to the said W. G. and his foresaids to intromit with, uplift, ask, crave and
receive the foresaid sums of money."562
The high point of the view that the procuratio style was absolutely necessary can be
found in an opinion of Lord Curriehill in the nineteenth century. He ventured that 'an
assignation in its proper form does not contain a direct conveyance, but creates the grantee the
cessioner, assignee and donatary of the granter'.563 But, as his Lordship then conceded,564
outright transfers were also allowed. There are many styles of this:
561 See generally T.C. Smout, Scottish Trade on the Eve of Union 1660-1707 (1963). This is the published
version of his doctoral thesis, The Overseas Trade of Scotland with particular reference to the Baltic and
Scandinavian Trades 1660-1707 (University of Cambridge PhD, 1960). See too A.M.J. Rorke, Scottish Overseas
Trade, 1297-1597 (University of Edinburgh PhD, 2001) and J. Watson, Scottish Overseas Trade 1597-1640
(University of Edinburgh PhD, 2004). There remains much work to be done. For example, there are traces of
Scots involved in litigation in the Courts of the Hanseatic City of Liibeck in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries:
see e.g. W. Ebel (ed.) Liibecker Ratsurteile 1421-1500 vol 1 (1950), cases 301 (1483) and 407 (1488), both cases
involving a Scot, Albert Nickelsen or Nickessen; Idem., (ed.) vol 2, 1501-1525 (1955), case no. 302 of 16th
October, 1510 involving one Wylhelm Conner; Case no. 587 of 18th September 1517 involving several
Dundonians and a ship, the 'Caledonia'. See too an example dating from 1667 in the National Archives of
Scotland: an assignation of an obligation originally granted by a Scot to a Norwegian at Bergen for seven 'Rex
Dollars'; and the subsequent assignation of it in Scottish form: NAS, GD 105/224.
562
George Dallas of Saint-Martins, A System ofStiles as now Practised within the Kingdom of Scotland (1688,
published 1774) vol I, 6-7. See also the deed in P. Gouldesbrough, Formulary ofOld Scottish Legal Documents
(1985) p. 2 quoted in n. 534 above. It is of interest that in France distinguishing between a cession and a mandate
to pay required some subtlety: K-H. Capelle, 'Anweisung' in F. Schlegelberger (ed.) Rechtsvergleichendes
Handwdrterbuch fur das Zivil- und Handelsrecht des In- und Auslandes (1929) vol 2, 242 at 245, the style being:
'Le cedant cede et delegue au cessionnaire ses droits contre le cede'.
563 Muir v Ross's Exrs (1866) 4 M 821 at 826.
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"Therefore wit ye me as assigney, and having right in manner foresaid, to have
assigned and transferred, and by their presents assigns and transfers to, and in
favour of the said P. G. his heirs, executors and assignees, the foresaid sum of
[X] ... and I have surrogate, and by thir presents surrogate and substitute the
said P. G. and his aforesaids, in my full vice, right and place of the premises for
now and ever: with full power to them, to intromit with, uplift, ask, crave and
receive the foresaid sums of money above assigned and transferred, and to use
and dispone thereupon at their pleasure.. .."565
The following is the style of a retrocession:
"I by my back bond subscribed with my hand, of [the date] for the causes
herein specified, band [sic] and obliged me my Heirs, etc, Not only to make
due Compt etc, But also to Transfer etc to and in favour of the said A ...
Therefore I for me my Heirs etc hereby repone, restore and retrocess the said A
and his foresaids in his full right, title, and places of the premises.. ."566
Matters would be complicated in the case of a retrocession if it was inconsistent with
the initial 'assignation'. If the initial assignation was a mere procuratory in rem suam and the
translation purported to transfer, then the second deed ought to have been, strictly speaking,
ineffectual. The procurator would have no claim to assign. While a procurator has a mandate
to uplift the money from the debtor and to retain it for his own benefit, it is not clear that the
procurator has the right to subsequently assign the claim to a further assignee.567 Even if a
procurator does have such a right, the subsequent procurator or assignee would be at the risk
of the original cedent's insolvency. Conversely, if the original deed sought to transfer the
claim to the assignee outright, but the translation only constituted the original cedent as a
procurator, the original creditor's right was now dependent on the assignee.
The deeds show that legal advisers did recognise there were differences between a
transfer and a procuratio in rem suam, even if they did not perhaps fully understand what
those differences were. For example, although the style assignations move readily between
the language of procuratio and that of transfer, there is no deed known to this writer in the
<r c q
style books where it is purported to transfer the claim as well as constituted the putative
564 Ibid, at 827: 'In our law that rigid rule of the common law [that claims are not transferable] is not enforced
but this doctrine shows that a mandate in rem suam is not an incompetent form by which a creditor may transfer
his right' (my emphasis).
565 Dallas, Stiles, op. cit., 8, 'Translation'. See also the Deed of Translation in Gouldesbrough, op. cit., 4 which
contains only words of transfer.
566 Birnie op. cit., n. 502, p. 15.
567
Muhlenbruch, Cession, 491, for example, thought that the procurator did have such a right. However, he was
not clear whether intimation to the debtor was required for this. Others thought that the right to further transfer
(scotice: 'translate') was the consequence of the cessioner's actio utilis: see Luig, Geschichte, 61 ff.
568 There are literally thousands of extant assignations in the National Archives of Scotland. Of the few that this
writer has consulted, they are remarkably similar to the styles quoted above.
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assignee as a procurator in rem suam.5 9 This may be a matter of chance. But there is good
reason why such a form would not have been invoked: it would seek to achieve mutually
contradictory things. The Scottish styles have changed little over the years despite the
increase in the relative importance of incorporeals in commerce.570
Substantive Scots law has always admitted the out-and-out transfer of claims. So
S71
despite the assertions by many lawyers from Stair and to Lord President Inglis, there was
no substantive basis in Scots law for invoking this style. This is mirrored by the French
experience.572 Conversely, in those German-speaking areas where the civil law had been




It seems that in the jus commune, a procurator was constituted by mere consent between the
mandatory and the mandant. It seems that the entitlement of the mandatory to sue the debtor
and retain the proceeds, did not hinge on prior intimation. Intimation, it seems, only became
relevant after the formulae system became obsolete when talk in terms of actiones became
redundant; there was no praetor before whom these actiones could be exercised. The right,
and perhaps requirement, to intimate (denuntiatio) to the debtor seems to have been to place
the debtor in bad faith to pay the cedent, or perhaps to play the role that litis contestatio had
under the formulae system.574 The meagre discussion of whether the protection accorded to
569 But see the deed in Gouldesbrough, op. cit., quoted in n. 534 above, where there appears to be an attempt to
assign as well as constitute the 'assignee' as a procurator.
570 Juridical Society of Edinburgh, Juridical Styles (6th ed. 1908) vol II, 934 ff; D.P. Sellar, 'Legal Drafting'
(1994) 39 JLSS 203.
571 See e.g. Carter v Mcintosh (1862) 24 D 925.
572
Pothier, Trade du contrat de vente (1762) § 551.
573
Luig, Geschichte, 30, citing J. Schilter, Praxis juris Romani in foro Germanico (3rd ed. 1713) §§ 63-64.
Schilter noted that the German courts did not use the language ofprocuratio but 'erb- und eigentumlich cediren'.
Cf. the style cession in W.X.A.F von Kreittmayr, Anmcrlcungcn tibcr den Codicem Maximilianeum Bavaricum
Civilem, Part II (Munich, 1761), Cap. 3, § VIII, Nr. 5 cited by C. Hattenhauer, in Historisch-Kritischer
Kommentar zum BGB vol 2 (2006, forthcoming), Rn 16, n. 84 where the granter describes the assigned claim as
one that he 'ganzlich cedirt und iiberlassen habe'.
574 C. Maynz, Cours de droit romain (4th ed. 1877) vol II, 90. He also observes that the idea of intimation had
existed even during the currency of the formulae system, noting that the first reference to denuntiatio is found in
a constitution of Severus in AD 226. The better view, however, is probably that of Brunner who was of opinion
that there is no trace of any notification requirement in the Roman sources; rather, the source must be looked for
in the mediaeval sources and, in particular, the theory of sasine: see H. Brunner, 'Das franzosische
Inhaberpapier', 503-4: 'Es ist in hohem Grade zweifelhaft, was der Satz: simple transport ne saisit point
ursprunglich bedeutet'.
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the cessionary in the civil law, coupled with the continued unnecessary discussion in terms of
actiones, means that it is difficult to determine whether the denuntiatio ever had the role
accorded to it in modern Scots law. What is apparent, however, is that there were no particular
requirements of form that the notification had to take, in contrast to the relatively onerous
formal requirements of intimation in Scots law. It is of note, however, that in the courts of
Flanders in the eighteenth century it was observed that the requirement of signification in
French law had no place there; rather, the Roman law ruled and a 'simple cession d'une chose
incorporelle rend le Cessionnaire possesseur de la chose cede'.575 Stair assumed that
intimation was a peculiar aspect of Scots law ('our proper custom'576) and not borrowed from
elsewhere.
It is suggested by Walter Ross that it was a result of the French influence in Scotland
that the intimation requirement was introduced into Scots law.577 Other writers have picked up
on this point.578 However, they are probably merely following Ross. The apparent similarity
between Scots and French law, in that both systems require notification to the debtor, coupled
with the historical links between the two countries, certainly makes Ross's conclusion a
tempting one. There is, admittedly, little historical evidence adduced by any of the other
writers or by Ross himself. Like other continental European countries, France also invoked
the concept ofprocuratio in the early history of their law of cession.579 It might be mentioned,
however, that Drummond v Muschet,580 which concerned the intimation of an assignation,
pre-dates the oft-quoted provision of the Coutume de Paris that Te simple transport ne saisit
point'.581
575 J. Pollet, Arrets de Parlement de Flandre, sur diverse questions de droit, de coutume et de practique (1772),
vol. II, case no. 18, cited by Grosskopf, Geskiedenis, 84, n. 31.
576 III.i. 12. Professor Luig, 'Assignation' in K.G.C. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds.) A History ofPrivate Law in
Scotland (2000), vol. 2, 413, has remarked: 'As earlier with the procurator in rem suam, it is surprising to a find
a typical Roman institution like intimation being regarded as an invention of the customary law of Scotland'.
577 For the French influence on Scots law, see F.P. Walton, 'The Influence of France on Scots law' 1895 3 SLT
(News) 189; idem, 'The Relationship of the Law of France to the Law of Scotland' 1902 JR 19; T.B. Smith,
"The Influence of the 'Auld Alliance' with France on the Law of Scotland" in idem, Studies Critical and
Comparative (1962), 28; idem, 'Influences franpaises dans le droit ecossais' (1965) 15 La Review Juridique
Themis 43; W.M. Gordon, 'Scotland and France: the Legal Connection' (1994) 22 Index 557.
578
E.g. A.M. Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed. 1882), 297. For the clear French influence on the related
subject of the beneficium cedendarum actionum, see the majority opinion of the whole court in Sligo v Menzies
(1840) 2 D 1478 at 1490 which stated that Art. 2037 Code Civil represented the law of Scotland. Cf. J.J. Darling,
Practice of the Court of Session (1833), 29-30 who suggests that the Court of Session was based on a French
model.
579 See e.g. R.J. Pothier, Coutumes des Duche, Baillage et Prevote d'Orleans (1740) in M. Bugnet (ed.) Oeuvres
de Pothier (1861) vol 1, § 84, at 667.
580
(1492) Mor 843; Balfour, Practicks, 169.
581 When it came to drafting the provisions of the Code Civil, the original draft allowed claims to be transferred
by mere agreement. The requirement of debtor notification was inserted by an amendment proposed by the
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From this early stage, Scots law has been clear: formal intimation was required. It has
never been seriously doubted that intimation is anything other than a 'solemnity requisite to',
and 'as a full accomplishment of, an assignation.582 Moreover, because Scots law recognised
the concept of transfer of a right from an early stage, there is some conflict with the concept
of procuratio in rem suam. What is necessary for a valid procuratory in rem suam in Scots
law? Assuming a mandate in rem suam is not a transfer, intimation becomes merely a
practical rather than a constitutive requirement.583
Interestingly, some of the discussion of orders to pay and bills (as distinguished from
assignations) involved intimation. Bills of exchange, for example, were transferred by
indorsement. Each indorsement transferred the holder's rights against the drawee but no
intimation (to the drawee) was necessary. This had important consequences for competition:
"Intimation being our proper custom so necessary a solemnity, it holds not in
the orders which stand for assignations among merchants, who act oft with
strangers especially, qui utuntur communi jure gentium; and therefore the first
order by merchants, direct to their debtor here, to pay the debt to the obtainer
of the order, was preferred to arresters and assignees, using diligence before
them, though there was neither intimation of the order nor acceptance by the
debtor."584
There are two cases to be distinguished. The first is where the drawer of a bill or order
to pay, draws on his debtor. The second is where the bill is drawn on credit. In the first case,
as has been noted, until payment by the debtor to the holder of the bill, the debt he owed to
the drawer was not discharged. Creditors of the drawer should, therefore, have been able to
competently arrest in the drawee's hands before payment. Indeed, it is because the debt owed
by the drawee to the drawer subsists that the drawee had a defence of good faith payment if he
paid on presentment of a posterior order:
"Bills of Exchange are also transmitted, without any formal assignation or
intimation, by a note on the bill itself, ordering it to be paid to such another...
the first order carries the right of the sum in the bill, without necessity if
Tribunal de Paris. The rationale was the protection of third parties by requiring a certain external and public act.
This is reflected in Art. 1690, which has remained unchanged since it was promulgated in 1804.
582 Stair III.i.6.
583 Cf. A.M. Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed. 1882), 297: 'It is obviously unnecessary in principle to
make intimation of the mere appointment of an attorney, which, in strict law, infers no divesting of the party but
leaves him in full legal right'.
584 Stair Ill.i. 12. See too Lord Ross v Gray ofNewton (1706) Mor 7724 cited by W. Forbes, Bills ofExchange
(2nd ed. 1718), 83.
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intimation, yet payment made bona fide by a posterior order, secures the
,,585
payer.
However, if this obligation to the drawer were arrestable, this could have deleterious
consequences for the drawee if he had already accepted the bill. For his acceptance renders
him liable on the bill, irrespective of his relationship with the drawer. Therefore, acceptance is
the crucial moment for determining arrestability. Before acceptance, creditors of the drawer
can arrest in the drawee's hands. After acceptance, creditors cannot arrest.586 It was perhaps
for this reason that Gloag suggested that the effect of drawing a cheque in settlement of an
obligation was to result only in a conditional discharge of the drawer in his obligation to the
payee. The discharge was conditional on the cheque being honoured; if the cheque was not
honoured the obligation would revive.587 In the second case, the drawee is not indebted to the
drawer. As a result, there is no obligation to the drawer which is arrestable by the latter's
creditors. It is not clear to which of these situations Stair is referring.
E. Modern Scots law.
The Court of Session in the nineteenth century followed the lead of the institutional
writers. They accepted unquestioningly the accepted view that claims were originally not
transferable. No one ever questioned whether Stair's view, that the mandate in rem suam had
been introduced to circumvent the prohibition, was true. There are therefore numerous
judicial dicta in the modern sources which state that an assignation is nothing more than a
mandate in rem suam.5SS Indeed, it is the nineteenth century cases which provide the most
numerous references to procuratio in the Scottish sources. It was a view of which Lord
President Inglis, in particular, was convinced.589
These dicta, however, were uttered unthinkingly. The judges copied what had been
said before. None stopped to ask whether there might be substantive differences between the
583 Stair I.xi.7.
586 John Ewing v Jo Geils & Ro Innes (1698) Mor 1460; Smith v Home (1712) Mor 1502; Dalrymple's Dec 130;
Richardson v Fenwick (1772) Mor. 678; Hailes 471 per Lord President (Dundas of Arniston): 'Practice is of
much consequence. There is no practice authorising arrestment against the drawer when bills are accepted but
not paid. After a bill is accepted, the drawer is only subsidiarily liable'. Cf. authorities cited in J. Graham
Stewart, The Law ofDiligence (1898), 79, n. 4.
587
Gloag, Contract (2nd ed. 1929), 273 cited in chapter 1 above at n. 195.
588 The most famous is probably that in Carter v Mcintosh (1862) 24 D 925 per Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis. See
too Wyper v Harveys (1861) 23 D 607 at 607 at 619 per Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis and Lords Wood, Cowan,
Ardmillan, Mackenzie and Jerviswood.
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different institutions. As with Stair's analysis, references to procuratio contributed nothing of
value to the development of the law. And it is clear that the judges themselves did not fully
understand or appreciate how a procuratio in rem suam might work. It was even suggested
that the mandate in rem suam was the only proper style for an assignation.590
Originally, it was clear that no consideration was required to effect an 'assignation' in
terms of a mandate in rem suam.591 All these cases dealing with the 'mandate in rem suam',
however, confounded the mandate to pay (Anweisung) with the mandate to uplift {procuratio
in rem suam') 592 Indeed, most of the well-known and oft-cited nineteenth century Scottish
cases on assignation have nothing to do with assignation in the conventional sense. The
judges confounded quite different concepts. As a result, the sources are a mess. Some
authorities suggested that the mandate must be irrevocable to effect an assignation and that
593 •
the mandate becomes irrevocable only on it being proved that it was given for value. Yet it
was also held that a mandate in rem suam is irrevocable without any additional proof of
onerosity.594 Further, there was no consensus whatsoever as to when transfer is supposed to
occur: protest,595 informal intimation,596 formal intimation where there are competing
diligence creditors,597 presentation,598 and judicial intimation in a multiplepoinding599 have all
589 Carter v Mcintosh (1862) 24 D 925; British Linen Bank v Carruthers (1883) 10 R 923 at 926. Cf. Lyon v
Irvine (1874) 1 R 512 at 518; (1874) 11 SLR 249 at 253.
590 Muir v Ross (1866) 4 M 821 at 826 per Lord Curriehill: 'an assignation in its proper form does not contain a
direct conveyance, but creates the grantee the cessioner, assignee and donatory of the granter'. However, this
assertion does not seem entirely consistent with his somewhat less assertive conclusion that a mandate in rem
suam was a 'not incompetent' method of transferring a claim. But, on his own analysis, a procuratio is required
because claims are not in any event transferable. Lord Curriehill was recognised by a contemporary Lord
Advocate (George Young) as 'the most skilled adepts of our day in the mystery of Scotch conveyancing': (1870)
14 Journal ofJurisprudence 1 at 4. In Wyper v Harvies (1861) 23 D 607 at 613, Lord Curriehill did not follow
his colleagues in characterising an assignation as a mandate in rem suam\ rather, he recognised only two types of
transfer: one, inter vivos, by assignation; the other, a judicial transfer, by arrestment.
591 Reid v Milne 29th November 1808, Hume's Dec.
592 Cf. Ritchie v McLachlan (1870) 8 M 815. See Lyon v Irvine (1874) 1 R 512 at 518 per Lord President Inglis.
Cf. the similar confusion which seems to have arisen in France: see K-H. Capelle, 'Anweisung' in F.
Schlegelberger (ed.) Rechtsvergleichendes Handwdrterbuch Jiir das Zivil- und Handelsrecht des In- und
Auslandes (1929) vol 2, 242 at 245.
593 Waterston v City of Glasgow Bank (1874) 1 R 470 at 479 per Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff; British Linen
Bank v Carruthers (1883) 10 R 923 at 926 per Lord President Inglis. Cf. Schlesinger, Davis & Co v Blaik (1886)
2 Sh Ct Rep 295.
594 Muir v Ross' Exrs (1866) 4 M 821 at 828 per Lord Deas.
595
Stirling Banking Co v The Representatives ofDuncanson (1790-92) Bell's Octavo Cases 111.
596 Watt's Trs v Pinkey (1852) 16 D 291 at 287 per Lord Ivory that 'Protest may be necessary, as a ground of
summary diligence, but it is not necessary where the mere fact in question is the fact of presentment to the effect
of certiorating the debtor that he has got a new creditor, and interpelling him from paying to any other; and the
whole matter here is, whether there is any evidence of that presentment'. Watt's Trs involved a bill not a cheque.
597 Watt's Trs v Pinkey, ibid.
598 Waterston v City ofGlasgow Bank (1874) 1 R 470 at 479.
599 Carter vMcintosh (1862) 24 D 925 at 935.
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been stated as the moment at which this 'virtual'600 or 'implied'601 assignation occurs. It is
therefore doubtful whether anything useful can be taken from these authorities.
The Bills of Exchange Act 1882 has been hailed as 'the best drafted Act of Parliament
which was ever passed'602 and 'a work of art'.603 Scots law was forced to cope with a unique
legal regime - s. 53 (2) marks the only significant departure from the law otherwise
applicable throughout the UK, and, to a large extent, the law exported throughout the Empire
- that was based on an unsound, nonsensical and commercially inexpedient proposition: that,
on presentment to the drawee, a mandate to pay is somehow simultaneously a mandate in rem
suam and as such operates as an assignation of any funds in the drawer's hands.604 As a result
the law provided a result that was completely contrary to what was desired. Bills and cheques
could not be countermanded (to the extent that the drawee was in funds);605 and, on
presentation of cheques drawn on accounts with insufficient funds, there was an assignment to
the extent of the funds. This required banks to move these sums into suspense accounts.
Unsurprisingly, the Scottish clearing banks did not appreciate this additional administrative
burden. Alas, the misunderstanding has continued; but this has been recounted elsewhere.606
On a more general level, however, there is some difficulty with the acceptance of the
opinions of the nineteenth century judges that, in Scots law, an assignation is nothing more
than a mandate in rem suam. These cases are often, but uncritically, cited. Yet,
contemporaneously, and for some time afterwards, the Court of Session placed a considerable
emphasis on the role of delectus personae in assignability.607 Yet any theory of an assignation
as mandate in rem suam is inconsistent with one which raises the idea of delectus personae to
a decisive level. Delectus personae is predicated on the view that rights cannot be transferred
600 Thorold v Thomson 14th July 1768 FC; McLeod v Crichton 14th January 1779 FC; Mor. 16469. The McLeod
case is reported under the title, 'Virtual'.
601 For example, Campbell, Thomson & Co v Glass 28th May 1803 FC is even reported in Morison's Dictionary
under the heading 'Implied Assignation', No. 2.
602 Bank Polski v Mulder & Co [1942] 1 All ER 396 at 398 per MacKinnon LJ. The same judge had contributed
the entry in the DNB 1922-1930 for Sir MacKenzie Chalmers, the draftsman of the 1882 Act.
603 His Honour Judge Raleigh Batt in 'Preface' to Chalmers' Digest of the Laws ofBills of Exchange (11th ed.
1947), vi, with whom J. Milnes Holden, A History ofNegotiable Instruments in English Law (1955), 202, n. 5
concurs in preference to the harsh judgement of Sir John Paget: 'The whole thing is, of course, a shocking piece
of legislation' (Law ofBanking, 4th ed. 1930, 109; cited by Holden, 322, n. 1).
604 Bills of Exchange Act 1882, s. 53(2).
605
Only partially repealed by the insertion of s. 75A into the 1882 Act in 1985. See generally, G.L. Gretton, 'The
Stopped Cheque' (1983) 28 JLSS 333 and 389; idem, 'Stopped Cheques: the new law' 1986 SLT (News) 25;
idem, 'Stopped Cheques' 1986 JBL 229.
606 See G.L. Gretton, 'Mandates and Assignations' (1994) 39 JLSS 175. See the case law there cited, to which
may be added Bank ofScotland v Richmond 1997 SCLR 303 and Mercedez-Benz Finance Co v Clydesdale Bank
1997 SLT 905 OH.
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without the consent of the other party. This was exactly the basis for the evolution of the
doctrine of the mandate in rem suam in the civil law. So, if the mandate in rem suam analysis
were indeed an accurate portrayal of Scots law, reference to delectus personae would be
superfluous. A mandate in rem suam is not an out-and-out transfer. It was, after all, because
of a perceived delectus personae creditoris that the idea of the mandate in rem suam evolved.
Indeed, arguably if one structures a transaction as a mandate in rem suam, then the principle
of delectus personae - assuming for the moment that it is a principle - cannot apply.608
A more modern development can also be noted. The resurgence of the procuratio in
rem suam is not limited to the dicta of Lord President Rodger in the Piper Alpha appeals.609
From 1985, mandates became exempt from stamp duty.610 The formulation of an assignation
in terms of a mandate should, therefore, have become the norm; especially since the
authorities made no distinction between mandates in rem suam and assignations. From 1985,
the difference was fiscal: a transaction with an identical purpose, appointing the 'assignee' as
the mandatary of the cedent did not attract stamp duty. An outright assignation did. While
there was no obligation to stamp an assignation, failure to do so would have prevented the
assignation being relied upon in court.611 As a result, any well advised party between 1985
and 2003 would have couched an assignation transaction in terms of a mandate in rem suam.
But it is difficult to see why mere terminology would mean that a transaction in the form of
the mandate could have effect as an assignation (i.e. no longer subject to the cedent's
creditors), while at the same time claim an exception from stamp duty.
F. Appraisal of the Scottish position.
Unlike in much of Europe, however, the basic concept of transfer seems to have been
recognised in Scots law from its inception. There are similarities between the Scottish and
French evolution. Originally, it seems, obligations were always reified in a bond. For various
reasons these would always be in favour of, inter alios, 'assignees'. As a result there was
607 This has been discussed in Chapter 2 above.
608 But cf. Goodall v Mclnnes Shaw 1912 1 SLT 425 at 428 per Lord Skerrington (Ordinary) where an attempt to
conceal the transfer of a non-assignable statutory right by way of a mandate was held to be ineffectual.
609 See n. 480 above.
610 Finance Act 1985, schedule 24, 27 Part IX and text to n. 219 in chapter 2 above. See generally, M.J.M.
Quinlan, Sergeant and Sim on Stamp Duties (12th ed. 1998), 225 and 268.
611
Although arguably the important point would have been the intimation, not the deed of assignation; it was
always the assignation, not the intimation, that was deemed liable to stamp duty. However, intimation, being a
formal act, could have allowed the intimation of an unstamped assignation to have been founded on in court.
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never any consideration - in the Scottish sources at least - of whether assignation required the
debtor's consent. As a matter of course the debtor's consent was apparent from the terms of
the obligation. At least by the time of Stair, however, it became established that the debtor's
consent was not required.
The reasons for the evolution of the bill, and indeed the blank bond, in Scotland were
primarily twofold: to avoid the major incidents of the law of assignation, viz. the formalities
of intimation and the assignatus rule. The bill was not utilised to circumvent any prohibition
on transfer. The blank bond seems to have been concerned primarily with frustrating the
debtor's defences, especially compensation, and arresting creditors. With the exception of
statements in the institutional writings based on Roman law, Scots law does not ever seem to
have had any difficulty with the transfer of rights. Writing at the end of the eighteenth
century, Hume observed of the development of the law of assignation in Scots law that:
"Now, this article of history explains to us the reason for the old form and style
of assignation. This was not, formerly, as it is now, a direct conveyance and
transmission of the jus crediti, in favour of the assignee: it was in the form of a
procuratory merely, or commission, or power of attourney granted by the
creditor, and authorising the assignee to exact payment of the debt, as if for
him, - in his name, and for his behoof. Men of business (so it appears) were
naturally afraid of openly violating the old rule; and it had occurred to them,
that, in this way, the real transaction would be sufficiently hidden, and the
prohibition eluded, after this fashion, under cover of a form, which was
calculated apparently from compliance with the law. Ross,612 says it was
borrowed from French practice. "Being once fixed on this plan, it happened
here, as in many other instances, that the style was continued after the original
/Til
reasons for it had ceased to apply."
Moreover, although Scottish assignations often invoked the form ofprocuratio, they did not
to suffer from the consequences that were characteristic of a mere mandate in rem suam. For
example, it was clear that the effect of the cedent constituting the assignee as his 'cessioner'
was to effect a transfer. The cedent was denuded of the assigned claim on intimation of the
assignation by the assignee to the debtor. The cedent could not recall it. The insolvency of the
cedent was irrelevant: the assignee was now the creditor. The Scottish assignation also carried
accessory rights. These points add considerable flesh to the skeleton theory presented by Lord
612
Ross, Lectures I, 180
613
Hume, Lectures III, 2.
130
Transfer ofMoney Claims in Scots Law
Rodger of the history of assignation in the Piper Alpha appeals.614 The mandate in rem suam
is distinct from the concept of assignation, although the boundary often becomes blurred.615
This summary of the position of Scots law can be favourably compared with the
European Codes drafted at the turn of the nineteenth century.616 Generally speaking, they
contained nothing of substance that had not been settled law in Scotland for two centuries.
Interestingly, there seems to be a curious parallel between the position adopted up by the great
German jurists617 and the point which English law had reached by the mid nineteenth century
with regard to their reluctance to admit the free transfer of claims. For German lawyers, the
idea of transfer of claims flew in the face of the Roman sources presented in the Corpus Juris.
These suggested that the relationship between creditor and debtor was inherently personal. In
England, assignment was generally not recognised at law, while the rules against champerty
rio
and maintenance jealously protected against what was perceived to be the potentially
damaging trade in litigious claims. Scots law, on the other hand, seems to have been quite
unconcerned with (or perhaps just oblivious to) these issues. There is almost no discussion of
the personal nature of a claim. As far as litigious claims were concerned, although concerns
were occasionally expressed, and particular measures taken,619 the transfer of litigious claims
in Scots law has proven relatively unproblematic. It is not clear whether this was because of
the lack of systematic study, like that which characterised the Pandektenrecht movement, or
whether it was a considered reluctance to support a legal rule which would proscribe an
institution of such economic expediency as cession.
614 See n. 480 above.
615 Cf. R. Zimmermann, Das romisch-hollandische Recht in Sudafrika (1983), 66-69 discussing the decision of
the Appellate Division in LTA Engineering Co Ltd v Seacat Invrestments (Pty) Ltd 1974 (1) SA 747 (A). At 66,
Zimmermann rightly remarks that the Digest texts (cited by the Court in LTA) could not have had any relevance
to the modern law of cession since cession was not admitted in classical Roman law.
616 For some general remarks on the history of these codifications, see O.F. Robinson, T. Fergus and W.M.
Gordon, European Legal History (3rd ed. 2000), 256 ff; H. Schlosser, Grundziige der Neueren
Privatrechtsgeschichte, Rechtsentwicklungen /, europaischen Kontext (9th ed. 2001) § 5.
617 It is, admittedly, almost impossible to determine to what extent the writings of the Pandectists actually
represented law in force anywhere, in much the same way as great American works (like Farnsworth on
Contracts or Scott on Trusts) represent a corpus of American law that is made up only of their (numerous)
constituent volumes. The law expressed in these books is not actually in force anywhere; particular aspects of the
law of trusts, for example, vary from state to state.
618 For which, see P.H. Winfield, 'Assignment of Choses in Action in Relation to Maintenance and Champerty'
(1919) 35 LQR 143. Maintenance is the funding of either party to an action without lawful excuse; champerty is
maintenance coupled with an agreement to share the spoils. Indeed, until the Criminal Law Act 1967, s. 13(1),
such an assignment was illegal. Yet the law of maintenance and champerty endures in English law: Trendtex
Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679; Giles v Thomson [1994] 1 AC 142 at 163 per Lord Mustill, and J.
McGhee (ed.) Snell's Equity (31st ed. 2005) para 3-36 ff.
619 In particular, the selling of litigious claims to advocates: Ramsay of Ochtertyre, Scotland and Scotsmen in the
18,h Century (1888) vol 1, 431 cited by McBryde, Contract para 19-46.
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That Scots law took such a unitary approach to claims is again unusual. Where Roman
law flourished, the prohibition on cession bore no relation to commercial reality. The same
picture can be seen in England. The Civil law as well as the Common law evolved without
regard to the developments in commercial law. Indeed, the practice of commercial lawyers
flatly contradicted the heavy dogmatic debates of the civil lawyers on the civil law
prohibition. There is a lesson here. Even now we see the UNIDROIT Principles of
Commercial Contracts compared to the generally applicable PECL. In France and Germany, a
peculiar duality of regimes persists for contractual prohibitions on cession: valid under
ordinary civil law, but invalid in commercial law.620
Therefore, in the wider European context, the substantive Scots law of assignation can
be seen to be a remarkably mature, and arguably unique, system. English law was
underdeveloped as a result of the peculiar result of the division between law and equity. The
common law did not admit the transfer of choses in action at law. Despite the best efforts of
the courts of equity, the outright of transfer of a claim (if indeed it is possible for English law
to think in such terms) was not possible until the unification of the courts of law and equity in
1873. Although the original European codes did finally admit the free transfer of claims (i.e.
the Bavarian Code, the ALR, ABGB and Code Civil),621 the evolution seems to have been
more gradual. The order to pay ('assignation' in the European sense) seems to have been the
more common interpretation of 'adsignatio' than transfer. The detailed academic
commentaries flatly refused to sanction transfers. The greatest Pandectist of them all, Bernard
Windscheid, could write in 1875 (only a year before the coming into force of the Judicature
Act in England, Wales and Ireland) that the prevailing opinion was still that enunciated by
Miihlenbruch in the 1820s: claims were not transferable.622 Scots law, in contrast, even in
1875, had been sanctioning the free transfer of claims for at least four hundred years.
One of the most influential Scots lawyers of the twentieth century, Professor Sir
Thomas Smith, wrote in the early 1980s that, 'The Scottish Legal Genius at its best has been
the selective and synthetic, adopting and adapting by comparative techniques solutions first
620 Cf. in Germany, §§ 399 BGB ff and § 354a HGB\ in France, Arts. 1689 ff Code Civil and the Loi Dailly (see
Code monetaire etfinancier (2005)) Arts. L 313-23 ff.
621 For the earlier local codes such as the Codex Maximilaneus Bavaricus Civilis (1756) (Bavaria), see B.
Huwiler, Der Begriffder Zession in der Gesetzgebung seit dem Vernunftrecht (1975).
622
Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts (4th ed. 1875) II, § 329, 257, n. 10, cited by Luig, Geschichte,
118.
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developed in other systems'.623 This comment is only partly true for the law of assignation.
Scots law in this area was indeed strongly influenced by the French position, but it is an
influence that can be overstated. It is of particular interest that it is the terminology of the
Germanic law that Scots law shares, not the French (although admittedly 'assignation', like so
many English words, is of old French origin). While Scots law borrowed the formality of
intimation from French law, much of the anterior and posterior development was indigenous.
The sources evidence perhaps two particularly Scottish features. The first is the constant focus
on the effect of insolvency on transfers.624 Assignation is considered as a transfer. This focus
does not seem to be so evident in other systems. The benefit of this focus is that it highlights
the distinction between contractual undertakings to act, and executed legal acts effecting a
transfer. The second point of interest has been the unparalleled willingness of Scots lawyers to
assign anything and everything. Stair's justified observation that 'assignations are more
common with us than anywhere'625 should alert comparative lawyers to the importance of
Scots law in this area. The liberal attitude of Scots legal writers and the courts to assignations
was considerably before its time. As will become clear in the following chapters, much of the
Scots law of assignation was settled by the mid to late seventeenth century. And the integral
parts had been fixed since the fifteenth. If the law of assignation should develop
concomitantly with the increase in the importance of incorporeals to modern economies, Scots
law, alas, has bucked the trend. The major corpus of the Scots law of assignation was
developed and entrenched at a time when Scotland was economically fragile. In these
turbulent times assignations were ubiquitous. Following the union with England and the
subsequent economic boom that industrialisation and empire brought, the assignation, though
a ubiquitous commercial instrument, produced little litigation. This could be a measure of its
success and practical utility. The sources were already rich. The principles were settled.
Litigation was therefore unnecessary. If this is so, then Scots law has been both a winner and
a loser: a winner because it provided its users with a functional body of law at a time when
assignation was - in other jurisdictions at least - a controversial operation. But, on another
view, Scots law has also lost out. It has been deprived of the litigation that some argue is the
623 T.B. Smith, 'Law, History of in D. Daiches (ed.) Companion to Scottish Culture (1981), 205.
624 See, in particular, Bell's appreciation of Stair's approach in the Institutions: 'He seeks with a liberal and
learned spirit for the principle of all his doctrines; but he is in general careful to submit them to the test of
practice; and to examine rights and obligations with reference to their effects on purchasers or creditors' (Bell,
Commentaries (7th ed. 1870) I, 260, n. 2).
625 III.i.5.
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lifeblood of a modern legal system.626 What is important to realise, however, is something that
has become, unfortunately, unfashionable: Scots law was workable and useful. At the turn of
the nineteenth century it could be favourably compared to the emerging European codes.
Paradoxically, however, this rich body of law, comprising settled principles, has generated
little discussion. But the issues relevant to legal development then are not dramatically
different today. The chapters that follow seek to stimulate debate and development of this
practically vital chapter of Scots law.
626 Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, '"Say Not the Struggle Naught Availeth': The Costs and Benefits of a Mixed
Legal System" (2003) 78 Tulane LR 419 at 424: 'In any event, a Scots lawyer who hopes to see the law develop
must hesitate before complaining of an abundance of cases. Any modern system lives on cases and dies without
them: the real threat to the commercial law of Scotland is not too many cases but too few cases'. But the point
can be overstated. It is understandable for a litigator to advance such a view. From the perspective of the users of
a legal system, however, an effective and efficient system will avoid litigation. And, even where there is
litigation, it may not produce helpful case law. In English law, it should be remembered, (where London, along
with New York, can claim to be the litigation capital of the world) the law of assignment is no more developed
than Scots law; in some respects it is less so. Yet assignment is crucial to commercial law. It is not apparent to
this writer why it is desirable to look for the law in a source which is essentially pathological. In any event, law
can endure without case law. Most legislation, mercifully, produces little or no litigation. But that does not mean
it is 'dead' law.
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Voluntary transfer of an asset requires a conveyance. Only on intimation being made
to the debtor, in due legal form, of the agreement to transfer the claim, does the transfer of a
claim take effect. While an agreement to assign is often confusingly called an 'assignation', it
is intimation which effectually transfers the right. Scots law is one of a number of legal
97
systems which require notification to the debtor to effect the transfer of a claim. Mere
delivery of the deed of transfer has few transfer consequences:
"There is such a thing as an imperfect right to a personal debt, as well as to
land. A disposition to land without infeftment, is only one step to a
transmission of property. An assignation of a bond without intimation, is in like
manner but one step to the transmission of a jus crediti: The cedent is not
divested before intimation. The debt may be arrested by his creditor, and
therefore not by the creditor of the assignee. After intimation, the debt is only
arrestable by the creditor of the assignee."628
627 The major system requiring debtor notification is French law and those systems that have drawn on it. The
traditional principle was famously articulated in the Coutume de Paris: Te simple transport ne saisit pas le
cessionnaire' (Art. 170 in the 1510 edition; Art. 108 in the 1580 text). See O. Martins, Histoire de la Prevote et
vicomte de Paris (1925) vol 2, 574. The modern law is in Art. 1690 Code Civil and in the Dalloz commentary to
the article. The similarity between French and Scots law is no accident; it is probably from France that Scotland
took her substantive law on assignation. Interestingly, however, other systems originally based on the French
have moved away from formal notification being a constitutive requirement. In Luxembourg, the law was
changed in 1994, substituting the requirement of 'signification' derived from the French Code civil, for one of
'notification'. This can be made informally: see Art. 1690 ff. Code Civil Luxembourgeois and discussion in G.
Rohl, 'Die Forderungsabtretung im Recht von Luxembourg' in W. Hadding and U. H. Schneider (eds.) Die
Forderungsabtretung, insbesondere zur Kreditsicherung, in ausldndischen Rechtsordnungen (2nd ed. 1999), 441
ff. A similar reform was undertaken in Belgium, also in 1994; notification is only required to place the debtor in
bad faith: Code Civil Beige Art. 1690 ff.; for which, see in particular, P. van Ommeslaghe, 'Le nouveau regime
de la cession et de la dation en gage des creances' [1995] 114 Journal des Tribunaux 529 ff. and also P.A.
Foriers and M. Gregoire, 'Die Forderungsabtretung, insbesondere zu Sicherungszwecken, im belgischen Recht'
in Hadding and Schneider, op. cit., 135 ff. Most recently, the Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek, Art. 3: 94 was amended
in October 2004, obviating debtor notification for security cessions: see J.W.A. Biemans, 'Kritische
kanttekeningen bij wetvoorstel 28 878 (cessie zonder mededelingsvereiste)' [2004] 135 Weekblaad voor
Privaatrecht, Notariaat en Registratie 532. It should be noted that the notification requirement in France has
been lifted for factoring transactions: Loi facilitatant le credit aux enterprises of 2.1.1981, the so-called Loi
Dailly, (taking its name from Senator Etienne Dailly, who introduced the legislation), now found in the Code
monetaire et financier (2005) Art. L. 313-23 ff. For other jurisdictions which have drawn on French law which
are of interest, cf. Code Civil du Quebec Art. 1641 and Louisiana Civil Code, Art. 2643.
628 Creditors of Benjendward, Competing (1753) Mor 743 at 744; 2 Karnes Sel Dec 75 per Lord Karnes. This
view is preferable to Dewar Gibb's statement that 'to speak of a right to a right is redundancy' (A. Dewar Gibb,
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This has been the law since at least 1492 when Drummond v Muschet was decided.629
It should be remembered that assignation is the transfer of a claim without the consent of the
debtor. Therefore, while the debtor's consent is not required to transfer a claim, his passive
participation is: 'en un mot, le creance ne peut se transferer sans lui, mais elle peut se
transferer malgre lui'.630 Some modern lawyers, however, are perplexed at what they see as an
unnecessary and obsolete formality.631 In some legal systems, the distinction between contract
and conveyance seems to be clearly demarcated without the need for some additional step.
Importantly, debtor notification is apparently seen as an impediment to the utilisation of
incorporeal assets as collateral for finance, as well as an obstruction to the free movement of
claims. The statement by the learned editor of the appropriate chapter in the International
Encyclopaedia ofComparative Law is indicative of foreign perceptions of Scots law:
"In France and other countries whose civil law is based on the French model,
the formalities needed to make assignments effective as against third parties
are so cumbersome that assignment is ruled out as a generally available legal
technique of organizing modern accounts receivables financing."632
Modern international codes therefore provide that the transfer of the claim occurs at
the time of the conclusion of the agreement between the cedent and assignee. These are
A Preface to Scots Law (4th ed. 1964), 16. He admits, however, that contractual rights to payment can be classed
in a general, if not technical, sense as 'property'.
629
(1492) Mor 843. See also Competition betwixt Sinclair ofSouthdun and Sinclair ofBraberdoran (1726) Mor
2793; 1 Kames Rem Dec 175.
630 P. Gide, Etudes sur la novation et le transport des creances en droit romain (1879), 244. Cf. I.M. Fletcher
and R. Roxburgh, Greene and Fletcher, the Law and Practice of Receivership in Scotland (3rd ed. 2005) para
4.80. They state that intimation of an assignation in Scotland must be accepted by the debtor. That is incorrect.
The debtor is a passive party.
631
Including civilian systems with which we have close affiliations: e.g. South Africa. S. Scott, The Law of
Cession (2nd ed. 1991) ch 7 maintains that there is no transfer until there is notification to the debtor. This is
probably not representative of the position in either Roman-Dutch or modern South African law; see P.
Nienaber, 'Cession' in W.A. Joubert et al (eds.) The Law of South Africa, 2nd edn, vol 2, part II, (2003) para 6.
Belgium and the Netherlands - as well as Germany, Austria, and Switzerland - now also allow a claim to be
transferred without debtor notification.
632 H. Kotz (ed.) vol 7, ch 13, 75, para 85. Cf. H. Kotz, Europaisches Vertragsrecht (1996) § 14 (trans. T. Weir,
European Contract Law (1997) § 14); Professor Sir Roy Goode, 'Europe and English Commercial Law' in B.
Markesinis (ed.) The British Contribution to the Europe of the Twenty-First Century (2002) at 19.
633
Principles of European Contract Law (Part III, 2003) Art. 11:202; UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts (2nd ed. 2004) Art. 9.1.7; UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring 1988 ('the
Ottawa Convention') available at <<http://www.unidroit.org>>. Arts 5 and 7; UNCITRAL Draft Convention on
the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade A/CN.9/489 available at «http://www.uncitral.org/en-
index.htm» 'Commission Sessions - Vienna', Art. 10. H. McGregor, Contract Code (Milan, 1993) Art. 666;
M.L.R. Gandolphi (ed.) Code Europeen des Contrats Art. 122(6). International private law in this area is
complex. Is an assignation a contract or a conveyance for the purposes of Art. 12 of the Rome Convention?
Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG v Five Star Trading LLC [2001] QB 825 involved the effect of an English
assignment of a French insurance policy. The English Court of Appeal took the view that an assignment is
contractual in nature. Art. 12 and, therefore, English law applied to the assignment. Accordingly there was no
need to comply with the formal requirements of intimation of French law. Characterisation, however, can be
more complex. Is intimation a question of formal or essential validity? A different connecting factor may apply
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vigorous criticisms. And any analysis of the substantive rules can only occur against the
backdrop of the underlying policies which any system must address in formulating the
formal/essential634 requirements for the transfer of a claim. It is difficult (if not impossible) to
consider fully policy arguments in the abstract. Different interest groups will highlight
different policies with equal force. The following will therefore focus on what we can gauge,
viz., judicial or juristic expressions of what is perceived to be the underlying rationale of the
rules on intimation in Scots law.
II. Judicial Expressions of Policy.
A. Publicity.
The policy of publicity is pursued for the benefit and protection of creditors. There are
many manifestations of this policy in property law. The law prescribes clearly defined ways
of ascertaining whether there has been a change in ownership or the constitution of a right in
security. Scotland has a particularly strong affection for the principle that people should be
entitled to act on the faith of the public records, and rightly so. Yet the requirement for a
physical - and therefore public - act has been dispensed with by most legal systems for the
transfer of corporeal moveables.635 It is perhaps now recognised that there are innumerable
bases on which goods can be possessed. The common law requirement of traditio, it could be
said, is based on the presumption that the possessor of an article was the owner. Creditors can
look to the assets in the possession of the debtor to ascertain his credit. However, the
importance of this presumption has been much reduced,636 and it is clear that publicity has a
relatively small role to play in the transfer of corporeal moveables.
to each question. Why must the proper law of the contract apply also to the legal act of transfer? Cf. Bankhaus
H. Aufhauser v ScotBoard Ltd 1973 SLT (Notes) 87. Unfortunately the complexities of international private law
in this area cannot be further discussed here.
634 This distinction, seldom made, is important. Characterisation for the purposes of international private law can
be illuminating: cf. D. Pardoel, Les conflits de lois en matiere de cession de creance (1997); W. Mangold, Die
Abtretung im europaischen Kollisionsrecht: unter besonderer Berucksichtigung des spanischen Rechts (2001).
European authors are more rigorous in their treatment of the subject than English language sources. The standard
reference is M. Moshinsky, 'The Assignment of Debts in the Conflict of Laws' (1992) 108 LQR 591. The most
recent Scottish contribution approaches the subject from an English perspective: J.M. Carruthers, The Transfer of
Property in the Conflict ofLaws: Choice ofLaw Rules concerning inter vivos Transfers ofProperty (2005).
635 See L. van Vliet, Transfer ofMoveables in German, French, English and Dutch Law (2000). In Scotland, see
Sale of Goods Act 1979, s. 17. At common law it is more accurate to say that property cannot pass without
delivery. There can always be physical delivery without an animus transferendi.
636
Hopkinson v Napier 1953 SC 139; Pragnall v O'Neill v Lady Skiffingdon 1984 SLT 282. But in some cases
the rule will remain important, cf. D.L. Carey Miller, 'Title to Moveables: Mr Sharp's Porsche' (2003) 7 Edin
LR 221 discussing ChiefConstable, Strathclyde Police v Sharp 2002 SLT (Sh Ct) 95.
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What then of assignation? It has been said that the requirement for intimation in Scots
law is based on an analogy with traditio637 for corporeal moveables or registration for
immoveables:
"... the law of Scotland requires that conveyance of even such as a jus crediti
shall, for its completion be accompanied by an extraneous and ostensible act, in
order to render it effectual in questions with third parties, in the same manner
as the transmission of a feudal right requires to be completed by saisine. The
usual mode of completing a conveyance of a jus crediti, when the subject of it
is a money claim is by intimating it to the obligant.. .The only purpose which is
intended to be served by requiring the transference of such a jus crediti to be
marked by some extraneous and ostensible act, is well effected by such a
proceeding [registration], as notice of the transfer is thereby published to all the
world in a record instituted for the very purpose of making such a
publication."638
Nevertheless, with the exception of rights relating to heritage,639 registration is not an
accepted equipollent of intimation.640
Intimation has the advantage that creditors can approach the debtor for information as
to his creditor. Nevertheless, intimation can be validly made even though the debtor may have
no actual knowledge of the new creditor.641 This seems irreconcilable with a policy of
publicity. More prosaically, to suggest that a debtor will always be co-operative in informing
inquisitive creditors of his creditor is probably naive. It is of no great surprise that the
argument in favour of a notification requirement based on the need to publicise the transfer is
generally given short shrift:
"Nor can notification be justified as a means to protect third parties, such as the
assignor's present and future creditors. It has been argued that these third
parties can turn to the debtor and ask him whether he has been notified of any
assignment. But this is impractical in cases where future accounts or a great
number of accounts have been assigned or where the assignee does not for the
present want to disclose the assignment to the debtor. Nor is the debtor obliged
to give a correct answer or to answer at all. If there is a need to protect third
parties against all or certain assignments, the validity of the assignment should
637 W.M. Gloag and J.M. Irvine, The Law ofRights in Security (1897), 476-477 approved in Gallemos Ltd (in
receivership) v Barratt Falkirk Ltd 1989 SC 239 at 243 per Lord Dunpark. Cf. G. Marty, P. Raynaud and P.
Jestaz, Droit Civil, Les obligations (2e edition, 1989) para 357; Pothier, Traite du contrat de vente (1762) § 554
in M. Bugnet, Oeuvres de Pothier (1861) vol 3, 219 and comments at n. 3.
638 Edmund v Mags ofAberdeen (1855) 18 D 47 at 55 per Lord Curriehill, affd (1858) 3 Macq 116.
639 Miller v Brown (1820) Hume's Dec 540; Edmund v Mags ofAberdeen (1855) 18 D 47.
640 Tod's Trs v Wilson (1869) 7 M 1100.
641 For example if intimation to one of a body of trustees is sufficient to interpel them all: cf. Jamieson v Sharp
(1887) 14 R 643, where the trustee to whom intimation was made was in sole control of the funds. Edictal
intimation is another obvious example.
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be made to depend on registration of the assignment in a publicly accessible
register."642
B. Debtor protection.643
The requirement of intimation can be commended from the point of view that it makes
clear to the debtor who is the creditor in his obligation. Only the creditor in the obligation can
give the debtor a discharge. The onus for making intimation is on the assignee. The debtor
may not be aware of the assignation. Even if he is, how is he to know whether the whole right
has passed? If it is generally accepted that some sort of notice to the debtor will be required to
interpel the debtor from paying the cedent, then this is an admission that intimation is the
proper time at which to draw the line, a line which must be crossed before there can be a
transfer.
How is mere private knowledge on the part of the debtor to be treated? Will he be in
bad faith? Maybe; but he is none the wiser. What is he to do? His creditor is the cedent.
Indeed parties to the 'assignment' may have had no desire that payment was to be tendered to
the assignee. The debtor is exposed to the possibility that a court may find much later that a
particular payment that he made was in bad faith to the cedent, and he is thus still liable to pay
to the assignee. If the debtor pays the putative assignee, he may not be discharged, if e.g. the
conveyance from cedent to assignee is in someway defective.644
While many often attempt to rationalise the requirement for an additional, defined act
for transfer with - inexplicably unfashionable - labels such as 'debtor protection' and
'publicity' it is submitted that these are facets of a more general policy underlying our
conveyancing rules. In seeking to protect the debtor and ensure some form of publicity the
642 H. Kotz (ed.) International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, chapter 13, vol 7 (1992), 82, para 90. The
issue of a dishonest or non-cooperative debtor was recognised but not decided in Black v Scott (1830) 8 S 367.
Compare the commentary to Principles ofEuropean Contract Law (Part. Ill, 2003), Art. 11:401: 'the intending
assignee, before giving value, can ask the debtor whether the debtor has received any prior notice of the
assignment'. This leaves the priority provisions of the Principles open to criticism.
643 Cf. generally L. Miller and L. Sarna, 'Assignment of Book Debts: Protection of Third Parties in Quebec'
(1981) 59 Canadian Bar Review 638.
644 If assignation in Scotland is an abstract conveyance, any invalidity of the underlying contract will be
immaterial. Despite the fact that we derived our law from France, where cession de creance - since 1804 - is
viewed as a sale, and therefore in causal terms, it is thought that the general theory of transfer in Scotland is
abstract. There seems no reason to differentiate assignation from other transfers: see Reid, Property, para 612.
The issue is however more complex in this area where the 'assignation' may incorporate both the obligationary
and transfer agreements.
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law is ensuring that which all its users - not just businessmen - are entitled to expect of the
law: certainty.
C. Certainty on Insolvency and Competition.
It is this writer's view that it is the certainty that intimation provides on insolvency or
competition that justify the apparently strict requirements of intimation. Where there is a
requirement of formal intimation, it can be ascertained, with relative ease who the creditor in
the claim actually is and to how much he is entitled. More importantly, this is a theme which
is evident from the sources:
"It has been the policy of our laws so to regulate this matter [i.e. diligence] as
to afford to the debtor the means of having the true amount of the debt due at
the date of the proceeding ascertained and the diligence restricted to that
amount; while other creditors have an opportunity of producing their claims to
the effect of obtaining a share in the attached property in the case of the
debtor's insolvency: and we have to submit that this principle ought to be
declared and followed out completely in all the several diligences."645
The earlier case reports are full of numerous and complex multiplepoindings. Such
competitions often give rise to notoriously complex questions of law at the best of times. The
potential for fraud is always great where there are antagonistic claims and insufficient assets
to go round: 'Wherever there is commerce, there must be bankrupts. Wherever there are
bankrupts there will be attempts to disappoint the law'.646 The law is therefore slow to accord
one party preference over his fellow unfortunates.647 Only those who have complied with the
requisite formalities will have rights.
'Intimation ought to be legally made by a notary, before witnesses, which, as it
was most solemn and requisite to be done, so these were the most probable
means to eschew falset; for being otherwise done, by such privy ratifications,
being deeds only done among the parties themselves, might have the greater
645
(18 3 5) Parliamentary Papers, XXXV [63] Second Report of the Commission for Inquiry into the Courts of
Law in Scotland 1835, 18. The report was prepared, chiefly, by George Joseph Bell, see W.M. Gordon in A.J.
Gamble (ed.) Obligations in Context: Essays in Honour ofProfessor D. M. Walker (1990), 79. Cf. Lord Johnston
in Macpherson's JF v Mackay 1915 SC 1011, quoted at n. 922 below.
646
Mansfield, Hunter & Co v Macilmun (1770) Mor. v. 'Bill of Exchange' App 1, No 1; Hailes 350 at 351 per
Lord Coalston. This was the rationale behind the notification requirement in the Coutume de Paris, see O.
Martins, Histoire de la Coutume de la Prevote et vicomte de Paris (1925) vol 2, 574-575 ; and why it was carried
on into the Code : see R.T. Troplong, De la vente, ou Commentaire du titre VI du Livre III du code civil (4th ed.
1845) vol 1, para 882, at 383. These passages highlight the problems experienced in France of fraud in
competitions. In modern French law, however, intimation is seen by legal writers, if not yet the courts, as
informative rather than constitutive. See in particular J. Ghestin, 'La Transmission des obligations en droit
positif franqais' in La transmission des obligations (Louvain, 1980) 3 at 29 ff.
647
Burnett's Tr. v Grainger 2002 SC 580 at para [28] per Lord Coulsfield.
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suspicion of falset or simulation, and had the more difficult means of trial and
discovery of the same'.648
This same policy was behind the Citation Act 1540,649 which opened thus:
'For eschewing of great inconvenientes and fraude, done to our Soveraine
Lordis Lieges, by summoning of them at their dwelling places, and oft times
falslie, and gettis never knowledge thereof...'
The law relating to citation and service of charges for payment and arrestment continues to
influence the law of intimation of assignations.
A rule that the transfer takes place when the parties intend to transfer their rights,
introduces the potential for delicate and prolonged litigation.650 The idea that a debtor can pay
someone who is not his creditor and still be discharged is exceptional.651 Our law of
652
conveyancing tends to favour bright-line rules; certainty over (individual) equity. The
desire to guard against fraud was the rationale behind the French principle, 'Simple transport
ne saisit point'.653 That general suspicion of fraud on insolvency is found in Scots law too.
Conveyances are instantaneous and unambiguous. An assignation is a conveyance. Only on
intimation654 does the conveyance take effect.
648 Stevenson v Craigmiller (1624) Mor 858. The proceedings in this case are also reported at Mor 836 and 837.
Compare the Preamble to the Act of 1617 c. 16, APS, c. 16, establishing the register of Sasines: 'Oure Souerane
Lord Considdering the gryit hurt sustened by his Maiesties Liegis by the fraudulent dealing of pairties ... which
can not be avoided vnles the saidis privat rightis be maid publict and patent to his hienes lieges...' The detailed
opinion of Lord Justice-Clerk Hope in Donaldson v Ord (1855) 17 D 1053 at 1069; (1855) 27 Sc Jur. 625 at 631
is the closest there is to a judicial examination of the policy underlying the requirement of formal intimation in
the Scottish sources. The reports, however, are unsatisfactory.
649
Cap. 75; APS II, 359, c. 10
650 To borrow Lord Cameron's greeting to the statutory introduction of the floating charge in Lord Advocate v
Royal Bank ofScotland 1977 SC 155 at 173.
651 Cf. Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas (2nd ed. 1707) 18.4.15. But see the residual rule of good faith payment
accorded to the debtor. There are many situations where a discharge can be received from someone other than
the creditor himself, e.g. the creditor's agent, judicial factor, trustee in sequestration, or curator bonis. Indeed, in
the case where the creditor is incapax, only his curator bonis will be able to discharge the debtor. Nevertheless,
all these discharges are granted on the creditor's behalf. With the exception of the trustees in sequestration,
whose appointment will be the equivalent of an intimated assignation, the right to payment remains in the
creditor's patrimony, only he or someone acting on his behalf can grant a valid discharge. But see the principles
applicable to good faith payment, infra.
652 See Sharp v Thomson 1995 SC 455 (1st Div) rev'd 1997 SC (HL) 66; K.G.C. Reid, 'Jam Today: Sharp in the
House of Lords' 1997 SLT (News) 79 at 83; Cf. M. Planiol and G. Ripert, Traite pratique de droit civil franqais
(2e edition, 1954) Tome VII para 1117.
653 P. Ourliac and J. de la Malafosse, Droit romain et ancien droit (1957) § 219, at 224. The formal requirements
found in French and Scots law can be distinguished from the civil law. There no unitary concept of transfer was
developed, but claims could be functionally 'transferred' (by a mandate in rem suam) without formal notification
requirements: C. Maynz, Cours de droit romain (4lh ed. 1887), 90. For later European development, which
followed this trend, see H. Coing, Europaisches Privatrecht, vol 1,1500-1800, (1985), 447.
654 Or one of the equipollents admitted by the law. These are few in number. See also, in the context of
presentment of a bill of exchange, the opinions of Lord Eskgrove and Lord President Campbell in Stirling
Banking Co v The Representatives of Duncanson (1790-92) Bell's Octavo Cases 111 and Bell, Commentaries
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Furthermore, it is not out of place to mention that Scotland is a small jurisdiction. The
rules need to be simple, clear and certain. As a legal system, therefore, we must seek refuge in
principle. Whatever those principles are, they must be clear. Intimation provides a certain date
of transfer. This is not to say intimation is the only way. There are others. One needs only to
look to the position in some other European systems.655 The general principle of good faith
payment could be given a more leading role at the expense of intimation. But the certainty
that intimation gives to the date of transfer would need a replacement. Registration is the
obvious candidate. But even those systems that eschew intimation as a constitutive
requirement for transfer, find a need to retain intimation for practical purposes.656 An
assignation involves a tripartite relationship. Debts are ephemeral A debtor can be discharged
by a good faith payment. But when will the debtor not be entitled to protection? In other
words, how can the assignee interpel the debtor from paying the cedent? This point is well
recognised in the Scottish sources by Bankton:
"But it is adviseable to intimate them, to prevent bona fide payment, the intent
of intimation being not only to complete the right, as is most cases, but
likewise to put the party in male fide to pay; this last is expedient, where the
zrc n
former is not necessary."
If there are no prescribed formalities for non-constitutive intimation, uncertainty is
introduced. If, then, intimation were to be abolished as a constitutuive requirement in favour
of registration, what is to become of the non-constitutive intimation which practical necessity
demands must continue. There are two workable options; there is also a third, which is not.
1. If intimation is retained in a registration system, the assignee who chooses to intimate
should do so formally, by an extract of the registered deed or in a prescribed form.
2. The alternative is to allow an informal notice. Often these are deliberately ambiguous:
technical wording (perhaps unintelligible to the debtor) in illegibly small font. The
ambiguity is deliberate because the assignee wants intimation to have legal effect (by
interpelling the debtor and cutting off defences), but is reluctant, for example, for his
customers to know that their debts have been factored. A most unsatisfactory situation.
(7th ed. 1870) I, 413-421 citing, inter alia, Pothier, Traite du contrat de change (1763) §§ 146-148 for the
requisites of protest.
655
Notably Germany: see §§ 398 BGB ff.
656
Principles of European Contract Law, Art. 1 1:303; UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts (2004) Art. 9.1.10
657 Bankton II, 193, 16.
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3. Intimation is abolished in every sense. It has no effect. This, however, is somewhat
inconsistent with a defence of good faith payment. How can a debtor claim to be in
good faith if he has been informed that his debt has been assigned? Abolishing
intimation in its entirety, therefore, may not be workable; at least not workable in a
system containing a general principle of good faith payment. Complete abolition
would require a principle that the debtor is discharged whosoever is paid: cedent,
assignee, or fraudster.
Perhaps a trade off must be reached: assignees who are reluctant to intimate formally still
receive protection from the cedent's insolvency (assuming they have registered their
assignations), but the price is that they will be subject to debtor's defences that could have
been cut-off by a formal intimation. This writer would prefer the first of the three possibilities.
But these are issues of reform which are for the future. For the present, the question is what is
the law of Scotland on intimation?
III. Scots Law de lege lata
A. Jurists
It is clear that intimation of the delivery of an assignation is essential to the validity of
the transfer in Scots law. The point is especially well made by Stair:
"The assignation itself is not a complete valid right, till it be orderly intimated
to the debtor, which, though at first, (it is like) hath been only used to put the
debtor in male fide to pay the cedent, or any other assignee: yet now it is a
solemnity requisite to assignations, so that though the debt remain due, if there
be diverse assignations, the first intimation is preferable, though of the last
assignation, and that not as a legal diligence, which can be prevented and
excluded by another diligence, but as a full accomplishment of the
assignation."658
For Stair, then, intimation was a 'solemnity requisite to assignations', not just the
method of putting 'the debtor in male fide'; only on intimation was there a 'full
accomplishment of the assignation'. This is strong authority for the proposition that intimation
is a pre-requisite of essential rather formal validity. Bankton is similarly unequivocal659:
"The assignation is not completed by executing and delivering it to the
assignee, but it must likewise be intimated to the debtor, till which is done, the
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is 'the assignee's giving notice of his right to the debtor', which regularly
ought to be done, by causing it read to him, and thereon protesting, that the
debtor may not pay the debt to any other ... Any onerous deed, executed by the
cedent before intimation, will prejudice the assignee, and a second assignation
for valuable consideration, first intimated will be preferable."
B. Assignation and Arrestment
It has been said that an arrestment, per se, is just a judicial assignation.660 This
proposition, however, cannot be correct, although the subject is controversial. An intimated
assignation operates as a transfer. An arrestment interpels the arrested debtor from paying to
another; it lays a 'nexus' on the obligation to account arrested to secure the arrester's
preference to the fund in medio,661 Only on furthcoming is the obligation of the arrestee to
account to the common debtor transferred to the arrester.662 This judicial assignation is to the
extent of the common debtor's indebtedness to the arrester. A voluntary transfer only occurs
on intimation of the transfer to the debtor; yet an arrestment prior to intimation will be
preferred.663 There are illuminating parallels to be drawn between the law of intimation and
the law on service of an arrestment although, admittedly, the service of the arrestment is not
the precise equivalent of intimation of assignation. It is of interest that in France reference is
made to the analogous rules of arrestment (saisie-arret; now, saisie-attribution664) for the
purposes of intimation.665 Arrestment also provides a useful control for the debate as to
whether the requirement of intimation should be retained. An arrestment, although it does not
of itself operate as a transfer, takes preference over an unintimated assignation. An arrestment
must always be served on the arrestee before it takes effect. Those who would argue for the
abolition of intimation in assignations ought therefore, by parity of reasoning, to argue for the
660 Stair III.i.24.
661 Cf. Stair III.i.39, this proposition is somewhat controversial and reflects the so-called 'attachment' theory. See
generally, A.J. Sim, 'The Receiver and Effectually Executed Diligence' 1984 SLT (News) 25 and G.L. Gretton,
Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol. 8, 'Diligence' (1992) para 285.
662 Erskine Ill.vi. 17: 'the decree of forthcoming, therefore, whatever the nature of the subject arrested be, is truly
a judicial assignation to the arrester of that subject, even before the sentence is carried into execution'. See too
Bankton, II, 190, 2 to the same effect.
663 Strachan v McDougle (1835) 13 S 954 at 959 per Lord Gillies and Lord Mackenzie; J. Graham Stewart, The
Law of Diligence (1898), 141. These issues were drawn into sharp focus in Lord Advocate v Royal Bank of
Scotland 1977 SC 155, but cf. Iona Hotels Ltd (in receivership) v Craig 1990 SC 330. A summary of the
literature is in S. Wortley, 'Squaring the Circle' 2000 JR 325.
664 See Loi no. 91-650 du 9 juillet 1991 portant reforme des procedures civiles d'execution, Art. 42 ff.
665 Planiol and Ripert, Traite theorique etpratique de droit civilfrangais, (2nd ed. 1954) Tome VII, 499, n. 1. It is
likely that the Scots law of arrestment also developed under French influence. Indeed, in some parts of France,
the term arrestation was even used for their saisie-arret: see F. Roger, Traite de la saisie-arret (2nd ed. 1860), 4,
n. 1.
144
Transfer ofMoney Claims in Scots Law
abolition of the requirement of service of an arrestment in the hands of the debtor. The
creditors of the assignee will be able to arrest in the hands of the debtor in the assignation; yet,
the debtor will not recognise any connection between the arrester and the common debtor (the
assignee).666 The assignation debtor will be understandably reluctant to comply with the
arrestment. In an attempt to distil some common principles, reference will therefore be made
to analogous cases dealing with the service of arrestments, and indeed of services of charges
for payment and summons.667
C. Service of an Arrestment668
There are a number of situations where it is possible that an arrestee will have no
actual knowledge of the arrestment. For example, personal service of an arrestment on a
natural person should take place at their dwelling house. Service was by a messenger-at-arms
or a sheriff officer in the presence of a witness.669 The officer would knock at the door and
request to see the arrestee. He should exhibit his warrant which is usually found in the extract
decree.670 If the debtor is not at home then the officer should leave the schedule with the
servant or relative who is in the house. The execution should state that the arrestee or debtor
could not be personally apprehended. If the officer could not find anyone at home after
knocking on the door six times,671 he may post the schedule through the door. This must be
followed by postal intimation.672 If the arrestee pays the common debtor in ignorance of the
arrestment, he will be protected.673 There is no requirement for an acknowledgement on
service of an arrestment; proof is afforded by the fact that service is effected by an officer of
the court in the presence of a witness.674
666 Cf. R.T. Troplong, De la vente ou, Commentaire du titre VI du Livre III du code civil (4th ed. 1845) vol 1 para
882, 383 ; F. Roger, Traite de la saisie-arret (2nd ed. 1860), 194 f.
667 J. Graham Stewart, The Law ofDiligence (1898), 320; Citation Act 1540, c. 75; APS, c. 10. The relevant rules
for citation are now contained in the appropriate Ordinary Cause Rules and the Rules of the Court of Session.
668 Cf. the formalities in France for signification: Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile (1999 edition) Art. 655 ff.
669 Debtors (Scotland) Act 1838, s. 32.
670
McKillop v Mactaggart 1939 SLT 65 OH.
671 At common law six knocks were essential: Menzies (1589) Mor 3773; Stevenson v Innes (1676) Mor 3788;
Hay v Laird of Pourie (1680) Mor 3773 and 3790; Duff v Gordon (1707) Mor. 3775; Gillies v Murray (1771)
Mor. 3795; G. Maher and D. Cuisine, Diligence (1991) para 7.09.
672
Ordinary Cause Rules r. 5.4(4). Cf. Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile Art. 658.
673 Debts Securities (Scotland) Act 1856, s. 1, cited by W.A. Wilson, The Scottish Law of Debt (2nd ed. 1991)
para 17.5; Stair III.i.40; Laidlaw v Smith (1838) 16 S. 367 aff d (1841) 2 Rob 490.
674 Debtors (Scotland) Act 1838, s. 32. But see Leslie v Lady Ashburton (1827) 6 S 165.
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D. Intimation and Private Knowledge
If the debtor has learned of the assignation before formal intimation has been made to
him, can he still pay the cedent? The answer to this question is disputed; the controversy
reaches back more than half a millennium.675 'Private knowledge' can bear at least two
interpretations. First, a wide interpretation: it could refer to all knowledge that the debtor has
of the transfer, including intimation, which has been made to the debtor, whether by the
assignee or cedent, but not in due legal form. A second interpretation would narrow the
possibilities: it would be limited to knowledge that the assignee has required from extrinsic
sources and not from the parties to the assignation.676 In the Scottish sources, little attempt is
made to distinguish between the different types of private knowledge that could be relevant.
The question always asked is whether private knowledge of the assignation - howsoever
• • .... . . 677obtained - can obviate formal intimation. While some, especially commercial lawyers,
favour a wide role for private knowledge, this is not the law.
The common law of Scotland is unambiguous when it comes to intimation of
assignations. It must be notarial:678
"The knowledge of an assignation mad supplies not the necessary solemnitie of
intimation thereof.. ,"679
"Intimation is either made under form of instrument, or by a charge and that
which is intimate must be shown. In assignations (albeit known to the cedent's
debitor) nothing can put one in male fide to deal with the cedent but a legal
intimation."680
675 See e.g. J. van de Sande, Commentarius de actionum cessione (1674), in English as Commentary on the
Cession ofActions (trans. P. Anders, 1906), 12.18 who summarises some of the contradictory sources in the jus
commune.
676 Cf. Codice Civile Art. 1264 (Italy).
677
E.g. L. Crerar, The Law ofBanking in Scotland (1997), 295; E-M. Kieniger (ed.) Security Rights in Moveable
Property in European Private Law (2004), 571 states that 'Also, in Scotland, the strict requirement for
notification has been lessened; today mere knowledge on the part of the debitor cessus is probably sufficient'.
With respect, that is incorrect. Indeed, where a Scottish solicitor fails timeously to intimate an assignation, that
omission may amount to professional misconduct: (2002) 47 JLSS December/30.
678 An acknowledgment is not an essential requirement; indeed an acknowledgement is an equipollent to
intimation: see Part V.B below. But compare the opinions of Lord Justice-Clerk Hope in Wallace v Davies
(1853) 15 D 688 at 696 and Donaldson v Ord (1855) 17 D 1053. Both opinions are ambiguous and the reports
are unsatisfactory. A formal (i.e. notarised) acknowledgment by the debtor is an alternative to intimation in
French law: Code Civil Art. 1690.
679
Hope, Major Practicks II, 12, § 9.
680 Robert Spotiswoode, Practiks of the Law ofScotland (2nd ed. 1706), 18. See also Bankton II, 191, 6.
146
Transfer ofMoney Claims in Scots Law
Notarial intimation requires the participation of five people: a procurator681 of the
assignee, a notary public,682 two witnesses and the debtor. The procurator reads the
assignation, or the relevant parts of it, to the debtor, and protests that the debtor 'should hold
the same duly and legally intimated, should not pretend ignorance thereof, or of the
intimation, and should not make any payment to any other than the assignee, or those in his
683
right'. The procurator then took instruments in the hands of the notary. This was acheived
by the presenting the notary with a piece of money, and asking the notary to make out a
formal notarial instrument recording what had been done. The debtor is furnished with a
'schedule' of intimation, which includes a copy of the assignation and the date and time of the
intimation.684 This is signed by the procurator and the notary. There is also executed an
'instrument' of intimation which will be retained by the assignee as evidence of the
intimation.685 The notary, procurator and witnesses was signed on every page. The witnesses
attest not merely to the subscription but also to the facts narrated in the instrument. Provision
is made in the Transmission of Moveable Property (Scotland) Act 1862 for notarial
intimation, which remains competent.686 In such circumstances, a properly intimated
assignation at common law will almost always have the effect of furnishing the debtor with




Surprisingly, it never seems to be suggested that the assignee can act for himself. Whether the procurator was
properly authorised has given rise to litigation: Bruce v Smith (1577) Mor 845; The Queen and Abbot of Couper
v the Laird ofDuffus (1558) Mor 846; Scot v Drumlarig {1628) Mor 846.
682 The procurator and notary cannot be the same person: Scott v Drumlanrig (1628) Mor. 846. For the historical
distinction between a procurator and a notary public, see Anon, 'The Notary Public' 1970 SLT (News) 77.
683 A.M. Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed. 1882), 311; A. Menzies, Lectures on Conveyancing (1856),
244; J. Sturrock (ed.) Conveyancing according to the Law of Scotland, being the Lectures of the late Allan
Menzies (1900), 284.
684 A.M. Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed. 1882), 311; Menzies, Lectures, ibid. See the forms of the
schedule and instrument of intimation in J.C. Murray, The Law ofScotland relating to Notary Publics (1890), 77
ff; Juridical Styles (3rd ed. 1794) vol II, 351; Cf. P. Gouldsbrough (ed.) Formulary of Old Scots Legal
Documents, Stair Society vol 36 (1985), 3.
685
Surprisingly, it was held that it was not customary for notaries to insert these instruments into their protocol
book: Cheisly v Chiesly (1681) Mor 848. For a style schedule of intimation, see Anon, Ars Notariatus (2nd ed.
1762), 256 ff.
686
s. 2, discussed below.
687 See Tod's Tr. v Wilson (1869) 7 M 1100 at 1103 per Lord Kinloch: 'Nothing else other than personal
intimation will be sufficient. To hold anything else would lead to confusion inextricable'. In the context of bills
of exchange cf. Stirling Banking Co v The Representatives ofDuncanson (1790-92) Bell's Octavo Cases 111 and
Poor Irvine (1790-92) Bell's Octavo Cases 120.
688 Notarial intimation was still used even after the passing of the 1862 Act: in Watt v Scottish North Eastern Rly
Co (1866) 4 M 318 at 320, Lord President McNeill narrates that the assignation in question was intimated
notarially. Cf. Mackintosh's Trs v Davidson and Sharp (1898) 25 R 554 regarding the Act of Sederunt of 19th
February 1680 which requires notarial intimation in the case of inhibition of a heritable creditor. G.L. Gretton,
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The principle of transfer only on intimation is enunciated with admirable clarity in
Gloag and Henderson in a passage that has remained unchanged since the first edition of the
work:
"In a competition between an unintimated assignation and other claims, the
defect in the assignee's title due to the absence of intimation will not be cured
by the fact that the debtor was aware of the assignation."689
This is reflected in the opinion of the Lord Justice-Clerk (Miller of Glenlee) in a case cited by
Gloag and Henderson:
"Private knowledge has never been held sufficient when supported by no
writing whatever. It would be dangerous to prove, by witnesses only, that a
man had private knowledge of a deed; for knowledge is an act of the mind, and
witnesses may differ in their opinion as to what will infer such knowledge. It
would be going very far to refer private knowledge even to the oath of the
party; for he might say, 'I did know so and so; but I relied on the law, which,
by assignation intimated, puts me in male fide, but not otherwise'."690
It is sometimes asserted that intimation is required only in a competition between
antagonistic assignees, but that as between the cedent and the assignee, intimation is not
required:691
The Law of Inhibition and Adjudication (2nd ed. 1996), 154-155 expresses no view as to whether the Act of
Sederunt is still in force; McBryde, Contract para 12-132 refers to it without comment.
689 The Law ofScotland (11th ed. 2001) para 38-06; to which is footnoted: uLord Rollo v Laird ofNiddrie (1665)
1 Br Supp 510. It would seem (although the point is not altogether clear) that, according to the decisions even
where there is no such competition, the debtor's knowledge of the assignation will not render him liable to the
assignee if he pay the debt the cedent while no intimation has been given. Stair II.i.24; More's Note CCLXXXI;
Bell, Comm II, 18; Dickson v Trotter (1776) Mor 873; Faculty of Advocates v Dickson (1718) Mor 866; L.
Westraw v Williamson & Carmichael (1626) Mor 859; Adamson v McMitchell (1624) Mor 859; and cf. Leith v
Garden (1703) Mor 865 and Erskine III.v.5." Cf. Mackenzie, Inst. III.v.6: 'The debtor's private knowledge is not
equivalent to an intimation'; W. Forbes, The Institutes of the Law ofScotland (1722) vol 1, Pt. Ill, Bk.l, Tit. 2 §
1 (3): 'But his private knowledge of the assignation is not sufficient'; Bell, Comm II, 18: 'mere private
knowledge is not enough'. In a recent case, however, a proof before answer was allowed on the averment that
the debtor had private knowledge of the assignation as a result of informal letters sent to him by the assignee:
Safdar v Saheed 2004 GWD 28-586.
690 Dickson and Dickson v Trotter (1776) Mor 873; January 18th 1776 FC; Hailes 675 at 675-6. This dictum
reflects the position set out in the anonymous work, Ars Notariatus, or The Art and Office ofa Notary Public, as
the same is practised in Scotland (1740) 227; (2nd ed. 1762), 252. See too the argument in Charteris and
Middleton v Sinclair (1707) Mor 2876. Compare Stair II.i.24: 'But private knowledge upon information, without
legal diligence, or other solemnity allowed in law, at least unless private knowledge be certain, it is not regarded
and nor doth constitute the knower in male fide' (Emphasis added). It is not clear what Stair means by the
italicised passage. Cf. J. Rankine (ed.) Erskine's Principles of the Law of Scotland (21st ed. 1911), 525, which
suggests that private knowledge is not enough to effect a transfer, but that it may be enough to bar the debtor
paying the cedent; E. M. Wedderburn, 'Assignation' in Lord Dunedin et al (eds) Encyclopaedia of the Laws of
Scotland vol II (1926), 8.
691 This argument is originally based on Leith v Garden (1703) Mor 865 and approved by Erskine III.v.5. The
earlier case of Stirling v White and Drummond (1582) Mor 1689 and 7127 involved payment by the debtor in
breach of an interdict, the knowledge was therefore judicial, not private. Cf. McBryde, Contract para 12-102, n.
70 citing Cochrane v Cochrane (1836) 14 S 1040 at 1046-1047 per Lord Gillies; McBryde Contract para 12-
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"But the debtor's private knowledge of the assignation is not sustained as
intimation; since that imports neither publication nor possession on the part of
the assignee. This doctrine is however confined to the case where there is a
competition of creditors; for where there is no creditor in the field, and the sole
question is between the assignee and the debtor, the debtor's private knowledge
of the conveyance is a sufficient interpellation to him, and puts him in male
fide to make payment to the cedent."692
Such an approach, however, is incoherent. As Erskine recognises, an unintimated assignation
is liable to be defeated by the cedent's bankruptcy.693 But what if the debtor has private
knowledge of the assignation but, before intimation, one of the cedent's creditor's arrests? If
the debitor cessus is in male fide to pay the cedent, must the arrestee not also be in male fide
to pay the arrester?694 The arrester's position is no better than the common debtor's.695 If the
debt cannot be effectually arrested by the cedent's creditors, Erskine's view is contradictory.
On one view, only an intimated assignation will protect against the cedent's creditors; on the
other, an unintimated assignation will defeat an arrestment where the debtor has private
knowledge of the assignation. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the law has not followed Erskine's
approach: until there is intimation, the creditors of the cedent can still arrest in the hands of
114, n. 99 and authority there cited; Donaldson v Ord (1855) 17 D at 1062 per Lord Deas (Ordinary). Cf. Hope,
Major Practicks II, 12, § 7. This is now the position in Belgium: Code Civil Beige Art. 1690.
692 Erskine III.v.5. See also Erskine Principles, cited in n. 690 above; and Stair, Inst (1st ed. 1681), Part, II, title
xxiii, at 15 to the same effect. Such an approach has also been suggested in France where cession de creance is
seen as a sale. Sale is effected solo consensu. The cessionary becomes the creditor on the conclusion of the
agreement. Signification is required purely to render the cession opposable against third parties, including the
debtor: see e.g. F. Terre, P. Simler and Y. Lequette, Droit civil: les obligations (8th ed. 2002) para 1289; H. de
Page, Traite elementaire de droit civil beige (3rd ed. 1967) vol III, 360 (Belgian law now requires only simplified
notification to interpel the debtor; the cession is otherwise opposable erga omnes on conclusion of the transfer
agreement). However, if the assignee's right pending intimation can be defeated by third parties, it seems wrong
to style him as the creditor of the debtor. This confusion is one of the consequences of analysing an assignation
in causal rather than abstract terms. Cf. 'The delivered but unintimated assignation' below.
693
Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, s. 31(4); Wood v Weir (1900) 16 Sh Ct Rep 356; A.M. Bell, Lectures on
Conveyancing (3rd ed. 1882), 310; Tod's Trs v Wilson (1869) 7 M 1100; Struthers v Commercial Bank (1842) 4
D 460 at 467 per Lord Fullerton; Strachan v McDougle (1835) 13 S 954; Freugh (1714) Karnes Diet, vol 1, 92;
Burnett v McLellan (1685) Mor Sup Vol, Harcase, 53. The holder of an unintimated assignation cannot rank on
the debtor's bankrupt estate: Glen v Borthwick (1849) 11 D 387 at 389 per Lord Robertson (Ordinary); Taylor v
Drummond (1849) 10 D 3. Cf. Pothier, Traite du contrat de vente (1762) § 556 in M. Bugnet, CEuvres de Pothier
(1861) vol 3, 220. Bugnet points out in n. 2 that the introduction of the principle in French law that property
passes solo consensu probably renders Pothier's view outdated. Cf. J.L. Baudouin and P.G. Jobin, Les
obligations (5th ed. 1998) para 907. For many, the advantage of the equitable assignment in English law is that
the assignment will prevail over the creditors of the cedent. Until 1986, however, where the assignor was a
natural person, the assignee would not have prevailed on the assignor's bankruptcy without notice to the debtor:
Bankruptcy Act 1914, s. 38.
694 Burnett's Tr v Grainger 2004 SC (HL) 9 holds that creditors who have knowledge of competing creditor's
rights cannot be penalised. The debtor in an assignation, however, is not a competing creditor, but a passive
party.
695 J. Graham Stewart, Diligence (1898), 233.
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the debtor.696 The debtor's private knowledge cannot be relevant.697 The position is the same
where the cedent grants a second assignation of the same claim before the assignee of the first
assignation has intimated: 'Any onerous deed', says Bankton, 'executed by the cedent before
intimation, will prejudice the assignee'.698 It is incontrovertible that the date at which the
assignee becomes the creditor in the debtor's obligation, is the date on which the requisite
intimation is made to the debtor.699 Notarial intimation at common law, an equipollent, or
intimation in terms of the 1862 Act, is required in Scotland to transfer the claim being
assigned, and not merely to place the debtor in male fide to pay the cedent.700 Unlike Scots
law, some other systems have dispensed with formal notification requirements to effect a
transfer.701 Transfer is effected by a mere agreement vis-a-vis all parties other than the debtor;
if the latter pays the cedent in good faith prior to notification he will be discharged.
The date of the transfer is also of importance where the cedent becomes insolvent and
the actio Pauliana applies.702 Scots law has oscillated in its approach to the relevant date for
the purposes of the actio Pauliana. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Bell advanced
the view that the date of intimation was the relevant date:
"But questions have arisen, respecting the dates of conveyances of moveables;
and these, I now proceed to explain: Debts are conveyed by assignation; and
the assignation is held to be complete, only when it has been intimated to the
debtor. Now, although the statute [1696 Act] made no exception to the rule,
that the date of the conveyance itself should regulate computation of the sixty
days,703 excepting only in the case of seisine, the idea was not perhaps
unnatural, of extending the spirit of this exception, to the case of assignations;
for, when the act speaks of 'dispositions, assignations etc. made and granted', it
may be understood well to mean, complete and effectual deeds, having the
force of conveyance; which an assignation has not, till intimated. The debtor
himself, and his heirs, are indeed, barred by personal exception from objecting
696 Strachan v M'Dougle (1835) 13 S 954; Creditors ofBenjendward, Competing (1753) Mor 743 at 744; Karnes
Sel Dec 75 per Lord Kames; Graham v Campbell (1724) Mor 2776.
697 For which, see below.
698 III.i.7. See also Erskine, III.ii.43 and 44: 'A writing, while it is in the granter's own custody, is not obligatory;
for so long as it is in his own power, he cannot be said to have come to a final resolution of obliging himself by
it'. Cf. McGill v Laurestoun (1558) Mor 843.
699 Scot v Lord Drumlanrig (1628) Mor 846; Creditors of Benjendward, Competing (1753) Mor 743 at 744;
Kames Sel Dec 75 per Lord Kames; authority cited at notes 689 and 690 above; Campbell's Trs v Whyte (1884)
11 R 1078.
700
Liquidators of Union Club Ltd v Edinburgh Life Assurance Co (1906) 8 F 1143 at 1146 per Lord McLaren.
701
E.g. Code Civil beige, Arts 1689 and 1690; Code Civil luxembourgeois, Art. 1691. Cf. Louisiana Civil Code,
Art. 2643, introduced in 1995. See also Code Civil du Quebec Art. 1641 and Principles ofEuropean Contract
Law, Art. 11: 303 (4).
702 Ss 34 and 36, Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 and ss 242 and 243, Insolvency Act 1986.
703 The period is now six months in the case of unfair preferences: s. 36, 1985 Act and s. 243, 1986 Act; and two
years or five years in the case of gratuitous alienations: s. 34, 1985 Act and s. 242, 1986 Act.
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to the conveyance; but it has no effect in competition with any other diligence
or voluntary right, completed before it. Till intimation, the assignation is an
unfinished, ineffectual conveyance and therefore, independently of any idea of
publication to the creditors at large, an assignation seems hardly even under the
words of the act, to entitle the creditor to found on it as a conveyance, till it be
intimated. In the case of Hay against Sinclair & Co704 already quoted upon
another point, the Court found the date of the assignation, not that of the
intimation to be the rule."705
Over the course of the nineteenth century, however, the courts wrestled with various
alternatives. The Court was particularly pressed where there was a contract to give security
for a debt if asked, but this was asked for within the sixty days: was the delivery of an
assignation pursuant to this obligation a voluntary act?706 The authorities cannot be
reconciled.707 There are a number of possibilities.708 The contract to transfer could fall
outwith, but delivery of the assignation and intimation within, the sixty days; or the contract
and delivery of the assignation could be outside the sixty day period, but the intimation
within. Wherever the contract is outside the sixty days, it has been argued, the transaction
cannot be reduced because the bankrupt does no voluntary act within the 60 days;709 or
delivery is voluntary, but intimation is not an act of the bankrupt;710 alternatively, delivery
and intimation are voluntary acts of the bankrupt.7103 Whatever the older authorities may say,
704
Hay v Sinclair & Co, 8th July, 1788 FC; Mor. 1194; Hailes 1046. See also Scottish Provident Institution v
Cohen (1888) 16 R 112 at 117 per Lord President Inglis, followed in Caledonian Insurance Co v Beattie (1898)
5 SLT 349 OH.
705 G.J. Bell, A Treatise on the Law ofBankruptcy vol I (1800), 188.
706 Gibson v Forbes (1833) 1 1 S 916 at 929 per Lord Fullerton followed by the consulted judges in Taylor v
Farrie (1855) 17 D 639 at 650-1. Curiously, the wrong statute is reported to have been cited in argument in
Taylor, the Session Cases report indicating that reference was made to 54 Geo III, c. 87, i.e. the Duties on Glass
(Ireland) Act 1814!
707
Moncreiff v Hay (1851) 14 D 200 at 203-204 per Lord Fullerton: 'It would be a fruitless task to attempt to
reconcile the various decisions pronounced at different times on this much vexed question'. Cf. Bell, Comm (7th
ed. 1870) II, 207 and Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1913, s. 4; Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1856, s. 6. For the
position of nova debita, see Houston & Co v Claud and Charles Stewarts (1772) Hailes 468, especially per Lord
Gardenston and Lord Pitfour at 469; D. Antonio, 'Nova Debita' 1956 SLT (News) 13 and MacArthur v
Campbell's Tr 1953 SLT (Notes) 81. But cf. Creditors ofMenzies (1715) Mor 981. In France, it seems that the
date of the deed, not the date of the intimation, is the relevant date for insolvency purposes. But this may stem
from the fact that cession is seen as a sale in French law. See generally, J.B. Blaise and R. Desgorces, 'Die
Forderungsabtretung im franzosischen Recht' in Hadding and Schneider, op. cit., n. 627, at 258. But compare, by
analogy, Art. L 621-50 Code du commerce (2005).
708 Cf. W.M. Gloag, 'Securities' in Lord Dunedin et al (eds) The Laws of Scotland vol 13 (2nd ed. 1932) para
784.
709
Taylor v Farrie (1855) 17 D 639 at 648-9 per Lord President McNeill and Lords Ivory, Curriehill, Deas,
Handyside, Neaves, Benholme and Ardmillan; W.M. Gloag, 'Securities' in Lord Dunedin et al (eds) The Laws of
Scotland vol 13 (2nd ed. 1932) para 836.
710 See, in particular, the argument by John Inglis, then Dean of Faculty, in Taylor v Farrie (1855) 17 D 639 at
643.
7l0a Erskine Ill.vi. 19 quoted but queried in Lord Advocate v Royal Bank of Scotland 1977 SC 155 at 170 per
Lord President Emslie.
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the wording of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 is explicit.711 The relevant date is the day
on which the alienation becomes 'completely effectual'.712 The rationale for this provision is
no different than that which underlay the corresponding section in the 1839 Act:
"These enactments passed in 1839, have applied the axe to the root of the evil.
They will check and put an end to the many unseemly attempts previously
made to defeat the important Act of 1696 by deeds executed on the eve of
bankruptcy on the professed authority of personal and latent obligations at a
prior period. For every conveyance and assignation is now to be held at the
date of the sasine and intimation respectively."713
E. Intimation by Whom?
"The deed to be intimated is the assignee's. He is the party interested in completing
his own title; and though, no doubt, intimation given in due form by the cedent, and proved in
writing, would be good and effectual, and proceedings heretofore in use to be adopted in
intimations have always, and in strict correct principle, in name and on behalf of the
assignee."714 There are only two cases where intimation by the cedent has been held good.715
There are another two cases which seem to hold that there need not be delivery of the
assignation, providing there is intimation.716 Such a proposition, however, cannot be
711 See W.W. McBryde, Bankruptcy (2nd ed. 1995) paras 12-114 to 12-116 and references there cited.
712
Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, s. 34 (3): 'The day on which the alienation took place shall be the day on
which the alienation becomes completely effectual' applied in Accountant in Bankruptcy v Orr and Malcolm,
2005 SLT 1019 OH. See also sections 36 (3), 1985 Act and sections 242 (3) and 243 (3), Insolvency Act 1986.
See too Grant's Tr. v Grant 1986 SLT 220, decided under the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1913. An arrestment
served sixty days before liquidation is good: Commissioners of Customs and Excise v John D Reid Joinery Ltd
2001 SLT 588; but an arrestment served sixty days before receivership is not 'effectually executed diligence':
Lord Advocate v Royal Bank ofScotland 1977 SC 155. Cf. Houston & Co v Claud and Charles Stewarts (1772)
Hailes 468 especially per Lord Pitfour: 'An antecedent obligation is good against inhibition, but not against
bankruptcy. An actual formal security granted before bankruptcy is good for nothing, if security is not given
until after bankruptcy. Shall we say that an obligation to dispone is of more weight than an actual disposition?' A
point often overlooked is that the common law (where there are no time limits) has not been superseded:
Johnston v Peter H Irvine Ltd 1984 SLT 209 and Bank ofScotland, Petrs 1988 SLT 690
713 Moncreiff v Hay (1851) 14 D 200 at 205 per Lord Cunninghame on Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1839 (2 & 3
Vict. c. 41), s. 35.
714 A.M. Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed. 1882), 310.
1,5 A v B (1540) Mor. 843 and Libertas Kommerz GmbH v Johnson 1977 SC 191 OH. It is likely that A v B is the
same case found in Sinclair's Practicks No. 107. Cf. Wylie's Trs v Boyd (1891) 18 R 1121 at 1126 per Lord
Kincairney (Ordinary) and Paul's Tr v Paul 1912 2 SLT 61 OH where proof was allowed on the allegation that
the cedent had been fraudulent in failing to intimate the assignation.
716
McLurg v Blackwood (1680) Mor 845 approved in Jarvie's Tr v Jarvie's Trs (1887) 14 R 411 at 416per Lord
President Inglis. Inglis' dictum is obiter. Bain v McMillan (1678) Mor 9128 may be a third case. Smith v Place
D'Or 101 Ltd 1988 SLT (Sh Ct) 5, cited by Reid, Property (1996) para 655, n. 14 and McBryde, Contract para
4-30, n. 62, involved a lease which may have specialities. For delivery of the assignation, see discussion in
chapter 6, 'Validity' above.
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717 .
correct. First, it conflicts with the law on delivery of deeds; secondly, without delivery of
the assignation the assignee cannot effect intimation because he cannot exhibit a copy of the
assignation to the debtor.718 From the converse perspective, the debtor will be wary of paying
a creditor who claims to be an assignee without that person producing some sort of deed:
'knowledge of an assignment, where it falls short of ocular evidence, will scarce be sustained
to put the debtor in male fide'.719 Thirdly, it conflicts with the opinion of Bankton who rightly
states that if the cedent 'retain the writings in his own hand, he is not understood divested,
since the assignation is still in his power, and which he may destroy'.720 Indeed, in one old
case, the date of intimation, made initially by the cedent, was postponed until the deed of
assignation was delivered to the assignee.721 Certainly, in the case of the double assignation of
797
the same right, priority is always regulated by the first intimation by the assignee.
The view just articulated is consistent with an important legal principle: the assignee
cannot have the claim transferred into his patrimony without his consent, or at the precise
moment he intends transfer to occur. But this view also poses one important problem. The
rules on intimation often ignore the debtor. The Scottish authorities hold that if the debtor
pays the cedent after intimation (assuming that he has actually received it), the debtor will not
717 E.M. Clive, The Law ofHusband and Wife in Scotland (4th ed. 1997) para 14.064 comments that, 'The law in
this whole area seems incoherent'.
718 The failure to exhibit a copy of the assignation was fatal in Forbes v Watson (1714) Mor 3687, 3753 and 7173
where the intimation was edictal.
719 Lord Karnes, Principles of Equity (2nd ed. 1767), 61; (3rd ed. 1778), 59; Lawrie v Hay (1696) Mor 849;
Gallemos Ltd (in receivership) v Barratt Falkirk Ltd 1989 SC 239 at 242 per Lord Dunpark. Karnes' view is
particularly important since he was of opinion that equity should ameliorate the common law necessity of
notarial intimation. In Rodgerson Roofing Ltd v Hall & Tawse Scotland Ltd 2000 SC 249, the First Division held
that there could still be a preliminary proof even where the putative assignee had not produced his assignation in
an arbitration; the respondents were not prejudiced because they could obtain an order for recovery of any
documents in the assignee's hands or the proceedings could be sisted until it was produced. In modern German
law, cession occurs by mere agreement; but the debtor is not obliged to pay until the assignee provides a copy of
the cession: § 410 BGB\ failing which, the debtor will be free to pay the cedent (assuming the cedent has not
intimated): see, generally, K. Luig, 'Zession und Abstraktionsprinzip' in H. Coing and W. Wilhelm,
Wissenschaft und Kodifikation des Privatrechts im 19. Jahrhundert (1977), 112 at 137. Cf. M. Planiol and G.
Ripert, Traite theorique et pratique de droit civilfranpais (2e ed. 1954) vol 7, 497, n. 2.
720
III, 191, 7; and see III, 202, 46. See too Erskine III.ii.43. Admittedly, if there has been a transfer (i.e. an
intimated assignation), it is not clear why subsequent destruction of the assignation is of much relevance. See
also, Macvey Napier, Lectures on Conveyancing, 202: 'Intimation requires to be done in the name of the
assignee, a statement so long and so well established as to make it difficult to conceive how a lawyer like Lord
Karnes could fall into the error of saying (Elucid. No. 39) that the intimation should be made in the name of the
creditor'. The citation from Karnes does not seem to deal with the point. In any event, the use of the term
'creditor' is ambiguous. Before intimation, the cedent is creditor; on intimation, the assignee becomes the
debtor's creditor.
721 Hisselside v Littlegill (1685) Mor 11496; Sup Vol, Harcase, 25. It is on citation of this case that Erskine,
Principles III.v.2 states that 'Assignations must not only be delivered by the assignee, but intimated by him to the
debtor' (my emphasis).
722 Cf. P. van Ommeslaghe, 'Le Nouveau Regime de la cession et de la dation en gage des creances' [1995] 114
Journal des tribunaux 529 at 533, No. 12.
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be discharged. Do these rules not perhaps expect too much of the debtor? It took some of the
most learned jurists in Europe and England some fifteen hundred years to admit the transfer of
claims. Their view was that contracting parties expect to pay only their co-contractor. Might
this not be the view of ordinary contract debtors? To the debtor, the assignee is an unknown
quantity, a stranger. But it is notification from this stranger with which the debtor must
comply. If the debtor ignores the assignee's intimation, the debtor is not discharged. Only if
considerable formal requirements for intimation are retained is it realistic to expect debtors to
understand fully the important legal consequences intimation has for them.
There are also older cases which suggest that inter-spousal assignations require no
delivery since the husband is custodier of his wife's deeds.723 This rule has probably been
superseded. But since delivery is a question of fact, it may well be that delivery between
cohabiting spouses could be entirely notional.724 Generally speaking, an assignee must, at the
very least, have passive legal capacity725 to take the rights granted to him by the cedent.
However, if ordinary legal capacity is required to make intimation, mere passive capacity is
not enough. Intimation, of course, is necessary to transfer the claim to the assignee. This
raises the issue of whether representatives of the assignee can effect intimation for him. In the
case where there is no appointed guardian and time is of the essence, intimation can be made
on the assignee's behalf on the basis of negotiorum gestio.126
F. The Transmission of Moveable Property (Scotland) Act 1862, 25 & 26 Vict,
c.85.
The genesis for a statute regulating the intimation of assignations is mysterious. There
is no trace of any recommendation in the four Reports of the Law Commissioners ofScotland
chaired by George Joseph Bell in the 1830s. The Bill was introduced to Parliament by James
727 728
Moncreiff, the Lord Advocate, who, unusually, was concurrently the Dean of Faculty.
723
E.g. Munro vMunro (1712) Mor 5052 and cases cited in chapter 6 below, 'Validity'.
724 See generally, E.M. Clive, The Law ofHusband and Wife in Scotland (4th ed. 1997) para 14.035.
725 For this concept, see D.N. MacCormick, 'General Legal Concepts' in Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 11
(1989), para 1035.
726 In Cockburn v Craigvar (1672) Mor 11493; 2 Stair 56, intimation was made in the name of a third party
allegedly acting as negotiorum gestor for the assignee.
727 Moncreiff was then MP for Edinburgh.
728 Moncreiff was appointed Lord Justice-Clerk in 1869. As Lord Advocate, he was responsible for the passage
of many important pieces of Scottish legislation. See generally G.F. Millar, 'Moncreiff, James Wellwood, first
Baron Moncreiff of Tulliebole (1811-1895)', DNB (2004); and (1895) 1 1 Scottish Law Review 153. The link
between the Moncreiff family and the Scots law of assignation extends further. After the death of Moncreiff s
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He was assisted in its preparation by David Mure, later Lord Mure729 as well as another
legally qualified MP, Alexander Dunlop of Session Cases-fame.730 The Bill had its first
reading on 10th March 1862,731 and Second Reading on Thursday 3rd April, where it was
committed to a committee of the Whole House. It was finally considered on Monday 12th
May. It was read for a third time on Wednesday 14th May whereupon it was sent to the Lords
where it was passed without amendment on 31st July. The un-amended Bill received Royal
Assent on 7th August 1862. It is perhaps justifiable to infer that the legislation was not
subjected to great scrutiny.732
The Act allows assignations to be validly intimated in two ways.733 First, by a notary
public delivering a copy of the assignation, certified as correct,734 to the debtor.735 This
essentially supersedes the common law on notarial intimation. A written certificate in the
form annexed to the Act736 is said to be sufficient evidence of such intimation being made.
Secondly, it allowed the holder737 of an assignation, or any person authorised by him, to
transmit a copy of the assignation738 by post to the debtor. Where the debtor has more than
one ordinary residence known to the assignee, it would be wise to ensure than the intimation
739is sent to both. Intimation sent to one address, however, should be sufficient. However,
brother in 1895, the purported assignation of rights conferred by his brother's will even reached the First
Division. Somewhat ungratefully, the Division declined to decide the intimation point: see Moncreiff's Tr. v
Balfour 1928 SN 139 affg 1928 SN 64 OH.
729 MP for Bute. He had also been Solicitor-General from 1858-9 and, briefly, Lord Advocate for two months in
1859. See F.J. Grant (ed.) The Faculty ofAdvocates in Scotland 1532-1943 with Genealogical Notes, (Scottish
Record Society CXLV, Edinburgh, 1944).
730 He was then MP for Greenock. Along with Patrick Shaw, Dunlop was one of the first editors of the Session
Cases: see G.F. Miller, 'Dunlop, Alexander Colquhoun-Stirling-Murray- (1798-1870)', DNB (2004). The
twenty-four volumes of the Session Cases, from 1838 to 1862, are to this day cited by a volume number and the
letter 'D' for Dunlop. The last MP with responsibility for the preparation of the bill was the Member for Perth,
Arthur F. Kinnaird: see F. Prochaska, 'Kinnaird, Arthur Fitzgerald, tenth Lord Kinnaird of Inchture and second
Baron Kinnaird of Rossie (1814-1887)', DNB (2004).
731 See 10th March 1862, Commons Journal, 88.
732 For example, the bill is reproduced without comment in the first issue of the Scottish Law Magazine: (1861) 1
Scottish Law Magazine 31. The Act as passed is reproduced, again without comment, at 55.
733
s. 2.
734 The Act does not enlighten us as to who is competent to certify the copy of the assignation as correct. It is
perhaps implicit that a notary is to certify the copy as correct.
735 The precise wording of the Act is 'the person or persons to whom intimation may in any case be requisite'.
736 See Schedule C.
737 This term is undefined in the Act. Such a term could include the cedent.
738 There is a tension here between the formalities required for a valid intimation and those for execution. The
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 11 (3)(a) states that no writing is required for an assignation.
While that may be so, it is (almost) impossible to intimate an assignation without writing. Therefore, while the
obligationary agreement does not require writing, the transfer agreement must.
739 Cf. Irvine ofKincoussie v Deuchar of Comrie (1707) Mor 3703; Baillie ofLarington v Menzies (1710) Mor
3704; Home v Creditors ofLady Eccles (1725) Mor 3704; Douglas and Heron v Armstrong (1779) Mor 3700;
MacDonald v Sinclair (1843) 5 D 1253 and a contributed note at 1981 SLT (News) 293 and reply at 1982 SLT
(News) 65. There may be international private law issues if the debtor, though he has a residence in Scotland, is
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where the debtor has two addresses, postal intimation to one address only involves the danger
that the debtor may not in fact become aware of the intimation for some time thereafter. A
written acknowledgement by the debtor would be sufficient evidence of intimation having
been duly made.740
G. Competition.
Fundamentally, the last point highlights that the Act is not clear as to the exact
moment of intimation. In particular, it does not spell out whether there is valid and effectual
intimation by simply posting the intimation to the debtor or whether actual receipt by the
debtor must be established. If the Act is to be assumed to have introduced a change in the law,
then the former position must have been intended. If so, then the potential of payment being
made by a debtor to the cedent in good faith, though there has been a proper intimation to the
debtor, is greatly increased. The Act did not supersede the common law forms of intimation
(where an acknowledgement from the debtor is usually obtained).741
It is probably the case that the date of the intimation is the date of receipt and not the
date of posting. The presumption will be that the debtor received the intimation on the day
following posting.742 However, for the purposes of assignations in security made by
companies, which require to be registered in the Register of companies, the Registrar will
accept a recorded delivery receipt as evidence of the intimation being duly made.743 Yet, if
intimation is made by post then there is no way of determining the precise hour of the day on
which intimation was made. Even if the intimation is sent by recorded delivery, the time of
delivery being noted by the postman, this is not necessarily evidence that the debtor has read
the intimation. If there is a competing arrestment which is served personally on the arrestee by
a court officer, then the precise time of the arrestment can be ascertained. In a competition
between an arrestment and assignation, it is the time of intimation and the time of service
not domiciled in Scotland for the purposes of citation: Trowsdale's Tr. v Forcett Railway Co (1870) 9 M 88 at 93
per Lord Cowan.
740 Since such an acknowledgement is only 'sufficient' evidence, other adminicles may be relevant, e.g. a
recorded delivery receipt. This will however prove only that the intimation was delivered, not that it has been
read by the debtor. Note that Interpretation Act 1978, s. 7 has no application to the 1862 Act, it being prior to
1889: Interpretation Act 1978, s. 22(1) and Sch 2, para 3. Interpretation Act 1889, s. 26, states that it does not
apply to pre-1889 Acts.
741 Section 3.
742 This is in accordance with the law of citation in the Court of Session: RCS r. 16.4(6); and the Sheriff Court,
OCR, 5.3(2). Cf. Allan v MacDougall (1887) 18 R 78; Smith v Conner & Co Ltd 1979 SLT (Sh Ct) 25.
743
'Registrar of Companies: Assignations in Security' 1983 SLT (News) 173.
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which are relevant.744 The earlier will be preferred. For Stair there had to be a discernible gap
of three hours between the intimation and arrestment if one was to be preferred over the other,
otherwise they ranked pari passu.745 But the better view is that 'when we go to examine
minutes and hours, there must be a demonstrative priority: without that arrestments must
come in pari passu'745 In Cust v The Carron Company747 it was held that the same principles
apply to the competition between intimation of an assignation after the death of the cedent
with the confirmation of an executor-creditor:
"A pari passu preference is given when the court cannot know which
competitor is preferable. When there is a probability, or even a possibility, that
the diligence in appearance posterior may be the first, the Court will give a pari
passu preference, because it must determine, and in such cases knows not how
to determine, otherwise than by dividing the subject in controversy. In this case
I have no doubt that the assignation was completed before the confirmation
was expede ... Lord Stair wished that no time less than three hours might be
regarded: he meant that there should be such interval as to prevent all
ambiguity. What he wished for is here - if the assignation must have been at
nine at the latest, and the confirmation at ten at the earliest, the priority is as
exactly ascertained as if the assignation had been twenty-four hours before the
confirmation."748
Any consideration paid by the assignee to the cedent for the assignation is of no
relevance to competition. Unlike the position in English law, payment of the price for the
assignation does not create a trust, constructive or otherwise. In Robertson v Wright 749 Lord
President Inglis suggested that a trust may be involved in an assignation. This would have
important consequences for competition. But while Inglis' dictum is sometimes referred to, it
is, with respect, incorrect.750 Lord Inglis is reported to have opined:
744 Rollo v Brownley (1676) Mor 2653; 2 Stair 436; Davidson v Balcanqual (1629) Mor 2773. However, in Inglis
v Edwards (1630) Mor 2773 the arrestment and intimation bearing to be made on the same day they ranked pari
passu. In Adie v Scrimzeor {1687) Mor 2775 only the intimation bore to have been made at a particular hour. The
arrestee deponed that the arrestment had been first. The Lords ordered them to be ranked pari passu.
745 Stair IV.xxxv.7 and followed in Dougals v Mason (1796) Mor 16213. Cf. R. Spotiswoode, Practicks of the
Law of Scotland (1706), 19 discussing a case involving Robert Balcanqual, 30th January 1629, sub nom
Balcanqual v Davidson (1629) 1 Br Sup 165.
746
Wright v Anderson and Laurie (1774) Mor 823; Hailes 558 at 558 per Lord Pitfour; Cameron v Boswall
(1772) Mor 821; Hailes 470 per Lord Kennet, disapproving Stair. Cameron was approved in Gibson & Balfour v
Goldie (1779) Mor 824; Hailes 828 by Lord Hailes.
747 Cust v The Carron Company (1774-5) Mor 2795; Hailes 627. See also Smith's Trs v Grant (1862) 24 D 1142.
748
Cust, ibid., Hailes 627 at 629 per Lord Hailes. See too F. Roger, Traite de la saisie-arret (2nd ed. 1860), 197,
para 212 to the same effect. Cf. Sutie v Ross (1705) Mor 816; 28th June 1705, Forbes Dec. In Sutie, two
arrestments made on the same day were ranked pari passu although one of the arresters offered to prove the hour
of service; the court commenting that witnesses would be apt to mistake or forget the hour. This view of
witnesses is outdated; proof would now be admitted.
749
(1873) 1 R 237. The facts of the case are set out in chapter 2 above.
750
McBryde, Contract para 12-31 quotes selectively from Inglis' opinion.
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"It is no doubt the effect of an intimated assignation of a nomen debiti, that the
debtor becomes the debtor of the assignee, and the creditor becomes entitled to
recover his debt from him just as he could have recovered it from the cedent.
And so in the case of an assignation of a fund the assignee becomes on
intimation the owner of the fund, and the holder of it a trustee for the assignee,
and liable to account to him alone. But the reason why in these cases the
intimation has such effect is, that the person to whom it is made is under a legal
obligation to the cedent."751
This passage is unintelligible. First, the reference to creditor must be to the assignee;
but an assignee will not always be the creditor of the cedent: an assignation can be gratuitous.
Secondly, the reference to 'from him' must be a reference to the debtor. Thirdly, assignation
does not transfer ownership of anything. It transfers claims.752 Fourthly, his reference to a
trust is incomprehensible. Lord Inglis is suggesting that on intimation of the assignation the
debtor becomes trustee for the assignee. But a trustee of what? The transferred right is a
liability as far as the debtor is concerned. A trust must have assets. I cannot create a trust in
favour of another over my liabilities.753 Furthermore, an assignation is the transfer of a claim
against a debtor without the consent of the latter. Any trust impressed on the debtor by virtue
only of the assignation would, therefore, have to arise by operation of law. But there is no
justifiable basis for such a trust. While the Inner House has recently reminded the profession
that the Session Cases are the authoritative reports,754 it must be concluded that the report in
the Session Cases cannot, on this occasion, be accurate. It simply makes no sense. Compare a
very different, but at least intelligible, opinion attributed to Lord Inglis in the Scottish Law
Reporter.
"Now, no assignation of a nomen debiti is such that the holder becomes debtor
to the assignee if he were not so to the cedent; and so in the case of an
assignation of a fund, the assignee becomes owner of the fund, and the holder
becomes liable to account to him; but the reason why intimation of assignation
has such an effect is because the legal obligation is transferred."755
This passage is, then, strong authority for the proposition that transfer occurs only on
intimation. If the debtor pays the cedent after intimation, the debtor is not discharged: he has
751 At 245, my emphasis. This idea was not conjured up by Lord Inglis. Earlier authorities are similar: see, e.g.,
Brierly v Mcintosh (1843) 5 D 1100.
752 As to whether rights can be owned, see chapter 1 above. Cf. F.A. Mann, The Legal Aspect ofMoney (5th ed.
1992) at 5: 'Bank accounts, for instance, are debts, not money and deposit accounts are not even debts payable
on demand'.
753 In Watt's Trs v Pinkney (1853) 16 D 279 at 288, Lord Rutherford makes the same mistake in suggesting that
the debtor can become a trustee of his own liability without some declaration of trust by the creditor of that that
obligation. See also Style Financial Services Ltd v Bank of Scotland 1996 SLT 421 and crucial discussion by
G.L. Gretton, 'Constructive Trusts' (1997) 1 Edin LR 281 (Part 1) at 308.
754 McGowan v Summit at Lloyds 2002 SC 638 at 660-661, paras [57]-[58]/?er Lord Reed.
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not paid his creditor. Consequently, the debtor remains liable to the assignee. As far as the
payment to the cedent is concerned, this is a payment of a debt that is not due. The debtor may
have a condictio indebiti. But there is no room for any trust.
III. Intimation to Whom?
A. General
In an arrestment, the officer can serve the schedule of arrestment in various ways: at
the arrestee's address, on a servant of the arrestee, by affixing a copy to the front door of the
arrestee's address, or posting it through the door.756 It has been held that service of an
arrestment at a merchant's counting house is insufficient,757 although this would be sufficient
today. Would these methods be sufficient for intimation of an assignation? In principle there
seems to be no reason why intimation cannot be made to one with the debtor's authority to
• 7SR
receive such documents. This should be ruled by the general principles of agents'
ostensible authority.759 While ostensible authority involves a representation of sorts from the
debtor that he has authorised his agent, good faith protection is subjective. As a result should
the debtor pay in actual ignorance of the intimation, he ought still to be protected.
Nevertheless, it has been held that where a debtor has left the country with his man of
business in charge of all his affairs, intimation to the latter interpelled the debtor from paying
755
(1873) 1 1 SLR 94 at 97.
756 Fraser, Reid & Sons v Lancaster and Jamieson (1795) Bell's Folio Cases 135; Mor 3706; January 14th 1795
FC. Again there is an analogy with the law of citation: see the Citation Act of 1540, c. 75; APS, c. 10. Note that
'The purpose of serving personally, or at the dwelling-place, is (as the Act of 1540 inferentially states [sic]) to
ensure that the writ or summons shall be brought to the knowledge of the person interested - it has no other
purpose', per Lord Trayner in Glasgow Corporation v Watson (1898) 25 R 690 at 695-6. See now, OCR r. 5.4(3)
and (4); RCSr. 16.1(1).
757 Fraser, Reid & Sons v Lancaster and Jamieson (1795) Bell's Folio Cases 135. Cf. Countess ofCassills v Earl
ofRoxburgh (1679) Mor 2857 and 3695; Nisbet v McLelland (1686) Mor 3696; Bruce v Sir James Hall (1708)
Mor 3696.
758 Home v Pringle (1706) Mor 734; Earl ofAberdeen and Creditors ofMerchiston, Competing (1729) Mor 867
rev'd sub nom Earl ofAberdeen v Earl ofMarch (1730) 1 Pat App 44. The point was debated but not decided in
Dougal v Gordon (1795) Mor 851.
759 See generally, Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties Ltd [1964] 2 QB 481 per Diplock LJ. There
are, however, some older cases which held that service of an arrestment in the hands of a factor was insufficient:
Muirhead and McMitchell v Miller (1610) Mor 732 and 2599; Hope, Major Practicks VI, 44, § 6; Donaldson v
Archibald-Cockburn (1709) Mor 735; cf. Lady Hisselside v Littlegill (1685) Mor 11496; Sup Vol, Harcase, 25.
The modern authorities on arrestment would suggest that, where free proceeds are to be arrested after the sale by
a heritable creditor, the arrestment should be laid in the hands of the bank not the solicitors acting as agents for
the bank in the sale: see e.g. Abbey National Building Society v Strang 1981 SLT (Sh Ct) 4; Abbey National
Building Society v Barclays Bank 1990 SCLR 639; Lord Advocate v Bank of India (Sh Ct) 1991 SCLR 320 at
332 affd 1993 SCLR 123.
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the cedent.760 Where an agent has a claim against his client, and this is ceded, the assignee is
not absolved from making intimation because the cedent is the debtor's agent.761
A distinction may also fall to be made between the kinds of money claim being
assigned. If a claim has already been assigned in security, the debtor (i.e. the cedent of the
security) will have a claim to any reversion against the assignee in security. This is itself a
claim. In the transfer of the reversion, the debtor to whom intimation must be made is the
transferee 'in security'. It is he who is the debtor in the obligation to account for any
reversion.762 If the assignation is a retrocession, there must still be intimation to the debtor.763
B. Debtor is a party to the assignation.
It seems that where the debtor is a party to the assignation there is no need to make
intimation.7 4 The debtor who actively intervenes does not need the same protection as the
passive debtor.765 It is not sufficient that the debtor is merely a witness.766 There is, however,
the problem that this equipollent does not fulfil the requirement of certainty or publicity. In
Campbell's Trs v Earl ofBeadalbane,767 there was some reluctance to give countenance to the
proposition that intimation or an equivalent is not required:
"Judgement must of course be pronounced in conformity to the opinion of the
consulted judges; but I am not prepared to assent to all the propositions
contained in that opinion. I have the greatest repugnance to the transference of
760
Dougall's Creditors Competing (1794) Bell's Folio Cases 41.
761 See, analogously, Campbell v McCreath 1975 SC 81 OH.
762
Ayton v Romanes (1895) 3 SLT 203 OH; Whittall v Christie (1894) 22 R 91. Cf. Union Bank v National Bank
(1885) 13 R 380 rev'd (1886) 14 R (HL) 1. For the transfer and transmission of rights of reversion generally, see
Erskine II.viii.9-15. See too Balfour, Practicks, 448.
763 Cf. Microwave Systems (Scotland) Ltd v Electro-Psychological Instruments Ltd 1971 SC 140 OH; Bentley v
McFarlane 1964 SC 76. These cases are, however, confused. Craig v Edgar (1674) Mor 838 involved a general
assignation on marriage. This required no intimation.
764 See e.g. Creditors of Ballenden v Countess of Dalhousie (1707) Mor 865; Turnbull v Stewart and Inglis
(1751) 2 Kames Rem Dec 260; Mor 868; Campbell's Tr. v Earl ofBreadlabane (1822) 2 S 62, on appeal (1825)
1 W & S 620, remitted to the Second Division in consultation with the other judges, (1827) 5 S 891; remitted to
the Lord Ordinary, the reclaiming motion and appeal to the House of Lords: (1829) 7 S 767 affd (1831) 5 W &
S 256; Paul vBoyd's Trs (1835) 1 Ross LC 511.
765 See e.g. Turnbull v Stewart and Inglis (1751) 2 Kames Rem Dec 260; Mor 868; Elchies, Annualrent No. 13;
Finlay's Trs v Alexander (1866) 1 SLR 111 affd sub nom Miller v Learmonth (1870) 42 Sc Jur418 at 421 per
the Lord Chancellor; Ayton v Romanes (1895) 3 SLT 203 OH.
766
Hope, Major Practicks II, 12 § 9; Mackalzean v Mackalzean (1586) Mor 854 (inserted in notairal instrument
of intimation as witness); Murray v Durham Winton (1622) Mor. 855; Low v Currie (1687) Mor Sup Vol,.
Harcase 25; Graham v Livingston (1611) Mor 13089.
767
(1827) 5 S 891.
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the share of a partner kept concealed from the world, the partner being allowed
to go on with management."768
There seems much to commend this reservation. It is, of course, offset by the practical
difficulties of someone in the dual position of transferee and debtor intimating to himself.769
Nevertheless such an idea is not unknown to the law.770 The writer would advocate a
requirement of registration in the Books of Council and Session where the debtor is himself a
party to the assignation. Again, this is based on a desire to protect against fraud.771
Registration provides a certain date at which the transfer occurred, against which competing
claims can be judged.772
C. Special Parties.
1. Trusts.
It seems that, where a trust is the debtor, intimation to one of the trustees is
insufficient to transfer the claim to the assignee.773 Even if there is entry in the sederunt book,
it seems that if this is not brought to the attention of the trustees, there cannot be sufficient
intimation. This is overly formal. As was pointed out by counsel in one case, 'the pursuer has
768 Per Lord Justice-Clerk Boyle (1827) 5 S 891 at 893. Compare Lord Fullerton in Hill v Lindsay (1846) 8 D
472 at 479. In the latter case Lord Fullerton made a distinction between the intimation that was required where
the subject was a share in the partnership and where the partnership was a company, when the debtor was a party
to the cession. Only in the first case did there require to be formal intimation. See also the comments by Lord
Dreghorn in Hay v Sinclair (1788) Mor 1194; 10 Fac Coll 45; Flailes 1046 at 1046.
769 Bankton II, 192, 10 suggests that it is 'absurd that one should intimate a right to himself.
770
See, for example, in the field of company law: Neptune (Vehicle Washing Equipment) Ltd v Fitzgerald [1996]
Ch 274. Cf. Moffat v Longmuir 2001 SC 137; James Prain & Sons Ltd 1947 SC 325 at 329 per Lord Moncreiff:
'A meeting at which only one member is present to play multiple parts may be thought to be nothing other than a
pantomime'; East v Bennett Bros Ltd [1911] 1 Ch 163 and sections 267 (2) and 371 (2) Companies Act 1985.
771 A beneficiary under a trust may also be a trustee (i.e. a trustee-beneficiary). He may want to assign his rights.
This involves two complex questions of intimation: first, since the debtor is a party to the cession, is formal
intimation to him necessary? Secondly, is this assumed intimation sufficient to bind any other trustees? See in
this regard the dubious case of Browne's Tr. v Anderson (1901) 4 F 305.
772
Compare the doctrine of data certa in some continental European systems: see e.g. Codigo Civil Arts 1218-
1220 and Art. 1526 (Spain); Art. 1328 Code Civil/Code Civil beige. This same principle underpins the
requirement in France for a notarised deed to express the exact date on which payment was made, where the
payer seeks to be subrogated (subrogation personelle) to the payee's rights under Art. 1250 Code Civil
(subrogation conventionale). See also the Dalloz commentary thereto. This is because, unlike cession de
creance, no intimation is required to the debtor to achieve a transfer. It is interesting that, although Scotland does
not seem to have a developed doctrine of data certa, it has the mechanism to give effect to it in the Books of
Council and Session and the Sheriff Court Books.
773
Kyle's Tr v White (1827) 6 S 40; Browne's Trs. v Browne (1901) 9 SLT 128 (OH) rev'd on a different point
sub nom Browne's Trs v Anderson (1901) 4 F 305, where it was noted that Jamieson v Sharp (1887) 14 R 644
was a special case (only one trustee was effectively acting and intimation was made to him); Watt's Trs v
Pinkney (1853) 16 D 279. Many of the cases involving trustees are complicated by the fact that they involve
assignations of a 'spes successionis' for which see W.W. McBryde and G.L. Gretton 'Sequestration and the Spes
Successions' (2000) 4 Edin LR 129. But cf. the obiter dicta of Lord Kinnear in Grade v Grade 1910 SC 899.
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no means of knowing the precise number of trustees named under the private trust; and even
if he did discover this, he could not know how many had accepted'.774 In furtherance of their
fiduciary duties to the beneficiary, the trustees have a duty to cooperate with each other. It
would seem, then, that if one trustee receives intimation of an assignationfailure by him to
circulate this information among the other trustees is res inter alios acta in relation to the
assignee. This would be consistent with the view that the trust is a quasi-juristic person in
Scots law.775 Moreover, Erskine776 suggested that intimation to one of several 'joint-debtors'
was sufficient, and this has been approved by the First Division.777
It is sometimes suggested that, since trusts require a quorum to act, intimation to one
778
trustee is not sufficient. This argument fails to recognise that an assignation of a right in
which the trustees are the debtors does not require their consent. In the case of service of an
arrestment, it makes no difference if the debtor refuses service.779 However, since an officer
of the court, in the presence of a witness, serves an arrestment, there is not the problem of
requiring the debtor to acknowledge receipt. The officer merely notes that the arrestee refused
to accept service.780 In the case of arrestments (and, therefore, assignations), then, intimation
to one trustee binds all. It does not require a juridical act on the part of any trustee. Where a
trustee pays after intimation made to another trustee, hownever, then, providing the paying
trustee was in good faith, the trust will be protected. Any intimation to the trustee should state
781
that the intimation is being made to him in his capacity as trustee, in respect of a trust debt.
782
The same principles would seem to apply to executors and judicial factors.
2. Incapacitated Debtor: trustees in sequestration, judicial factors etc.
774 Per the Solicitor General (Hope) arguendo in Black v Scott (1830) 8 S 367.
775 Alexander's Tr v Dymock's Trs (1883) 10 . 1 189 at 1195 per Lord President Inglis. See also an anonymous
article at (1878) 22 Journal ofJurisprudence 617 especially at 622. It is unclear whether a trust can commit a
criminal offence. But there is provision in the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 141 (2)(c) for service
of a summary complaint on a trust. Remarkably, service on one trustee suffices. A fortiori intimation to a single
trustee should be sufficient for the purposes of the civil law.
776 III.v.5.
777 Mantach v Sharp (1887) 24 SLR 453 at 455 per Lord President Inglis. In Finlay's Trs v Alexander (1866) 1
SLR 111 aff d sub nom Miller v Learmonth (1870) 42 Sc Jur 418 HL there seems only to have been a single
executor debtor who was also a party to the assignation in another capacity.
778 Black v Scott (1830) 8 S 367per Lord Balgray at 369.
779 J. Graham Stewart, The Law ofDiligence (1898) 320 citing Stair IV.xxxviii.15.
780
Busby v Clark (1904) 7 F 162.
781 Henderson's Trs v Drummond's Trs (1831) 9 S 618; Burns v Gillies (1906) 8 F 460
782 Cf. Mitchell v Scott (1881) 8 R 875.
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Where the debtor has been sequestrated, all his assets are transferred to the trustee in
sequestration.783 While the trustee does not become liable for the debts, the trustee must pay
the creditors out of the assets. It therefore makes sense to intimate to the trustee. Since the
debtor remains the obligant, any intimation to him will still be good in law if not in practice.
There are difficult issues where the debtor has granted a trust deed for creditors; in particular
whether non-acceding creditors can still use diligence.784
Where an individual lacks capacity and has a curator bonis or guardian785 acting for
him, the incapax remains vested in his estate. If for any reason the ward were an assignee, it
would be the curator or guardian who would have to intimate the assignation.786 Where a
debtor has become incapacitated, intimation should be made to the curator or guardian. It is he
or she who is responsible for the management of the debtor's affairs. Only the curator or
guardian could make a payment.787 Again, however, it the incapax who remains the debtor;
and intimation to an incapacitated debtor is still competent: as with intimation to a single
trustee, no juristic act is required by the debtor. Practical considerations, however, strongly
support intimation to the guardian: only the guardian will be paying the debts and only the
guardian will be able to grant an acknowledgment. In the case of a judicial factor appointed
over the estates of a partnership, or indeed a company,788 intimation should, for the avoidance
of doubt, be made to the judicial factor.7883 Intimation made in the usual way will be effectual
notwithstanding the appointment of the judicial factor, but there is the danger that the judicial
factor will be able to intromit with the estate in good faith if intimation is not made to him.
3. Partnerships.
As in the case of a company (see below) it should be sufficient to post the intimation
of the assignation to partnership's place of business. Partnerships have legal personality but,
unlike companies, need not have a registered office. If intimation is to be made by notary,
783
Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, s. 31.
784 See in particular the conflicting opinions of the members of the Court in Johnson and Colquhoun v Trustees
ofFairholm's Creditors (1770) Mor v. 'Bankrupt' App. No. 5; Hailes 386.
785 Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000.
786 See Part III of the 2000 Act.
787 Bell, Principles (10th ed. 1899) § 2121; Yule v Alexander (1891) 19 R 167 at 168 per Lord President Inglis;
Part III of the 2000 Act.
788 D. Bennett et al (eds) Palmer's Company Law para 15.601 (release dated September 2001).
788a Cf. Cross & Bogle v Mure (1775) Mor 757; Hailes 615 per Lord Karnes: 'I arrest in the hands of a debtor, to
hinder him to pay to the common debtor. To what purpose is it to arrest in the hands of a bankrupt, who cannot
pay, rather than in the hands of the factor who can? By the late statute [the 1772 Sequestration Act], the factor is
vested, in truth and in words, a factor like the present one in truth, though not in words'.
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therefore, the question arises: to whom can intimation be made? One of the characteristics of
a partnership is mutual agency.789 Intimation to one of the partners will be sufficient. There
seems no reason why intimation to one of the partners should have to be made at the firm's
place of business.790 The legal incidents of a partnership demand that this proposition must be
correct. A partner is jointly and severally liable for the debts of the partnership.791 As is
explained below, intimation to one co-obligant is intimation to all; however, should one of the
partners, to whom intimation was not made, pay the cedent in good faith, the firm will be
discharged. In the same vein, it has been held that a decree against a partnership is sufficient
to charge an individual partner for payment of the whole debt.792 The provisions of the
Partnership Act 1890 should be sufficient to render evidence of ostensible authority
unnecessary. Section 16 provides that notice to any partner of the firm who habitually acts in
the partnership business of any matter relating to partnership affairs operates as notice to the
firm. In a case where one of the parties to the assignation and the debtor are both partnerships
with a common partner, the knowledge of the debtor should be an insufficient equipollent to
intimation. This is really no different from any other case where the debtor is a party to the
assignation. Again, however, some additional act should be required to ensure that the transfer
has a certain date.
4. Companies.793
(a) General
The Companies Act provides a general rule that service of documents on a company is
effected by leaving it at, or sending it by post to, the company's registered office.794 Best
practice is to post any intimation to the registered office. It is probably the case, however, that
789
Partnership Act 1890, s. 5.
790 Cf. the law on service of an arrestment and a charge for payment: J. Graham Stewart, The Law ofDiligence
(1898) 32 and 325; and citation: Wordie v McDonald (1831) 10 S 142.
791
Partnership Act 1890, s. 4(2).
792
Selkrig v Dunlop & Co (1804) Hume's Dec 477; Thomson v Liddell & Co 2nd July 1812 FC; Knox v Martin
(1847) 10 D 50 at 55 per Lord President McNeill; Ewing v McCllelland (1860) 22 D 1347 at 1351-2 per Lord
Wood.
793 There is a wealth of jurisprudence under the analogous provisions of the Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile
(Dalloz, 1999), Art. 651 ff. In France signification is even more formal than in Scotland: an officer of the court
(d'huissier en justice) must perform the intimation. Much of what follows is also applicable mutatis mutandis to
partnerships.
794
Companies Act 1985, s. 725(1). See also Hannan v Kendal 30th March 1897, Outer House, unreported. An
extract of the Lord Ordinary (Kincairney)'s opinion is reproduced in an appendix to J. Graham Stewart, The Law
ofDiligence (1898) 849. The contractual aspects of the case are reported at (1897) 5 SLT 4.
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intimation made at the 'proper place',795 which is not the registered office, will also be
sufficient. If intimation is personal instead of postal, it may be delivered to an employee at
this proper place.796 This must be a place where the business is habitually carried on.797
Intimation to the branch of a bank where an account is held would therefore be appropriate
where an account holder assigns a right to payment against his bank on a credit account.798
This will not, however, transfer the liabilities which are owed by the bank on accounts which
are held at other branches.799 In theory, intimation made at the head office of the bank should
cover liabilities owed at all branches in Scotland. It is probably sufficient to hand the
intimation to an employee at the branch.800 According to one Outer House case, money held
on deposit receipt801 is transferred by indorsation and delivery of the deposit receipt.802 But
the better view is that intimation to the bank is required.803
The company, if the cases are correct, will become bound to the assignee from the
moment the employee receives the intimation.804 Again, there is likely to be no actual
knowledge of the intimation at that time by other employees of the company who are
responsible for making payment. Generally speaking, however, unless the debtor company
can show that this bona fide payment was made through no fault of its own, the general
principle should be that the company would be bound to pay the assignee from the time that
the intimation was received.
795
Glasgow Corporation v Watson (1898) 25 R 690 at 695; sub nom Campbell v MacAlister 1898 SLT No. 417;
(1898) 35 SLR 508 at 511 per Lord Young. It is submitted that this is still good law for the purposes of the law
of intimation despite the observations of the First Division in Rae v Calor Gas Ltd 1995 SLT 244 on the issue of
'personal' citation; see also Rachkind v Donald & Sons 1916 SC 751 cited in a contributed note at 1982 SLT
(News) 65; Hay v London & North Western Rly Co 1909 SC 707. But cf. Ewing v McLelland (1860) 33 Sc Jur 1
OH and Graham v McFarlane & Co (1869) 7 M 640.
796
Glasgow Corporation v Watson, op. cit.
797 Aberdeen Railway Co v Ferrier (1854) 16 D 422; Hepper & Co v Walker & Co (1903) 20 Sh Ct Rep 137;
Corson vMcMillan 1927 SLT (Sh Ct) 13.
798
Dalrymple of Waterside v Bertram (1762) Mor 752; Kames Sel Dec 263 cited with approval by Erskine
Ill.vi. 16 \ Lord Advocate v Bank ofIndia (Sh Ct) 1991 SCLR 320 at 332 aff d 1993 SCLR 123.
799 Stewart v Royal Bank of Scotland 1994 SLT (Sh Ct) 27. Cf. McNairn v McNairn 1959 SLT (Notes) 35;
Stevenson v T. Dixon Ltd 1924 SLT (Sh Ct) 45; London, Provincial and South-Western Bank v Buszard (1918)
35 TLR 142.
800
Mclntyre v Caledonian Railway Co (1909) 25 Sh Ct Rep 329. Cf. Watt v Governor & Co of the Bank of
Scotland 1989 SCLR 548.
801 These are nnow rare in practice.
802
Shawbridge's Trs v Bank ofScotland 1935 SLT 568 OH.
803 Muir v Ross (1866) 4 M 820 at 826 per Lord Benholme.
804
Interestingly, it has been held in England that it is insufficient to serve a summons at the registered office by
merely leaving it with a security guard or receptionist. Rather service must be to a 'managing agent' who has a
discretion to accept service: Amerada Hess v Rome (2000) 97 (10) LSG 36 (QBD). Quite what is discretion to
refuse service is unclear. Moreover how is the assignee to determine who such a person in the company is?
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Evidence of acknowledgment is desirable. The best evidence is a written
acknowledgement that binds the company. Here we encounter problems. There is a conflict of
two legal principles: on the one hand there is the law relating to the subscription of deeds, on
the other the company law relating to authorised agents. Determining whether there is a good
acknowledgment is a two-stage process. First, is the deed validly executed? The relevant law
is found in schedule 2 of the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995. A deed is signed
by a company if it is signed on its behalf by a director, or the secretary, or a person authorised
to sign on the company's behalf.805 The acknowledgment is presumed to have been so granted
if the signature is witnessed.806 Where the company has validly signed, but this has not been
witnessed, the acknowledgment will be presumed to have been so granted if it was subscribed
807
by two directors, a director plus the secretary, or two persons authorised to act on its behalf.
O AO
The second stage is a question of authority. Only the board of directors have capacity to
bind the company. So an acknowledgement which bears to be valid, and indeed possibly
probative, will be meaningless if the signatories did not have authority to perform such an act
on the company's behalf.809 Whether they were, in fact, so authorised, is a question of the
ordinary law of ostensible authority. It should be noted that a single director generally has
little or no authority to bind the company per se. But it is suggested that directors are,
ordinarily, authorised to 'clothe documents with formal validity which has already been
authorised by the board or the managing director'.810 Since an acknowledgement is essentially
811
just a receipt rather than a juridical act, signature by a director would seem to be sufficient.
Acknowledgment by the company's secretary will almost certainly be good evidence against
the debtor company.812 It has been held that intimation to a treasurer of a hospital was good
intimation to the whole company,813 but that service of an arrestment on a clerk to certain
Waterworks Commissioners was invalid.814 Nevertheless, it is thought that intimation to an
official such as a clerk would be more than sufficient today.
805
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, schedule 2, para 3(1).
806
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 3(1) as substituted by para 3(5) of schedule 2.
807
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 3(1 A), as substituted by para 3(5) of schedule 2.
808 See also the Law Commissions' Joint Consultation Paper on Partnership (Law Comm CP No. 159; SLC
Discussion Paper No. Ill, 2000).
809 Even a probative deed does not prove that the person signing does in fact hold their designated office: s.
3(1C) 1995 Act.
810 See R. Potts (ed.) Gore-Browne on Companies para § 5.3.3.
811
Again, there may be a distinction to be made if the written acknowledgement required at common law is more
than purely evidentiary and is an essential, rather than a formal, requirement.
812 Panorama Developments (Guilford) Ltd v Fidelis Furnishing Fabrics Ltd [1971] 2 QB 711.
813 Menzies' Creditors vLaw (1739) Mor 738 and 850; 5 Br Sup 656.
814 Gall v Stirling Waterworks Commissioners 1901 9 SLT 123 OH.
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As far as other officers are concerned there is a difficult distinction to be made
between their ostensible authority to bind the company and their ostensible authority to
communicate decisions of the company. While a putative agent cannot represent his own
authority,815 the assignee must be able to ask someone, other than the board itself, who has
authority to bind them. That person (to whom the inquiry is made) himself must have
ostensible authority to make that representation. The distinction is therefore between authority
816 • •
to bind the company and authority to make representations of fact. Again, since an
acknowledgment is not a juridical act on the part of the company, but essentially an
evidentiary representation that a certain document has been received (i.e. a copy of the
assignation) this type of ostensible authority should be sufficient.
These rules, however, do not reflect commercial (or indeedany other) reality. The idea
that good evidence of a good intimation to e.g. the Royal Bank of Scotland could only be
provided in writing by a member of the board is not only unrealistic, but preposterous. The
common sense approach is that found in Glasgow Corporation v Watson: intimation to an
employee and an acknowledgment from him is sufficient.
(b) Companies in Liquidation, Receivership or Administration.
Where a company is in liquidation, administration or receivership should not affect the
method of intimation. In the case of large companies at least, it is unlikely that intimation
would ever be made to a director in any event. The fact that a liquidator, administrator,
administrative receiver or receiver has superseded all or some of the director's powers is
therefore immaterial for the purposes of intimation. The company, after all, remains the
debtor in the obligation.817
(c) Crown as a debtor.
815
Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA, the Ocean Frost [1986] AC 717.
816 First Energy (UK) Ltd v Hungarian International Bank Ltd [1993] BCLC 1409 at 1422d (Steyn LJ); 1425h
(Evans LJ); 1427c (Nourse LJ). Cf. Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile (1999) Art. 654, Dalloz commentary, n.
5.
817 Cf. Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile Art. 654, Dalloz commentary n. 3.
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Where the Crown is a debtor, intimation should be made to the 'appropriate law
officer'.818 The appropriate law officer is the Lord Advocate where the debtor is part of the
Scottish administration; otherwise intimation should be made to the Advocate General for
O 1 Q
Scotland. The Advocate-General is based in London. This has the peculiar result that
• 890
intimation of the assignation of a Scottish debt may be made in another jurisdiction.
(d) Unincorporated Associations.
Unincorporated associations have no legal personality. There is some theoretical
difficulty with the idea that an entity can contract a debt while at the same time lack
personality. Be that as it may, it is perhaps doubtful that intimation can be made by sending a
copy of the assignation to the address of the association or given to an employee, although, in
principle, there seems no good reason why this should not be possible. For the avoidance of
doubt, however, intimation should probably be made to an office bearer.821
IV. Good Faith Payment
A. General
It was suggested above that a requirement of formal intimation had the virtue of
certainty. A system based on a transfer at the date of delivery of the deed or purely in the
intention of the parties suffers from the problem that the debtor is unlikely to know of the
transfer until after it has been made. Such a system may, however, satisfy the goal of certainty
by requiring an authentic or notarised deed of a certain date before the law will hold the claim
to be transferred. But, even then, there is a real possibility that the debtor, in ignorance of the
transfer, may pay his former creditor on the basis of a genuine understanding that the cedent is
818 Cf. Crown Proceedings Act 1947, s. 46; Crown Suits (Scotland) Act 1847, s. 1 (as amended by Scotland Act
1998, Sch 8, para 2) cited by G.L. Gretton, 'Diligence' in Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol 8 (1992) para 259.
These provisions apply only to the bringing of proceedings against the Crown; they are relevant to intimation
only by analogy. See also Cameron v Lord Advocate 1952 SC 165 OH.
819 Crown Suits (Scotland) Act 1857, s. 4A. See also the Transfer of Functions (Lord Advocate and Advocate
General for Scotland) Order 1999 SI 1999/679; Scotland Act 1998 (General Transitory, Transitional and Savings
Provisions) Order 1999, SI 1999/901.
820 On her website, the Advocate General asks for the service of all documents to be made to the Solicitor to the
Advocate General, whose office is in Edinburgh (see <www.oag.gov.uk>). Arguably, however, because
intimation is a substantive legal requirement - with its own rules and legislation - advantage cannot be taken of
the Advocate General's sensible request and intimation must be made to the proper place which, for the
Advocate General, is London. For intimation outwith the jurisdiction, see McBryde, Contract, para 12-125 and
R.G. Anderson, 'A Note on Edictal Intimation' (2004) 8 Edin LR 272.
821 Cf. Renton Football Club v McDowall (1891) 18 R 670 at 674 per Lord McLaren.
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still his creditor. In this situation the debtor should be discharged.822 In Scotland, where it has
been suggested the requirements for formal intimation are strict, there are still some clear
situations where some element of good faith protection will be required. We are here
dealing with voluntary assignations. Occasionally, there occurs the equivalent of an intimated
assignation by force of law, e.g. the act and warrant confirming a trustee in sequestration.824
In this situation there is no actual intimation to the debtor.825 If the bankrupt's debtor pays the
bankrupt in good faith, he will be discharged.826 However, some large commercial
undertakings, such as banks, will have knowledge of any notice of sequestration in the
Edinburgh Gazette imputed to them. So, where a bank paid out sums to the bankrupt that the
latter held on credit with the bank, after publication of a notice of his sequestration, the bank
was liable to make a second payment to the trustee.827 It was irrelevant that the individual
teller making the payment was in good faith. Generally speaking, however, the guiding policy
here is one of debtor protection. The principle of good faith payment was recognised by Stair:
"The third common exception in personal actions is, payment made bona fide
to him who had not the true right, but where there was another preferable right,
which the defender neither did, nor was obliged to know, and therefore the law
secures the payer, without prejudice to the pursuer to insist against the obtainer
of the payment."828
This principle is fundamental. It is the basis of debtor protection in systems where
notification is not a constitutive requirement for transfer. Potentially this principle could form
the basis for future development of the law if were decided to abolish intimation as a
constitutive requirement.
822 Hume v Hume (1632) Mor 848. Cf. Art. 6: 34 BW\ Art. 1643 Code Civil du Quebec where the debtor who
pays the cedent in good faith is discharged even if the formalities required for the cession (which usually
encompass debtor notification) are fulfilled.
823 Cf. P. Nienaber, 'The Inactive Cessionary' 1964 Acta Juridica 99 at 118 ff who argues that any protection of
the debtor should be based on the assignee being personally barred. But there can be situations where the
assignee does everything in his power to bring the assignation to the debtor's attention, but is nevertheless
unsuccessful. The debtor then pays the cedent in good faith: Hume v Hume (1632) Mor 848.
824
Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, s. 31(4). It is also the equivalent of an arrestment followed by forthcoming:
s. 37(l)(b).
825 There are other situations where there may be a transfer by force of law. Even so, intimation may be of some
practical importance. Cf. Bankton II, 193, 16.
26
s. 32(6) (acquirenda) and s. 32(9) (all other dealings). See also Erskine III.v.7; J.J. Gow, Mercantile and
Industrial Law ofScotland (1964), 70; Adam v McRobbie (1845) 7 D 276; McDonald v Mcintosh's Tr. (1852) 14
D 937; Gray v Gray's Tr. (1895) 22 R 326; Mishas's Tr. v Bank ofScotland 1990 SLT 23; Rankin's Tr. v H C
Somerville & Russell 1999 SC 166 OH. Cf. the position on the appointment of a judicial factor: Judicial Factors
Act 1889 (as amended by Act of Sederunt 17th March 1967); Campbell's JF v National Bank ofScotland 1944
SC 495.
827 Watt v Bank ofScotland 1989 SCLR 548.
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B. Edictal Intimation / Execution.
Edictal intimation, according to the books, is the method by which intimation is
effected of an assignation of a claim in which the debtor is abroad or cannot be found.
Although the point seems to have escaped the attention of academics, practitioners and, most
R9Q
importantly, the legislature, it is no longer competent to effect an edictal intimation.
Assuming - perhaps with naive sanguinity - that the oversight will be corrected, then the law
is as follows. Edictal intimation is, at present,830 the only recognised instance of registration as
an equivalent of intimation in Scots law. Registration is allegedly the paradigm method for
implementing a policy of publicity. Yet utilisation of edictal intimation presupposes that the
debtor has no actual knowledge of the assignation or diligence used against him. The idea that
all Scots maintain an agent (or procurator) with knowledge of the Register is fictional. Edictal
citation has been described as 'highly artificial'.831 Not even the most fanatical adherent of a
doctrine of constructive notice would maintain that the debtor or arrestee should be imputed
with knowledge by virtue of registration at the Office of Edictal Citations.
So does the law protect the debtor's position? Compare the analogous position of
arrestment. Take the example of a fund in the hands of a person (George) subject to the
jurisdiction of the Scottish Courts who cannot be found. He has an obligation to account to
John. Jessica is John's creditor. She has extracted a decree for payment against John. She
seeks to serve an arrestment in the hands of George. This has to be done edictally. George
reappears. Having no knowledge of the arrestment he has accounted in good faith to John.
John now disappears. Is George liable for breaching the arrestment? It is the potential for
abuse that perhaps underlies Erskine's statement that where an arrestment is properly served
on a debtor, it does not matter that he does not have actual personal knowledge of the
proceeding, 'for the admitting pretences of ignorance might evacuate the lawful diligence of
creditors'.833 This is consonant with the general principle, that the law is concerned with
828 Stair IV.xl.33. See also Stair, I.viii.3. Cf. Erskine III.iv.3.
829 See R.G. Anderson, 'A Note on Edictal Intimation' (2004) 8 Edin LR 272. For edictal intimation in the
Haseatic City of Hamburg before the BGB, see H. Baumeister, Das Privatrecht der Freien und Hansestadt
Hamburg (1856) 1,89.
830 However, as has been argued, where there would otherwise be no certain date of intimation (as in the case
where the debtor is a party to the assignation) registration in the Books of Council and Session is wise, despite
the decision in Tod's Tr v Wilson (1869) 7 M 1100.
831
Corstorphine v Karsten (1898) 1 F 287 at 292 per Lord President Robertson.
832
Registration at least provides certainty.
833 IH.vi. 14, citing Robert Blackwood v The Earl of Sutherland (1703) Mor 1793, a case involving edictal
citation of an army officer serving abroad. In ignorance of the arrestment the officer paid the common debtor. He
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objective and not subjective knowledge. However, statutory protection for arrestees abroad
upon whom there had been only edictal service, was subsequently introduced.834 A bona fide
payment would not render them liable for breach of the arrestment. This was reflected in a
later case, where a trustee lacked private knowledge of an arrestment which had been properly
served at his dwelling place.835 Arrestees are now protected generally.836 It seems desirable
that the law should have some sort of exception for the debtor who can prove that he made
payment to the cedent after intimation in good faith.837 The burden, however, should be on the
debtor.838
C. Co-debtors.
"Where there are many obligants whether joint debtors, or principals or
cautioners, intimation made to any one is sufficient for completing the
conveyance; but such intimation is not effectual for interpelling those to whom
no intimation was made from making payment to the cedent; and therefore
assignees ought in prudence to make intimation to all of them."
The situation of co-debtors is difficult. The creditor in their obligation can seek
performance of the total obligation from one of the debtors. If intimation were required to all,
the deisreability of a joint and several obligation would, from a creditor's point of view, be
considerably reduced. Conversely, if co-debtors were ignorant of each other, then it would be
harsh to have the knowledge of one of their number imputed to the others. Any payment in
ignorance should therefore have a good faith defence. This writer agrees with Professor Reid:
was nevertheless held liable for breach of the arrestment. Cf. Mackie v Dunbar (1628) Mor 1788 and Hume v
Hume (1632) Mor 848.
834
Payment of Creditors (Scotland) Act 1783 (23 Geo III, c. 18) s. 3; Payment of Creditors (Scotland) Act 1793
(33 Geo III, c. 74), s. 4; Payment of Creditors (Scotland) Act 1814 (54 Geo III, c. 137) s. 3; Bankruptcy
(Scotland) Act 1856, s. 2 (both provisions have been repealed). Arrestees furth of Scotland were also protected
in some older cases: e.g. Scott v Fludyer & Co (1770) Mor v. 'Arrestment' App. No. 1; Hailes 348 at 349 per
Lord Coalston: to require a second payment to the assignee 'would be to introduce a new and unknown hypothec
into the law'. Scott was approved in Laidlaw v Smith (1841) 2 Rob 490 at 503 per Lord Cottenham LC.
835 Laidlaw v Smith (1838) 16 S 367 affd (1841) 2 Rob 490. Cf. Leslie v Lady Ashburton (1827) 6 S 165.
836 Debts Securities (Scotland) Act 1856, s. 1 cited by W.A. Wilson, The Scottish Law ofDebt (2nd ed. 1991) para
17.5.
837 Cf. J. Russell, Theory ofConveyancing (1788), 173.
838 See per the Lord Justice-Clerk in Laidlaw at 373: 'I could conceive a case ofpresumptio juris et de jure of an
arrestee's knowledge of an arrestment having been used'; Lord Glenlee: 'if the party appears desiisse possidere
dolo malo, he must acquit himself of all suspicion'.
839 Erskine III.v.5, approved in Montach v Sharp (1887) 24 SLR 453. Erskine cites Stair III.i.10 which is quoted
in the text below. Stair deals expressly with correality.
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'in the case of joint debtors, intimation to one completes the transfer, but intimation to all is
necessary to prevent payment to the cedent'.840
D. Cautioners.
Suppose A is the creditor, D is the debtor and G is the cautioner. A assigns his right
against D to B. This is intimated to D. Assignation of a claim carries any accessory
obligations.841 Caution is an accessory obligation. It is rarely suggested that there must be
intimation to the cautioner as well as to the principal debtor.842 Stair suggests that intimation
to one is intimation to all:
"Where there are many, correi debendi, principal or cautioners, Intimation
made to any will be sufficient to all; yet this will not exclude payment made by
another of the debtors, bona fide, to whom no intimation was made to secure
843
which, it is safest for assigneys to intimate to all the correi debendi."
What, then, if A (the cedent) calls upon G to pay after the intimation of the assignation
to D, but before G is aware of the transfer? Does a good faith payment to the cedent discharge
the cautioner, G? If so, is he entitled to relief against the debtor? If relief is based on the
beneficium cedendarum actionum then the cedent has nothing to assign. He no longer has any
rights against the debtor. This would suggest that payment to the cedent after intimation does
not discharge the cautioner. The principal debtor's obligation, after all, is no longer owed to
the cedent but to the assignee. The assignee, on this analysis, would still be entitled to call
upon the cautioner. The assignee may not even have been aware of the existence of the
cautioner. How can an assignee be expected to intimate then? The cautioner's remedy is to
bring the condictio indebiti against the cedent for recovery of the double payment, and to
demand an assignation of the assignee's rights against the principal debtor.
Nevertheless, such a result is harsh on the cautioner. He has paid the cedent in good
faith. Should this not provide a defence against a demand from the assignee? If so, the
assignee has the beneficium cedendarum actionum of the cautioner's condictio against the
840 K.G.C. Reid, 'Unintimated Assignations' 1989 SLT '(News) 267 at 269. See also the opinion of Stair quoted
at n. 843 below; and T.M. Taylor, 'Bona et Male Fides' in Viscount Dunedin (ed.) Encyclopaedia of the Laws of
Scotland vol. 2 (1927) para 686.
841 Stair III.i.17; Erskine III.v.8; Bankton II, 197, 7; Wilson v Burrel (1748) Kilkerran 1. See generally authority
cited in chapter 2 above, n. 40.
842
Hope, Major Practicks II, 12, § 8 takes the view that intimation to the principal puts the cautioners in male
fide even if they are ignorant of the transfer. Mosman v Bells (1670) 2 Br Sup 457 is also authority for this
proposition. See also Lyall v Christie (1823) 2 S 288 and Montgomerie Bell, Lectures (3rd ed. 1882), 313. Cf.
Art. 1645 Code Civil du Quebec.
843 Stair, III.i.10.
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cedent. As a matter of policy, the onus should be on the assignee to make intimation to the
cautioner if the assignee wants to ensure the benefit of the accessory obligation. Were it
otherwise, would threaten the free transfer of cautionary obligations on the basis of potential
prejudice to the cautioner.844
E. Miscellaneous.
There must also be a residual category. As has become evident above, Scots law still
insists on a formal intimation requirement to transfer the claim being assigned. Nevertheless,
there are some instances where formal intimation may have been properly made, resulting in
the transfer of a claim, but the debtor, as a matter of fact, remains ignorant of it. The most
common example will be postal intimation to the debtor. If the debtor pays the cedent in good
faith because he never received the intimation before payment, he must have a defence of
good faith payment. This miscellaneous category should also cover cases which would fall
within a claim of assignatus utitur jure auctoris or the corresponding (identical) rule for
arrestment, viz. that the arrestee should not be prejudiced by the arrestment.845 So, for
example, where the debtor sends a cheque to the cedent on day 1, and receives intimation of
the assignation on day 2, the debtor should not be forced to countermand the cheque or bear
the risk that any countermand will be too late. If his cheque clears on presentment by the
cedent, then the debtor shall be discharged.846 If the cheque in favour of the cedent does not
clear, then the assignee can demand payment; there is only a difficulty because of the time lag
involved in a payment by cheque - discharge is conditional on the cheque being honoured.847
The position with credit cards may be different.848
844 See J-L. Baudouin and P.G. Jobin, Les obligations (5th ed. 1998) para 918. In the converse situation it was
held that bona fide payment by the principal debtor to the cedent when there had been only intimation to the
cautioner, was a good defence when the principal was sued by the assignee: Lyon v Law (1610) Mor 1786.
845 J. Graham Stewart, Diligence, 233: 'Arrestment cannot have the effect of making the arrestee's position
worse'.
846 These were the facts in Bence v Shearman [1898] 2 Ch 582.
847
Leggat Bros v Gray 1908 SC 67; McLauchlin v Allied Irish Bank 2001 SC 485 and authority cited in n. 195
above.
848 Re Charge Card Services Ltd [1989] Ch 497 CA.
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V. Equipollents.849
A. General
The policy of the law is certainty. The Courts are - or at least traditionally were -
reluctant to expand the categories of equipollents to notarial or statutory intimation. Verbal
intimation is almost certainly insufficient.850 A written acknowledgement by the debtor is
probably essential if there is to be an equipollent of notarial intimation.851 This leaves little
room for confusion. There are, admittedly, several cases where the requirement of intimation
has been relaxed to such an extent that if the reasoning in those cases were to be followed,
transfer could hardly be said to be based on intimation.852 However, these cases are of limited
utility since they confound mandates to pay with mandates to uplift. In a mandate to pay,
since there is nothing to intimate, it is hardly surprising that informal intimation was held to
be sufficient.
B. Acts of the debtor.
The position is concisely stated by Stair:
'Any writ under the debtor's hand, acknowledging the production of the
assignation, will be sufficient intimation, as if he gave a bond of corroboration
to the assignee, or gave discharges of the annualrent, or any part of the
principal sum'.853
849
Francophone lawyers use the same terminology: see P. van Ommeslaghe, 'La transmission des obligations en
droit positif beige' in La transmission des obligations (1980), 96.
850 The Queen and the Abbot ofCouper v The Laird ofDuffus (1558) Mor 846 has never been doubted.
851 McGill v Hutchison (1630) Mor 860; Home and Elphinston v Murray (1674) Mor 863; Newton & Co v
Cologan & Co (1785) Mor 850; Donaldson v Ord (1855) 17 D 1053 at 1070 per Lord Justice-Clerk Hope. But
compare his earlier opinion in Wallace v Davies (1853) 15 D 688 at 696.
852 Wallace v Davies (1853) 15 D 688 at 696 per Lord Justice-Clerk Hope; Finlay's Trs v Alexander (1866) 1
SLR 111 at 112 per Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis. Lord Justice-Clerk Hope departed from this view in Donaldson v
Ord. Inglis' opinion in Finlay's Trs is not easy to follow. Cf. Watt's Trs v Pinkney (1853) 16 D 279 at 287 per
Lord Ivory: he maintained that assignation occurs only on intimation, but that intimation could be informal. The
dicta in Libertas-Kommerz GmbH v Johnston 1977 SC 191 OH were obiter, while in Lombard North Central
Ltd v Lord Advocate 1983 SLT 361, the court failed even to consider the requirement of intimation: see K.G.C.
Reid, 'Unintimated Assignations' 1989 SLT (News) 267.
853 III.i.9 (emphasis added). In modern law, production of the assignation to the debtor will suffice for intimation
alone, no additional acknowledgment being requirement. In Stair's time, however, the intimation had to be
notarial. See also L. Dunipace v Sandis (1624) Mor 859. In France, such an acknowledgement by the debtor will
have important consequences: the debtor will be deprived of the right to plead compensation of debts, due by the
cedent to the debtor, against the cessionary: see Art. 1295 Code civil', L. Aynes, La cession de contrat (1984) 40,
n. 70. Cf. Art. 1295, Code civil beige.
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In Newton v ColloghanKA it was held that intimation was effected by holograph writing of the
debtor on the back of a bond, even though this was neither attested nor dated. The Court was
apparently influenced by the usage of the banking profession. Nevertheless, several members
of the Court were apparently of opinion that the intimation was insufficient in law and the
practice should not be encouraged. An acknowledgement, if it is just that, must be
distinguished from a promise to pay (an independent unilateral obligation). In one case it was
successfully argued that 'intimation cannot be supplied without a document in writ [sic], or at
least a promise of payment upon communing'.855 In modern law, something less than a
promise to pay would suffice as an acknowledgement. However, it is likely that some written
deed will be required so that there is an ascertainable date on which the transfer can be said to
have occurred. Payment or part-payment by the debtor to one holding a delivered but
otherwise unintimated assignation is an acknowledgment, as recognised by Stair in the above-
quoted passage.856 In some other legal systems, equipollents are of more limited utility in that
they have only limited effect: while a debtor who acknowledges the assignation thereby
becomes bound to the assignee, creditors of the cedent are not.857 There is no trace of such
limited effect being accorded to an equipollent in Scots law.
The equipollent of acknowledgment does give rise to a theoretical problem.
• 858
Acknowledgment - whether in writing or by payment - is a unilateral act of the debtor. As
a result of this (perhaps unwanted) intervention by the debtor, the holder of the delivered but
unintimated assignation becomes the assignee, perhaps against his will. Indeed, this incident
has an unexpected consequence for the principle of good faith payment in assignation:
assuming the assignation is valid, good faith payment can apply only to a payment made to
the cedent. A payment made to the assignee after delivery of the assignation, but before
intimation, renders the holder of the assignation the debtor's creditor. As a result there is no
issue of good faith payment: the debtor, by his act of payment, renders the assignee his
creditor.
854 23rd November 1785 FC; Mor 850; Cf. Earl of Selkirk v Gray (1708) Mor 4453; (1709) Rob 1; Watson v
Murdoch (1755) Mor 850; 19th November 1755 FC; Selkrig v Davies (1814) 2 Dow 230.
855 Faculty ofAdvocates v Dickson (1718) Mor 866; Dalrymple's Dec 246.
856 See too Livingstone v Lindsay (1626) Mor 860; Ridpeth's Exrs v Hume (1669) Mor 2792; 1 Stair 647.
857 P. van Ommeslaghe in La transmission des obligations, op. cit., n. 849, at 96-97. Grosskopf, Geskiedenis, 85
suggests that this equipollent was introduced into French law by Pothier, (Traite du droit de domaine de
propriete (1771) § 215). But this may be doubted. In any event, unlike modem French law, Pothier gave full
effect to an acceptance: it was good erga omnes\ further, for Pothier, acceptance has no effect on the debtor's
right to plead compensation.
858 P. van Ommeslaghe in La transmission des obligations, op. cit., n. 849, at 93.
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C. Correspondence between Assignee and the Debtor.
Recently it has been suggested that as long as the debtor has been made aware of the
• • • RSQ
intimation, the courts 'will not require anything formal by way of intimation'. This is based
chiefly on an Outer House decision in 1977.860 The point, however, was not a live one:
counsel had conceded the point. In any event, the raising of the action was sufficient formal
intimation.861 There is perhaps authority for the proposition that if there is informal intimation
such as correspondence, then provided that there is a written acknowledgment from the debtor
'which does acknowledge the interpellation,'862 then there is good intimation. Nevertheless,
since this requires the participation of the debtor, this is not a true method of informal
R6T • • •
intimation. Acts of the debtor are well established as equipollents. The correct position is
stated in the one line report of an old case: 'Found the writing a letter to the debtor not a
sufficient intimation of an assignation'.864 Nevertheless, in a recent case a proof before answer
Of.Z
was allowed on the basis of averments that intimation had been made merely by letter.
D. Judicial Intimation.
Production of an assignation in judicial proceedings is said to be the best of
intimations866 in that 'the publication of the conveyance is still more solemn than in the case
of a notarial instrument; for they are judicial acts, exposing the conveyance of the right in
859 R. Bruce Wood, 'Special Considerations for Scotland' in F. Salinger, Factoring: the Law and Practice of
Invoice Finance (3rd ed. 1999) para 7.41. In a similar vein see Wallace v Davies (1855) 17 D 688 at 693 per Lord
Robertson (Ordinary).
860 Libertas-Kommerz GmbH v Johnston 1977 SC 191. The decision is inconsistent with the opinions expressed
in the Inner House, albeit probably obiter, in Gallemos Ltd (in receivership) v Barrat Falkirk Ltd 1989 SC 239.
It was explicitly held in Faculty ofAdvocates v Sir Robert Dickson (1718) Mor 866; Dalrymple's Dec 246 that
correspondence was insufficient intimation. See also John Laurie v Hambly Ltd, 15th April 1992, Outer House,
unreported, Lord Penrose. Lord Penrose was counsel in Libertas-Kommerz.
861
Although this does not seem to have been argued by counsel for the pursuer (a Mr. Hope).
862 Wallace v Davies (1853) 15 D 691 at 696 per Lord Justice-Clerk Hope; see also Lord Rutherford (Ordinary)
at 692-3. Cf. Microwave Systems (Scotland) Ltd v Electro-Physiological Instruments Ltd 1971 SC 140 OH.
863 See above, and also Hope, Major Practicks II, 12 § 33.
864
Bayne v Cunningham McMillan (1679) Mor 863 and 9131. See further the unsuccessful arguments for the
Faculty of Advocates, suing as assignees, in Faculty ofAdvocates v Sir Robert Dickson (1718) Dalrymple's Dec
246: 'Sir Robert [the debtor] took the advantage to raise a process before intimation, which can afford him no
advantage; because it was a point of civility in the Faculty, not to intimate or charge, but to acquaint him in
discretest manner of an onerous right in order to obtain payment...'.
865 Safdar v Sahid 2004 GWD 28-586.
866 Carter v Mcintosh (1862) 24 D 925 at 934 per Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis.
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favour of the pursuer to the eye of the judge as well as the debtor'.867 The principle is deeply
rooted in Scots law:
"Intimation may be by any legal diligence, as by arrestment, by a charge or
process upon the assignation: yea, though the process be not sustained, because
ozro o/-q
all parties having interest were not called it will stand as an intimation..."
There are two important issues which follow. First, there must, as a general rule, have
been a deed of assignation; otherwise there will be nothing to produce.870 Secondly, what
exactly is the relevant date on which intimation is made? Only if there is a certain date on
which an assignation, intimated by the production of the deed in proceedings,871 can judicial
intimation be said to be the 'best'. Here we encounter difficulties. There are a number of
possibilities: the service of the initial writ,872 the lodging of the assignation in process, the
closing of the record,873 the date of the decree, or the date of the extract of the decree. There is
some difficulty with the proposition that the date of intimation can be held to be the date of
service of the initial writ.874 At this date the debtor will have no idea on what basis the
assignee has a title to sue:
"I hesitate, however, to believe (what some of the older judgements point at)
that the mere act of citation to such a process, not followed with judicial
production of the assignment, shall be equally effectual; because that step does
not carry evidence to the debtor of the verity of the alleged assignment, or the
ground of his claim."875
The leading case is Carter v Mcintosh. This is probably the most cited case in the Scots law
of assignation. Unfortunately, the facts of the case are difficult. They must therefore be recited
867 Erskine III.v.4.
868 This surely cannot mean that the debtor can fall into the category of all parties not called.
869 Stair III.i.7; Cf. Erskine III.v.4; Bell, Comm II, 18; Bell, Prin § 1465. Cf. Lord Elphingston v Ord (1624) Mor
858; Oglivie v Oglivie (1681) Mor 863; Sup Vol 21.
870 Somewhat subverting the theory that an assignation does not have to be in writing according to the
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 11 (3)(a); but cf. Gams v Russel's Tr. (1899) 7 SLT 289 OH.
The advantage that the omission does have is to allow a development of a doctrine of cessio legis. In such a
situation detailed averments as to the basis of the pursuer's position might suffice. In terms of Art. 1644, Code
Civil du Quebec, any other evidence of the assignment can be produced in the process. The interesting point is
made in Quebec that if the debtor pays between service and the actual appearance in court, the assignee alone
will be liable for any expenses, unless the debtor had not complied with an earlier intimation: J.-L. Baudouin and
P.G. Jobin, Les obligations (5th ed. 1998) para 895.
871 Thomas Dunn's Tr (1896) 4 SLT 46 OH.
872
Whyte v Neish (1622) Mor 854; Murray v Durham (1622) Mor 855.
873 This seems to be the only certain date for intimation in Carter v Mcintosh.
874 The date preferred in Nigel Lowe Holdings Ltd v Intercon Construction (Pty) Ltd 2004 GWD 40-816, para
[54] per Sheriff Principal Dunlop QC. This is discussed below.
875
Hume, Lectures vol. Ill, (Stair Society vol 15, 1952), 9. Cf. Stair III.i.45 and Royal Bank v Dickson (1868) 6
M 995.
876
(1862) 24 D 925.
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at some length. The case was a multiplepoinding. The fund in medio was the estate of a Mr
Fyfe who died in 1838. He had left some heritage to his daughter (Mrs. Wright) in liferent.
The fee was to go equally to his two nieces M. Fyfe (Mrs Vass) and E. Fyfe (Mrs. Ducat). The
two nieces were also appointed residuary legatees. Mrs Vass was married in 1844. Mrs
Wright died in 1858. Mrs Vass's marriage contract purported to assign in 1844 her rights
under the will to her marriage contract trustees. There was an initial dispute as to whether Mrs
Vass herself or her marriage contract trustees were entitled to rank in the multiplepoinding.
The Lord Ordinary (Kinloch)'s first interlocutor dealt with this matter. He held that the
trustees were entitled to the ranking.877 The rest of the case, however, is not concerned with
the claims on Mrs Vass's share of the estate. The remaining claims were made on Mrs
Ducat's share. For our purposes the relevant claims on this share were four:
1. Mrs Ducat herself
2. A claim for some £818 made by the representatives of a firm of solicitors,
Mcintosh & Ducat WS ('Mcintosh'). The firm had advanced certain sums
to Major Ducat in 1841. The Major and his wife had jointly granted these
claimants an assignation in security of all of Mrs Ducat's rights under the
trust. For reasons that are not explained in the reports, a second assignation
was granted in 1842. On the death of the lifrentrix, Mrs Wright, in 1858,
Mcintosh's representatives raised an action against Mrs Ducat. Arrestments
were served on Mr Fyfe's trustees on the dependence of the action. Before
the action was called, a compromise agreement was reached inl858. As a
result, Mrs Ducat 'instructed and authorized'878 Mr Fyfe's trustees to pay
the sum of £818 to Mcintosh's representatives (who already held an
assignation from her). This was apparently intimated to Mr Fyfe's trustees.
3. Arnott ranked for payment of £150 he had advanced to Mrs Ducat. She had
drawn a bill for this sum on the trustees, dated March 1856. This was duly
R7Q
presented and protested for non-acceptance in June 1856.
4. After the record had been closed,880 Mrs Ducat was sequestrated.881 Her
trustee, Carter, successfully craved to be sisted in the process as a claimant.
877
(1862) 24 D 925 at 927-928. Unfortunately, the Lord Ordinary confused an obligation to assign with an
assignation. This failure has had far-reaching consequences for the development of Scots law. Unfortunately the
point cannot be discussed here; but see G.L. Gretton, 'Assignation of Contingent Rights' 1993 JR 23.
878
(1862) 24 D. 925 at 928; (1862) 32 Sc Jur 418 at 418.
879
(1862) 32 Sc Jur 418 at 418.
880 In June 1859.
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With an additional claim in his name, with answers from the competing
parties, a second record was made up and closed in February 1861. Carter
sought to be preferred for the whole amount on the basis of his act and
warrant.882
The Lord Ordinary (Kinloch) repelled Carter's claim. He held that the second (Mcintosh) and
the third (Arnott) claimants were entitled to be preferred for their whole claims. These rested,
he held, 'on absolute assignations, duly completed by intimation, anterior to the date of the
sequestration'.883 He continued,
"In the case of [the Mcintosh claim], the right rested on a minute of agreement
by which Mrs Ducat not only become bound to pay the sum claimed out of her
share of Mr Fyfe's estate, but granted an express direction and authority to Mr
Fyfe's trustees forthwith to pay the amount to the holders of the deed; and the
date of this minute of agreement, it will be remembered is considerably
subsequent to the time when, by the death of Mrs Wright, the liffentrix, the
right of Mrs Ducat had fully vested. There appears sufficient evidence that this
mandate in rem suam was immediately intimated to the trustees, but it is
unnecessary to go curiously into this point, for the production of the minute of
agreement containing this mandate in the multiplepoinding raised by the
trustees was, according to the authorities, judicial intimation of the
assignation.... In the case of Mr Arnott there is not a deed of assignation, but
there is what in law is equivalent - a draft on the trustees, payable three months
after date, protested for non-acceptance. This, it is well-known, is equivalent to
an assignation of the funds of the drawer in the hands of the drawee, completed
by intimation."884
When the matter reached the Second Division, however, Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis referred to
the issue of judicial intimation, but not with respect to the Mcintosh claim. He accepted that
they had already intimated their assignations. 85 Lord Inglis refers to judicial intimation only
with respect to Mr Arnott's alleged assignation.886 But it had already been proved that Arnott
had protested his bill for non-acceptance.887 Surprisingly, Lord Inglis seems to assume that
this did not amount to intimation, (though he does not even mention the proceeding). Indeed,
Lord Inglis seems to suggest that it was only as a result of production of the bill in the
multiplepoinding that it operated as an assignation. In Carter, then, the dicta on judicial
881 In July 1860.
882 He also founded on the decision in Gordon v Millar (1842) 4 D 352.
883
(1862) 24 D 925 at 931.
884 Ibid.
885 At 933: 'that assignation was intimated long before the sequestration of Eliza Ducat's estate'.
886
(1862) 24 D 925 at 934.
887 That this operated as a 'virtual' assignation does not even seem to have been in dispute at the time, see e.g.
Stewart v Ewing (1745) Mor 1493.
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intimation were obiter with regard to both successful claimants: they had both already
intimated their assignations.
In the absence of authority to the contrary, the only certain date is either the date of
ooo
production of the deed in process, or the date of closing of the record. The most recent case
to deal with the matter, however, has raised a logical difficulty with judicial intimation. The
Sheriff Principal held that the date of service of the initial writ was the date of the
OOQ
intimation. He then commented:
"I approach the issue on the basis that it was argued, namely that intimation
was required at latest by the time of the raising of the action. I make that point
specifically because it seems to me that there is at least an argument that the
assignation gives the pursuers a substantial interest in the subject matter of the
litigation, requiring only formal completion by intimation, such that title to sue
can be sustained even though intimation is only made in the course of the
process (see Symington v Campbell 890 at p. 437 and Bentley v McFarlanem at
p. 79). For the sake of completeness I should say that Alderwick v Craig 892 and
Bank of Scotland v Liquidator of Hutchison Main & Co Ltd 893 can be
distinguished as the foundation of the claimed title was merely an agreement to
assign (or equivalent) and not, as with this case, an assignation."894
This statement highlights a tension between the cases on title to sue on the one hand;
and the principles regulating transfer on the other. Some of the cases suggest that an
unintimated assignation will provide a sufficient title to sue. The general principle is that
transfer only occurs on intimation. The law of intimation itself, however, says that intimation
can occur judicially. Suppose the action is raised. Any debtor served with a writ from
someone other than his creditor will be bound to refuse to pay, lest he be found liable to make
a second payment to the true creditor. The pursuer is not his creditor. Even if the pursuer is
claiming on the basis of an assignation, there will be no copy of it in the initial writ. The
Sheriff in Nigel Lowe Holdings was untroubled by this: 'I accept that the defenders were
entitled to call upon the pursuers to vouch these matters and to give greater specification, but I
do not consider that the vouching and specification were required contemporaneously with the
initial writ'.895 In other words, the date of intimation is deemed to be a date at which the
888
Dougal v Gordon 17th November 1795 FC; (1795) Mor 851; Thomas Dunn's Tr (1896) 4 SLT 46 OH.
889
Nigel Lowe Holdings Ltd v Intercon Construction (Pty) Ltd 2004 GWD 40-816, para [54] per Sheriff
Principal Dunlop QC.
890
(1894) 21 R 434.
891 1964 SC 76.
892 1916 2 SLT 161.
893 1914 SC (HL) 1.
894 At para [53],
895 Para [54],
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debtor has no proof that the putative assignee has any title whatsoever to sue. This would
suggest that validity of the intimation, on this analysis, must be retrospective. That the Sheriff
Principal's analysis gives rise to these difficulties, added to the weight that should be
accorded to Hume's opinion, suggests that the soundness of his decision is open to question.
How, then, does judicial intimation work? Initially, the debtor will be bound to plead
that the action is irrelevant: whatever the authorities on title to sue say,896 the debtor cannot
pay the pursuer for the simple reason that, until intimation, the pursuer is not the defender's
creditor. At the very least, the pursuer's action is almost certainly not necessary.897 The
pursuer then lodges the assignation in process. The defender may have no substantive defence
to the claim. The defender should then adjust his pleadings once the assignation has been
lodged. It is the date of lodging in process of the assignation that must be taken as the date of
intimation of the assignation. Even if the defender has adjusted so as to state no substantive
defence, the pursuer will be liable for the debtor's expenses. As a result, judicial intimation is
an expensive way of intimating an assignation.
VI. What is assignable - the relevance of intimation.
The question of whether intimation is actually possible is helpful in focussing the issue
on what can be assigned. If there can be no effective intimation, then there can be no
conveyance of the claim. This does not mean that there cannot be concluded an effective
contract to assign, or even delivery of the assignation. However there can be no completion of
the conveyance until there is intimation. So where intimation was made of the assignation of a
legacy to the executor before the death of the testator, this was held to be ineffectual. There
was no vested right to assign until death. An arrestment served on the executor after death was
OQO OQQ
therefore preferable. However this topic cannot be considered here.
896 These cases are dubious. They are contrary to the general principles of Scots law. As a result they can give
rise to strange results. They were most recently followed in Tayplan v D & A Contracts 2005 SLT 195 OH.
897 If the pursuer has a written deed of assignation, there should have been nothing to prevent him from
intimating the assignation conventionally. If there is no deed, it is difficult to see how the pursuer can claim to be
an 'assignee'
898 Bedwells and Yates v Tod, 2nd December 1819 FC.
899 See G.L. Gretton, 'Assignation of Contingent Rights' 1993 JR 23.
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VII. The Effect of the Delivered but Unintimated Assignation.
A. Discharges.
Until the delivery of the transfer agreement is intimated, the cedent can still grant a
valid discharge of the debt.900 Whether the debtor who pays the cedent in the interim period
between delivery of the assignation and intimation is discharged, raises questions more
complex than might initially appear.901 Subsequent to the delivery of the assignation, the
cedent may compromise all his claims with the debtor. The cedent has no idea whether there
has been intimation. He grants a general discharge to the debtor. Does this include the
assigned claim? Ultimately, the matter is a question of construction of the discharge
agreement. It has been held that a general discharge covers an assigned but unintimated
claim,902 but there are also cases where the contrary has been held.903 In Mitchells v Sinclair904
the Court held that, if there is no mention of the assigned debt in a general discharge, it will be
assumed that it was not included and is not discharged. This may be unfair on the debtor. If
the discharge is in general terms, and the cedent has not told the debtor of the assignation,
why should the debtor be forced to pay again to the assignee on intimation? Indeed, where the
compromise is for onerous causes, the effect of the decision in Mitchell is to require the
debtor to make a double payment. By parity of reasoning, a gratuitous discharge will not
prejudice an onerous assignee (there can be no question of double payment here as, ex
hypothesi, the debtor gave no consideration for the discharge);905 but, that an onerous
discharge will prejudice the assignee (the debtor has given consideration for the discharge; so
he cannot be compelled to pay again to the assignee).906 If a cedent discharges the assigned
debt, he will find himself liable for breach of warrandice.907 Creditors who are entering into a
general compromise of claims with a debtor should therefore be careful to exclude any
assigned claims from the discharge.
900 Drummond v Muschet (1492) Mor 843; McGill v Laurestoun (1558) Mor 843; McDowall v Fullerton (1714)
2 Ross LC 709; Mor 576; Hope and McCaw v Walsh 12th June 1816 FC; Safder v Sahid 2004 GWD 28-586.
901 For the position of an arrested claim prior to furthcoming, see Pitcairn v Eraser (1836) 14 S 1101.
902 Alexander v Agnew (1713) Mor 5041.
903 Munro v Munro (1712) Mor 5052; Logan v Affleck (1736) Mor 5041.
904
(17 1 6) Mor 5031.
905 Blair ofBagillo v Blair ofDenhead (1671) Mor 940
906 See Ritchie v The Scottish Automobile and General Insurance Co 1931 SN 83, also reported as an addendum
to Todd v Anglian Insurance Co Ltd 1933 SLT 274 OH.
907 Alexander v Agnew (1712) Mor 5041.
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B. General.
The sequestration of the cedent prior to intimation will spell disaster for the assignee.
In all likelihood, both the price and the claim will be swallowed up by the cedent's
insolvency. Quite what is the juristic effect of the delivery of the deed of assignation - or, for
that matter, delivery of a disposition of heritage - is therefore one of the burning questions for
modern Scots law. There are precious few answers to this question in the sources.
It is often said that there are only two types of rights in Scots law: real rights and
personal rights. The real right/personal right dichotomy is fundamental, especially on
insolvency. However, how does it explain the delivery of the assignation? It has been said that
on delivery of the deed, the transferee thereof is vested in a personal right to the asset (jus in
personam ad rem acquirendam) over and above his personal right under the contract.908 This
is insufficient - personal rights are, by definition, rights against persons, not rights in things.
But, if one thing is clear, it is that the person to whom an assignation or disposition is
delivered does not get more personal rights, but fewer. On conclusion of the contract to assign
the assignee has a contractual right against the cedent to execute and deliver an assignation.
The cedent complies. The assignation is delivered. The cedent has performed the primary
obligations incumbent upon him under the contract. Performance discharges obligations.
Therefore, on delivery of the assignation, the assignee has fewer rights against the cedent than
he had before. The assignee can no longer sue the cedent for specific implement. What then is
the position of the assignee? Until intimation there is still no transfer of the asset. Importantly,
if the debtor pays the cedent prior to intimation, he is discharged.909
It has been suggested that there is a distinction between the contractual right to
delivery of the assignation (a jus crediti) and the right to a complete the transfer by intimation
(a jus ad rem9XQ)\
"I must confess upon this subject that I think that there is a great deal of doubt
and obscurity, from the want of anything definitely explaining the distinction
between jus ad rem and jus crediti, because I think I find that these words are
used interchangeably, without any clear distinction of the one from the other;
but there may be this practical distinction, that the jus ad rem is a right which
the person possessing it may make a complete right by his own act which he
908 See e.g. Edmund v Gordon (1855) 18 D 47 at 57 per Lord Deas; Gibson v Hunter Home Designs Ltd 1976 SC
23 at 27 per Lord President Emslie; Burnett's Tr. v Grainger 2004 SC (HL) 19 at para 40 per Lord Hope of
Craighead. Cf. G. Lubbe, 'A Doctrine in Search of a Theory: Some Reflections on the Doctrine of Notice in
South African Law' 1997 Acta Juridica 246 at 248.
909 UNIDROIT Ottawa Convention, Art. 8; UNCITRAL, Art. 19, and see authority cited at n. 828 above.
910 For general discussion of the amorphous nature of this right, see generally R. Michaels, Sachzuordnung durch
Kaufvertrag (2002).
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may compel another, without a suit, to perform: whereas a jus crediti may be
defined as a right which the holder of it cannot make available, if it is resisted,
without a suit, to compel the person to do something else in order to make the
right perfect."911
It is not surprising that Lord Cranworth found the distinction difficult. The distinction, if
indeed there is one, is subtle. Nevertheless, the crucial incidents of delivery of the assignation
seem to this writer to be these: First, as far as a competition with the trustee in sequestration
Q1 9 •
over the estate of the cedent is concerned, delivery of the deed has no effect. Secondly, in
terms of personal rights, the assignee does not get 'more' personal rights on delivery of the
assignation. On the contrary, he gets less. This occurs by virtue of the fact that the cedent has
extinguished his contractual obligations by performance.913 Thirdly, although having a
delivered but unintimated assignation will not assist on insolvency of the cedent, the position
is preferable to having a mere contractual right to delivery. This is the crux of the matter.
Possession of the deed of assignation gives the assignee the power to intimate. The assignee
is, to some extent, in control of his own destiny. If he fails to intimate and creditors of the
cedent arrest in the hands of the debtor, the assignee has only himself to blame. Delivery of
the deed, then, gives the transferee thereof the power and privilege to rely on himself rather
than someone else to comply with the requirements of the law; in the Hohfieldian terminology
employed by Professor Reid, the assignee has a 'power'.914 Fourthly, it is probably the case
that the holder of a delivered but unintimated assignation can still translate a good right to a
second assignee. It will be necessary, however, for the cedent to deliver a copy of the original
assignation in the translation. This will have to be intimated to the debtor as well as the
second assignation. Otherwise, the second assignee will be founding his right against the
debtor on the basis of an assignation from a creditor who is unknown to the debtor. If the first
assignation is not intimated to the debtor, the debtor can withhold payment from the assignee.
The well-advised debtor would raise a multiplepoinding.914a The same principle applies to
911 Edmund v Mags of Aberdeen (1855) 18 D 47 affd (1858) 3 Macq 116 at 122 per Lord Cranworth. Cf.
Wilson's Trs v Pagen (1856) 18 D 1096 at 1104 per Lord Benholme.
912 Cf. Strachan v McDougle (1835) 13 S 954 at 959 per Lord Mackenzie: 'it is an important general principle of
our law, and there is none more vital, that the delivery of the corpus of a deed or instrument will not carry the
real right that is contained within such a deed or instrument'. Although, quaere whether the 'real right' is ever
contained in the deed or instrument. A real right is the relationship of a person to a thing. It should be noted that
delivery of the deed does, apparently, have an effect in a competition with a floating charge holder: see below.
However, this will be of limited practical importance in the future following the effective abolition of
receivership.
913 A point made by R. Michaels, Sachzuordnung durch Kaujvertrag (2002), 42.
914
Reid, Property para 644.
914a Cf. Art. 6: 31 BW.
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every successive assignation. The failure of the cedent to deliver the original assignation is a
breach of warrandice.
In the case that only a contract to assign has been concluded, this gives the putative
assignee a personal right against the cedent. As a personal right this is in itself assignable9143
(assuming that there is no pactum de non cedendo). For example, A enters in a contract with
B for the assignation of B's claim against C. Before delivery of the assignation, A could
assign his right to receive a delivered assignation (of B's claim against C) to D. The debtor in
this obligation is not C but B. There seems to be no good reason why D could not compel B to
assign and deliver an assignation of the claim against C. Moreover, D should be able to have
this delivered in his own name.
C. Assignations and Floating Charges.
It has been argued that the effect of the speeches in Sharp v Thomson915 is to render
intimation necessary only for the purpose of interpelling the debtor from paying the cedent.916
Mere delivery of the assignation, it is argued, gives the holder of the first contractual right an
insolvency preference. The argument is not new.917 On the basis of Sharp, however, it has
been suggested that the analogy between the failure to register a delivered disposition of
heritage for almost a year and invoice discounting 'is seemingly irrefutable'.918 The argument
is no doubt partly motivated by a desire of commercial lawyers to bring Scots law into line
with English law.919 With respect, such an analogy does not seem to this writer to be so
9l4a See 'Case Commentary' 2005 SLT (News) 119.
915 1997 SC (HL) 66. The debate sparked by this decision has been great. The academic literature is voluminous;
the judicial limitations to any ratio numerous. See, inter alia, K.G.C. Reid 'Equity Triumphant' (1997) 1 Edin
LR 464; G.L. Gretton 'Equitable Ownership in Scots Law?' (2001) 5 Edin LR 73; Fleming's Tr. v Fleming 2000
SC 206; Lady Fforde v McKinnon 1998 SC 110. Lord Hope of Craighead, who, as Lord President, was overruled
by the House of Lords in Sharp, has commented extra-judicially that the appellate committee's decision, 'was
not well founded in principle': Lord Hope of Craighead, 'The Place of a Mixed System' (2001) 35 Israel LR 1 at
18. Sharp was distinguished by the House of Lords in Burnett's Tr. v Grainger 2004 SC (HL) 19.
916 See e.g. J.G. Birrell, 'Sharp v Thomson: the Impact on Banking and Insolvency Law' 1997 SLT (News) 151;
R. Bruce Wood, in F. Salinger, Factoring: the Law and Practice of Invoice Finance (3rd ed. 1999) paras 7.51 -
7.52; and, most pertinently, D.P. Sellar, 'Current Law Case Update' Law Society of Scotland PQLE Conference,
22nd May 2001, 56. The cases cited by Sellar were, however, disapproved by the First Division in Sharp v
Thomson 1995 SC 455 at 480 per Lord President Hope. See also Karnes, Principles ofEquity (2nd ed. 1767), 61.
917 Traces of this theory can be found in Grigor Allan v LJrquhart (1888) 15 R 56 at 61 per Lord Young; and in
Browne's Tr. v Anderson (1901) 4 F 305 at 311 per Lord Trayner. The argument was successful in Till v
Jamieson (1763) Karnes Sel Dec 273; Mor 2858 and 5946. But the facts were special. Cf. Macioca v Alma
Holdings Ltd 1993 SLT 730 OH.
918 R. Bruce Wood, 'Special Considerations for Scotland' in F. Salinger, Factoring: the Law and Practice of
Invoice Finance (3rd ed. 1999) at para 7.52.
919 For English law, see M. Bridge, Personal Property Law (3rd ed. 2002) at 148 ff.
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apparent. Even if there is an intelligible ratio which can be taken from Sharp, it is limited to
the floating charge.920 There are no 'equities' with the finance company.921 They have not
been the victims of careless solicitors. As invoice financiers, by definition, they are acutely
aware of the legal position. Individuals are required to intimate; so too should companies. The
general principle is clear: in Scots law intimation is essential to the transfer:
"I think that the law of Scotland and the law of England, in the matter of
assignations, start from diametrically opposite bases. I think that, in this matter,
the law of Scotland is preferable to the law of England. The object of the law
of Scotland is as in the case of heritable securities - to effect security by
creating a definite system of completing title on which people can rely.
Accordingly for 300 years at least it has been the law of Scotland that an
assignation is of no use to the assignee until it is intimated, but that once it is
intimated, it gives him an absolute and preferable right to what is assigned to
him against all concerned."922
The only protection the assignee can gain in this situation is to suggest that the cedent
holds the funds he has received in some sort of trust. There are two problems with this
analysis. First, this seems to be an example of a trust being used to defeat the claims of a
lawful creditor. Secondly, since a floating charge attaches as if it is a fixed security, on one
theory at least, it should defeat the personal rights of any beneficiaries of a trust.924 Moreover,
if delivery of the assignment is the relevant date of preference, the stated policy of the law is
subverted. Any competition becomes a free-for-all. The genuine assignee can be defeated by
wet ink bearing a prior date to the intimation by the true assignee.
Extracting a ratio from Heritable Reversionary925 or Sharp may be impossible. On one
view - a view, it must be added, that is quite inconsistent with the history and principles of
920 In Burnett's Tr. v Grainger 2002 SC 580, Lord Coulsfield suggested that he found the reasoning in Lord
Clyde's speech 'difficult to follow' (at para [23]).
921 Burnett's Tr. v Grainger 2002 SC 580 at para [28] per Lord Coulsfield.
922
Macpherson's JF vMackay 1915 SC 1011 at 1015 per Lord Johnston.
923 G.L. Gretton, 'Ownership and Insolvency: Burnett's Tr v Grainger' (2004) 8 Edin LR 389.
924 K.G.C. Reid, 'Trusts and Floating Charges' 1987 SLT (News) 113. Admittedly, however, even if one does
not accept the dual patrimony theory of trusts (for which see G.L. Gretton, 'Trusts without Equity' (2000) 49
ICLQ 599) it is arguable that since the company has no 'beneficial interest' in assets it holds on trust for another,
these assets will not be subject to the charge: Sharp v Thomson 1997 SC (HL) 66; Bank of Scotland v
Liquidators ofHutchison, Main & Co Ltd 1914 SC (HL) 1; Heritable Reversionary Co Ltd v Miller (1892) 19 R
(HL) 43 and D. Cabrelli 'Can Scots Lawyers Trust Don King? Trusts in the Commercial Context' (2001) 6
SLPQ 103.
925
(1891) 18 R 1166 rev'd (1892) 19 R (HL) 43. Lord Watson's speech is the basis of much of the recent
confusion. It is difficult to see how much of Lord Watson's speech can still be considered good law following
the decision of the House of Lords in Burnett's Tr. v Grainger 2004 SC (HL) 9. It is to be regretted that the
House in Burnett's Tr. was not asked to overrule Heritable Reversionary.
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Scots law - it is the passing of 'beneficial interest' that is crucial.926 For present purposes,
however, what is the effect of these decisions on the competition between a floating charge
holder and the holder of a delivered but unintimated assignation? According to Sharp, the
floating charge does not attach to assets in which the company has no 'beneficial interest'. It
is, however, unclear what this beneficial interest is, or when, exactly, it passes. We can only
guess. Two possible alternatives may be suggested. The first is on payment implementing an
agreement to assign (often also referred to, confusingly, as an assignation). The second is on
delivery of the deed of assignation to the assignee. The beneficial interest probably passes
only with the latter. No writing required for an assignation (though writing is required for
intimation, so the statutory abolition is somewhat strange). So an assignee's claim, founded
on a verbal assignation, if proved, could be preferred.929 But, if that is correct, an assignee is
accorded a preference on the insolvency of a cedent who is a company (or limited liability
partnership930), even though he could not have done so if the cedent was an individual,
partnership or trust which had been sequestrated.931 Moreover, it gives an assignee a right
which he would not have had if the cedent was solvent: Assume that the receiver did not
demand payment, so the debt is still extant. An assignee with no deed will have great
difficulty in getting payment from the debtor. The debtor will demand to see a copy of the
assignation before he pays this alleged assignee; a demand the debtor is entitled to make:
'knowledge of an assignment, where it falls short of ocular evidence, will scarce be sustained
to put the debtor in male fide'.932 The assignee whose claim is based on a verbal assignation,
however, will have nothing to produce. As has been described above, the only way that this
'assignee' will be able to demand payment will be if he brings an action of payment against
the debtor, raises a multiplepoinding in the name of the debtor, or stakes a claim in a
multiplepoinding raised by the debtor. In the latter two cases a claim will then have to be
submitted. So there is the strange situation of an 'assignee', who would have difficulties
claiming from the debtor if the latter was solvent, being potentially accorded a preference in
926 Cf. Brownlee v Robb 1907 SC 1302 at 1313 per Lord Pearson; Tayplan Ltd v D & A Contracts Ltd 2005 SLT
195 at para [23] per Lord Kingarth (Ordinary).
927 But compare O. Lando, E. Clive, A. Priim and R. Zimmermann (eds.) Principles ofEuropean Contract Law
(Part III, 2003) Art. 11:202, which sides with the first alternative.
928
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 11(3) (a).
929 But the Civil Evidence (Scotland) Act 1988 may be a small hurdle to overcome.
930 Since they can grant floating charges: Limited Liability Partnerships (Scotland) Regulations 2001, SSI
2001/128, reg. 3, schedule 1.
931 Since they cannot grant floating charges. It is clear that the trustee in sequestration will be preferred to an
assignee who holds an unintimated assignation, see above.
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the cedent's insolvency. Put shortly, a wide application of Sharp to an assignation is
problematic.
What, then, is the position if the debtor pays the receiver? Receivers are notorious for
asserting their (perhaps dubious) rights to assets in furtherance of their duty to the floating
charge holder.933 If a receiver were to demand payment of a debtor after an assignation by the
company but before intimation by the assignee, the debtor would be discharged were he to
pay. The only right that the assignee then has is a personal right against the company for the
money. The receiver cannot take the benefit of the claim since it is not an asset in which the
company had a beneficial interest. But a company which is in receivership is likely to be in
financial difficulties. It is not clear what effect this passing of beneficial interest has in a
competition with other creditors who do not hold a floating charge. The other creditors'
claims may be greater than the assets. The assignee will therefore only have his contractual
right against the company. The company will probably be in no position to fulfil its obligation
owing to its practical insolvency.
But matters may be more complicated still. Suppose A Ltd assigns a claim for value
against Eve to John. The assignation is delivered. Before going into receivership, A Ltd then
assigns the same claim to Jack, also for value. Jack receives a delivered assignation. Neither
assignation is intimated. A Ltd then goes into receivership. Thereafter, Jack intimates to Eve.
On the Sharp reasoning, John is preferred to Jack. Following intimation, Jack is preferred to
John. This seems incongruent. Such a position may occur under English law; although, even
the great Lord Reid was at a loss to see how A Ltd can grant a valid assignment to Jack under
English law if it has already assigned all its 'beneficial interest' to John.934 It is therefore
disappointing to see these confused rules reproduced in the Principles ofEuropean Contract
Law,935 Furthermore, what would be the position, on the foregoing analysis, if John is
sequestrated in the interim period between delivery of the assignation from A Ltd and
intimation by Jack? That there is no clear way ahead here should set the proverbial alarm bells
ringing. Such arbitrary, nay, whimsical rules of competition hardly inspire confidence in the
law.
932 Lord Kames, Principles ofEquity (2nd ed. 1767), 61; (3rd ed. 1778) I, 59. Kames' view is important since he
was of opinion that equity should ameliorate the necessity of notarial intimation.
933 See S. Wheeler, Retention ofTitle (1990).
934
BSLyle v Rosher [1959] 1 WLR 8 HL.
935 O. Lando, E. Clive, A. Pram and R. Zimmermann (eds.) Principles of European Contract Law, (Part III,
2003) Art. 11:401.
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There is also some difficulty with the attachment of the floating charge. It attaches 'as
if it is a fixed security.936 There is, however, a problem: it is not possible to create a fixed
security over incorporeal moveable property in Scotland, in the true sense of the term. The
assignation in security is not, strictly speaking, a security; though it may function as such. It is
a case of absolute transfer qualified by a personal obligation to re-convey (fiducia cum
creditore). It is the converse of the sale of corporeal moveables by retention of title.937 It is
notable that other instances offiducia cum creditore do not require registration as 'charges';
after all, they are not subordinate real rights in security.938 The provisions of the Companies
Act are construed strictly, like taxation legislation.939 Terms employed by the Act are to be
given their precise legalistic meaning.940 If this principle is applied to the provisions regarding
the floating charge, then one could perhaps argue, albeit perhaps not with force, that a floating
charge does not attach to those incorporeal moveables over which it is not possible to create a
right in security, most importantly of which is the paradigm money claim.
How, then, to judge competing unintimated assignations? In a competition with a
trustee in sequestration, or liquidator, the trustee or liquidator will be preferred to the
'assignee' who has not intimated. As for a competition with a floating charge holder, it seems
that, providing a claimant can prove that he was the 'assignee' of a verbal, though unintimated
assignation, or that he had paid, then the beneficial interest has passed and the claim is not
attached by the floating charge. It remains to be seen how individual assignees, who fail to
intimate before the attachment of the floating charge, will be treated by the courts in
competition with a receiver or floating charge holder. In the opinion of the writer, however,
there seems little to support their position in principle; after all, 'if hardship justified
exemptions from pari passu ranking there could be no insolvency proceedings in Scotland'.941
936 Forth & Clyde Construction Ltd v Trinity Timber & Plywood Co 1984 SC 1.
™ Allan & Son v Turnbull (1833) 11 S 878 aff d (1834) 7 W & S 281 HL; Braithwaite v Bank ofScotland 1999
SLT 25 at 29 A-B per Lord Hamilton (Ordinary).
938 See generally, G.L. Gretton, 'Registration of Company Charges' (2002) 6 Edin LR 146. So, retention of title
clauses in sales of corporeal moveables are not registrable in Scotland, although they are in England: Compaq
Computer Ltd vAbercorn Group Ltd [1993] BCLC 602.
939 E. Ferran, Company Law and Corporate Finance (1999), 380 and authority there cited.
940 See in particular Barclays Bank pic v British & Commonwealth Holdings [1996] 1 BCLC 1 and 29, and NZI
Bank v Euro-National Corporation Ltd [1992] 3 NZLR 528 at 539,per Richardson J. approved by McKay J. in
Hovard Industries Ltd v Supercool (1991) Ltd [1995] 3 NZLR 577 at 583 line 40.
941 N. Whitty, 'Sharp v Thomson: Identifying the Mischief 1995 SLT (News) 79.
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D. Conclusion.
On any analysis, intimation to the debtor is required at some point to interpel his
payment to the cedent. Intimation is the relevant date for transfer. It is certain. The potential
for fraud is always reduced by the necessity for a formal act. With formal intimation
requirements, detailed rules for the protection of the debtor, who pays in good faith, are
unnecessary.
Yet, as we have seen, there are often situations where intimation is either not possible,
or is apparently unnecessary. Moreover, when other parties are introduced into the equation,
the law does not require intimation to them to transfer the cedent's rights against them to the
assignee. The law engenders respect through clear and intelligible rules. Certainty is
synonymous with such rules. This policy is inherently equitable. But our devotion to certainty
should not be unfailing. It should not prevent the law attaining equally legitimate objectives.
So where devotion to certainty will lead to unfairness, a reappraisal is necessary. Cautioners
are a case in point. Intimation is required to the debtor. This provides a certain date of
transfer. All accessories follow from the date of intimation to the principal debtor. The goal of
certainty has been attained. This being so, there is no need to maintain that a cautioner who
pays the cedent in good faith is still liable to the assignee. The cautioner should not be
prejudiced. The same can be said of co-debtors who are ignorant of each other.
If certainty is the goal, why should a requirement of registration not be adopted? As
Scots law has demonstrated in the case of edictal intimation, registration is a workable
alternative to intimation.942 Arguably it is preferable: it provides genuine publicity as well as a
certain date of transfer. Certainty having being achieved, all questions involving the debtor
can be settled by a general principle of good faith payment. Debtor notification can either be
retained as an alternative to registration or eschewed it is entirety. But, if there are no formal
intimation requirements, how does the assignee demand payment? More importantly, how is
the debtor to respond to perhaps vague demands if there are no rules governing what form the
assignee's demand must take? A lack of formal rules places the debtor in an invidious
position: when can he rely on the notice? Any regime has to address the practicalities of the
assignee's demand to the debtor.
The present Scottish rules may not be perfect; they do, at least, have the benefit of certainty.
190
Transfer ofMoney Claims in Scots Law
942 For which, see R.G. Anderson, 'A Note on Edictal Intimation' (2004) 8 Edin LR 272.
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Chapter 5
Assignatus utitur jure auctoris.
I. The Maxim.
Where there is a transfer of a claim against a debtor by assignation, the debtor can
raise all the defences he has against the cedent against the assignee: assignatus utitur jure
auctoris. This is variously described as 'a law maxim, importing that the assignee comes into
the right and place of his cedent';943 'the assignee exercises the right of the cedent';944 or, 'the
cedent's right must be the measure of the right in the assignee'.945 In the American Bar
Association work, Latin for Lawyers, it is said that the maxim applies 'generally to all
property, real and personal'.946 In Scotland, however, it is said to be 'peculiar' to the law of
assignation,947 and it has been held that the principle does not apply either to heritable
property,948 corporeal moveables, or to negotiable instruments.949 Indeed, it has been observed
that it is the exemption from the assignatus rule which is the distinguishing feature of a
negotiable instrument.950 Whatever the shortcomings of the maxim, it is preferable to the
943 G. Watson (ed.) Bell's Dictionary and Digest ofthe Law ofScotland (1882), 66.
944 A.G.M. Duncan (ed.) Trayner's Latin Maxims (4th ed. 1894, reprinted 1993), 53. Cf. W.J. Stewart, Collins
Dictionary ofLaw (2nd ed. 2001), 33-34; W. Burton, Legal Thesaurus (2nd ed. 1979), 36; R.H. Kersley, Broom's
Legal Maxims (10th ed. 1939), 302.
945 Robertson v Wright (1873) 1 R 237 at 243 per Lord Ardmillan.
946 H. Jackson (ed.) Latin for Lawyers (1915, reprinted, Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 2000), 127, no.77, founding on
P. Halkerston, A Collection of Law Maxims and Rules in Law and Equity (Edinburgh, 1823), 14. There is no
reference by Halkerston at 190 as to the origin of the term. The statement in the former work that 'the thing
assigned takes with it all the liabilities attached to it in the hands of the assignor at the time of the assignment' is
inaccurate.
947
McBryde, Contract para 12-84 citing Karnes, Elucidations, 13-14; Scottish Law Commission Memorandum
No 42, Defective Consent and Consequential Matters (1978) para 3.137: '...it is possible to argue that apart from
settled practice there are today no convincing reasons for making an exception to the general rule [that personal
obligations of the transferor are not prestable against the transferee]'. Cf. Reid, Property para 660.
948 Scottish Widows Fund v Buist (1876) 3 R 1078 at 1082 per Lord President Inglis. In fact, feudalism provided
a tripartite situation of superior, vassal and transferee, to which the maxim was applied: e.g. Governors of
Heriot's Trust v Caledonian Railway Company 1915 SC (HL) 52 at 62 per Lord Dunedin; see also the dictum of
Lord Young in Whyte v Lee (1879) 6 R 699 at 701 quoted in Reid, Property para 705. Cf. Arnott's Tr v Forbes
(1881) 9 R 89.
949 But cf. London Joint Stock Bank v A Stewart & Co (1859) 21 D 1327.
950 Scottish Widows Fund v Inland Revenue 1909 SC 1372 at 1375 per Lord Dunedin. But cf. discussion in
chapter 3 above Part V, A, and James Steven Rogers, An Early History of the Law ofBills and Notes (1995) for
refutation of this proposition in Anglo-American law.
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expression used in English law, 'subject to equities' which is inherently inaccurate, since
these 'equities' take effect at law as well as in equity.951
The source of the assignatus formula is obscure. It was not referred to by Stair
himself. It is absent from both the first (1681) and second (1693) editions of his Institutions. It
was, however, found in some of Stair's manuscripts in the Advocates Library and was
included by William Johnstone in the third edition of the Institutions published in 1759:
"...the common rule of law is more rational, that the assigny utitur jure
auctoris, and is in no better case than the cedent, unless it be in the matter of
probation, that the cedent's oath will not prove against him nisi in jure
litigiosa, and therefore in personalibus all exceptions against the cedent are
• • QS9
competent against the assignee, even compensation itself."
However, subsequent editors of Stair have returned to the text found in the first and
second editions.953 Andrew MacDouall, Lord Bankton, refers to 'utitur jure auctoris'' in his
Institute published between 1751 and 175 3.954 However, it seems that the first recorded use of
the full term 'assignatus utitur jure auctoris' in Scots law is Morison's report of a case in
17 5 5.955 As a result of this inclusion, the first writer to refer to the maxim in its full form is
Erskine (whose Institute was published posthumously in 1773).956 The maxim, as used by
QS7 QSR
Erskine, has been approved by the House of Lords. It is also employed by Bell. It has
been suggested959 that the term was used by Voet.960 But there is no trace of the term in the
951 W.W. Cook, 'The Alienability of Choses in Action' (1917) 30 Harvard LR 449; L.C.B. Gower (1956)
Butterworth's SA Law Review 228, both cited by D.V. Cowen and L. Gering, Cowen's Law of Negotiable
Instruments in South Africa (5th ed. 1985), 21.
952 J. Gordon and W. Johnstone (eds) Stair, Institutions (3rd ed. 1759), I.x.16. Bell was strongly critical of this
passage, see the quote in n. 1484 below. The main reason for this criticism was the fact that Stair's passage failed
to take account of the apparent freedom that an assignee has from a latent trust. Bell's view was confirmed by
the House of Lords in Refearn v Sommervails (1813) 1 Dow 50.
953 Brodie's edition, (4th ed. 1826), 120. See his note thereto. Brodie seems to have been the first to notice the
irregularity in the text of the third edition. Cf. More's edition, (5th ed. 1832); and D.M. Walker's Tercentenary
edition, (6th ed. 1981). This issue was the subject of full argument in the leading case of Scottish Widows Fund v
Buist (1876) 3 R 1078.
954 III.i.8. He also refers to the formulation in the civil law: non dabeo melioris conditionis esse quam autor
meus, which K. Luig, 'Assignation' in K.G.C. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds) A History of Private Law in
Scotland (2000) vol 2, 415 helpfully identifies as D. 50, 17, 1, 175(4), 1: 'I cannot be in a better condition (have
a better title) than my author by whom the right to me is transferred', Trayner's Latin Maxims (4th ed. 1894),
393.
955 Irvin v Osterbye (1755) Mor 1715 at 1716.
956 III.v.10.
957
Redfearn v Sommervails (1813) 1 Dow 50 at 66.
958 G. J. Bell, Commentaries on the Law ofScotland (3rd ed. 1816)1, 184.
959 A. Milne et al, Bell's South African Legal Dictionary (3rd ed. 1951), 68.
960 J. Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas (2nd ed. 1707) 11.4.12.
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passage. In Mansfield v Walker's Trs961 a decision of the Whole Court, it was asserted that
Scots law borrowed the term from the civil law.962
The peculiarities of the term may be found in the history of the law of cession. Where
the terms 'assignatio' or fidsignatio' or 'assignatus utitur jure auctoris' appear in European
dictionaries, all references are to the related concept of the order to pay (.Anweisung).963 The
important differences between the concepts of cession and Anweisung were not always
appreciated. It is the Anweisung that was labelled 'Assignation' in the Germanic sources.
However, this leads us to another historical mystery. The debtor in the cession of the claim
can raise his defences against a transferee of the original creditor (nemo plus, assignatus, call
it what you will); in an Anweisung, the creditor orders the debtor to pay the creditor's creditor;
as a result, the debtor cannot raise defences based on his relationship with the original
creditor.964
II. The Debtor's Defences.
A. General.
As we have seen, the assignatus rule operates in the peculiar tripartite factual situation
involved in an assignation. It is just one facet of the better-known principle, nemo plus juris
ad alium transferre potest quam ipse habet965 This is in line with the approach taken in other
legal systems.966 The substantive manifestations of the rule embody the need to protect the
debtor who is a passive party to the arrangement. She should not be prejudiced. In the law of
arrestment, the principle is simply articulated by Graham Stewart: 'Arrestment cannot have
the effect of making the arrestee's position worse'.967 In Quebec, the import of the principle is
easily understood in the formulation adopted by the Civil Code, that the cedent 'may not,
961
(18 3 3) 1 1 S 813 affd (1835) 1 S & McL 203; sub nom Stewart's Trs v Walker's Trs (1835) 3 Ross LC 139.
962
(18 3 3) 1 1 S 813 at 822.
963 D. Liebs, Lateinische Rechtsregeln und Rechtswdrter (6th ed. 1998), 37, No. 104, v. 'Assignatus utitur jure
auctoris': 'Der Angewiesene ubt ein Recht des Anweisenden aus. Er leistet Rechnung des Anweisenden aus. Er
leistet fur Rechnung anweiden'; R. Lieberwirth, Latein im Recht (4th ed. 1996), 36: 'assignatio' = Anweisung.
Cf. § 783(2) BGB'. Cf. Bell's South African Legal Dictionary, n. 959 above.
964
Compare chapter 2, n. 209 above.
965 Mackenzie v Watson & Stuart (1678) Mor 10188. Cf. J.S. Muirhead, An Outline ofRoman Law (1937), 150
who sees the assignatus rule as a just one facet of the general nemo plus principle.
966 Cf. M. Planiol and G. Ripert, Traite pratique de droit civil (2nd ed. 1954) para 1126; J. Ghestin, 'La
transmission des obligations en droit positif franpais' in La transmission des obligations (1980), 19 ; P. Engel,
Traite des obligations en droit Suisse (1973) § 276 ; G. Marty, P. Raynaud and P. Jestaz, Droit civil: Les
obligations (2eed. 1989) para 359; S. Scott, The Law ofCession (2nd ed. 1991), 70, 115, 221.
967 J. Graham Stewart, The Law ofDiligence (1898), 233.
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however, make an assignment that is injurious to the rights of the debtor or that renders his
obligation more onerous'.968 In Scotland, by contrast, the principles are not immediately
apparent from the so-called assignatus rule. It has been subjected to almost no critical
analysis. There is, to some extent, a tension between the defences that a debtor can raise under
the assignatus rule, and those defences that could be raised on the basis of the simple rule that
the debtor should not be prejudiced.
It is the right of the debtor to raise defences that was one of the important factors969 in
the utilisation in earlier Scots law of first, the blank bond and, subsequently, negotiable
instruments.970 Exceptionally, where such an instrument is negotiated in good faith and for
value, the indorsee (assuming it is an order bill) is not subject to the debtor's defences.971 It is
the applicability or otherwise of the assignatus rule, which demarcates the distinction between
079 079
'negotiation' (in the strict sense of the term) and 'transfer' of a bill of exchange.
B. Juristic Writers.
As has been mentioned, although Stair did not actually use the brocard assignatus
utitur jure auctoris himself, he acknowledged the existence of the principle: 'Except in the
matter of probation,'974 he observes, 'all exceptions competent against the cedent before the
assignation or intimation, are relevant against the assignee'.975 However, the principle is
perhaps most fully articulated by Erskine:
968 Code Civil du Quebec Art. 1637; J. Baudouin and P. Jobin, Les Obligations (5th ed. 1998) para 901 and
authority there cited. This is the position in Belgian juristic writing: see P. van Ommeslaghe, 'La transmission
des obligations en droit positif beige' in La transmission des obligations at 100. In the Netherlands, the civil
code provides that the cession leaves the debtor's defences (verweermiddelen) undisturbed (onverlet): Art. 6: 145
BW.
969 See D. Cowen and L. Gering, The Law ofNegotiable Instruments in South Africa (5th ed. 1985), 21. Cf. J.S.
Rogers, An Early History of the Law ofBills and Notes (1995) who shows that in Anglo-American law, where
the transfer of claims was not admitted at law, the negotiable instrument initially evolved simply to facilitate the
transfer of claims.
970 See general discussion in chapter 3 above.
971 Herries & Co v Crosbie (1775) Mor 2577; Hailes 616.
972 R. Goode, Commercial Law (3rd ed. 2004), 49, n. 164; Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Sham Magazine Centre
1977 (1) SA 484 (A) at 493 E-G per Holmes JA; OK Bazaars Stores (1929) Ltd v Universal Stores Ltd 1972 (3)
SA 175 (C) at 179 per Corbett J (as he then was).
973 D.V. Cowen and L. Gering, The Law of Negotiable Instruments in South Africa (5th ed. 1985), 22. Cf. N.
Elliot, J. Odgers and J.M. Phillips, Byles on Bills ofExchange and Promissory Notes (27th ed. 2002), 79: "The
terms 'transfer' and 'negotiable' are hopelessly mixed up in the Act and in the judgement in National Bank v
Silke [1891] 1 QB 435."
974 This refers to the rule that reference could not be made to the oath of the cedent to establish the assignation.
975 III.i.20. He cites Swintoun v Brown (1668) Mor 3412 and 8408; 1 Stair 547 for the proposition that even
extrinsic defences are pleadable. Stair's own report of this case is detailed but unintelligible. Cumming v
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"All defences competent to a debtor in a moveable debt against the original
creditor, which he can prove otherwise than by his oath, continue relevant
against even an onerous assignee, whether those defences arise from a separate
backbond granted by the creditor at constituting the debt, or from other
grounds; Stair, Jan. 14th 1663 [Scot v Montgomery Mor. 10187]976 because no
assignee can be in a better condition than his cedent utitur jure auctoris; for the
assignment gives him merely the right as it stood in the cedent or original
creditor. And this doctrine extends also to mutual contracts, in which the
assignees are subjected to all the burdens which affect the right while it was
vested in the cedent, not only where the mutual obligations are inserted into the
contract itself (for these the assignee cannot be ignorant of), but even where
they are partly formed by a separate backbond, if it shall appear by witnesses
that the contract and backbond have a relation to and are mutual causes of one
another; Stair I.x. 16."977
Erskine suggests that every plea which the debtor could have raised with the cedent
can be raised against the assignee. However, he does not seem to discriminate between
defences which can be pled against third parties, i.e. by the debtor against an assignee, and
those which can be pled against fourth parties, i.e. creditors of either the cedent or the
978
assignee.
One of the earliest reported cases on the assignatus rule states that 'The Lords found
that the assigney could be in no better case than the cedent, albeit it was answered that the
cedent could only be excluded by a personal exception'....979 This comes remarkably close to
simply articulating the crux of the modern law. The object of the transfer is a personal right
itself. The general principle, therefore, is that only those defences which are connected with
the personal right that is assigned may be pled. But what does this mean? What sort of
defence is one 'connected with' the claim transferred? George Joseph Bell draws the
distinction between those which are extra corpus juris and those which are in corpore juris:
"It is necessary to distinguish between such conditions as are incorporated with
the right {in corpore juris), and such are extraneous to it. 1. Conditions of the
former kind, inherent in the nature of the right, or (in the case of debts) existing
as exceptions or counterclaims by the original debtor against his creditor, are
effectual both against creditors and purchasers coming in place of the original
Cumming (1628) Mor 9207 and 9147 comes close to suggesting that extrinsic defences are pleadable. Stair's
reference to assignation 'or' intimation is poorly expressed.
976 This case involved a back bond which was of its very nature extrinsic.
977 III.v.10.
978 This question is normally viewed in terms of the nemo plus rule: see Reid, Property para 660. In this writer's
view, the principles are identical, irrespective of the varying Latin. Compare the cases which hold that the
assignee's right is subject to trust rights to which the cedent was subject: Keith v Irvine (1635) Mor 10185; Scott
v Dickson (1663) Mor 5799; Mackenzie v Watson & Stuart (1678) Mor 10188 (arrester); Black v Sutherland
(1705) Mor 10190; Monteith v Douglas (1710) Mor 10191.
979 Schaw (1622) Mor 829. See also Muir v Calder (1635) Mor 831; Spotiswood, (Assignation), 22.
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holder of the right. 2. Conditions of the latter species, collateral obligations, or
latent trusts extraneous to the deed (extra corpus juris), and of which the new
holder of the right has no notice, have given occasion to great diversity of
opinion among our lawyers."980
As will be seen, Bell's formulation is the embryonic basis of much that follows. This
crucial passage, however, is not without its problems. First, Bell's exposition is vague. What
is meant by 'conditions which are incorporated with the right', 'in corpore juris' and
'inherent'? Do these mean the same thing? What about vices of consent which arise prior to
the existence of the right? Are they included? Second, his reference to counterclaims is simply
wrong. The debtor cannot bring a counterclaim he would have against the cedent against the
assignee. Third, his reference to latent trusts is irrelevant. Latent trusts raise issues with fourth
parties, not the debtor and defences which may be available to him. Fourth, the issue of
notice, in the sense of good faith, is again of little relevance to the defences which are
available to the debtor. Again, this is a fourth party issue. Fifth, Bell suggests that 'collateral'
or 'extraneous' rights (those which are 'extra corpus juris') cannot be raised by the debtor
against the assignee. What, then, of compensation? While compensation may be based on a
money claim due and owing to the debtor out of the same contractual relationship which is the
basis of the assignee's claim, this is unusual. It is more common for the debtor to plead
compensation of unrelated debts which he alleges are due to him by the cedent.
Nevertheless, despite the problems with his formulation, Bell was on the right track.
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic claims was not original to Bell. It is, indeed,
common sense. Lawyers probably took heed of the principle for centuries prior to Bell. For
example, in Balfour's Practicks, there is a case of an assignee of reversionary interest who
981
was held to take the right free of an extrinsic agreement between debtor and creditor.
980 Commentaries (7th ed. 1870) I, 302. A portrait of Bell can be viewed at (1893) 5 JR 104.
981 Laird ofDrumquhassil v Laird ofMinto (1577) Practicks, C.xvii, 449. See also Gordon v Skein and Crawford
(1676) Mor 7169; and Achinleck v Williamson (1667) Mor 6033 which held that a deed ex corpus juris did not
bind singular successors. There are explicit references to the intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomy by Lords Monboddo
and Pitfour in Arbuthnot v Colquhoun (1772) Mor 10424; Hailes 464. See too King v Douglas (1636) Mor 10186
at 10187 referring to a deed 'in corpore primi juris'; Cockburn v Trotters (1639) Mor 4187; Brown v Sibbald
(1669) Mor 10204 {'in corpore juris')', Crighton v Murray, 10th March 1686, Fountainhall, I, 407 which refers to
'extrinsick' debts.
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C. Intrinsic/Extrinsic Dichotomy.
The basic principle applicable lo the debtor's defences is that only defences which aie
intrinsic to the claim assigned can be pled against the assignee. What, then, is an intrinsic
defence? The most obvious is that which arises out of the contract which the debtor has with
the cedent. It is these rights which the cedent has transferred to the assignee. The right to
plead intrinsic defences is a manifestation of the mutuality principle. So, a right of retention or
a right to rescind for material breach can be plead against an assignee.
More difficult is the position of vices of consent, which induced the debtor to contract.
Q&9
These will have arisen prior to the conclusion of the contract. Nevertheless, if there was a
vice of consent which induced the debtor to enter into a contract, then it is of fundamental
importance to the debtor. The debtor has the right to reduce the contract with the cedent. If the
debtor is not to be prejudiced by the assignation, it is necessary that he is able maintain this
right against the assignee. As far as the debtor is concerned a vice of consent in the original
contract is manifestly intrinsic to the very basis of the cedent's rights against him. The vice of
consent is an inherent qualification to the title of the assignee to sue the debtor. If the cedent
assigns, then the debtor can raise vices of consent against the assignee. Similarly, if the
putative cedent is not the creditor in the right assigned, then the debtor can plead this against
QOI
the assignee. This a defect which is intrinsic to the claim assigned. If the putative cedent
had attempted to sue the debtor, the debtor could have defended on the basis of this
fundamental flaw in his title to sue. Consequently, this can be raised against the assignee. The
same applies to factors which would render the contract null, for example, illegality. All
factors which are intrinsically concerned with the constitution of the right or the continued
prestability of the right assigned, and as such would afford the debtor a defence against the
cedent, or putative cedent, can be raised against the assignee.984
What, then, are extrinsic defences? Where the debtor has rights against the cedent
which arise out of transactions which are distinct from, and separate to, the contract out of
which the ceded right arose, then they are extrinsic. In other legal systems, such extrinsic
982 Where there is no assignation, and the creditor sues his debtor, such a vice cannot found a counterclaim by the
debtor. It does not arise out of the contract but from 'something which preceded' it: Smart v Wilkinson 1928 SC
383, followed in Sutherland v Barrie 2002 SLT 418. See criticism of these decisions below. Cf. RCS r.25.1;
OCR r.19.1, and also Borthwick v Dean Borthwick Ltd 1985 SLT 269 OH and Anderson v Spence (1683) Mor
10286.
983 Cf. Reid, Property para 660 for a different view.
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claims are described variously as those which are based on the personal relationship of the
QO C
debtor with the cedent. They are not inherently connected with the right assigned. In the
words of one judge, rights which are based on an 'independent personal obligation of the
cedent' cannot be pled against an assignee.986 This formulation obviously raises the question
as to what obligations are sufficiently 'independent' or 'unconnected'.
In principle, the intrinsic/extrinsic division provides a neat rationalisation. But neat the
law is not. There is one important defence which will usually be extrinsic to the right
assigned, which the debtor can nevertheless plead against the assignee: compensation.
Although compensation may arise out of the same contractual relationship as the right which
is assigned, this is unusual. More often than not, compensation will be founded on an
independent and unrelated obligation. It is an important right for the debtor. It not only allows
him to resist the claim of the assignee; if it is sustained in court it discharges his obligations to
the cedent in so far as they are mutual debtors and creditors.
The defences which the debtor can plead against the assignee are these: all those
defences which are intrinsic to the claim assigned plus compensation. The 'intrinsic plus
compensation'987 formula is applicable equally to diligence creditors and trustees in
sequestration. These creditors are said to take tantum et tale. This maxim is notoriously
slippery. It has been invoked to mean much more than is understood than the assignatus rule
984
Again, compare the similar test for a valid counterclaim: J W Chafer (Scotland) Ltd v Hope 1963 SLT (Notes)
11 OH; RCS r.25.1; OCR r.19.1.
985
Compare the formulation of the first draft of the BGB, Erster Entwurf eines Burgerlichen Gesetzbuches fur
das Deutsche Reich (1887) § 302: 'Der Schuldner kann dem neuen Glaubiger Einreden nicht entgegensetzen,
welche eine auschliefiliche Beziehung auf die Person des Bisherigen Glaubigers haben'. Cf. A.J.F. Thibaut,
System des Pandekten-Rechts (6th ed. 1823) § 79 and cf. S. Scott, The Law of Cession (2nd ed. 1991), 222-225.
The modern German provisions are §§ 404 BGB.
986 Marshall's Trs v Bank 1934 SC 405 at 411 per Lord Murray. Cf. Bills of Exchange Act 1882, s. 38(2) 'Where
he is a holder in due course, he holds the bill free from any defect in title of prior parties as well as from mere
personal defences available to prior parties among themselves, and may enforce payment against all the parties
on the bill'; Loi uniforme concernant la lettre de change et le billet a I'ordre 1932 (the 'Geneva Convention' on
Bills of Exchange) Art. 17 states that persons liable on a bill cannot plead 'defences founded on their personal
relations with the drawer' against a holder. While this is axiomatic in relation to a holder in due course, it is not
so in the case of a simple holder who is not entitled to the privileges held by the former. Byles on Bills of
Exchange (27th ed. 2002) paras 18-32 to 34 adopt the analysis of an early edition of D.V. Cowen and L. Gering,
The Law of Negotiable Instruments in South Africa (4th ed. 1966) 271-274 between defences in rem and in
personam. However, this is merely to incorporate the common law cession of South Africa (see S. Scott, The
Law of Cession (2nd ed. 1991), 222-225); put another way, such an interpretation of s. 38(2) would mean that
holder in due course would still be subject to the assignatus rule, i.e. subject to defences which in the South
African sense, would be described as defences in rem. This is roughly equivalent to Scottish 'intrinsic' defences.
987 This statement is subject to the major qualification of balancing of accounts in bankruptcy. Further, the
development of the assignatus rule in Scots law in terms of intrinsic and extrinsic defences is not entirely
consistent with an approach which is formulated in simple terms that the assignation cannot prejudice the debtor.
Indeed, in other jurisdictions, the intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomy has been abandoned for this reason: see, for
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or the nemo plus rule. However, in principle, all these maxims amount to one and the same
thing.988 For instance, extrinsic claims cannot be pled against an arrester,989 adjudger, or
heritable creditor under a decree of maills and duties.990
D. Intrinsic Defences: the paradigm situations.
The classic case is payment of all or part of the debt to the cedent prior to intimation
of the assignation.991 So if the right has been discharged prior to the purported assignation,
nothing is transferred.992 The position may, however, be different where the discharge is
granted between assignation and intimation for no consideration.993 If the debtor reduced the
obligation which she owed to the cedent prior to intimation of the assignation, this will be
good against the assignee.994 If the right is inherently unassignable, the debtor need not pay
anyone other than the original creditor.995 If the cedent is only a conjunct creditor, the
assignee will also only be a conjunct creditor.996 Where the benefit of an insurance policy is
assigned, the assignee takes the rights of the cedent. So, if the cedent was guilty of a
misrepresentation, the insurer can plead this against the assignee.997 The assignatus principle
will be particularly relevant in insurance cases. Where an insured person is insolvent, injured
instance, P. van Ommeslaghe, 'La transmission des obligations en droit positif beige', in La transmission des
obligations {1980), 100.
988 Chamber's JF v Vertue (1893) 20 R 257 at 258 per Lord Wellwood (Ordinary), approved in Marshall's Trs v
Bank 1934 SC 405.
989
Montgomery v Creditors of Glendinning (1745) Kilkerran 44; Mor 2573; Kames Rem Dec 102; Gibson v
Wills (1826) 5 S 74; Brodie v Wilson (1837) 15 S 1195 at 1196 per Lord Gillies; Houston v Aberdeen Town and
County Banking Co (1849) 11 D 1490 (no opinions reported); Chamber's JF v Vertue (1893) 20 R 257 at 258
per Lord Wellwood (Ordinary). The opinions of the majority in Park, Dobson & Co v William Taylor & Son
1929 SC 571 are wrong.
990 Marshall's Trs v Bank 1934 SC 405 held that such a creditor was merely a judicial assignee of the rights of
the proprietor: Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison at 410-411; Lord Murray at 414; Stewart v McRa (1834) 13 S 4;
Turner v Nicolson (1835) 13 S 633; Elmslie v Grant (1830) 9 S 200. A summons of poinding of the ground is not
a judicial assignation: Royal Bank v Dickson (1868) 6 M 995.
991
Farquharson v Hutchison (1895) 1 1 Sh Ct Rep 225; McGill v Laurestoun (1558) Mor 843; McDowall v
Fullerton (1714) 2 Ross LC 709; Mor 576; Hope and McCaw v Walsh 12th June 1816 FC. See generally, D.
Girsberger, 'Defences of the Account Debtor in International Factoring' (1992) 40 Am. J. Comp. Law 467.
992 Smiths Gore v Reilly 2003 SLT (Sh Ct) 15; 2001 SCLR 661 at 668D-E per Sheriff Principal Nicolson.
993 Blair ofBagillo v Blair ofDenhead (1671) Mor 940. See also chapter 4 above, 'Intimation', n. 900.
994
Hume, Lectures III, p. 15; Houston v Nisbet (1708) Mor 8329; Thorn Scott v Peter Bain, 9th February 1821 FC;
(1825) 3 S 400.
995 James Scott Ltd v Apollo Engineering Ltd 2000 SC 228, discussed in chapter 6 below, 'Validity'.
996 Cairnis v Leynis (1533) Mor. 827; Balfour, Practicks, 169. There is no mention of the assignatus rule in the
reports; but this is the basis of the decision.
997 Scottish Widows Fund v Buist (1876) 3 R 1078. Cf. where the insurance company has notice of the breach and
continues to accept premiums nevertheless: Armstrong v Turquand (1858) 9 Irish Common Law Reports 32.
Insurance policies have specialities which cannot be discussed here.
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parties may claim directly against the insurer.998 The basis of this claim is a statutory
assignation of the insolvent insured's rights against the insurer.999 Any defence which the
insurer would have had against a claim for indemnity by the insured, is good against the
statutory assignee.1000 The insurer will often seek to claim that the insured was in material
breach of the insurance contract, thus absolving them from liability.1001 If the cedent was
personally barred from claiming payment from the debtor, the same defence will be available
to the debtor against the assignee,1002 at least in so far as the bar arises out of the same
agreement. Nevertheless, where the bar is not intrinsic to the right assigned, but arises from
some other relationship between the debtor and the cedent, it is arguable that the bar will not
bind the assignee. Where the assignee has obtained an assignation of the debtor's obligation
secured by a standard security, the debtor is not bound to pay the assignee the cost of
obtaining an assignation.1003 It is usually said that it is the date of intimation which is the
crucial date for determining the relevancy of the debtor's exception to the assignee's
claim.1004
Generally speaking, the principle is the same whether it is expressed in terms of the
'assignatus'' rule or the 'nemo plus' rule. However, there may be cases where the debtor
cannot plead defences against the assignee which he could against the cedent.1005 The leading
case is Macpherson's JF v Mackay.m6 A beneficiary under his father's will assigned part
(£1000) of his entitlement to a share of the residue to marriage contract trustees. This was
intimated to the trustees under his father's trust, of which the beneficiary was one. At the date
of intimation of the assignation to the marriage contract trustees, although certain advances
had been made to the beneficiary in virtue of his legacy, there remained in excess of £1000
due to him. It subsequently transpired that he had thereafter overdrawn from his father's estate
998 Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930, s. 1.
999 Greenlees v Port of Manchester Insurance Co Ltd 1933 SC 383 at 400 per Lord Justice-Clerk Alness;
Cheltenham & Gloucester pic v Sun Alliance & London Insurance pic 2001 SC 965 at 970D, para 10 per Lord
President Rodger; Cheltenham & Gloucester pic v Sun Alliance & London Insurance pic 2001 SLT 347 OH;
Aitken v Independent Insurance Co Ltd 2001 SLT 376 OH; Aitken v Financial Services Compensation Scheme
Ltd 2003 SLT 878 at 883H OH.
1000 Cf. Mackay v Duke of Sutherland's Trs 1971 SLT (Land Ct) 2 for an example of the assignatus rule being
invoked in a statutory transfer.
1001 For examples see the cases cited in n. 999 above.
1002 The authority is sparse, but see E. Reid, 'Personal Bar: Case Law in Search of Principle' (2003) 7 Edin LR
340 at 347.
1003 G. Dunlop & Sons JF v Armstrong 1994 SLT 199.
1004 Sheills v Ferguson, Davidson & Co (1876) 4 R 250 at 240 per Lord Deas; O'Hare v Reaich 1956 SLT (Sh
Ct) 78.
1005 Cf. G. Marty, P. Raynaud and P. Jestaz, Droit Civil, Les obligations (2nd ed. 1989) para 360: 'Le situation du
cessionnaire peut ne pas etre toujours absolument identique a celle du cedant'.
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by some £1244. The marriage trustees then sued the testamentary trustees for payment in
terms of the assignation. The testamentary trustees sought to compensate their claim against
the cedent for repayment. It was held, however, that while the cedent would have had no
claim to the £1000 - indeed he would have been liable to repay his excessive drawings - the
assignee was entitled to payment. At the date of intimation, there was no claim to
compensation.
Some inherently personal characteristics of the cedent may not be applicable to the
assignee. For example, suppose that on being sued by the cedent, the debtor could have
demanded the cedent be ordered to find caution. If the solvency of the assignee is
unimpeachable, then the debtor will not be able to demand that the assignee find caution on
the basis of the assignatus utitur doctrine.1007 It is not just the debtor who has title to plead
assignatus utitur. In a multiplepoinding, competing creditors can object to the claim of an
assignee on the basis that he can have no better right than the cedent had.1008 A right of
reduction held by a creditor which is extinguished by payment cannot be enforced by an
assignee of the creditor.1009 Similarly it is conceivable that some inherently personal
characteristics of the assignee will accord him additional rights that would not have been
available to the cedent.1009a
A few words should be said about the history. Under the old rules of proof, the
debtor's defence that the claim had been extinguished, which was to be proved by the
cedent's oath, was only available before intimation.1010 There was an exception to this. Where
the object of the assignation had been rendered litigious prior to intimation, the cedent's oath
could be admitted after intimation to the prejudice of the assignee.1011
E. Assignatus utitur: Applicable to every Assignation?
It is generally assumed that the maxim is applicable to all assignations of money
claims with the exception of the assignation effected on the negotiation of a bill of exchange
1006 1 9 1 5 SC 1011.
1007 Moore v Little (1899) 7 SLT 43 OH.
1008
Briggs v Briggs 1923 SLT 755 OH.
1009
Edinburgh Entertainments Ltd v Stevenson 1926 SC 365.
1009a See e.g. McKintosh v Brodie (1826) 4 S 729: assignee, being a Solicitor to the Supreme Courts, entitled to
pursue in the Court of Session, thought the cedent could not have.
1010 Erskine III.v. 10.
1011 Erksine, ibid.
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(whether by indorsement and delivery, or delivery1012), or on acceptance.1013 In Scottish
Widows Fund v Buist,1 14 Lord President Inglis observed that:
"It appears to me to be long ago settled in the law of Scotland - and I have
never heard of any attempt to disturb the doctrine - that in a personal
obligation, whether contained in a unilateral deed or in a mutual contract, if the
creditor's right is sold to an assignee for value, and the assignee purchases in
good faith, he is nevertheless subject to all the exceptions and pleas pleadable
against the original creditor...But it seems to be said that this doctrine admits
of some exceptions. Now, that I entirely dispute. [...] I think the true view of
the law is that these things that are called exceptions are classes of cases to
which the doctrine does not apply."1015
However, in the report of his opinion found in the Scottish Law Reporter, the
following is present in the bracketed part of the above passage: 'the application of the maxim
assignatus utitur jure auctoris may be subject to some exceptions'.1016 Nevertheless,
assignation is a transfer. It is thought that where there is an assignation of a money claim, then
the ordinary principle of property law applies, and on the facts of an assignation, assignatus
utiturjure auctoris.
III. Defences and Counterclaims.
Assignation is the transfer of a creditor's rights against the debtor, without the consent
of the latter. The assignee will be able to enforce the cedent's rights against the debtor. The
assignatus rule circumscribes the right of the assignee, however, so as to allow the debtor to
plead those defences that were relevant against the cedent against the assignee. Nevertheless,
this does not mean that the assignee becomes liable for the cedent's obligations. This much
seems common sense. As one South African judge concluded, 'should the cessionary be liable
for the full counterclaim in excess of the debt ceded, the cessionary's position would be very
risky. If this were the law, little will hereafter be heard of cession'.1017 It seems unlikely, then,
1012 Bearer bills are not indorsed.
1013 Bills of Exchange Act 1882, s. 53(2). Note that only time bills are presented for acceptance. Why
presentation should operate as an assignation is a result of a failure to appreciate the difference between an order
to pay and a mandate to uplift. See discussion in chapter 3 above, part VI, E.
10
(1876) 3 R 1078.
1015 At 1082.
1016
(1876) 13 SLR 659 at 662.
1017
Regional Factors (Pty) Ltd v Charisma Promotions 1980 (4) SA 509 (C) at 512 per Burger J. Cf. Anderson v
Spence (1683) Mor 10286 where the debtor sought to render the assignee liable for damages for the cedent's
conduct in taking advantage of the debtor's minority in inducing him to contract. This was refused on the basis
that the assignee was a singular successor. Interestingly, the Court was considerably influenced by the fact that
the cedent remained solvent.
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that it can be the law that the assignee is liable for the obligations of the cedent. Yet, before
we examine the cases in Scots law which consider the paradigm examples of the principle, it
is necessary to examine two ancillary points which potentially subvert it.
A. Judicial Definitions of Assignation.
There are numerous judicial dicta, which, if taken literally, would unsettle the idea that
the assignee has no active liability for the debts of the cedent. For example, the only
contemporary judicial dictionary in Scotland1018 explains the term assignation in reference to
a dictum of Sheriff Principal McLeod in relation to the use of the term 'assignation' in the
Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970, s. 20(5):
"I am therefore inclined to think that the technical meaning of the word
'assigned' is the meaning intended ... in law, the ordinary rule is that a
personal right vests in an assignee subject to all the contingencies affecting his
author's right. If it is correct, as I believe it to be, to give the word 'assigned'
its technical legal meaning, the subsection operates to assign to a creditor not
only the proprietor's rights but his obligations as author of the right
assigned."1 19
This is incorrect. While it may be true to say that an assignee is 'subject to all the
contingencies affecting his author's right', it does not necessarily follow that an assignation
transfers not only the rights of the cedent, but also his obligations.
B. The Assignee and Counterclaims.
The fundamental basis of an assignation is the transfer of the cedent's rights against
the debtor to the assignee without the consent of the debtor. The cedent's obligations do not
transfer. The debtor remains protected. Fie can still raise all those defences he could have
raised against the cedent against the assignee. As for counterclaims, it could be argued that the
effect of an assignation is to put the assignee in a better position than the cedent. The debtor
cannot bring a positive counterclaim against the assignee. In the often-quoted words of Sheriff
Brydon, 'A counter claim is a sword, whereas compensation is only a shield, and the right to
1018 W.J. Stewart (ed.) Scottish Contemporary Judicial Dictionary (1995), 48 'assigned'.
1019 David Watson Property Management v Woolwich Eqidtable Building Society 1989 SLT (Sh Ct) 74 at 76
rev'd 1990 SLT 764 affd 1992 SC (HL) 21. Reported at first instance at 1989 SLT (Sh Ct) 4. Cf. also D.M.
Walker, The Law ofContracts and Related Obligations in Scotland (3rd ed. 1995) para 29.29, which contains two
errors: first, transfer by assignation is not effected merely by contract; second, the cedent does not by assignation
transfer his liabilities.
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defend oneself with the latter does not imply the right to wield the former'.1020 This analysis
has been followed;1021 and rightly so.1022
Professor McBryde forcefully argues for a re-examination of the rule and accentuates
the legitimate concern that the debtor should not be placed in an inferior position by virtue of
the assignation. He postulates the situation of the illiquid claim for damages that the debtor
may have against the cedent in the latter's capacity as a seller of goods. The seller assigns his
right to payment. The assignee demands payment from the assignee. McBryde argues that in
such situation it would be unfair on the debtor if he could not bring his counterclaim against
the assignee. If the debtor has no defence against the claim of the assignee then he is in a
worse position than he would have been but for the assignation.1023 However, this overstates
the difficulties of the debtor. The argument fails to account for the debtor's right to plead
retention. At the heart of the debtor's claim for damages is an allegation that the cedent failed
to perform his part of the bargain. If the cedent sought payment of the price, the debtor could
refuse. He is not willing to pay the price until the seller performs his obligations under the
contract; this is the defence of the unperformed contract (exceptio non adimpleti
contractus)}024 Since this is a defence (a shield), there is no problem in allowing it to be pled
by the debtor.1025 It seems well established that in Scotland the debtor may refuse a demand
1020 Binstock, Miller & Co v E. Coia & Co Ltd 1957 SLT (Sh Ct) 47 at 48 per Sheriff Brydon. The Sheriff
indicated he was merely borrowing the phrase adopted by Sir George Jessel MR in Birmingham Estates Co v
Smith (1883) 13 Ch D 506 at 509. The Master of the Rolls did not, however, formulate his opinion thus. The
phrase was invoked by Cockburn CJ in his detailed opinion in Stooke v Taylor (1880) 5 QBD 569 at 575.
Counterclaims were first introduced into English law by the Judicature Act 1873. The phrase was employed
earlier by Lord Neaves in Menzies v Menzies (1863) 1 M 1025 at 1037 in the context of a plea of bonafides.
1021 Alex Lawrie Factors Ltd v Mitchell Engineering Ltd 2001 SLT (Sh Ct) 93 per Sheriff Taylor, declining to
follow McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland (1987) para 17-87. The substantive issue as to the rights of
assignees was not decided by the Inner House in Tods Murray WS vArakin Ltd 2001 SC 840.
1022 See also H.L. MacQueen 'Assignation and Breach of Contract' (1997) 2 SLPQ 114; idem, 'Assignation' in
SME vol 15 (1995), para 864; H.L. MacQueen and J.M. Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland (2000) para 2.85
drawing on Pan Ocean Shipping Ltd v Creditcorp Ltd, The Trident Beauty [ 1994] 1 WLR 161 HL, for which see
G. J. Tolhurst, 'Assignment, Equities, the Trident Beauty, and Restitution' (1999) 58 CLJ 546. See also A.
Deutsch, 'Swords or Shields? Counterclaims and Assigned Debts' 1996 Greens Civil Law Practice Bulletin 11-
4.
1023
McBryde, Contract, para 12-88, points (2) and (5). Cf. S. Scott, The Law of Cession (2nd ed. 1991), 196 who
suggests that if the cedent is in a position to pay, then the debtor must bring his counterclaim against the cedent.
However, if the cedent is unable to pay, then it is presumed that the cession was effected with the intention of
depriving the debtor of his counterclaim and was made male fide and therefore invalid. This, however, is not
consistent with the South African cases: Goodwin State Trust v Duohex (Pty) Ltd 1998 (4) SA 606 (C) at 617 E-
H.
1024 Ross v Ross (1895) 22 R 461 at 464-465 per Lord McLaren; Lovie v Baird's Trs (1895) 23 R 1 at 3 per Lord
McLaren. See discussion below v. 'Retention'.
1025 This possibility was adverted to by Sheriff Taylor in Alex Lawrie, op. cit., n. 1021 above, at 97B. The
Appellate Division in LTA Engineering Co Ltd v Seacat Investments (Pty) Ltd 1974 (1) SA 747 also expressly
noted that the debtor there was seeking only to counterclaim; he had pled neither retention nor compensation.
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for payment from the assignee of the cedent's rights under a mutual contract on the basis that
the cedent has failed to perform his part:
'An assignee to a contract, or bond, if he charge the other party to fulfil to him
as assignee, his part of said contract, the defender may allege that the cedent
must first fulfil his part, or at least per simul et semel; whilk the Lords allow,
for that contract whereunto the charger is made assignee; but if the cedent be
obliged to the defender by another contract or bond, the assignee is not holden
to answer for the same'.1026
It is conceded that an assignation of a seller's right to the price of goods will prevent
the debtor from exercising his right to retain the goods and claim damages1027 against the
assignee. But the effect of allowing a plea of retention is to ensure that the debtor is not
prejudiced. If the debtor is sued he does not have to pay until the cedent performs his part
of the contract for the sale of goods. Stair suggested that the debtor could compel the assignee
to compel the cedent to perform.1029 If the debtor wants to keep the goods he has bought and
claim damages then he can still do just that. The assignation makes no difference to the
situation. For example, the debtor is still entitled to invoke the terms of the Sale of Goods Act
1979 in relation to consignation1030 against an assignee.1031 Admittedly, the debtor may still
have problems of satisfying the conditions of mutuality. In particular, the debtor must show
that his suspension of performance is on the basis of a failure of the cedent to perform an
obligation which is a counterpart of the debtor's obligation to pay. In general, a defender who
is sued for a liquid sum cannot withhold payment on the ground that he has an illiquid claim
against the pursuer arising out of a different contract.1032 A defence of retention is
unproblematic. At heart, retention has nothing to do with liquidity.1033 Counterclaims are
procedural in nature. The introduction of counterclaims into Sheriff Court,1034 and eventually
into Court of Session,1035 procedure effected no change in the law of retention on the basis of
1026 Hamilton v Hamilton (1629) Mor 830. Cf. Lawrie v Lawson (1685) Mor 9210; Shearer v Cargill (1686) Mor
9210 and Stair I.x.16, followed by Erskine III.v. 10 and Johnston v Robertson (1861) 23 D 646 and following
cases discussed below.
1027 Sale of Goods Act 1979, s. 15B (l)(a).





Lithgow Factoring Ltd v Nordvik Salmon Farms Ltd 1999 SLT 106.
1032 Grewar v Cross (1904) 12 SLT 84 OH.
1033 Graham v Gordon (1843) 5 D 1207; Earl ofGalloway v McConnell 1911 SC 846.
1034 Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1907, schedule 1, r. 55.
1035 Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1933; Rules of Court 1936, r. 11,13; Rules of Court of Session,
1964, AS 10th November 1964 r.84 (see also SI 1965/321 and SI 1965/1090). See now RCS r 25.1.
Counterclaims were first introduced in England, along with a unified concept of set-off, under the Judicature Act
1873. See generally the opinion of Cockburn CJ in Stooke v Taylor (1880) 5 QBD 569 at 573 ff.
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the exceptio non adimpleti contractus,1036 Rather, they allow decree for any balance due to the
defender to be pronounced in the same action.1037
C. Mutuality: exceptio non adimpleti contractus.1038
1. General.
Retention is one facet of 'the principle of mutuality which applies to all contracts'.1039
It is a simple and desirable doctrine: a contractor who seeks to enforce his rights must have
performed or be willing to perform the obligations which are incumbent upon him before he
can demand counter performance. If the pursuer has not performed, then the defender can
'retain' or 'suspend' his counterperformance. The terminology in Scottish sources is confused
and we will refer to the doctrine as 'suspension' rather than 'retention'. Unsurprisingly, the
doctrine is old.1040 Suspension merely postpones the performance of obligations, although it is
of course possible that performance will never take place. The respective obligations of the
parties continue to exist.1041 Suspension can only be invoked where the retained performance
is a counterpart of the right claimed by the pursuer.1042 There is a presumption that the
obligations contained in a single contract are counterparts of each other.1043 Not every
1036 Christie v Birrells 1910 SC 986 at 991 per Lord Mackenzie; at 992 per Lord Dundas; at 994 per Lord
Justice-Clerk MacDonald.
1037 British Motor Body Co Ltd v Thomas Shaw (Dundee) Ltd 1914 SC 922 at 930 per Lord Skerrington. The
leave of the Court will be required to bring a counterclaim against a company in liquidation: Insolvency Act
1986, s. 113.
1038 See generally, P.D. O'Neill and N. Salam, 'Is the exceptio non adempleti contractus part of the new Lex
Mercatorial' in E. Gaillard (ed.) Transnational Rules in International Commercial Arbitration (International
Chamber of Commerce, 1993) at 147 ff. Cf. D. Girsberger, 'Defences of the Account Debtor in International
Factoring' (1992) 40 AmJComp Law 467.
1039 The Scottish cases in this area are a mess. The reader is referred to the helpful overview in McBryde,
Contract para 20-67 ff.
1040 In the first edition of his Institutions (1681), Part II, title xxiii, at 16, Stair observes of the authorities - of
which he cites: Laird ofKeirs v Mr James Marjoribanks Leidington, 27th July 1546, Mor 5036; James Crichton v
Marion Crichton, 19th November 1565, Mor 1702; Lord Herries v Provest ofLimluden July 1581; Laird ofKer v
Panter, 19th February 1548; Earl of Glencairn v Commendatar of Kilwinning, December, 1563 - that 'our
decisions have been exceeding various in this matter'. The cases are not cited in the second edition: I.x.16.
1041 Erskine III.iv.20; Ballantyne v East ofScotland Farmers Ltd 1970 SLT (Notes) 50.
1042 Stair, I.x.16; Bank of East Asia v Scottish Enterprise 1997 SLT 1213 HL; Macari v Celtic Football and
Athletic Club 1999 SC 628; Cf. Lawson v Drysdale (1844) 7 D 153 at 155 per Lord Cockburn: 'You can't stop
the decree by a vague general statement of claim that may be sustained in another process'. A debtor who is also
cautioner for the cedent apparently can refuse to pay the assignee on the basis that he is entitled to retain to
secure his relief against the debtor: Sibbald v Turnbull (1683) Mor 2608. Cf. the English position: J. Philips,
'When Should a Guarantor be Permitted to rely on the Principal's Set-Off?' [2001] LMCLQ 383.
1043 Hoult v Turpie 2004 SLT 308 at 312.
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obligation will be a counterpart of the others.1044 Suspension can be raised against a pursuer
who is in default in respect of a non-material1045 element of the contract.1046 In a recent Outer
House case, the Lord Ordinary explicitly limited suspension to cases where there has been a
material breach.1047
Either way, suspension is an important and forceful remedy. It is particularly
important for debtors of a pursuer who is an assignee, since a plea of retention is not subject
to the rules of liquidity which govern compensation. The leading case where the distinction
between 'retention' and compensation is brought out is Johnston v Robertson.1048 Here the
pursuer had completed work and claimed for payment of the balance of the contract. He
obtained decree in absence. The defenders brought this decree under suspension. They argued,
inter alia, that the pursuer had been late in completing the contract, that the pursuer was
subject to contractual penalties, and that the defenders were entitled to other damages for
breach. The defenders attempted to plead compensation. As we have seen, compensation
cannot be pled where the claims are not liquid. The issue was therefore simply whether the
defenders were entitled to refuse payment on the basis that the pursuer had not carried out his
corresponding obligations under the contract. The defence was successful:
"The plea of the defenders is based mainly on the rule of the law of Scotland,
that one party to a mutual contract, in which there are mutual stipulations,
cannot insist on having his claim under the contract satisfied, unless he is
prepared to satisfy the corresponding and contemporaneous claims of the other
party to the contract. I think that the rule of law, that an illiquid cannot be set¬
off [i.e. compensated] against a liquid claim, does not apply to such a case; and
that, at all events, if one claim can be liquid, and the other partly illiquid, yet
contemporaneous, the rule should suffer some qualification or relaxation if the
claims arose under one contract. The counterclaims must be contemporaneous,
for, if not, the rule would apply."1049
1044 Bank ofEast Asia v Scottish Enterprise 1997 SLT 1213; Macari v Celtic Football and Athletic Club 1999 SC
628.
1045 See McBryde, Contract paras 20-88 ff. for discussion of this term.
1046
Gloag, Contract, 628; H.L. MacQueen and J.M. Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland (2000) para 5.10. This
is somewhat controversial. In Marshall's Trs v Bank 1934 SC 405, Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison referred to the
'cardinal' conditions in the contract, reflecting the approach of Lord Wellwood (Ordinary) in Chambers JF v
Vertue (1893) 20 R 257 at 258. Lord Anderson in Marshall's Trs referred to claims 'connected with' the
contract.
1047 Hoult v Turpie 2004 SLT 308 at 314L-315D. The Lord Ordinary is wrong.
1048
(1861) 23 D 646. See also McBride v Hamilton (1875) 2 R 775 partly overruled in British Motor Body
Company v Thomas Shaw (Dundee) Ltd 1914 SC 922; Turnbull v McLean (1873) 1 R 730; Pegler v Northern
Agricultural Implement Co (1877) 4 R 435; Christie v Birrels 1910 SC 986; Dingwall v Burnett 1912 SC 1097;
Haig v Boswell Preston 1915 SC 339 and Graham v United Turkey Red Co 1922 SC 533.
1049 At 652 per Lord Benholme; cf. Lord Cowan at 654 and Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis at 656. Benholme's dictum
was approved in Redpath Dorman Long Ltd v Cummins Engine Co Ltd 1981 SC 370 and Bank ofEast Asia Ltd v
Scottish Enterprise 1997 SLT 1213 HL.
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In so far as the claims have to be contemporaneous, then the availability of a plea of
suspension to an assignee fits in with the distinction previously discussed between intrinsic
and extrinsic claims. It has been suggested that, for the plea to be successful, it is necessary
that the defender actually counterclaims.1050 Otherwise, it is said, retention 'would obviously
give rise to all kinds of abuses' since a defender could retain for a non-material breach while
otherwise enjoying the use of delivered goods about which he has no complaint.1051 There
may be something to be said for this general point. In terms of the authorities, however, a
counterclaim is probably not necessary. Providing the defender offers to prove that the
pursuer is in breach of contract this should be sufficient for the action for payment to be
dismissed.1052 Admittedly, it is an approach that is not free from difficulty. In Sutherland v
Barry,1053 landlords sued for outstanding rent. The tenants admitted that the sums sued for
were due and owing. But they pled retention on the ground that they had been induced to
enter the lease by the pursuer's fraudulent misrepresentations. The tenants counterclaimed1054
for the value of the wet and dry stock which was to be valued and paid for by the landlord at
the date of termination of the lease. The pursuer in turn answered the defenders' counterclaim
with his own defence of retention, based on the principal claim for rent. This pleading process
shows how the concept of retention as a complete defence resulting in dismissal is circuitous;
in some situations it could postpone the resolution of a dispute ad infinitum. The Lord
Ordinary held that since the misrepresentation must logically have occurred prior to the
conclusion of the contract, and was essentially based on delict, it could not found a valid plea
of retention.1055 On the facts, however, he held that since the rent was due and owing, and
since the landlord admitted that he was bound to pay the tenants the value of the wet and dry
stock, these amounts should be set-off and the balance payable to the pursuer. This was a
1050 Ure & Menzies Ltd v Summerville 1946 SLT (Sh Ct) 23.
1051 Ibid per Sheriff-Substitute (Arch. Hamilton) at 24. Alex Laurie Factors Ltd v Mitchell Engineering Ltd 2001
SLT (Sh Ct) 93 at 95C-D is predicated upon the assumption that retention is only a valid defence "to the extent
that the pursuers' claims might be extinguished." But suspension does not extinguish anything. Cf. Principles of
European Contract Law, Art. 9:201.
1052
Peglar v Northern Agricultural Implement Co (1877) 4 R 435 at 441 per Lord Shand (dissenting) approved
by Lord Jauncey in Bank of East Asia Ltd v Scottish Enterprise 1997 SLT 1213 at 1217E; McDonald v Kyd
(1901) 3 F 923; McNab v Nelson 1909 SC 1102 at 1101 per Lord President Dunedin. These averments will have
to be established if there is a proof: Kilmarnock Gas Light Co v Smith (1872) 11 M 58 at 61 per Lord Justice-
Clerk Moncreiff. It is unclear why the plea of retention was unsuccessful in Dod's Trs v Fortune (1854) 16 D
478. In Ure the conclusion of the defender was for absolvitor which obviously could not have been granted.
1053 2002 SLT 418 OH.
1054 This was also raised as a separate action sub nom Barry v Sutherland 2002 SLT 413 OH. No doubt the
defenders raised a separate action for payment based on a provision of the lease since so as not to be approbating
and reprobating the lease in the same action.
1055 At 419K-L, para [9] following Smart v Wilkinson 1928 SC 383.
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perfectly sensible way to dispose of the case. Yet, in following Smart v Wilkinson,1056 the
Lord Ordinary's conclusion in Barry, that the defender could not retain against the original
contracting party, is inconsistent with the position that would have arisen had the pursuer
assigned his right to payment. It is clear beyond doubt that the defender could have pled the
fraudulent misrepresentation as a defence to a claim by the assignee on the basis of assignatus
utiturjure auctoris.1057
Some landlord and tenant authorities suggest that a liquid claim for rent can be
compensated by a 'counterclaim' by the tenant for damages. These are better categorised as
retention cases.1058
2. Intimation as a cut-off point.
Is intimation relevant to a claim based on mutuality? Suppose Keith assigns a claim from a
mutual contract with Murray to Mary. Mary intimates to Murray on day 1. On day 2, Keith
breaches his contract with Murray. On day three Mary demands payment from Murray. Can
Murray plead retention on the basis of a breach which has occurred after intimation? This
issue has given rise to considerable debate in Belgium. There it has been held that any breach
by the cedent of his contract with the debtor after the completion of the assignation may still
be raised against the assignee. The debtor's right to retain performance on a breach by the
creditor is said to arise from the moment that the contract was concluded.1059 This solution has
much to commend it.1060
3. Contemporaneous but Extrinsic claims.
1056 1928 SC 383.
1057 Scottish Widows Fund v Buist (1876) 3 R 1078.
1058
E.g. Graham v Gordon (1843) 5 D 1207 especially at 1211 per Lord Cockburn. The opinion of Lord
Fullerton in Graham was approved in Lovie v Baird's Trs (1895) 23 R 1 at 3 per Lord Kinnear. See also
Fingland v Mitchell & Howie 1926 SC 319.
1059 P. van Ommeslaghe, 'La transmission des obligations en droit positif beige' in La Transmission des
obligations, 102-103; idem, 'Le Nouveau Regime de la cession et de la dation en gage des creances' [1995] 114
Journal des tribunaux 529 at 531, n. 29.
1060
Compare the position in Scots law on a balancing of accounts in bankruptcy for which, see below.
210
Transfer ofMoney Claims in Scots Law
What is the position in a case of complex transactions where the mutual stipulations
are actually in a different contract?1061 Gloag observes that 'there is a general presumption
that the reason why the parties have not recorded their agreement in separate documents is
that they intended them to be dependent on each other'.1062 This would suggest that there can
be no retention of performance of an obligation on the basis that the party is in breach an
obligation contained in another document. The introduction of an assignation may complicate
matters. What if the assignee is unaware of the counter stipulations which are contained in a
different document? The debtor's argument would be based on an extrinsic claim. Yet, why
should the debtor be prejudiced by the mere fact of an assignation? In Caddagh Steamship Co
v Steven & Co1063 it was held that one party was entitled to retain performance under one
contract where there was a failure of the other party to perform on another contract. There is
partial support for such an approach in Erskine. Of the assignatus rule, he observes,
"And this doctrine extends also to mutual contracts, in which the assignees are
subjected to all the burdens which affect the right while it was vested in the
cedent, not only where the mutual obligations are inserted into the contract
itself (for these the assignee cannot be ignorant of), but even where they are
partly formed by a separate backbond, if it shall appear by witnesses that the
contract and backbond have a relation to and are mutual causes of one another:
Stair I.x.16."1064
On Erskine's reasoning, then, a defence 'partly' based on an extrinsic backbond would
be admissible where it can be established by evidence that the stipulations are truly
contemporaneous of each other. Erskine further suggests that the assignee's knowledge of any
backbond may be relevant. Such an approach, however, would lead to considerable
. • . 1065
uncertainty.
1061 A counterclaim has been allowed on an averment of breach of a separate but ancillary contract to a claim
against a claim on the principal contract since they were all related to the same transaction: Borthwick v Dean
Borthwick Ltd 1985 SLT 269 but there was no discussion of the point. Cf. Stewart v Lindsay 1961 SLT (Sh Ct)
31 and Hopkirk v Pririe 1958 SLT (Sh Ct) 9.
1062
Gloag, Contract (2nd ed. 1929), 595. This passage was approved in Hoult v Turpie 2004 SLT 308 at 312 by
the Lord Ordinary (Drummond Young).
1063 1919 SC (HL) 132. See also Cumming v Camming (1628) Mor 9147 and 9207, and Dick v Skene 1946 SN
64; Erskine III.v. 10 and Bell, Commentaries (7th ed. 1870) I, 222.
1064 III.i.20 (my emphasis). Cf. UNCITRAL, Art. 20(1): 'In a claim by the assignee against the debtor for
payment of the assigned receivables, the debtor may raise against the assignee all defences and rights of set-off
arising from the original contract, or any other contract that was part of the same transaction, of which the
debtor could avail itself of such claim were made by the assignor' (my emphasis); and PECL, Art. 11:307(2):
'The debtor may assert against the assignee all rights of set-off... in respect of claims against the assignor... (b)
closely connected with the assigned claim' (emphasis added); and UCC § 9-318.
1065 Cf. Park, Dobson & Co v William Taylor & Son 1929 SC 571 and Marshall v Nimmo & Co (1847) 10 D 328.
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It is sometimes suggested that suspension can be pleaded at any time, even after
decree has been pronounced against the debtor.1066 This is quite unusual. There would be no
end to disputes if, after being given the opportunity to state defences, the defender can wait
until he is served with a charge for payment before pleading suspension.1067 The case cited by
Erskine1068 was, in any event, pled in terms of compensation (which discharges obligations);
while Glendinning involved an insolvency and the retention of a corporeal moveable.1069
There was no suggestion that a plea of retention would prevent diligence following on the
decree.
The requirements that the debtor will have to satisfy for retention are, on one view of
the requirement of liquidity, less onerous than those for compensation. But the different
requirements for a successful plea of retention may be more onerous:1070 in particular, a
defence of retention against an assignee will have to be an instrinsic qualification to, and
contemporaneous with, the pursuer's claim. Retention cannot be pleaded where the right to do
so is excluded by agreement.1071 Retention probably cannot be sustained where the counter
1 079
performance due is conditional and the condition has not yet been purified.
IV. Set-Off
A. Compensation, Contractual Set-Off and Balancing of Accounts in
Bankruptcy.
1. General.
Perhaps the most important defence open to a debtor against a claim by an assignee is
to plead some form of set-off.1073 In Scots law, set-off is not a term of art. It will be used here
1066 Erskine III.iv.20 citing McLaren v Bisset (1736) Mor 2646; Creditors of Glendinning v Montgomery (1745)
Kames Rem Dec 102; Kilkerran 44; Elchies, Arrestment 24; Mor 2573 followed by Lord Ormidale in Paul and
Thain v Royal Bank ofScotland (1869) 7 M 361 at 365. The principle applies only to decrees for payment, not
decrees of constitution: Lockhart v Ferrier (1842) 4 D 1253 at 1258 per Lord Moncreiff.
1067 Where a multiplepoinding was raised by a claimant (the real raiser) in the name of the fundholder (as
nominal raiser), the fundholder was nevertheless bound by the decree: Downie v Rae (1832) 11 S 51. Cf. J.
Millar, 'Multiplepoindings' 1997 Greens Civil Law Practice Bulletin 13-8.
1068 Mclaren v Bisset (1736) Mor 2646.
1069 Cf. the law on retention by an owner, see Glendinning, op. cit., n. 1066 above; Mein v Bogle, 17th January
1828 FC; 6 S 360; 2 Ross Lead Com Cas 648 approved by the majority in Melrose vHastie (1851) 13 D 880.
1070 This has not always been kept in view. In Crawford v Hamilton (1735) Mor 2548, it was successfully argued
that a plea of retention should be refused as it would allow a plea of compensation by the back door.
1071
Harper v Faulds (1791) Mor 2666; Bell's Octavo Cases 440 at 464-465 per Lord Dreghorn.
1072 Ibid, at 469 per Lord Eskgrove.
1073 See generally Laing v Lord Advocate 1973 SLT (Notes) 81.
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in a loose and general sense; a convenient expression which brings together the distinct claims
of compensation, contractual set-off and balancing of accounts in bankruptcy. Any attempt at
analysis is an uphill struggle - the sources in Scots law on set-off are desperately confused;
the law of compensation and retention especially so.1074 Professor McBryde concisely
identifies the true distinction between the last two: 'the purpose of retention is to enforce
obligations; compensation extinguishes them'.1075
2. Compensation.
(a) History.
It has been suggested that prior to the Compensation Act 1592,1076 compensation was
not available.1077 Such a suggestion seems to be reinforced in the decisions collected prior to
the Act.1078 However, there are problems with this theory. Compensation is based on common
sense and justice. It can be traced at least as far back as Roman law.1079 It would be surprising
that a system, which borrowed as heavily from this area of the civil law as the Scots, did not
recognise such a substantive doctrine. Granted, there may have been procedural problems
with giving effect to the doctrine, but it does not therefore follow that the substantive
principle was not recognised prior to 1592. This point was forcefully made in the dissenting
opinions of Lords Eskgrove and Braxfield in Harper v Faulds:1080
'I assume it as a principle, that the law of Scotland is a branch of the civil law,
especially with regard to contracts: it is enough, therefore, if the civil law
establishes the principle of retention; and both compensation and retention
were received in that law. They are founded on a principle of common justice
between man and man; not the creature of statute. They must have been
recognised in our law long before the statute 1592, which only allowed the
principle to operate by way of exception. Before the act, had two parties come,
1074 See generally McBryde, Contract, paras 20-68 ff.
1075 Ibid, para 20-64. Note, however, that the pursuer pleading compensation is seeking to discharge his own
obligations; the pursuer pleading retention is seeking to enforce the defender's obligations.
1076
Cap. 143; APS, c. 61. Of the statute, it has been described as, '...a just and positive statute, most creditable
to the wisdom and sound views of the ancient Scottish legislature, as it was centuries before such a law was
recognised in England' in Donaldson v Donaldson (1852) 14 D 849 at 855 per Lord Cunninghame.
1077 Stair I.xviii.6; Erskine IH.iv. 12.
1078 The Queen v Bishop of Aberdeen (1543) Mor 2545; Balfour, Practicks (Exception), 349, c.xxxii; Hope,
Major Practicks, VI. 44 § 1: Be the old pratique of this kingdom the exception of compensatione wes not
admitted, albeit de liquido in liquidum (A 306), befoir the Act of Parliament 1592, c. 143. Nota be the Act of
parliament compensation is onlie receavable in the first instance and not in suspension or reducitone of decreit: C
786'.
1079 See Zimmermann, Obligations, 760 ff.
1080
(1791) Bell's Octavo Cases 432 at 440; Mor 2666.
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each with decree in his hand, must both have gone to prison? Surely not; or
could this have taken place, though one was a decree for delivery, while the
other was a decreet for payment? It cannot be. Retention1080a must have existed
before the act of Parliament; the case from Balfour proves it."1081
The report of the case by Balfour1082 states only that compensation was 'not available by way
ofexception'. The case is similarly reported in Sinclair's Practicks.1083 If appropriate stress is
placed on the procedural qualification to the statement that compensation was not available
until 1592, then the position is more acceptable.1083® In any event, as Bell points out, the
report by Balfour 'bears no evidence of any such plea or judgement'.1084 Bell was apparently
unimpressed by Balfour's suggestion that Scots law did not recognise compensation prior to
1592: 'From the prevalence of the Roman jurisprudence in Scotland, one should not expect to
find a period in her law where the doctrine of compensation was unknown'.1085 After all, as he
had just argued, compensation is 'not only expedient, it is required by the plainest principles
1 ORA 1 f)R7
of equity'. In a footnote, Bell refers to an excerpt from the Records of Scotland
furnished to him by the Deputy Clerk Register, Thomas Thomson.1088 This shows that far
from refusing the plea of compensation, the Lords of Council responded by allowing the
allegation to be proved. They stated,
'assignis to the [procurator for the Bishop, the defender] procurator foresaid ye
xxviij day of Maij instant with continuatioun of dais for proving thereof And
losoa
use 'retentjon' instead of 'compensation' is indicative of the confusion in this area of the law.
1081 At 467-8 per Lord Eskgrove. It is interesting that counsel was confident enough to label Stair's suggestion
that compensation was not part of Scots law prior to 1592 as a 'ridiculous notion' (see argument at 438). For
fascinating, and amusing, information about David Rae, Lord Eskgrove, see: H. Cockburn, Memorials of His
Time (1856), 118-125.
1082 The Queen v Bishop ofAberdeen (1543) Mor 2545; Balfour, Practicks, 349. For the authority of Balfour's
Practicks generally, see H. McKechnie, 'Balfour's Practicks' (1931) 43 JR 179; for Sinclair's Practicks see
generally: A. Murray, 'Sinclair's Practicks' in A. Harding (ed.) Law Making and Law Makers in British History
(1980), 90.
1083 See the annotated provisional version by Professor G. Dolezalek available at «www.uni-
leipzig.de/~jurarom/scotland>>, nos. 323, 324 and 539. Bell, Commentaries (7th ed. 1870) I, 120 cites page 50 of
a MS copy. Dolezalek criticises Balfour's wide proposition also: see his n. 262.
io83a ££ [j Dernburg, Geschichte und Theorie der Kompensation (2nd ed. 1868; repr. 1965) § 30, at 266 who
suggests that it was only procedural difficulties that prevented a reception of compensation, expressly admitted
by the Canonists, in municipal law. Dernburg was familiar with the Scottish position: he cites the 1592 Act (at
278, n .1) as one of the earliest recognitions of compensation in municipal law.
1084 Commentaries II, 120 (7th ed. 1870).
1085 Ibid, II, 120. Contrast the position in England, which did not admit set-off at law until it was introduced by
statute in 1729, see R. Derham, The Law ofSet-Off (3rd ed. 2003) para 2.01.
1086 Ibid, II, 118.
1087
Register ofActs and Decreets vol. June 26, 1542 - February 13th 1543 fol. 325 and fol. 360. The excerpt is
reproduced in footnote 6.
1088 Note 6. For Thomas Thomson, see Guide to the National Archives ofScotland, Scottish Record Office, (Stair
Soc Supplemental vol. 3, 1996), xiii and J. Imrie, Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol 19 'Public Registers and
Records' (1990) para 810. It is fitting that Bell opens his note with a tribute to Thomson, 'to whom Scotland is
so much indebted for the restoration of her records'.
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ordanis him to haue letters summond sic writtis rychtis resonis & documentis
as he has or will vse for preving of ye said allegeance agane ye said day'.
It seems that the Bishop failed to prove that he had made any payment whatever, and decree
was pronounced against him. There was no dispute that his plea was relevant; the Lords were
careful to narrate the fact that they had continued the cause to provide the opportunity to the
defender to prove his plea of 'contentatioun & payment'. Moreover, there is further positive
authority for the proposition that compensation was available at common law prior to 1592. In
Colyn v Sleich,m9 a Frenchman, one Colyn, sued Sleich, of Leith, for freight. Both parties
compeared and the defender alleged that the pursuer was in turn indebted to him. In response
to this the Lords allowed both parties a proof to prove their allegations; it was reported that
'Sleich enacts himself to pay to Colyn what is found just'. It is thought that this is another
early case where compensation would have been given substantive effect had the plea been
sustained.
(b) Claims must be de liquido in liquidum or at least able to rapidly liquidated.
The Act provides that compensation is proponable only by exception where the debts
are de liquido in liquidum at the time of time when the plea is entered.1090 However
subsequent cases relaxed this doctrine. Stair noted that the terms of the statute could be
interpreted loosely following the Courts Act 16721091 which sought to expedite the settlement
of disputes before the court and obviate continual hearings.1092 Erskine articulates the
principle: quod statim liquidari potest, pro jam liquido habeteur.1093 But how is 'statim' to be
construed? There are several cases where the cause was sisted to allow liquidation to take
1089 21st January 1499, reported in G. Neilson (ed.) Acta Dominorum Concilii: Acts of the Lords of Council in
Civil Causes vol. II (1918), 307, cited by D.M. Walker, A Legal History ofScotland vol III (1995), 709.
1090 Colonel Fullerton v Viscount Kingston (1663) Mor 2558 1 Stair 152; Earl of Linlithgow v Laird ofAirth
(1616) Mor 2564; Tait v Mcintosh 26th Feb 1841 FC; 13 Sc Jur 280. Cf. G. Watson (ed.) Bell's Dictionary and
Digest of the Law ofScotland (1882) v. 'Liquid': 'A liquid debt is a debt the amount of which is ascertained and
constituted against the debtor, either by a written obligation or by the decree of the court. Stair I.xviii.6; Erskine
Ill.iv. 16; Bankton I, 492'. In Peglar v Northern Agricultural Implement Co (1877) 4 R 435 at 439, Lord
President Inglis is reported to have opined 'It is quite settled that it is only against an illiquid claim, that a plea of
compensation [founded on an illiquid counterclaim] may be set up'. The bracketed part is excised in the report at
(1877) 14 SLR 302 at 305. Irrespective of which report is correct, the opinion makes no sense: both statements
are manifestly contrary to the 1592 Act.
1091 1672, c. 16; APS c. 40.
1092 Stair IV.xl.37.
i°93 which may he immediately liquidated, is held as liquid'] Erskine Ill.iv. 16 approved by the First
Division in Munro v Macdonald's Exrs (1866) 4 M 687 at 688 per Lord President McNeill and Lord Curriehill.
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place. Cases have been sisted for between two weeks1094 and three or four months;1095 while
in another it was mentioned in argument that Menochius1096 observed that Bartolus1097
allowed 2 months to liquidate the claims - the Lords allowed a period five weeks.1098 A claim
is liquid if the defender admits that it is due and owing in his pleadings. A pursuer will also be
absolved from having to prove that a debt is due if the response to his averments from the
defender is 'believed the account to be correct'.1099 However, where this is followed by
averments that the pursuer was in breach of his corresponding obligations, the pursuer's claim
is not liquid. The admission cannot be divorced from the qualification.1100 Where a contract
contains an arbitration clause, it may be difficult to establish a liquid claim.1101 In such a
situation perhaps a court would sist the proceedings in which compensation is pled to allow
liquidation of the alleged debt in arbitration proceedings.
(c) Other Substantive Rules of Compensation.
There must be a concursus debiti et crediti.n02 Both claims must form part of the
respective creditors' private patrimonies. A claim which is part of another patrimony, like a
trust, cannot found a good claim of compensation. Similarly, where the debtor's claim against
the cedent has been arrested by one of the debtor's creditors, this will prevent the debtor using
it for the purposes of compensation. Compensation is not proponable after decree.1103 This
1094 Hisselside v Littlegill (1685) 2 Br Sup 72; Sup. Vol. Harcase 25.
1095 Selton (1683) Mor 2566; Fountainhall I, 244.
1096 Lib 2. centur. 1 casu 14.
1097 Ad. L.46. § 4 de iure fisci.
1098 Brown v Ellis (1686) Mor. 2565; Fountainhall I, 391 and 429. See also Ross v Magistrates ofTayne (1711)
Mor 2568; Fountainhall II, 636.
1099 Scottish North Eastern Railway Co v Napier (1859) 21 D 700. Cf. Binnie v Roderij Theodoro 1993 SC 71.
1100 Armour Melvin Ltd v Melville 1934 SC 94 at 96 per Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison; John Robertson & Co v
Bird & Co (1897) 34 SLR 867 at 869 per Lord Kinnear (1st Div). The case is also noted at (1897) 5 SLT 80. See
earlier statements to the same effect by Lord Wood (Ordinary) in Campbell v Macartney 27th June 1843, to
which the First Division adhered. His opinion is reported in an appendix at 14 D 1086 and approved by the First
Division in Donaldson v Donaldson (1852) 14 D 849 and Picken vArundale & Co (1872) 10 M 987.
1101 This issue has arisen in England: Glencore Grain Ltd v Agros Trading Co [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep 410. The
English authorities on set-off must be treated with caution since English law rests on a different doctrinal and
historical basis.
1102 Erskine Ill.iv. 12.
1103 Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh, Observations on the Acts of Parliament ...(1687), 269; Viscount of
Stormont v Duncan (1626) Mor 2638; Spotiswood, (Compensation) 40; Walker v Mainqair (1632) Mor 2639;
Earl of Marshall v Brag (1662) Mor 2639; Naismith v Bowman (1707) Mor 2645; Creditors of Paterson v
Maculay (1742) Elchies, Compensation No. 9; Mor 2646; Wilson & Co, 15,h Dec 1808, cited by J. Graham
Stewart, Diligence, 234, n. 2; Cuninghame, Stevenson & Co v Archibald, Wilson & Co, 17th January 1809 FC;
Lawson v Drysdale (1844) 7 D 153 at 155 per Lord Cockburn; Thomson v Whitehead (1862) 24 D 331 at 346
per Lord Cowan. Cf. Erskine Ill.iv.19, approved by J.A. MacLaren, Court ofSession Practice (1916), 402, who
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includes a decree in absence,1104 but not an order of a baron court1105 or a decree-arbitral.1106
Clearly, if the defender was not called to the action in which decree was pronounced against
him, he may still plead compensation.1107 The position of awards of expenses seems to be
different since these only come into existence on decree being pronounced. There is no
opportunity to plead compensation against an award of expenses during the process.1108
Where the creditor is bankrupt there is no issue of compensation, rather the question is one of
balancing of accounts in bankruptcy. The Act of 1592 introduced compensation by way of
exception. It must therefore be pleaded and sustained. Failure to do so will be fatal to the plea.
Unlike some other legal systems,1109 in Scotland, compensation is 'the operation of the judge
rather than of the law'.1110 Stair asserted that compensation operated ipso jure on
concourse.1111 However, this approach had been departed from before Bankton1112 and
Erskine1113 were writing. Nevertheless, on being sustained, the plea of compensation operates
retrospectively to the time of concourse:
"Upon a more mature consideration of the nature of compensation, and the
reason of the thing, in this case, a very different notion prevailed; namely, that
compensation is not the operation of the law, but of the Judge; and that it had
no effect till it is applied by the Judge: That it is true, when it is applied, the
law, upon principles of equity, gives effect to it retro to stop the course of
annualrent; and that, in that sense only, is the common maxim to be
understood, that compensation operates retro et ipso iure; and this being so,
says that if compensation 'has been pleaded by the debtor in the course of the process and repelled by the judge,
it may be received, either by suspension or reduction,' and also the arguments for the suspender in Beatson and
Lumsden v Beatson (1747) Kilkerran 195; Mor 4345. In Thorns v Thorns (1868) 5 SLR 561 there was an attempt
to plead compensation after decree. Only Lord Deas seemed to base his decision on the fact that the plea was too
late. The other judges simply based their opinions on the principle that compensation could not be founded on an
illiquid claim. See also Burrell v Burrell 1916 SC 729 to the same effect. Balancing of accounts in bankruptcy
may be pled after decree; in other words, a charge for payment can be suspended on a demand for balancing of
accounts.
1104 Creditors ofRobert Paterson v Mcaulay (1742) Mor 2646; Wright v Sheill (1676) Mor 2640; Logan v Couts
(1678) 2641; Gordon v Melvil (1697) Mor 2642.
1105 Earl ofMarshall v Brag (1662) Mor 2639.
1106 McEwan v Middleton (1866) 5 M 159. Much will depend on the terms of reference.
1107 Corbet v Hamilton (1707) Mor 2642; AvB (1747) Mor 2648.
1108 Fowler v Brown 1916 SC 597 at 603 per Lord Salvensen, following Fleming v Love (1839) 1 D 1097.
1109 See R. Zimmermann, Comparative Foundations ofa European Law ofSet-Offand Prescription (2002).
1110 Erskine IH.iv. 12. Cf. confusio which operates ipso jure: Craig v Mair's Trs 1914 SC 893. Although it should
be noted that confusion operates only to suspend obligations; it does not discharge them: Competition between
Murray, Chapel and Lanark (1728) 1 Karnes Rem Dec 196. It is probably the case that if payment is made in
ignorance of the right to plead compensation, there will be no grounds for an unjustified enrichment claim: the
debt would only have ceased to be due had compensation been pled and sustained, see generally R.
Zimmermann, Comparative Foundations ofa European Law ofSet-Offand Prescription (2002), 38 ff.
11111.xviii.6. Cf. Lord Elchies, Annotations on Lord Stair's Institutions on the Law ofScotland (1824), 101.
11121.xxiv.23.
1113 See the cases prior to Erskine which departed from Stair: Cleland v Stevenson (1669) Mor 2682; 1 Stair 598
approved in Inch v Lee (1903) 11 SLT 374 OH; Maxwell v Creditors of McCulloch (1738) Kilkerran 133;
Elchies, Compensation No. 6; Mor 2550; Campbell v Carruthers (1756) Karnes Sel Dec 158; Mor 2551.
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that it is optional to the party to plead it or not, or, if he be creditor in more
debts, to plead it on which of them he pleases... Where one is creditor in more
debts, why should he not have it in his power to compensate upon the debt
which is least secure?"1114
The retrospective effect ascribed to compensation has been the subject of fierce criticism by
Professor Zimmermann.1115 The requirement in Scots law that compensation must be pled in
court and sustained does at least provide some certainty which is absent in systems where
compensation is effected by an informal declaration.
It has been held that, in a competition, other creditors can claim than a competing
creditor's claim has been extinguished by compensation.1116 However, if compensation is the
operation of the judge and not the law, then this cannot be correct. As was explicitly held in
1117
Maxwell, it is the debtor's prerogative to plead compensation or not. If the debtor has not
• . . . . .. *1118invoked compensation, it is difficult to see how or why third parties can rely upon it.
Generally, compensation can be pled against all debts irrespective of the person of the
creditor.1119 However, certain Crown claims cannot be answered with a plea of
compensation.1120 In cases of contractual set-off, extinction will not necessarily operate
1121
retrospectively from the date of concourse. Interest may, therefore, continue to accrue.
Since shareholders should be paid last on any winding up, they cannot compensate debts due
to them by the company on any calls made on them.1122 Generally speaking, where a
partnership is charged for payment, they can plead compensation on a debt owed to one of the
1123
partners, or a debt due to another partnership where the partners are the same.
1114 Maxwell v Creditors ofMcCulloch (1738) Kilkerran 133; Elchies, Compensation No. 6; Mor 2550. See also
the opinion of Lord Kyllachy (Ordinary) in Inch v Lee (1903) 11 SLT 374.
1115 R. Zimmermann, European Foundations of a European Law of Set-Off and Prescription (2002), 36,
especially at 42-43. See also B. van Niekerk, 'Some Thoughts on the Problems of Set-Off (1968) 85 SALJ 31.
1116 Middleton v Earl of Strathmore (1743) Kilkerran 134; Mor 2573. See also Briggs v Briggs 1923 SLT 755
OH.
1117 Maxwell v Creditors of McCulloch (1738) Kilkerran 133; Elchies, Compensation No. 6; Mor 2550 and
approved in Turner v Inland Revenue Commissioners 1994 SLT 811 at 819 per Lord Kirkwood (Ordinary).
111 Cf. Scottish Fishermen's Organisation v McLean 1980 SLT (Sh Ct) 76, a retention case.
1119
Taylor v Scott and Universal Newspapers Ltd 1981 SC 408 at 415 per Lord Ross (Ordinary).
1120 Crown Proceedings Act 1947, s. 50. See Smith v Lord Advocate (No. 2) 1980 SC 227. Cf. Code Civil du
Quebec Art. 1672: compensation is not pleadable against a claim by the state. J-L. Baudouin and P-G Jobin, Les
obligations (5th ed. 1998) para 968 also query whether compensation is available against an inherently personal
debt such as an alimentary obligation. Cf. Code Civil Art. 1293(3).
1121
Campbell v Caruthers (1756) Mor 2551; Karnes Sel Dec 158.
1122 Cowan v Gowans (1878) 5 R 581; Cowan v Shaw (1878) 5 R 680; Miller v National Bank (1891) 28 SLR
884 OH.
1123 See Williams Trustees v Inglis, Borthwick and Co, 13th June 1809 FC and Mitchell v Canal Basin Foundry
Co (1869) 7 M 480 especially at 489 for the authority cited by Lord Deas. In Heggie v Heggie (1858) 21 D 31 at
32, Lord Cowan observed that 'Very difficult questions have been raised in cases of this kind, and perhaps there
is no class of cases in which more ingenious argument has been used in compensatory questions - as between a
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Can compensation can be pled on the basis of a conditional or future debt? For example,
if Helen is sued for payment, can Sara compensate on the basis of a debt admittedly due to her
from Helen payable in 14 days; 3 months; or 3 years down the line? Bell says no;1124 but this
may be doubted. If Bell's position does state the law, then the position of debtor where the
creditor assigns is weakened.1125 Nor is Bell's view consistent with the practice of the Court
1 1
in allowing up to three months for a claim to be liquidated.
(d) Assignees.
(i) General
Compensation of a debt due by the cedent to the debtor has been a relevant defence to
i i 'yj i i ?o
a claim by an assignee at least since 1592 Act and probably before. However, such a
defence is exceptional. As was suggested above, only defences intrinsic to the claim assigned
may be asserted against the assignee. A plea of compensation is not necessarily intrinsic to the
claim assigned. It may be; but, more often than not, the defence of compensation will be
founded on a wholly extrinsic relationship between the debtor and the cedent. At first blush it
is questionable why such a defence is available to the debtor. Before there can be
compensation there must be a concursus debiti et crediti,1129 Yet, as soon as the creditor
assigns his rights against the debtor, there is no longer a concursus debiti et crediti. The
creditor of the debtor is now the assignee, not the cedent:
"...we begun [sic] with sustaining compensation against an assignee for a
valuable consideration, in quality of procurator; not adverting, that though his
title did not protect him from compensation, his right as a purchaser ought to
have had that effect: and by force of custom we have adhered to the same
erroneous practice, even after our law is changed, when now the title of an
assignee protects him from compensation, as well as the nature of his right
when he pays value for it."1130
debt due by or to the individual partners of a company, and a debt due by or to the company'. See also Lord
Ivory's footnote to Erskine Ill.iv. 13 (5th ed. 1824).
1124 Comm II, 122. Cf. Paul and Thain v Royal Bank ofScotland (1869) 7 M 361 at 364 per Lord Ormidale.
1125 See the discussion below.
1126 Cf. Principles ofEuropean Contract Law, Part III, (2003), Art. 13:102.
1127
Hope, Major Practicks VI, 44, § 3; Muirhead and McMitchell v Miller (1610) Mor 2599; Carnoway v





Karnes, Principles ofEquity (2nd ed. 1767), 206. Cf. Karnes, Elucidations, Art. 3, at 14.
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It is perhaps ironic that Kames objected to the plea of compensation against a
purchaser on the grounds of equity. In England, it was only on the grounds of Equity1131 that
set-off could be pled against an assignee prior to 18 73.1132 Nevertheless, Kames' point is a
good one. The assignee has paid the cedent for the assignation. If compensation on an
extrinsic claim were to be excluded, then the debtor would still have two options: first, to pay
the assignee and sue the cedent who should be in funds; second, if the cedent is not in funds
for the reason that there was no value given, then the debtor (as a creditor of the cedent in the
counterclaim) would have a title to reduce the assignation and assert the counterclaim against
the cedent.1133
Since compensation is usually an example of an extrinsic claim by the debtor, where
there is no concursus debiti et crediti, as is the case in an assignation, the admission of the
claim can have some unexpected results. This is especially so in complex cases which involve
successive assignations. Suppose Jack and Jill are mutual debtors and creditors. Jill assigns
her claims against Jack to Keith. Under the present law, Jack can plead compensation against
Keith, even if the debt he seeks to compensate is extrinsic to the claim assigned. But what
happens if instead of demanding payment himself, Keith translates his right to Murray? Can
Jack still plead compensation against an unrelated subsequent assignee? Murray has bought a
right against Jack. Murray will appreciate that any deficiencies in the right itself will affect
him in turn. But what of claims against previous cedents of whom he has little knowledge?
Moreover, if it is the case that both the cedent and the debtor can actively acquire
unrelated extrinsic claims to defeat a claim by the other, this is potentially subversive. Again,
take the example of successive transfers. Jill transfers to Keith. On intimation, Keith becomes
creditor of Jack. What if Jack has extrinsic counterclaims against Keith which fulfil the
requirements of compensation? If Keith then assigns, is it the case that Jack can plead
compensation not just of extrinsic claims he has against the original creditor Jill, but also
intermediate assignees who assigned in turn?1134 If it is the case that the debtor is not to be
1131 R. Derham, The Law ofSet-Off (3rd ed. 2003) para 2.01 ff.
1132
Assignments at law were not available in England until the Judicature Act 1873, with the exception of bills
of exchange: see Minet v Gibson (1789) 3 TR 482; 100 ER 689 aff d 1 H. Bl. 569; 1 Ross Lead Com Cas 76 at
93. Set-off against a solvent plaintiff was only first admitted in English law by statute in 1729: Relief of Debtors
with Respect to the Imprisonment of their Persons Act 1729 (2 Geo II, c. 22). Where there was an equitable
assignment, however, the debtor's right to raise a set-off was an 'equity' that was equal to the assignee's equity;
and, where it was earlier in time than the assignee's, could be raised against the assignee. See generally, Derham,
op. cit., para 17.03.
1133 This occurred in Alison v Duncan (1711) Mor 2657.
1134 See generally discussion in F. von Ktibel, Erster Kommission zur Ausarbeitung des Entwiirfes eines
biirgerlichen Gesetzbuches (1882) Absch. I, Tit. 4, § 22, at 49, reproduced in W. Schubert (ed.) Vorentwiirfe der
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prejudiced by the assignation, then this must be the case. However, if this is the law, multiple
transfers of the right itself multiply the risk of non-payment. Risk of non-payment owes more
to the position of the preceding cedents vis-a-vis the debtor, than to the solvency of the debtor
himself. If this be an incident of the law of assignation, then claims which it is envisaged will
be the subject of successive transfers should always be embodied in a negotiable instrument;
although it seems than negotiable instruments are becoming less and less frequent in domestic
debtor-creditor relationships.1135
Similarly problematic is the effect of the principle that compensation operates
retrospectively to the date of concourse where the plea is sustained. Jill again assigns to Keith
who, in turn, assigns to Murray. Murray intimates to Jack. Jack has a debt he can compensate
against Murray. Murray does not demand payment, instead he retrocesses to Keith. Even if
the assignation from Keith to Murray was in security, Keith may now be defeated on the basis
that Jack can now plead compensation of any liquid debts that Murray owed to Jack between
the date of intimation from Murray and intimation from Keith of the retrocession in Keith's
favour.1136
There is, then, perhaps much to be said for the reservations advanced by Karnes. The
law, however, has not taken this approach. Nor is it an approach which is advocated by any
other writers. Karnes' analysis is incontrovertible in terms of the intrinsic/extrinsic theory. An
onerous assignee is only subject to intrinsic claims. Compensation is usually extrinsic. The
law, however, has pursued a policy rather than a principle: the transfer should not prejudice
the debtor. Usually, legal principle and policy are co-extensive. Where these paths diverge,
however, the law tends to take the path of the 'no prejudice' policy. As we have seen, even
where the debtor is unable to exploit some of the remedies against the assignee that would
have been available against the cedent (such as damages), he is not thereby substantively
Redaktoren zum BGB, Recht der Schulverhaltnisse (1980), 979. In England the debtor is not permitted to raise
such a set-off. However, this is probably due to the peculiar history of English law which was reluctant to admit
either set-off or assignment: see A. Tettenborn. 'Assignees, Equities and Cross-Claims: Principle and Confusion'
[2002] LMCLQ 485 at 491 and R. Derham, The Law ofSet-Off (3rd ed. 2003) para 17.47.
1135 Cf. I.F.G. Baxter, 'What is the Future of the Cheque: North American Use of Commercial Paper' in J. Tittel
(ed.) Multitudo Legum ius unum: Festschrift fur Wilhelm Wengler zu seinem 65. Geburtstag (1973) II, 151; D.
Pardoel, Les conflits de lois en matiere de cession de creance (1997), 1, n. 5; R. Goode, Commercial Law (3rd ed.
2004), 482. The decline of the negotiable instrument is mysterious since this is the one sure way of excluding the
debtor's defences; in other words, the negotiable instrument ensures a 'clean' claim. One would have thought
that the commercial demand for such a result would be great.
1136 The ex tunc effect attributed to compensation in continental legal systems has been criticised as a hangover
from the jus commune'. P. Pichonnaz, 'The Retroactive Effect of Set-Off (Compensatio)' (2000) 68 TvR 560,
cited in R. Zimmermann, Comparative Foundations, 40. See also Pichonnaz's monograph, La Compensation
(2001).
221
Transfer ofMoney Claims in Scots Law
prejudiced. He can still bring the claim against the cedent, and may well be able to take
exception to a demand for performance by the assignee. A failure to allow a plea of
compensation would be, it is argued, prejudicial to the interests of the debtor.
For compensation to operate against an assignee, intimation is the relevant moment for
concourse.1137 A debt contracted by the cedent to the debtor subsequent to the delivery of the
assignation, is relevant against the assignee if prior to intimation.1138 If the debtor seeks to
plead compensation against the assignee on a money claim obtained against the cedent, this
must be intimated to the cedent before there is intimation by the assignee of the cedent's
assignation.1139 Some authorities suggest that the deliberate acquisition of claims against the
cedent, so as to frustrate the claim of the assignee, if in bad faith, will not be sustained.1140
However, these authorities are unclear. Compensation can also be pled against a receiver,1141
although the assignee (in security) is the charge holder.1142
The position of conditional or future debts is difficult. Bell holds that the debtor can
only compensate a claim by the assignee with a debt against the cedent which is presently
due.1143 However, what if the debtor extended credit to the cedent prior to intimation of the
assignation, repayable in, say, 14 days? The assignation is intimated on day 13. Surely the
debtor should be entitled to compensate the claim by the assignee with the debt due to him by
the cedent on the following day? The problem here is one of liquidity. Most of the cases place
1137
Bell, Commentaries (7th ed. 1870) II, 131; Shiells v Ferguson, Davidson & Co (1876) 4 R 250 at 254 per
Lord Deas; Chamber's JF v Vertue (1893) 20 R 257 at 259-260 per Lord Adam; or the date of arrestment: J.
Graham Stewart, Diligence, 175. See also Code Civil Art. 1298 and UNCITRAL Art. 20(2). Previously, where
the death of the cedent prior to intimation required the assignee to confirm, the debtor could acquire claims
against the cedent to found compensation until confirmation was obtained: Alison v Dumfries (1682) Mor Sup
Vol Harcase 51.
1138
Oglivy v Napier (1610) Mor 2600; Relict ofInglis v Eral ofMurray (1662) Mor 2602.
1139 A v B (1676) Mor 2603; Wallace v Edgar (1663) Mor 837 and 2651; Rollo v Brownlie (1676) Mor 2653; 2
Stair 436 cited with approval by Stair I.xviii. 16.
1140
Finlayson v Russell (1829) 7 S 698; Munro v Hogg (1830) 9 S 171; Lawson v Burman (1831) 9 S 478;
Mitchell v Canal Basin Foundry Co (1869) 7 M 480 per Lord Barcaple (Ordinary) at 481 (reversed by a Bench
of seven judges on a different point); Bell, Comm II, 124. Cf. Code Civil du Quebec Art. 1676.
1141
Although there is a conflict of authority, the better view is that a receiver cannot avoid a plea of
compensation by suing for recovery of debts, due to the company over which a floating charge has attached, in
his own name: Taylor v Scott and Universal Newspapers Ltd 1981 SC 408 OH and Myles J Callaghan Ltd (in
receivership) v Glasgow District Council 1987 SC 171 OH, both declining to follow Macphail v Lothian
Regional Council 1981 SC 119 OH.
1142 MacPhail v Cuninghame District Council 1983 SC 246 OH. The bases for the last four mentioned decisions
are conflicting. The intimated assignation in security is judicial in terms of the Act. There is no actual intimation.
It is not clear whether the debtor of a company in receivership can acquire debts against the company after
appointment of a receiver, but prior to any notification, to found compensation. See chapter 4 above,
'Intimation', n. 826 for the analogous position of a trustee in sequestration.
1143
Compare J. MacLaren, Court ofSession Practice (1916), 402 who desiderates three cumulative elements for
a successful plea of compensation: (i) debts be of the same nature, (ii) each of them be liquid, and (iii) each be
presently exigible.
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emphasis on the right rapidly to 'liquidate' a claim so as to place a certain value on it.
However, there is no discussion as to what sort of time periods should be allowed to the
debtor who has a claim of a certain sum, but is due at some date in the future. By analogy, if
(as is the case in some of the authorities1144) a period of weeks or months is allowed to
liquidate a claim so as to give it a certain value, a debtor should be allowed the same latitude
to raise a defence of compensation on a debt payable to him by the pursuer at a certain date in
the future.
(ii) Good Faith and Bad Faith Assignees.
Stair suggested that certain defences that would not otherwise be available to the
debtor, would be sustained against the assignee of a gratuitous assignation: 'And
compensation was sustained against an assignee, upon a debt due by the cedent, though
liquidate after the assignation, in respect the assignation was gratuitous'.1145 He cited Crokat v
Ramsay.1146 It should be remembered that at the date Crokat was decided, there had been little
relaxation of the terms of the 1592 Act. At that time, it was exceptional for the Court to allow
subsequent liquidation. In Alison v Duncan1147 the debtor was required to reduce the
gratuitous assignation first and raise his defences with the cedent. Professor McBryde queries
two cases where it is said that an onerous assignation takes preference over a gratuitous
one.1148 These were cases of competition. Where a transferor subsequently becomes insolvent,
conveyances for no consideration are presumed to have been in fraud of creditors. There is
also one case where the debtor (one of the partners of the indebted partnership) was allowed
to suspend a claim for payment where it was proved that the pursuer was neither a bona fide,
nor an onerous, assignee; but a trustee for the defender's ex-partner.1149 The juridical basis for
this decision is not clear. Lack of consideration is of little relevance to the debtor. He can
plead the same defences against an onerous assignee as against a malefide one.1150
1144 See notes 1094 f. above.
11451.xviii.6.
1146
(1676) 2 Stair 400; Mor 2652.
1147
(1711) Mor 2657.
1148 Contract para 12-101, n. 58, citing Campbell's Trs v Whyte (1884) 11 R 1078 and Gam's Trs v Russel's Tr
(1899) 7 SLT 289.
U49 Knox v Martin (1850) 12 D 719.
1150 Scottish Widows Fund v Buist (1876) 3 R 1078 at 1082 per Lord President Inglis. Cf. Davidson v Scott 1915
SC 924 at 929, where the Lord Ordinary (Hunter) subjected an assignee to the debtor's defences on the ground
that the assignee was not in good faith. It is clear, however, that these defences could have been pled even
against an onerous bona fide assignee; see too Johnstone v Irving (1824) 3 S 163 (NE 110) and Meggat v Brown
(1827) 5 S 343 at 344 per Lord Craigie.
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In South Africa, the assignee is bound to 'defend' his cedent against the debtor's
counterclaims, when he (the assignee) is in bad faith.1151 Bad faith includes a deliberate
attempt to deprive the debtor of counterclaims.1152 If the principle in the LTA case is to mean
anything, the only counterclaims to which this rule can apply are to extrinsic, illiquid
counterclaims which the debtor had against the cedent, which the cedent has in male fide
attempted to deprive the debtor.1153 Intrinsic defences can be pled against an assignee, while
liquid claims will found a defence of compensation. Yet, in LTA, it is not clear from the facts
whether the debtor's claim was an extrinsic or intrinsic illiquid one. It may well be that the
debtor's claim actually arose out of the same contract. There are two possible interpretations
that can be given to the LTA case. First, the debtor can simply retain payment on the basis of
an extrinsic illiquid claim that he has against the cedent. Alternatively, the debtor can actually
hold the assignee liable for the counterclaims. But this alternative view flatly contradicts the
orthodox position that bona fide assignees cannot be made actively liable for the cedent's
obligations;1154 although it must be conceded that view is predicated on a bona fide cession.
But what is the content of the cessionary's duty to 'defend'1155 the cedent after a male fide
cession? On balance, there is no persuasive argument for holding the assignee actively liable
for the cedent's obligations. The debtor in a bad faith cession should be allowed to retain,
even if the counterclaim is illiquid, extrinsic and not a counterpart of the creditor's right
which has been assigned. This is sufficient to protect the debtor. To hold the assignee actively
liable is to go too far, even if the cedent is now insolvent. Had no cession occurred, the debtor
would only have been entitled to retain.1156 There are traces in the Scottish sources of a
1151 LTA Engineering Co Ltd v Seacat Investments (Pty) Ltd 1974 (1) SA 747 (AD).
1152 LTA Engineering, ibid at 770A per Jansen JA; Sande, De Actionum Cessione (trans. Anders, 1906) 10.2 on
D. 3, 3, 34 discussed by R. Zimmermann, Das romisch-hollandische Recht in Siidafrika (1983), 66-69 who
rightly questions the relevance of the citation of Roman authority
1153 Cf. Windscheid, Pandektenrechts § 332 at 377: where a cession is in bad faith the debtor will even be able to
plead defences based on the personal relationship between the debtor and the cedent, i.e. extrinsic illiquid
defences.
1154 Munira Investments (Pty) Ltd v Flash Clothing Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1980 (1) SA 326 (D) at 330D-E per
Howard J; Regional Factors (Pty) Ltd v Charisma Promotions 1980 (4) SA 509 (C) at 512A-C per Burger J;
Goodwin Stable Trust v Duohex (Pty) Ld 1998 (4) SA 606 (C) at 617E-H.
1155 Jansen JA explicitly reserved his opinion the precise nature of the duty to defend: see 772C-F. For the
technical nature of 'defendere' in Roman law, see: P. van Warmelo, 'Male Fide Cession, Stare Decesis and
Abrogation by Disuse' (1974) 91 SALI298 at 303.
1156 In Scots law, by virtue of a balancing of accounts in bankruptcy. Cf. the analysis of S. Scott, The Law of
Cession (2nd ed. 1991), 196 ff., although this writer would not agree with all of Scott's analysis. See too the
analogous civil law requirement that a buyer must defend his vendor against any claims from third parties
asserting that they have a better title to the article sold, before the buyer can have a claim for breach of
warrandice against the vendor: J.B. Moyle, The Contract ofSale in the Civil Law (1892, reprinted 1994), 118.
This might mean simply that the buyer must show that he has been evicted, or that he (the buyer) cannot assert
his rights as against a party with a better claim; in other words, the transfer is valid only ad hunc effectum. So
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distinction been made between the defences available to a debtor where the assignation is
male fide. The furthest that these cases have gone is to accord the debtor in a male fide
assignation the same rights that he would have had against a bona fide assignee.1157
Unlike in some legal systems, there is no equivalent in Scots law of the Lex
Anastasianus, i.e. the assignee of a litigious claim is not limited to recovering from the debtor
what he paid to the cedent.1158
(iii) Compensation of Expenses and the Agent Disburser.
For compensation to operate there must be a concursus debiti et crediti. Moreover the
relevant date for the concourse is the date of intimation or arrestment. The plea must be
sustained by the judge. Further, compensation cannot be pled after decree. Nevertheless,
where an award of expenses has been made in favour of the debtor, though the decree may
have decerned her to pay the principal sum, this award of expenses will be able to be
compensated against the claim for the principal sum.1159 This will be the case even where the
award of expenses was made subsequent to the date of an arrestment.1160 The principle is also
important in the cases dealing with the 'agent disburser'. That is, where counsel and agents
act for litigants who are in forma pauperis, they are entitled to ask the court to make any
award of expenses in their own names. The effect of this principle is to constitute the agent
the assignee of the litigant.1161 As a result the debtor in the award of expenses can subject the
agent to a plea of compensation. However, unlike ordinary pleas of compensation, only
strictly intrinsic pleas will be sustained. In practice this means that the debtor will only be
allowed to plead awards made against the other party in the same action:
"Accordingly an extrinsic claim for compensation does not prevent decree
going out in the name of the agent-disburser, and in my opinion a claim for
compensation must be deemed to be extrinsic when it relates to the a
transaction different from that which gives rise to the action in which the award
of expenses is made. On the other hand, if the claim for compensation and the
award of expenses arise out of the same transaction or negotium, then
too with the case of cession designed to deprive the debtor of his counterclaims: the cessionary cannot assert his
rights as against the debtor. It is otherwise valid. This analysis requires some development of a doctrine of
inopposabilite or relative Unwirksamkeit. This issue, however, cannot be explored further here.
1157 See authorities cited at n. 1150 above.
1158 See generally, H. Kotz, Europaisches Vertragsrecht (1996), 408 (trans. T. Weir, European Contract Law
(1997), 268).
1159
Livingston v Reid (1833) 1 1 S 878.
1160 Lennie v Mackie & Co (1907) 23 Sh Ct Rep 85.
1161 Gordon v Davidson (1865) 3 M 939. See also Fleming v Love (1839) 1 D 1097.
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compensation is intrinsic and the agent is not entitled to decree in his own
name."1162
A claim will be intrinsic in such a case if (1) cross awards of expenses are made in the
same action, either at the same or different times; (2) when there are cross awards of expenses
in different actions pending at the same time and relating to the same subject matter; (3)
where there has been a decree for the principal sum in favour of the party in one and the same
action.1163
(iv) Contractual Set-Off Arrangements.
The debtor can plead compensation against the assignee even where the debt being
compensated is extrinsic to the claim assigned. It this regard, compensation is exceptional.
What, then, if the basis of the right of set-off is not the ordinary law of compensation but the
contract out of which the assigned right arose, or a separate contract? Most of the cases in
Scotland have dealt with compensation legale. In one case dealing with contractual set-off,
however, the ordinary rules as to retrospective extinction were not applied; although it was
held that no interest would accrue in the interim period between the concourse and the
dispute.1164 If it is the case that the assignee takes the right of the cedent, the debtor can plead
any rights of contractual set-off against the assignee. Yet, as was noted at the outset,
compensation is exceptional. There will be no problem if the contractual right to set-off is
found in the same contract as the assigned claim. The difficult case is that of an extrinsic
contractual right to set-off which covers the claim assigned. It is arguable that this is 'an
independent personal obligation of the cedent';1165 from the debtor's point of view, on the
other hand, the right to set-off will be fundamental to his relations with the cedent. The debtor
will regard the contractual right to set-off as an intrinsic qualification to the right assigned.
Surely it would prejudice the debtor if he could not plead contractual set-off against the
assignee? Again, however, to admit extrinsic contractual set-off, arguably subverts the entire
intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomy. The basis for a contractual right to set-off is, by definition,
contractual. The ordinary rules on mutuality of contracts must therefore apply. In so far as the
1162 Holt v National Bank ofScotland 1927 SLT 664 per Lord Fleming (Ordinary) at 666.
1163 Cf. further, Smyth v Gemmill and Henderson 9th July 1802 FC; Paterson v Wilson (1883) 11 R 358; Stuart v
Moss (1886) 13 R 572; Paolo v Parais (1897) 24 R 1030; Strain v Strain (1890) 17 R 566; Lochgelly Iron and
Coal Co Ltd v Sinclair 1907 SC 442; Grieve's Trs v Grieve 1907 SC 636; Fine v Edinburgh Life Assurance Co
1909 SC 636; Masco Cabinet and Bedding Co Ltd v Martin 1912 SC 896.
1164
Campbell v Carruthers (1756) Mor2551; Kames Sel Dec 158 at 159.
1165 Marshall's Trs v Bank 1934 SC 405 at 411 per Lord Murray.
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right is extrinsic, set-off cannot be effected against the assignee. In so far as it is a counterpart
of the right assigned,1166 however, it will found a mutuality defence and the debtor can retain
payment.1167
3. Balancing of Accounts on Bankruptcy.
(a) General Principles
The principles regulating the retention or compensation of claims are, to some extent,
relaxed when the party against whom the plea is to be advanced is insolvent.1168 No longer do
the claims have to be liquid or intrinsic. Any plea or counterclaim1169 held by the defender
against an insolvent pursuer will be upheld:
"...[F]or the policy of our law has long been that a person who is both debtor
and creditor of a bankrupt cannot be compelled to pay his debt in full and to
receive in exchange only a ranking for the bankrupt's debt due to him. That
policy may be said to give that person a preference; but the opposite view
could equally be said to give the other creditors a preference."1170
This doctrine is known as 'balancing of accounts in bankruptcy'. It is a peculiar doctrine.1171
With the greatest of respect to Lord President Cooper, his analysis of the rationale of the
doctrine is not without difficulty. The doctrine of balancing of accounts applies to pleas which
would not otherwise have afforded the proponer a valid defence. If the defender were forced
to pay, it is indeed correct that he would probably not be able to have his counterclaims
against the bankrupt satisfied in full. However, it is not true to say that the other creditors are
1166 It is most unlikely, however, that a right which is extrinsic to the assigned right will ever be sufficiently
contemporaneous.
1167 Cf. Ross v Ross (1895) 22 R 461 at 464-465 per Lord McLaren.
1168
Receivership does not necessarily involve insolvency and the rules on balancing of accounts do not apply:
Taylor v Scott and Universal Newspapers Ltd 1981 SC 408.
1169 For example, a claim for payment can be met with a claim for delivery: Bell, Commentaries II, 122; while a
debt which arose before insolvency can be adduced, though it may become due to the defender only after
insolvency: McBryde, Contract para 25-62. Indeed, it is thought that a claim for reparation arising out of a
delictual act which is subject to the three year limitation period could be raised on a balancing of accounts in
bankruptcy; though a prescribed claim could not.
1170 Atlantic Engine Co (1920) Ltd (in liquidation) v Lord Advocate 1955 SLT 17 at 20 per Lord President
Cooper (Ordinary). See also Bell, Commentaries II, 122; H. Goudy, A Treatise on the Law of Bankruptcy in
Scotland (4th ed. 1914), 555; Gloag, Contract (2nd ed. 1929), 649; Asphaltic Limestone Concrete Co Ltd v
Glasgow Corporation 1907 SC 463 at 474 per Lord McLaren; the application of the law to the facts in Asphaltic
is criticised by W.A. Wilson, The Scottish Law ofDebt (2nd ed. 1991) para 13.10. See also the opinion of Lord
McLaren in Ross v Ross (1895) 22 R 461; Ross was described as a 'very special case' by the Lord Ordinary in
Barton Distilling (Scotland) Ltd v Barton Brands Ltd 1993 SLT 1261.
1171
Surprisingly, it seems to be present in most legal systems: R. Zimmermann, Comparative Foundations of a
European Law ofSet-Offand Prescription (2002), 43 ff.
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thereby accorded a preference. They will still only receive a dividend, albeit a larger one. But
it is the same dividend to which the defender would be entitled. Arguably the doctrine of
balancing of accounts in bankruptcy is arbitrary: it favours those who have not yet paid a debt,
over those who have.
The important factor for balancing of accounts in bankruptcy is time. The relevant
date is not intimation, but insolvency. Post-insolvency debts cannot be pled against pre-
insolvency debts.1172 On sequestration, the main reason for this is a lack of concourse. The act
and warrant assigns the bankrupt's claim to the trustee. Any counterclaims acquired by the
bankrupt's debtor after this date will be of no use against a trustee. Even where there is no
vesting, however, the date of insolvency is the crucial date.1173 However, unlike in a case of
compensation, it may be possible to prevent diligence following on a decree held by the
bankrupt as a result of a right to balance accounts.1174
There are three situations where the rule might be relevant in the context of
assignation. In the first, the cedent's solvency is in issue. For example, the cedent was vergens
ad inopia?nU15 when the assignation was made, and intimation is made prior to sequestration
or liquidation.1176 Alternatively, there could be an intimated assignation of a claim. After
intimation, the cedent becomes insolvent. The assigned claim was in a mutual contract. The
cedent breached the contract before his insolvency but after intimation. Can the debtor plead a
balancing of accounts? While intimation is the cut-off date for the debtor's defences in the
1172
Taylor's Trs v Paul (1888) 15 R 313. Cf. Powdrill v Murrayhead Ltd 1997 SLT 1223 OH for a case where
the distinction between pre- and post-insolvency was difficult to draw. It has been suggested that two post-
insolvency debts can be set-off against each other: Liquidators ofHighland Engineering Ltd. v Thomson 1972
SC 87 OH.
1173 What is the date of insolvency? Practical insolvency? Apparent insolvency? Absolute insolvency? In this
writer's view, it is consonant with the policy of the law that the only relevant date can be apparent insolvency. It
is then that the debtor can be sequestrated. The other relevant date may be where the debtor is vergens ad
inopiam in terms of the common law rules.
1174
Highland Council v Construction Centre Group Ltd 2004 SC 480. Admittedly, this was an application for
the suspension ad interim of a charge for payment.
1175 Bell, Commentaries II, 127 seems to suggest that balancing of accounts in bankruptcy is available where the
pursuer is vergens', so does Barclay v Clerk (1683) Mor 2641. Importantly, Barclay allowed a balancing of
accounts to be pled against a party seeking to enforce a decree.
1176 In Bank ofEast Asia Ltd v Scottish Enterprise 1997 SLT 1213 at 1215 F-G it was conceded by the debtor,
Scottish Enterprise, that they could not claim a balancing of accounts in bankruptcy as against the pursuer who
held an assignation in security (the cedent being insolvent). This concession was probably unwise. Matters are
complicated by the fact that the case was pursued in the English courts so, until the appeal to the House of Lords,
Scots law was treated as a matter of fact. Since there is little authority in Scots law, it may be that the position in
English law, where insolvency set-off is not available against an assignee (De Mattos v Saunders (1872) LR 7
CP 570; Re Arthur Saunders Ltd (1981) 17 BLR 125), was assumed to represent Scots law. This perhaps reflects
the amorphous and contradictory nature of assignment in English law: see the comments of Lord Reid in BS Lyle
v Roscher [1959] 1 WLR 8 HL.
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case of compensation, it is the date of insolvency that is the relevant date for a balancing of
accounts. Moreover, if the debtor were not allowed to plead a balancing of accounts in this
situation, he is arguably prejudiced by the assignation: he must pay to the assignee, yet is
unlikely to get anything in return from the cedent.
The second situation is the converse of the first. The cedent is solvent. He assigns his
claim against the debtor. The assignee then becomes insolvent. Is the debtor entitled to defend
any claim by the assignee or the latter's trustee on the basis of extrinsic illiquid claims he
holds against the cedent, i.e. is he allowed to balance accounts in bankruptcy with the
insolvent assignee on the basis of claims he holds against the solvent cedent?1177 If the debtor
is allowed to do so, the doctrine comes close to unjustifiably frustrating the rights of the
assignee's creditors: the debtor in the assignation has, after all, a claim against the cedent who
may be solvent. It is consistent with the exceptional nature of the doctrine of balancing of
accounts that the debtor should not be entitled to raise claims against the assignee that he
could not have raised against the cedent. Therefore, if the cedent is solvent, the assignee's
trustee or liquidator can demand payment from the debtor and the debtor can still raise his
counterclaims against the cedent. Were it otherwise, the creditors of the assignee could
receive nothing though the debtor has a perfectly good remedy against a solvent party.
Conversely, if the debtor cannot satisfy his claims against the cedent (because the cedent is
insolvent), then the debtor may rightfully plead a balancing of accounts on a demand by the
assignee.
The third situation is where the debtor is insolvent and the assignee seeks to claim a
balancing of accounts. In Smith v Lord Advocate,1178 the debtor (Upper Clyde Shipbuilders)
was in liquidation.1179 Thereafter, there was a statutory transfer of the assets and liabilities of
the creditor (the Shipbuilding Industry Board) to the Secretary of State. The liquidator sought
payment from the Secretary of State in respect of work carried out on certain naval vessels.
This claim was met with a defence of 'set-off on behalf of the Secretary of State. While the
Court and commentary on the decision have characterised the statutory transfer as one of
1177 It should be remembered that we are here concerned only with illiquid and extrinsic counterclaims, i.e.
claims which would not otherwise afford a defence of retention or compensation. Where the debtor has such a
defence against the cedent, it can be raised against the assignee whatever the assignee's solvency.
1178 1980 SC 277.
1179 Leave of the Court does not appear to be necessary to plead balancing of accounts in bankruptcy against a
company in liquidation: G & A Hotels Ltd v THB Marketing Services Ltd 1983 SLT 497, although leave is
required to bring a counterclaim: Insolvency Act 1986 s. 113.
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assignation,1180 this is unhelpful. It was rather a universal succession: both assets and
liabilities were transferred. The case, therefore, is of limited relevance to assignation. The
only reason that the liquidator was able to sue the Secretary of State was on the basis that the
government department was liable for the debt. That liability arose as a result of the statutory
transfer. Moreover, contrary to Mr. Sellar's argument,1181 there was a concursus debiti et
crediti. The insolvency did not disrupt it: there is no transfer of the assets of the company to
the liquidator as in sequestration or in a trust deed for creditors.1182 Moreover, as a result of
the universal succession, the Secretary of State stood in the shoes of the Shipbuilding Industry
Board. In other words, despite the statutory transfer (which, admittedly, occurred after
liquidation) the position was the same as before liquidation. In any event, as explained by
Lord Avonside, the relevant 'personality' of the debtor was the Crown. In Scots law, the
Crown is regarded as an 'indivisible entity'.1183 The Lord Advocate represents these
departments. The only effect of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947,1184 therefore, is that the
leave of the court is required where debts nominally owed to one department may be used for
the purposes of set-off or compensation by another. On this analysis then, it matters not what
transfers of assets and liabilities occurred as between government departments and whether
these occurred before or after insolvency.
V. Invalidity.
A. General.
If sued by the assignee, the debtor will be entitled to plead that the contract out of which the
assigned claim arose was void.1185 This is a paradigm application of the assignatus rule. The
debtor could and would have pled this against the cedent; similarly, he may do so against an
assignee. If the underlying contract is voidable, the position may be more complicated. In
general, a voidable contract can only be reduced where restitutio in integrum is possible. The
1180 See generally D.P. Sellar, 'Assignation and Retention in Liquidation' 1985 SLT (News) 41. Sellar's analysis
is not always easy to follow. It is also not entirely consistent: he adopts the analysis of the Lord Ordinary in
Smith that the effect of the universal succession by statutory transfer was to effect a 'statutory assignation' (at
41); but later (at 45) argues that a 'statutory subrogation' is 'surely different in its effect from an assignation'.
This is incorrect. Subrogation is merely cession ex lege (cessio legis).
1181 See preceding note.
1182 As a general rule; exceptionally, however, assets may be vested in the liquidator: Insolvency Act 1986, s.
145; Titles to Land (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1868, s. 25.
1183 Cf. F.W. Maitland, 'The Crown as a Corporation' (1901) 17 LQR 131.
1184 Crown Proceedings Act 1947, s. 50(2)(d).
1185 See McBryde, Contract for the applicable principles.
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effect of reduction is retrospective. It is perhaps arguable that, since there has been an
assignation of one party's rights under the contract, this is no longer possible. The cedent will
typically have received money for the assignation. Generally speaking, where corporeal
property is concerned, a bona fide transferee cannot be prejudiced if title has passed to him
prior to any reduction. It is arguable that a bona fide assignee, who has duly intimated, is in a
similar position. If the contract were reduced the cedent would then be in breach of
warrandice vis-a-vis the assignee. If the assignee has translated his right to a subsequent
assignee, the debtor cannot reduce.
B. Debtor's title to challenge the assignation.
Professor McBryde observes that, in England, there is a conflict of authority on
whether the debtor can challenge the assignation.1186 Irrespective of issues of title, the debtor
clearly has an interest: he will want to ensure that he pays the correct creditor. Elowever,
where the debtor gets it wrong and pays the wrong person in error, he will still be protected on
the basis of the general principle of good faith payment:
"The third common exception in personal actions is, payment made bona fide
to him who had not the true right, but where there was another preferable right,
which the defender neither did, nor was obliged to know, and therefore the law
secures the payer, without prejudice to the pursuer to insist against the obtainer
of the payment."1187
The issue of whether the debtor is in good faith is a difficult one. Is he in bad faith if the
cedent intimates an allegation of a defect of consent? In cases of doubt, the debtor can always
consign the money on a multiplepoinding. The test, it is thought, is a subjective one. Provided
the debtor honestly thought that he was paying his creditor, he will be protected.
VI. A Special Case: Arbitration Clauses.
A. General
One of the parties to a contract assigns his rights to payment. Can the debtor plead that
the sum is in dispute and invoke an arbitration clause in the contract? If a court has no
jurisdiction to hear such a defence and the assignee cannot be heard in any arbitration, the
1186 Contract para 12-98.
1187 Stair IV.xl.33.
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debtor can refuse payment though he may have no substantive defence to the pursuer's
claim.1188 In the case of a sub-contract, it is clear that a clause incorporating the provisions of
the main contract, which contains an arbitration clause, does not subject any disputes between
the main contractor and the sub-contractor to arbitration.1189 However, what of the position
where rights under a contract are transferred - does this right continue to be subject to
arbitration? The issue has perplexed modern writers: 'the situation is far from clear'1190
concludes the leading Scottish writer; while Lord Mustill has expressed similar sentiments in
his work on the subject.1191 There is no problem with an assignation of an arbitral award.1192
The claim is then liquid. It can be assigned like any other money claim. The problem arises if
there is an assignation at any time before decree-arbitral has been pronounced.1193 The answer
will depend on the type of arbitration clause in question. First, it will be necessary to
determine whether the agreement between the cedent and the debtor to submit to arbitration is
in the contract out of which arose the assigned right. If it is not, then the claim is extrinsic.
References to extrinsic documents, which in turn contain arbitration clauses, are not
uncommon. However the courts, in Scotland at least, have taken a strict approach to the issue
of incorporation of these terms.1194 If this approach represents the law,1195 then it is thought
that such an arbitration clause will not provide a good provisional defence against a demand
for payment by an assignee. Assuming that there is an arbitration clause in the same contract
1188 It should be noted, however, that the Court has been reluctant to hold that it has no jurisdiction where there
is, in Lord Adam's phrase, no 'real' dispute to go to the arbiter: Mackay & Son v Leven Police Commissioners
(1893) 20 R. 1093.
1189 Goodwines, Jardine & Co Ltd v Charles Brand & Son (1905) 7 F 995. Cf. East Kilbride DC v Whatlings
(Building) Co Ltd 1990 SLT 492.
1190 F.P. Davidson, Arbitration (2000) para 7.26.
1191 Lord Mustill and S.C. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration (2nd ed. 1989, with 2001 supplement), 138, 'The
decided cases on the rights of parties in this situation are far from clear'. There is an excellent comparative
discussion in English by D.L. Girsberger and C. Hausmaniger, 'Assignment of Rights and Agreement to
Arbitrate' (1992) 8 Arbitration International 121. See also, Werner, 'Jurisdiction of Arbitrators in Case of
Assignment of an Arbitration Clause' (1991) 8 Journal ofInternational Arbitration 13.
1192 J.P. Wood and J.R.N. Macphail, The Law ofArbitration in Scotland (1900), 77.
1193 Such an assignation may also raise taxation issues: Commissioners for Inland Revenue v Forrest's JF (1924)
8 TC 595 (1st Div). This case was the result of the proceedings in the well known litigation of Boyd & Forrest v.
Glasgow & South-Western Railway Company, 1911 SC 33 and 1050; 1912 SC (HL) 93; 1914 SC 472; 1915 SC
(HL) 20; 1918 SC (HL) 14.
1194 F.P. Davidson, Arbitration (2000) para 7.04 citing McConnell and Reid v Smith 1911 SC 635 at 638 per
Lord Dundas: 'I think it requires clear and distinct language to oust the ordinary jurisdiction of the courts and
substitute procedure by way of arbitration.. .A mere reference to the rules is.. .quite insufficient to import such a
condition into the contract'. McConnell was approved in Babcock Rosyth Defence Ltd v Grootcon (United
Kingdom) Ltd 1998 SLT 1143 at 1150F per Lord Hamilton. See also Montgomerie v Carrick and Napier (1848)
10 D 1387 at 1392per Lord Ivory (Ordinary).
1195
Although it is perhaps an outdated analysis, see F.P. Davidson, Arbitration (2000) para 7.04 referring to the
English courts' reaction to McConnell. Cf. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
art. 7(1), adopted in Scotland by Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990, s. 66.
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as that from which the assigned right arose, the clause may be specific or universal. If the
clause is specific, then the debtor will only be able to invoke the clause if it relates to the
claim assigned. This is fairly obvious. This then raises the question as to what is to happen if
the assignee's claim does fall within such a clause. If the arbitration clause is general or
universal in so far as it submits all the disputes that may arise between the parties to an
arbiter,1196 then the question will be more complicated. For our purposes it will be assumed
that the contract, out of which the assigned right arose, contained a universal arbitration
clause. In terms of the intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomy, it seems that such a clause is intrinsic and
in principle could found a plea of assignatus utitur from the debtor.1197
B. Comparative background.
The issue has vexed the courts in most European jurisdictions.1198 At the outset, it is
necessary to make the distinction between assignation of claims (i.e. cession de creance) and
a transfer of a contract in toto (cession de contrat). Many of the continental sources deal with
the latter. Nevertheless, it is only with the cession of claims that we are here concerned. In
Germany, Austria, France and Switzerland, an agreement to submit to arbitration seems to be
construed as an agreement which is accessory to the right assigned.1199 Therefore, the right
and duty to arbitrate passes to the assignee.1200 However these jurisdictions all admit
exceptions to this rule where there is delectus personae (what Francophone lawyers refer to as
fntuitus personae').1201 Moreover, the idea that the assignee automatically becomes a party to
the agreement to arbitrate by virtue of the cession has been criticised by many continental
commentators.1202 The general view is that there must be an acceptance to enter into
arbitration by the assignee as well as the debtor.1203 While the difficulties cannot be discussed
1196 See the example given in Styles and Arbitration Rules of the Law Society of Scotland reprinted as an
appendix to Lord Hope of Craighead's title on 'Arbitration' in SME, Reissue 1 (1999).
1197 Palmer v South East Lancashire Insurance Co Ltd 1932 SLT 68 at 69 per Lord Murray (Ordinary): 'The
arrester cannot, in my opinion, at once invoke the contract and reject the inherent condition'.
1198 See generally, P. Mayer, 'La 'circulation' des conventions d'arbitrage' (2005) 132 Journal du droit
international 251.
1199
§ 401 BGB; § 1394 ABGB; Art. 1692 Code Civil; Art. 170(2) OR.
1200 See the authorities cited by D.L. Girsberger and C. Hausmaniger, op. cit., n. 1191, at 126-131.
1201 P. Mayer (2005) 132 Journal du droit international 251 at 256.
1202 D.L. Girsberger and C. Hausmaniger, op. cit., n. 1191, at 126-131.
1203 P. Fouchard, L 'arbitrage commercial international (2nd ed. 1997), cited by Mayer, op. cit., n. 1201.
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here, it must be remembered that the complications multiply when there are different laws
applicable to the principal claim, the agreement to arbitrate and the cession.1204
C. Scottish Sources.
Of the Scottish cases, perhaps the least complex is Henry v Hepburn and Burns.1205
Henry and Burns submitted their accounts to arbitration. Burns had acted as Henry's law
agent for some years. There was a large account outstanding, the quantum of which was the
subject of submission. In the course of the arbiters' deliberations, Burns assigned his claim to
Hepburn. This was intimated to Henry. The assignation included a clause which empowered
Hepburn to take decree from the arbiters in his own name. Intimation of the assignation
(which was acknowledged by the debtor) was made more than one year before the arbiters
finally drew up the outstanding account. Before decree-arbitral was pronounced, Hepburn
appeared and produced his assignation and craved that the arbiters pronounced decree in his
name. The debtor Henry objected. Arbitration, so Henry argued, was a personal contract
which was coloured with delectus personae}206 On occasion, this objection may have some
force. In this case, however, the argument for the assignee that 'even if there could be delectus
personae in respect of the litigious temper of an opponent throughout a discussion, there
could be none as to the name of person in whose favour a decree should be pronounced'1207
was rightly preferred. The submission had been concluded. As the Lord President observed,
'the cedent remains effectually bound, notwithstanding the assignation'.1208 There was
therefore no potential prejudice to the debtor. Lord Mackenzie observed that it was 'a mere
formal objection'.1209 The Court was considerably influenced by the fact that if one of the
parties to an arbitration becomes bankrupt their trustee had a right to be received into the
arbitration.1210 Indeed, where a party to an arbitration was sequestrated but decree-arbitral was
1204
Mayer, op. cit., n. 1201, at 260.
1205
(183 5) 13 S 361.
1206 This argument found favour with the Lord Ordinary (Moncreiff); his opinion is reproduced verbatim by J.
Montgomerie Bell, Treatise on the Law ofArbitration in Scotland (2nd ed. 1877), 117-118. See also Climat c.
SCA (lerChambre Civil, Cour de Cassation, 28 May 2002), noted by N. Coipel-Carbonnier, (2002) 91 Revue
critique de droit international prive 758 especially at 769 and in Mayer, op. cit., n. 1201 at 258. For discussion




1210 Grant v Girwood, 23rd June 1820 FC.
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1211
pronounced without giving the trustee the opportunity to be heard, the decree was reduced.
Since a judicial assignee could appear in the proceedings, their seemed no reason to prevent a
voluntary assignee from doing so.1212 These cases are, however, inconclusive. In none of them
was there any indication that the debtor had refused to enter into the proceedings and thereby
potentially frustrate the claim of the assignee. It could be argued, therefore, that the debtor
had waived any delectus personae that might have been implied.
An analogous issue arises where one of the parties to an arbitration dies. There is
authority for the proposition that death has no effect.1213 But this view may mean no more
than that a decree-arbitral is binding upon the heirs of the deceased. It has been held that the
death one of the parties in an arbitration will necessarily bring the proceedings to an end,
unless there is a clause specifically binding executors.1214 In Robertson v Cheynes1215 claims
between a tenant and his landlady were submitted to arbitration in terms of the lease. The
cautioners for rent, who had already been required to make advances, consented to the
submission. The tenant had purported to assign his claims against the landlady to the
cautioners. The landlady acknowledged the assignation. The cautioners had meanwhile raised
an action against the tenant for their relief and had arrested in the hands of the landlady on the
dependence of the action. They obtained decree against the tenant and again arrested in the
hands of the landlady. Prior to the conclusion of the arbitration, both the tenant, one of the
cautioners and the landlady's husband died. The remaining cautioner presented a minute
craving to be sisted in the submission. The arbiter proceeded and found a balance due to the
tenant. He pronounced decree-arbitral in favour of the cautioner. The landlady thereupon
raised an action for reduction. The First Division held that the effect of the death of the parties
was to bring the arbitration to an end and it was incompetent for the arbiter to proceed and
pronounce decree-arbitral. It was held that the assignation was ineffective (it was in the terms
of a mandate to pay). However, even if it had been valid, the only effect of an assignation of a
claim, which is the subject of arbitration, is to allow decree-arbitral to be pronounced in the
name of the assignee,1216 and this, apparently, can only be done with the concurrence of the
1211 Barbour v Wright, 21st November 1811 FC.
1212
Henry v Hepburn and Burns (1835) 13 S 361 at 366 per Lord Balgray. Cf. the French case of Banque Worms
(lerChambre Civil, 5th January 1999), noted at (1999) 88 Revue critique de droit internationalprive 537.
1213 Earl ofSelkirk v Naismith (1778) Mor 627; Hailes 780.
1214 Watmore and Taylor v Burns, 17th May 1839 FC, at 824 per Lord Mackenzie.
1215
(1847) 10 D 559.
1216 At 604 per Lord Fullerton.
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cedent.1217 Lord Mackenzie1218 held that if either of the parties to the arbitration dies before
decree-arbitral is pronounced, both parties are released. If decree has been pronounced, then
death will have no effect and the estate of the debtor will be bound.1219 In an obiter dictum,
Lord Mackenzie suggested that if the assignation had been valid, perhaps the assignee could
have proceeded in the name of the cedent.1220 It is difficult to extract a ratio from the decision.
It seems to be at odds with the right of a trustee in sequestration to submit to an arbitration in
which the bankrupt was involved.1221
Leases often include arbitration clauses. These may be specific, for example,
1222
regarding the valuation of an outgoing tenant's crops, or general. In McConnell v Carrick
and Napier 223 a mineral lease contained a universal arbitration clause. The property was sold.
The tenant then decided to exercise his right to sink another mine. This required the consent
of the landlord. The singular successor refused to give it so the tenant took his request to the
arbiter. The singular successor subsequently sought reduction of the decree-arbitral allowing
the tenant to proceed. The case therefore involved a transferee (the landlord's singular
successor) arguing that he was not subject to the arbitration clause in the original lease to
which he had, by statute,1224 become a party. The tenant successfully argued that 'the clause
of reference was not a personal obligation extrinsic to the lease, but in a measure necessary to
it, since it was impossible to extricate a mineral lease without an arbiter'.1225 The Court held
that the successor was personally barred from challenging the decree-arbitral. They also made
some observations on the effect of an arbitration clause on successors. Lord President Boyle
asserted that 'it was most plain and obvious...that there is a distinction between those
stipulations which are extrinsic to a lease, and do not transmit against singular successors, and
those other stipulations which are the essence of the contract, and do therefore of necessity
transmit against them'.1226 The universal clause before him was, he held, 'in the essence of the
1217 At 603 per Lord President Boyle. Though one would have thought a voluntary assignation of the whole
claim subject to the arbitration was indication enough of consent.
1218 Who delivered the leading opinion in Watmore, n. 1214 above.
1219 Robertson v Cheynes (1847) 10 D 559 at 603.
1220 At 604. For the apparent right of the assignee to sue in the name of the cedent, see discussion in chapter 2,
Part I, C above.
1221 As in Barbour v Wright, 21st November 1811 FC.
1222 See Sanderson & Son v Armour & Co 1922 SC (HL) 117 at 125 per Lord Dunedin.
1223
(1848) 10 D 1387.
1224 See the terms of the Leases Act 1449, cap. 6. Only those terms which are inter naturalia of the lease [i.e.





Transfer ofMoney Claims in Scots Law
lease'.1227 Two able judges, Lords Fullerton and Jeffrey, however, disagreed (although they
concurred in the decision). Lord Jeffrey thought that an arbitration clause was one which
'bore reference to the private relation of the contracting parties'.1228 He agreed with Lord
Fullerton's suggestion that a singular successor could not be expected to submit to arbitration
1229
on a matter such as whether a tenant could retain a portion of his rent. An arbitration
clause relating to the ordinary matters of landlord and tenant would, however, transmit. It is
impossible to take any clear ratio from these opinions.
Positively, an assignee, judicial or voluntary, has the right to rely on an arbitration
clause and invoke it himself.1230 Moreover, if there is an agreement between the cedent and
the debtor to submit to arbitration after intimation, this will not affect the assignee.1231 It has
been held in the Outer House that an insurer can refuse a claim of a statutory assignee under
the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 on the basis that there is an arbitration
1232
clause in the policy and only the original contractor can enter into the arbitration.
However, such a result seems unworkable. The insured is insolvent and, if it is a company,
may no longer even exist. If, as Lord President Hope suggested in Henry above, the obligation
to submit to arbitration remains with the cedent, then it seems that in the case of insolvency of
the cedent, the claim of the assignee could be frustrated by an arbitration clause. The issues
1233
were brought into focus in Rutherford v Licences and General Insurance Co Ltd. The
pursuer arrested in the hands of the insurer rather than rely on his statutory rights under the
1930 Act. On furthcoming, the insurer pled that the claim by the insured had to be settled by
arbitration. The pursuer objected on two grounds. First, since the wrongdoer's policy was
only for third party risks, the insured had little interest in the arbitration. There was a danger,
therefore, that he could prejudice the pursuer's claim. Consequentlty, the pursuer sought to
interdict the arbitration proceedings taking place in the pursuer's absence as well as an order
that the pursuer be allowed to enter into the submission. Second, the pursuer was equally
1227 ibid. Lord Mackenzie delivered a concurring opinion.
1228 At 1396. Compare A Alfred Herbert Ltd v Scottish Bricks Ltd (1945) 62 Sh Ct Rep 23 where there was an
arbitration clause in the feu-contract to which neither the pursuer nor the defender were party.
1229 As in Ross v Duchess ofSutherland (1838) 16 S 1179.
1230 Boland v White Cross Insurance Co 1926 SC 1066, cited in Davidson, Arbitration para 7-26. See the
discussion of Boland in Palmer v South East Lancashire Insurance Co Ltd 1932 SLT 68 OH.
1231
Whately v Ardrossan Harbour Co (1893) 1 SLT 382 (1st Div). This report is thoroughly unsatisfactory. There
is a fuller report, but of earlier proceedings only, before the First Division at (1893) 30 SLR 493.
1232
Cunningham v Anglian Insurance Co Ltd 1934 SLT 273 OH.
1233 1934 SLT 31 OH.
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concerned that the arbiter chosen by the insured and insurer was not independent.1234 The
pursuer was successful on the first ground. The arbiter, being a sheriff, was confirmed. The
Lord Ordinary accepted the argument that by virtue of the fact that the pursuer was a judicial
assignee, 'he and he alone had a consequent right to control and be a party to any arbitration
proceedings relative to the claim'.1235 Similarly, in Palmer v South East Lancashire Insurance
Co Ltd,1236 the Lord Ordinary observed,
"The arrester cannot, in my opinion, invoke the contract and reject the inherent
condition. He may be entitled, by virtue of the 'judicial assignation' implied in
his arrestment to force the arrestees to join issue with him on the question of
liability...."1237
1238
It is thought that the modern cases, albeit emanating only from the Outer House, are
preferable to the opinions to the contrary in Robertson and McConnell, which may be seen as
outdated.1239
It seems, then, that where the rights transferred to the assignee divest the cedent of all
his interest in arbitration; and, if the submission has not yet begun, the assignee will be
entitled to proceed1240 and take decree in his own name.1241 This right will be particularly
important where the cedent is insolvent or is a liquidated company.1242 Where the cedent is
solvent and retains an interest in the arbitration proceedings, the assignee, it seems, must be
able either to compel the cedent to enter into the arbitration; or, to furnish the assignee with
all information that might be necessary for him to conduct arbitration proceedings respecting
1234 In A Alfred Herbert Ltd v Scottish Bricks Ltd (1946) 62 Sh Ct Rep 23, the Sheriff held that there was no
delectus personae in an arbitration agreement in a feu-contract since the successors in title would still be able to
exercise the right to appoint an arbiter. See also Holburn v Buchanan (1915) 31 Sh Ct Rep 178.
1235 At 32.
1236 1 932 SLT 68 OH.
1237 At 69 per Lord Murray (Ordinary).
1238 See also Cant v Eagle Star and British Dominions Insurance Co 1937 SLT 444 OH, where an action of
forthcoming was sisted to allow the arrester to enter into an arbitration with the insurer.
1239
Rodgerson Roofing Ltd v Hall & Tawse Scotland Ltd 2000 SC 249 involved an assignee of rights under a
sub-contract in which there was an arbitration clause. The assignee seemed to be participating in the arbitration
proceedings although there was doubt about whether he even had a title to sue. There was no discussion,
however, of whether the assignee was entitled to submit to arbitration agreed upon between the cedent and the
debtor.
1240 In England it has been held that an assignee must submit to the arbitration before he can become a party to it.
Assignment per se will not have that effect: Baytur SA v Finagro Holding SA [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep 135 at 150
per Lloyd LJ. A party who submits to arbitration will be bound by the decree-arbitral: Brown v Gardner (1739)
Mor. 5659.
1241 In South Africa an attempt to enter into arbitration in the name of the cedent after cession was held to be
void: Goodwin Stable Trust v Duchex (Pty) Ltd 1998 (4) SA 606 at 618E per Selikowitz J.
1242 Cf. McGruther, Noter 2003 SCLR 144 OH aff d 2004 SC 514. Here one of the parties to an arbitration was
in liquidation. The liquidator successfully sought a sist of the liquidation to allow the directors of the company,
rather than the liquidator himself, to prosecute the company's claims.
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the claim. After all, the assignee will be a complete stranger to the contractual history between
the parties. In some legal systems, the assignee is entitled by virtue of the assignation to
require the cedent to assist by furnishing all relevant information and material that may be
necessary to pursue the claim against the debtor.1243 If, on the other hand, the assignee can
compel the cedent to enter into proceedings, this then raises the crucial question of who is to
pay for this arbitration. On the one hand perhaps the assignee is liable as doiminus litis; on the
other, perhaps the expense should fall on the cedent: after all he has warranted (assuming
there was no stipulation to the contrary) that the debt is presently due and owing; but, until
arbitration is successfully concluded, this is not the case. It should be noted that as far as
arbitration clauses in insurance policies are concerned, most insurers have now undertaken not
to enforce arbitration clauses in standard form policies if the insured prefers to have questions
of coverage determined by the Court.1244
D. Anglo-American position.
The older English authorities treated an agreement to arbitrate as 'a personal
covenant'.1245 As such, the assignee could not become a party to it; although it is not clear
what effect the decision had on the assignment. One would assume that a finding that the
arbitration clause was 'a personal covenant' would prevent the assignee entering into the
arbitration. However, some American authorities come to the surprising conclusion that the
effect of an assignment of a right under a contract which has an inherently personal arbitration
clause, to which the assignee will not agree, is to frustrate the agreement to arbitrate: the
assignee is not bound by it and has an unencumbered claim against the debtor.1246 But this
seems to run contrary to the principle that the debtor should not be prejudiced by the
1243
See, for example, the Swiss Obligationenrecht Art. 170 (2). But note that in Switzerland this may not apply
where a delectus personae in the original party to the arbitration agreement can be shown: see Mayers, op. cit., n.
1201, at 256.
1244 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission Report, Third Parties - Rights Against Insurers Law Com
Report No. 272, Scottish Law Commission Report No. 184 (2001), para 5.40 citing the ABI/Lloyd's Arbitration
Agreement 1956 (confirmed in 1986).
1245
Cottage Club Estates Ltd [1928] 2 KB 463.
1246 Lachmar v Trunkline LNG Co 753 F.2d 8, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1985) cited by Girsberger and Hausmaniger, op. cit.,
n. 1191, at p. 124. The authors comment, at 135, of the Common Law authorities that, 'Those courts, however,
that hold that the assignee is not bound by the arbitration agreement focus on the relationship between assignor
and assignee, not between the original parties, to determine whether the assignee should be bound by the
arbitration agreement'.
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assignation. Later English cases have held that the arbitration clause can bind the assignee,
where the debtor agrees.1247
In England, it seems that in notifying the assignment and seeking decree, the assignee
implicitly accepts that he is potentially liable for costs.1248 However, in England it seems that
the consent of the arbitrator is required before the assignee can take part in the
proceedings.1249 Why the arbitrator's consent should be important is not clear. In terms of the
Arbitration Act 1996, a reference to an 'arbitration agreement' includes a reference to any
person claiming under or through a party to the agreement'.1250 It is not clear whether the
older authorities have been superseded. For example, it has been suggested that to allow an
assignee to get decree without being liable for a counterclaim would be unjust; otherwise an
insolvent party to an arbitration could assign away his right to an associated company leaving
the other party with a worthless claim against the assignor.1251 The issue is not peculiar to
1252arbitration. Such an approach ignores what an assignment is. It transfers rights, not
liabilities.1253 If an assignation is gratuitous and the cedent becomes insolvent then it can be
reduced; a fortiori can one which is both gratuitous and to an associated company.1254 In
Scotland, the law relating to the dominus litis will regulate issues of expenses.1255
E. Interpretation
It seems, then, that there are two tests to be fulfilled. First, one must look at the
position of the assignee. The traditional approach of the civil law is to ask if the agreement to
arbitrate is accessory to the assigned claim; if so, it will transfer automatically. On this
analysis, the assignee is entitled to submit to arbitration. In the modern law of arbitration,
1247
Shayler v Woolf[ 1946] Ch 320.
1248 The Jordan Nicolov [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep 11 at 19 per Hobhouse J.
1249
Baytur SA v Finagro Holding SA [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep 135 at 151-152 per Lloyd LJ, a case dealing with an
equitable assignment.
1250 Section 82 (2). Obviously, if there is a prohibition on assignment in the underlying contract, an assignee
cannot possibly seek to submit to arbitration: Bawejan Ltd v M C Fabrications [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 377
CA.
1251
Baytur SA v Finagro Holding SA [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep 135 at 151 per Lloyd LJ. This reflects the dicta of
Lord Hobhouse in Government ofNewfoundland v Newfoundland Railway Company (1888) 13 App Cas 199 at
212.
1252 The Smaro [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep 225 at 243 per Rix J.
1253 This was accepted by Lloyd LJ: 'It is elementary that an assignment, whether legal or equitable, cannot
transfer the burden of a contract' (at 151).
1254
Indeed, if the assignee company is associated with the director, he may be personally liable: see Companies
Act 1985, sections 320 and 322.
1255 For which, see chapter 2 above, part I, C.
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however, it now seems to be generally accepted that the agreement to arbitrate may, and very
often will, lead an existence entirely separate from the contract to which it relates. Such an
autonomous agreement is unaffected by the invalidity of the terms of the contract.1256 As a
result, issues relating to validity and termination are still subject to arbitration. This would
suggest that an autonomous agreement to arbitrate is not accessory to the main claim; the
assignee is, therefore, neither bound by it, nor able to invoke it.1257
Second, one must focus on the debtor. Assuming the claim is assignable, the
fundamental principle of the law of assignation must be complied with, namely, that the
debtor must not be prejudiced by the assignation. Consequently, if the debtor could have
defended a claim by the cedent for payment in the arbitration, so too can he plead this against
an assignee. Focus on the debtor raises the fundamental question of whether claims subject to
arbitration clauses are assignable at all. If the debtor agreed to arbitrate only with the cedent,
there is an element of delectus personam, therefore the assignee of a claim cannot submit to
the proceedings, even he wants to, without the consent of the debtor.1258 (It should be noted in
parenthesis that the assignee who wants to submit to arbitration in a situation where the debtor
is arguing that it is subject to delectus personae, could argue that he is entitled to arbitrate in
the name of the cedent.1259 The right to litigate in the name of the cedent has been confirmed
in some Scottish cases, although, in this writer's opinion, this line of authority should not be
followed; in any event, suing in the cedent's name carries its own risks). If there is delectus
personae in the agreement, the claim is unassignable. The assignee may then recur against the
cedent for breach of warrandice.
F. The Assignee in Arbitration proceedings: the debtor's defences.
If the debtor's right to submit to arbitration does bind the assignee, the question
remains: what pleas can the debtor plead before the arbiter? Depending on the wording of the
1256
Moreover, it may be subject to a different law than the principal contract. Assignment introduces the
possibility of a third law (if the international private law rules of the lex fori apply a connecting factor other than
the law of the principal claim). See the discussion by Grisberger and Hausmaniger, op. cit., n. 1191, at 151 ff.
1257 See discussion by Girsberger and Hausmaniger, op. cit., 1191, at 136 ff.
1258 After all, the arbitration agreement will impose duties on both parties. If there is an assignation of a right
subject to the arbitration agreement, the cedent cannot be discharged from his liabilities under that arbitration
agreement without the consent of the debtor.
1259 See chapter 2, above.
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arbitration clause, the pleas available to the debtor may be wider or narrower than if the
assignee's claim had been pursued before a court. If the terms of arbitration are not
sufficiently wide, then the arbiter has no jurisdiction to give effect to a plea of
compensation.1260 Conversely, it seems that counterclaims which the debtor has against the
cedent may be pled in the arbitration.1261 If counterclaims are allowed, there will problems in
giving effect to these. The assignee is not responsible for the obligations of the cedent, so a
decree cannot be awarded against the assignee. Therefore, unless specific provision is made in
the arbitration agreement there could be a situation of continuous retention, for which see the
above discussion.
VII. Fourth Parties.
A. Fourth Parties and Fraud.
In the transfer of assets, the general principle is that the transferee is unconcerned with
1 9
the personal obligations of the transferor. The assignation of personal rights is, apparently,
different:
"But in personal rights the fraud of authors is relevant against singular
successors though not partaking or conscious of the fraud when they
purchased; because assignees are but mere procurators, albeit in rem suam\ and
therefore they are in the same case with their cedents, except that their cedents'
oaths after they were denuded, cannot prejudge their assignees."1263
This passage is somewhat contradictory. If assignees are only mere procurators, then why
does Stair refer to the cedent being 'denuded'? Stair's analysis was strongly criticised by Bell
in his Commentaries nbA Assignation today is understood as a transfer. That the outdated
language of procuratio is still used is unfortunate and confusing. Once it is accepted that
assignation is a transfer then the position should, in principle, be the same as in the transfer of
other assets. Where the fraud has been perpetrated against the cedent, but not in the contract
out of which the assigned claim arose, then this should not affect subsequent bona fide
onerous assignees.
1260 McEwan v Middleton (1866) 5 M 159 followed in Wilson v Porter (1880) 17 SLR 675 at 676 per Lord
President Inglis.
1261 See e.g. Rules of International Commercial Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (1998,
ICC publication no. 581) Art. 5, reproduced in Davidson, Arbitration, Appendix IV, at 525.
1262 Reid, Property para 694.
1263 Stair IV.xl.21. See also Gosford's report ofDuffv Fowler (1672) Mor 10282.
1264 Commentaries (2nd ed. 1810), 150, note n; (3rd ed. 1816) I, 182; (7th ed. 1870) I, 303, in reference to the
earlier passage at I.x.16, for which see n. 1484 above.
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In McDonnells v Carmichael1265 CI assigned to C2 a debt owed to CI by D. C2 then
assigned to C3. C3 was in good faith and took for value. CI then sought reduction of the
assignation. C3 claimed his position was unassailable. The defect was extrinsic to the claim
assigned. The pursuers, however, argued that the distinction was between dolus dans causam
contractui and dolus incidens in contractum. Fraud of the former type rendered the transfer
1966 • •
null and void. A bona fide onerous transferee was therefore unprotected. This distinction
arguably confuses two matters. First, it was argued that dolus dans causam contractui was in
the transfer rather than in the claim assigned. It is unclear whether even an essential error,
• 1967 •
induced by fraud, in the transfer should prejudice third parties. The consensual argument is
that there is a total exclusion of consent; therefore, since there is no consensus in idem, there
can be no animus transferendi. The contrary view is that fraud is a vice of consent and renders
any conveyance only voidable. Bona fide transferees for value are therefore protected.
Secondly, if such fraud were to be effective against third parties, it can only be on the basis
that fraud is real vice.1268 The court, however, granted the reduction. Lord Karnes, though not
dissenting, had difficulty with the decision:
"The difference between the case of nomina debitorum and the other cases is
this, and it is mentioned by Lord Stair, - An assignee is nothing else than a
procurator in rem suam. Hence, in England, at this day, an assignee must
pursue in the name of his cedent. With us an assignee is now held to have the
total right. In that respect the law has changed. Why should not the effects of
assignations also be changed? For want of this change, our law is, in one
particular, a sort of hotch-potch; but we cannot help that."1269
1265
(1772) Mor 4974; Hailes 513.
1266 Resolutio jure dantis resolvitur jus accepientis (the right of the giver having ceased or become void, the right
of the receiver ceases also). This apparent principle is not an accurate statement of law then or now, although it
is discussed by the Court in Heron v Stewart and Hawthorn (1749) Mor 1705; Kilkerran 389; Elchies, Fraud,
No. 21 aff d (1749) 1 Craigie, Stewart and Paton 432. It was also invoked in Livingston v Menzies (1705) Mor
14004; Sinclair v Shaw (1739) 5 Br Sup 658; Elchies, Arrestment No. 11; Kilkerran 36; Countess ofMoray v
Stewart (1772) Mor 4392; Elliot v Wilson 9th February 1826 FC and in Johnstone-Beattie v Dalzell (1868) 6 M
333 at 346 per Lord Ardmillan. Cf. T. Hue, Commentaire heorique et pratique du code civil (1894) vol VII, 299-
300 and P. Malaurie and L. Aynes, Droit civil: obligations vol 3 (1 le ed. 2001) para 82.
1267
Compare McBryde, Contract, para 13-08. There is controversy in the sources, see in particular Morrison v
Robertson 1908 SC 332; McLeod v Kerr 1965 SC 253 at 256 per Lord President Clyde; T.B. Smith, Short
Commentary on the Law of Scotland (1962), 816; idem, 'Error and the Transfer of Title' (1967) 12 JLSS 206;
idem, Property Problems in Sale (1978), 170 ff; McBryde, Contract paras 15-83 ff; Reid, Property para 617
notes that error as to persona may be a real vice.
1268 See J. van den Sande, De Actionum Cessione (trans. P. C. Anders, 1906, Commentary on Cession of
Actions), 240 and see below.
1269 Halies 513. Cf. Karnes, Principles ofEquity (2nd ed. 1767), 206.
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Professor McBryde has charted the history of the effect of fraud on assignees.1270 He suggests
that the Court probably first gave effect to the law as articulated by Stair in Burden v
1 971
Whitefoord of Dundass. This case however can only be fully understood in light of the
comment by Lord Pitfour in McDonells v Carmichael}212 Burden apparently involved a
reduction of a disposition elicited from one Kennedy while he was drunk, 'in so far as the
property was not vested in a third party by infeftment'.1273 Since the third party transferee was
not infeft, there could be no problem with reduction.1274 There was no bona fide onerous
transferee. In any event, it is not apparent what relevance a case dealing with the disposition
of heritage has to a rule which is said to be peculiar to assignation.
The other relevant case is Irvin v Osterbye.1215 Here there was a competition between
an assignee to a bond and an arrester. The arrester was the insurer of a ship. The ship had been
damaged. The arresters had paid out to the master on the basis that the ship had been a total
loss. In fact the ship was repaired and sold. A representative of the master bought it. The
whole circumstances of the case were fraudulent. The master bought the ship back from his
representative and granted him a bill for the price. This was assigned to the assignees. The
insurers arrested the bill. It seems that the arrester was preferred to the bond but the basis of
the decision is unclear. There was no mention of intimation of the assignation, so it may be
that the arrester was preferred on the ordinary principle that an arrestment is to be preferred to
an unintimated assignation.
B. Redfearn v Sommervails.1276
This case can be seen as one of the most controversial, or at any rate important,
decisions of the House of Lords in the private law of Scotland. It is as a result of the decision
1270 Contract paras 14-93 to 14-101. See also McBryde's contribution to K.G.C. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds.)
A History ofPrivate Law in Scotland (2000) vol II, 72, v. 'Error'.
1271
(1742) Elchies, Fraud No. 11.
1272
(1772) Hailes 513 at 514.
1273 Lord Pitfour, ibid.
1274
Though Lord Pitfour was nevertheless in favour of reduction in McDonnells on the ground that 'an
assignation to a mere personal right gives no security: it is extinguishable by compensation or by payment. In it
the assignee wholly relied on the warrandice of the cedent'.
1275
(1755) Mor 1715; 6th March 1755 FC.
1276
(1813) 1 Dow 50; 5 Pat App 707. The reports are unsatisfactory. Dow's report is not a verbatim report of the
speeches, but a second-hand account. Paton's report contains no trace of the arguments presented before the
House. A full transcript of the arguments can be found in House of Lords Cases vol 45 in the Signet Library.
Attempts to track down the session papers of the proceedings before the Court of Session have been
unsuccessful. Note that in the General Index ofNames the parties are listed under 'Sommerville v Redfearn'.
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in Redfearn that it can be stated with certainty that the position in modern law is that an
assignee (with one exception) is not subject to the extrinsic obligations of the cedent.
Although the point had previously been decided by the Court of Session,1277 there are several
dicta which suggest that their Lordships in Redfearn paid scant regard to the existing Scottish
• • • 197R 197Q
authorities and imposed a new rule, albeit one 'for the benefit of society'. Hostility to
Redfearn stems from the opinion of Lord President Hope in Gairdner v Royal Bank of
Scotland where he stated that, 'You must know the situation of the party with whom you
transact. Look to the case of Sommervail, founded upon by the defenders ... Even as matters
stood, I think the case was wrong [sic] decided in the House of Lords. I thought that the
cedent could only communicate to the assignee of the right tantum et tale as he possessed
• 1280it'. However the position was not as clear as the Lord President imagined. The history of
the law on the effect of the personal obligations of an author on a transferee is confused. As
• 1281far as creditors are concerned, the matter has only recently been authoritatively resolved.
The issue, however, is a general one. It is not peculiar to assignations; as a result, it cannot be
discussed further here.
1277 See e.g. Anderson v Dempster (1702) Mor 10213.
1278 Lord Balgray in Gordon v Cheyne (1824) 3 S 566 at 568; Lord Gillies at 570 and Lord President (Hope) at
571; Littlejohn v Black (1855) 18 D 207 at 219 per Lord Ivory; North British Railway Co v Lindsay (1875) 3 R
168 at 176 per Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff: 'it was conceded that the previous rule of the law of Scotland was
otherwise [prior to Redfearn] and the judgement proceeded on views of expediency which prevailed in the law of
England'. This was quoted with approval by Lord Keith of Avonholm in the English appeal BS Lyle v Rosher
[1959] 1 WLR 8 HL, who then commented that, 'though a Scots decision [i.e. Redfearn] I have little doubt that
Lord Eldon LC and Lord Redesdale were applying English law and would have reached the same decision in
like circumstances in an English case'. This seems to be the only situation since Heritable Reversionary in which
Redfearn has been considered by the House of Lords. However, compare the (perhaps more accurate) opinion of
Lord Moncreiff, in Burns v Lawrie's Trs (1840) 2 D 1348 at 1356: 'The case of Redfearn was decided on the
general ground, and on a principle not new to the law, though previously overruled'.
1279 Lord Balgray, ibid.
1280 June 22nd 1815 FC.
245
Transfer ofMoney Claims in Scots Law
1281 Burnett's Tr. v Grainger 2004 SC (HL) 19.
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Chapter 6
Validity
I. Contract and Conveyance: causal or abstract relationship.
A. General.
There is almost no consideration in the Scottish sources of the relationship between the
constituent elements of an assignation. This relationship is crucial for the purposes of any
discussion on validity. If the contract to assign (the obligationary agreement) and the
assignation (the transfer agreement)1282 are separate, then invalidity of the contract does not
necessarily entail the invalidity of the conveyance, and vice versa.1283 This is the principle of
abstraction (Abstraktionsprinzip). By contrast, if an assignation is causal in nature, i.e. that a
valid transfer requires valid basis or cause (justa causa), invalidity of the underlying
obligationary agreement will invalidate the transfer.1284 In the case of the transfer of
immoveables, Scots law probably follows an abstract approach.1285 The transfer of corporeal
i ^O/- i 907
moveables at common law is probably the same, but the point is not undisputed. The
1282 This distinction is important. In the transfer of real rights, the distinction is between obligationary agreement
and real agreement. The distinction was first recognised by C.F. von Savigny, System des heutigen romischen
Rechts (1840-1849) III, 313; although traces can also be found in R.J. Pothier, Traite du droit de domaine de
propriete (1771) § 231. See discussion in C.G. van der Merwe, Sakereg (2nd ed. 1989), 301 ff. 'Real agreement'
is not appropriate for the transfer of claims: cession (properly so-called) transfers personal, not real, rights;
'transfer agreement' is therefore preferred.
1283 Cf. Dobie v McFarlane (1854) 17 D 97 where the reduction of the whole transaction was held to be
unnecessary; reduction of the title on which the defender held the claim was sufficient.
1284 Cf. McBryde, Contract para 13-01 ff. and Reid, Property para 608. The history of the abstraction principle in
the jus commune is complex. It only emerged in its modern form in the nineteenth century. The Scottish history
may be different, but the point cannot be explored here. In the early jus commune, where outright transfer of
claims was not possible, the maxim was cessio sine causa facta non valet: K. Luig, 'Zession und
Abstraktionsprinzip' in H. Coing and W. Wilhelm (eds.) Wissenschaft und Kodifikation des Privatrechts im 19.
Jahrhundert (1977) 112 at 121. Luig attributes this to Rolandinus', Summa artis notariae (1255). See too
Grosskopf, Geskiedenis, 65, n. 156.
1285 Reid, Property para 611, citing Stair Il.iii. 14. Cf. D.L. Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law
(1991) para 8-06 and idem, 'Systems of Property: Stair and Grotius' in D.L. Carey Miller and D.W. Meyers (eds)
Comparative and Historical Essays in Scots Law (1992) 28-30.
1286 The Sale of Goods Act 1893, and now the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended), introduced an essentially
causal theory into the sale of corporeal moveables - but not completely. For example, A agrees to sell a camera
to B. B gives a cheque and takes delivery. There is no specific agreement as to the date of transfer; however, rule
1 of s. 18 states that property passes on conclusion of the contract. B's cheque bounces. A does not regain
ownership by the mere act of rescinding the contract: B is the owner. To reinvest A with ownership, B will have
to redeliver the camera to A (it is not a sale so common law applies). Cf. Erskine III.iii.11 and some of the obiter
dicta in McLeod v Kerr 1965 SC 235 which deal with the (irrelevant) arguments presented to the court, for
which see: T.B. Smith, Property Problems of Sale (1978) and Reid, Property para 610. Cf. L.P.W. van Vliet,
Transfer ofMovables in German, French, English and Dutch Law (2000) at 24 who suggests that rescission of a
causal sale has real resolutive effect; and, for the position in Roman law, Zimmermann, Obligations, 716 ff.,
especially at 731 f.
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abstract approach is consistent with the methods by which a transfer is achieved in Scots law;
in particular, the sale of heritable property: the completion of missives, the delivery of the
disposition, followed by the recording or registration of it, being the three distinct elements.
The missives and the disposition are quite distinct. They usually occur at different times. By
contrast, while in principle the three stages, which should occur prior to the transfer of a
money claim, (contract to assign, delivery of written assignation, and intimation)1288 are
similarly distinct in principle, this is not always the case in practice. It is not unusual for the
contract to assign and the assignation to be combined in the one deed.12883 This is potentially
problematic. It is common for commercial agreements to embody only an agreement or
undertaking to assign.1289 Such an agreement, however, is only the first stage of a three-stage
process.1290 It is a typical example of the overemphasis on the contractarian approach to
commercial transactions.1291 Similarly, a clause whereby the cedent 'agrees to assign' is
inconsistent with one in which the cedent 'hereby assigns'1292 a claim. The first is an
obligation to perform a juridical act in the future; the latter a de praesenti conveyance.1293
Matters are complicated by the fact that Scots law, on the predominant view,
subscribes to the Abstraktionsprinzip with regard to immoveables and corporeal moveables (at
common law), yet the law of assignation evolved under the influence of French law.1294
1287 Cf. Reid, Property para 609 and McBryde, Contract para 13-08.
1288
Although where there is a donation or an assignation by an executor there may be no contract.
1288a R. Bruce Wood, 'Special Considerations for Scotland' in F. Salinger, Factoring: the Law and Practice of
Invoice Finance (3rd ed. 1999) para 7-39. It should be observed, however, that his need not of itself be
problematic. For example, in German law on the transfer of immoveables, the Kaufvertrag and the Auflassung
are often found in the one deed. But German lawyers are well-versed in the importance of the
Abstraktionsprinzip; many Scots lawyers are not.
1289 See e.g. Bank ofScotland Cashflow Finance v Heritage International Transport Ltd 2003 SLT (Sh Ct) 107.
Cf. S. Scott, the Law ofCession (2nd ed. 1991), 8-9.
1290 Bank ofScotland v Liquidators ofHutchison, Main & Co 1914 SC (HL) 1. Cf. McBryde, Contract para 12-
58 who speaks of a two stage process. This seems to overlook the fact that the conveyance only occurs on
intimation of the transfer agreement to the debtor and that it is the transfer agreement that must be intimated, not
the contract to transfer.
1291 K.G.C. Reid, 'Unintimated Assignations' 1989 SLT (News) 267 discussing Lombard North Central Ltd v
Lord Advocate 1983 SLT 361. This writer would not, however, agree with all Reid's conclusions; in particular,
that an implied assignation (cessio legis) is never possible.
1292 See e.g. Bell, Commentaries (7th ed. 1870) II, 16.
1293 The following egregious example is taken from the standard publishing agreement which the author was
required to subscribe by W. Green, the Scottish Law Publisher, for publication in the Juridical Review in March
2003: 'In consideration of the above payment, I hereby agree to grant licence and assign to W. Green the sole
and exclusive right to publish the work for commercial gain...'. How can one simultaneously grant licence and
assign? If there is an assignation, the cedent has no title to grant licence. Alternatively, this clause succeeds in
granting a licence, with only a personal obligation to assign in the future ('I hereby agree...to assign'). Does this
really reflect the intention of the parties?
1294 See chapter 3 above.
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Cession de creance in French law is treated as a sale.1295 Sale in French law is causal in
nature.1296 While French law requires intimation in the same way that Scots law does, the
causal nature of the transaction means that cession takes effect 'as between' the parties on
conclusion of the agreement, but only in respect to third parties on formal intimation to the
debtor.1297
What, then, of the Scottish sources? Professor Reid refers to Stair's 'masterly'1298
analysis:
"There may be three acts of the will about the disposal of rights: a resolution to
dispone, a paction, contract or obligation to dispone, and a present will or
consent that that which is the disponer's will be the acquirer's. Resolution
terminates with the resolver, and may be dissolved by contrary resolution, and
so transmits no right: paction does only constitute or transmit a personal right
or obligation, whereby the person obliged may be compelled to transmit the
real right. It must needs then be the present dispositive will of the owner, which
conveyeth the right to any other..." 299
The controversial element in this passage is the repetition of the verb 'transmit'.
Where corporeal or immoveable property is being transferred, the contract will create a
personal right in favour of the intended transferee whereby he is entitled to demand that the
transferor executes a real agreement which will allow him to effect a transfer (in Stair's
example, the real right of ownership). Does this analysis fit where the object of the transfer is
a personal right itself? According to Stair, 'paction does only constitute or transmit a personal
right'. There are two ways of looking at this passage. First, since an assignation is the transfer
of a personal right, what Stair is saying is that mere agreement is necessary: 'paction ... does
transmit a personal right'.1300 The second - and, it is submitted, the correct - approach would
be to look at the reference to 'transmit' in the context of the first line: 'there may be three acts
1295 Art. 1690 Code Civil. This article is in the final part of Title 6 on 'Vente\ A similar structure is found in the
Spanish code: Art. 1526 f Codigo Civil. However, this does not mean that a gratuitous cession is impossible in
French law. See F. Terre, P. Simler and Y. Lequette, Droit civil: Les obligations (8th ed. 2002) para 1275 and H.
Kotz, Europaisches Vertragsrecht (1996) § 14, at 405, n. 12 (trans. T. Weir, European Contract Law (1997) §
14, n. 12). In Scots law, a donation of a right must be effected by an intimated assignation: Alderwick v Craig
1916 2 SLT 161 OH.
1296 Arts. 1134 and 1583 Code Civil. See generally L. van Vliet, Transfer of Movables in German, French,
English and Dutch Law (2000) p. 74. Cf. Pothier, Traite du contrat de vente (1762) §§ 307-312.
1297 The debtor is also a third party. The respective positions in France and Germany provide an interesting
parallel: Germany requires registration for the transfer of land, but only delivery of the transfer agreement for
claims; France does not require registration for the transfer of immoveables but insists on relatively formal
intimation to the debtor for the transfer of claims. Scotland, characteristically, exhibits elements of both systems.
1298
Reid, Property para 606.
1299 Stair III.ii.3 (emphasis added).
1300 Cf. Keith v Grant (1792) Mor 2933; 3 Ross LC 308 at 315; 14th November 1792 FC it is reported that it was
observed from the bench that, 'In personal rights the law holds an obligation to convey and conveyance to be the
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of the will about the disposal of rights'; and the reference to personal right as
contradistinguished from the real right. In transfers of corporeal moveables or immoveables,
the transfer is of ownership. Ownership is a real right. Analysing the stages of transfer in
assignation requires some sophistication: the object of the transfer is a personal right. Stair's
usage of 'transmit' is ambiguous. From the context, however, it clear that he is actually
referring to the creation ('constitution') of a personal right, i.e. the personal right to demand
an assignation. Since an assignation is just a transfer of a personal right, Stair is referring to
stage two, i.e. a personal right to a personal right.1301
Before leaving this passage from Stair, one point of criticism may be levelled. Stair
makes no mention of the need for completion of the transfer, i.e. recording (immoveables);
delivery (moveables); intimation (claims). A mere resolution to transfer on the part of the
transferor and a resolution to accept transfer on the part of the transferee generally not
1302sufficient to effect a transfer at common law, as Stair himself vigorously asserts elsewhere.
B. Intention and Revocable assignations.
Many Scottish cases involve assignations made by a father in favour of his children, or
a wife in favour of her husband, 'for love and favour and affection'.1303 Historically,
donations made between husband and wife (donatio inter virum et uxorem)n 4 were revocable
during the lifetime of the donor.1305 This was the case even where they bore to be
same; and, therefore, everybody liable in absolute warrandice is bound to grant the same'. However, Keith was
an accretion case.
1301 Creditors ofBenjenward, Competing (1753) Mor 743 at 744; Kames Sel Dec 75 per Lord Karnes: 'there is
such a thing as an imperfect right to a personal debt...'
1302
E.g. Stair Il.iii. 16: 'nulla sasina nulla terra' (land); III.ii.5 (moveables); III.i.6 (claims). Cf. Reid, Property
paras 619 (A.J. Gamble); 644 and 652; and G.L. Gretton, 'Assignation of Contingent Rights' 1993 JR 23.
1303 See geneially the excellent work by D. Murray, The Law Relating to the Property of Married Persons
(Glasgow, 1891). Not only was Murray a scholar of great ability, he was also one of the founding partners of
McLay, Murray and Spens, solicitors. See generally, M.S. Moss, 'Murray, David (1842-1928)' DNB (2004).
1304 For which see A.G.M Duncan (ed.) Trayner's Latin Maxims (4th ed. 1894, reprinted 1993) and authority
there cited.
1305
Following the rule in Roman law, as it had evolved in the jus commune, marriage was viewed as a product of
love and harmony and could not be bought: see e.g. Ulpian, D. 24, 1,3 pr. See, generally, D. Murray, The Law
Relating to the Property ofMarried Persons (1891) §§ 14 ff citing, inter alios, R.J. Pothier, Traite des donations
entre mari et femme in M. Bugnet (ed.) CEuvres de Pothier (Paris, 1861) vol 7, 499 ff. The French Coutumes
seem to have been particularly influential on the seventeenth century Scottish rules on matrimonial property: see
E.M. Clive, The Law of Husband and Wife in Scotland (4th ed. 1997), 219 and authority there cited; and, in
particular, D. Murray, op. cit. Cf. Inglis v Loury (1676) Mor 6131: 'The Lords found that the assignation of an
heritable bond being a donation by a wife to her husband during the marriage, that the same was revocable by the
wife at any time in her life, even after the husband's death, by a posterior assignation, which was effectual
against every singular successor, though acquiring bona fide from the husband for onerous cases; and found, that
albeit a provision to the wife, during the marriage, where there was no contract or prior provision, is not
revocable, the man naturally obliged to provide his wife, this does not hold in an assignation in favours of a wife
250
The Transfer ofMoney Claims in Scots Law
irrevocable.1306 In modern law, inter-marital assignations1307 are as irrevocable as an
assignation made to an unrelated assignee.1308
As a general principle, however, revocability can only apply to the personal obligation
to assign.1309 Revocation is simply ineffective after the assignation has been intimated. A
judicial reduction will be required and the debtor will have to be called as a party to the
action. In approaching these issues, a useful starting point is to ask: is assignation a unilateral
or a bilateral act in Scots law? This is an issue of some nicety. Whether transfer is a unilateral
or bilateral act goes deep into the fundamentals of the law of transfer; well beyond the
boundaries of the law of assignation. It is thought that assignation is a bilateral act.
Acceptance of delivery of the assignation by the assignee, even implicitly, is necessary.1310
That the debtor has consented to the assignation is not relevant: the assignee's consent is an
essential requirement; the debtor's is not.1311 Fortunately, in the Scots law of transfer, it is
difficult to voluntarily transfer a right without the consent of the assignee. An additional step
(registration, delivery, intimation) is usually required to effect the transfer. And it is the
putative transferee who ought to carry out this act: registration of the disposition in the case of
land; intimation of the assignation in the case of claims.1312 (Were it otherwise, the cedent
could transfer claims into the patrimony of the assignee without the latter's consent1313). A
transferee or donee may have good reasons for not wanting the benefit to be transferred to, or
granted to her husband, though there were no contract, unless the assignation did bear to implement her contract
of marriage'.
1306 Cousin v Caldwell (1838) 16 S 109; Jardine v Currie (1830) 8 S 937.
1307 We should perhaps not stray into the realm of extra-marital 'assignations'.
1308 Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act 1920, s. 5.
1309 See e.g. Scot v Scot (1665) Mor 1344. In Trotters v Lundy (1667) Mor 11498 it was held that after intimation
a father could not revoke an assignation to his daughter. This much is uncontroversial and, indeed, obvious: the
assignee is now the creditor.
1310 See Reid, Property para 613. In Bailey's Trs v Bailey 1954 SLT 282 at 287, Lord President Cooper stated
that 'as [the assignation] has been accepted, intimated and acted upon, it is now irrevocable by the grantor'. This
one of the few instances where there is a suggestion that acceptance of the assignation (i.e. the transfer
agreement) is required. This is not the same as a contractual acceptance. Acceptance of delivery will be
necessary, otherwise the assignee will have nothing to intimate to the debtor. But must there also be an intention
to transfer at the moment of transfer, i.e. on intimation? The point is rarely made, though it is by Windscheid,
Pandektenrechts § 330, at 366, and C.G. van der Merwe, Sakereg (2nd ed. 1989), 302-303. Contracts are often
formed despite a lack of consensus on conclusion: for example, an offeror seeks to revoke an offer. Before the
revocation reaches the offeree, the offeree's acceptance is communicated. There is a contract though one of the
parties had done everything in his power not to be bound: Costigan, 'Constructive Contracts' (1907) 19 Green
Bag 512.
1311 Lord Chorley and J. Milnes Holden, The Law of Banking (6th ed. 1974), 42 remark that, 'Conversely an
assignment is not effective until the assignee has notice of it, though the debtor may have assented to it' (my
emphasis). It is difficult to accept that, in English law, an assignment is a unilateral act and that an assignee can
have a right forced upon him by mere notice. But this is the prevailing view: Sir Guenter Treitel, The Law of
Contract (11th ed. 2003), 680.
1312
Adopting a bilateral analysis is consistent with the view that only the assignee can intimate the assignation;
otherwise, the cedent could force the transfer on the assignee. This is discussed in chapter 4, 'intimation' above.
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conferred upon, him. These may be moral or immoral, rational or irrational, honourable or
dishonourable. Whatever the reason, the basic tenet of individual autonomy which underlies
the legal principles applicable to consensual transactions require consensus. It is objectionable
that a transferee's patrimony can be enlarged by the act of another contrary to the transferee's
wishes. How can anyone then refute accusations of accepting bribes? Are unilaterally
conferred benefits taxable? Indeed, for this reason, it seems to this writer that the unilateral
promise found in Scots law, binding without acceptance, is objectionable. It is not sufficient
to argue that the transferee can always renounce any rights or property given to him. Indeed,
if this is all a transferee can do, the process of donation and renunciation could go on
indefinitely.1314
What, then, if the transferor purports to intimate or register, i.e. complete the transfer?
This occurred in Burnett v Morrow.1315 H was to assign a bond and disposition in security he
held to M. H instructed his agent, B to do so. B prepared the assignation and recorded it. M
was ignorant of this until sometime after. M demanded delivery of the assignation from B. B
refused: he had not received instructions from his client to do so; further, H had not paid B for
his work, so he was entitled to retain the assignation. M then offered to settle the account in
return for delivery. Still B refused. The disposal of the case turned on issues of proof.
However, Lord Deas made some important remarks about the role of delivery of a
conveyance in effecting a transfer:
"It is quite true that registration of a deed may be delivery - particularly
registration which is equivalent to infeftment. But registration after all is only
constructive and not actual delivery.... The object of constructive delivery is
open to evidence...13153 The import of [that evidence] here is, that neither the
grantee, nor any one entitled to act for him, knew anything till long afterwards,
either of the granting or recording of the assignation. This being so, did the
recording bind the grantee? Certainly not. It might have been a deed which it
was neither convenient nor profitable for him to accept, but the reverse; and if
he would not in that case have been held to have accepted delivery, it is hard to
see how the mere act of registration can be conclusive against the granter, that
he intended such registration to be delivery."1316
1313 See discussion below and in chapter 4 above, 'Intimation'.
1314 Cf. HMV Fields Properties Ltd v Bracken Self Selection Fabrics Ltd 1991 SLT 31. Admittedly, however,
there are other examples. For example, rights of beneficiaries under trusts are conferred without the beneficiary's
consent.
1315
(1864) 2 M 929.
13l5a What Lord Deas understands by delivery here is ambiguous. Registration cannot be the equivalent to
delivery of the disoposition: on Lord Deas' own argument, delivery is needed for Registration to take effect.
Lord Deas must mean that registration is the equivalent to delivery in the case of corporeal moveables.
1316 Ibid at 934. Cf. Burnett's Tr. v Grainger 2004 SC (HL) 19 at para [88] per Lord Rodger of Earlsferry.
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A deed recorded in the Register of Sasines is subject to the ordinary principles of
property law. An application for registration must be made by the grantee or a solicitor acting
for the grantee. The reservations expressed by Lord Deas might not be applicable to a title
registered in the Land Register; although arguably the register would be inaccurate. However,
what if the assignation in the Burnett case had been of a personal right? There is no delivery
of the assignation and the cedent intimates.1317 The reservations expressed by Lord Deas
would apply equally in that situation: there would be no transfer (although the debtor could
doubtless validly pay the assignee). As a result, in this writer's view, an intention to transfer
must be accompanied with an intention to receive (animus accipiendi). The consent may be
implied as well as expressed.1318 The general principle is that there must be an intention to
transfer and a concomitant intention to receive. The intention to transfer is manifested in the
delivery of the assignation by the cedent:1319 'Delivery to the grantee, whereby the granter
puts the voluntary deed beyond his own power, is the expression of his final purpose
concerning such deed'. This principle is common sense and efficacious. It would
suggest that after delivery, a disposition or assignation is irrevocable. While this seems
inconsistent with the underlying principle that voluntary conveyances require consent and that
this consent be present at the moment of transfer, it is certain. Registration of the assignation
in the books and Council of Session would suffice for delivery.1322
Assuming assignation to be a bilateral act, can the cedent revoke his assignation
before intimation of the assignation? At the very least, this revocation must be intimated to
the debtor to be effectual. There is no problem if revocation occurs prior to delivery of the
assignation (i.e. before there is a transfer agreement); although revocation may be a breach of
1323
contract. If the assignation has been delivered, the issue is more problematic. Must the
1317 In Jarvie's Tr. v Jarvie's Trs (1887) 14 R 411 at 416, Lord President Inglis suggested that delivery of the
assignation is not necessary if there is intimation by the cedent. This cannot be correct. See discussion in chapter
4 above, 'Intimation'.
1318 In some cases silence may denote acceptance. Cf. Commaille v Steyn 1914 CPD 1100 at 1103: 'Silence is
equivalent to consent where it is one's duty to speak' approved in Seeff Commercial and Industrial Properties
(Pty) Ltd v Silberman 2001 (3) SA 952 SCA.
1319 It has been held that the raising of diligence in the name of the assignee is equivalent to delivery: Dick v
Oliphant (1677) Mor 6548; but this is contrary to principle: the assignation needs to be lodged in process for an
effectual judicial intimation.
1320 A.M. Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed. 1882), 102.
1321 Cf. McBryde, Contract, para 4-09: "The requirement of delivery is in the interests of the granter. It enables
the granter to prepare documents but to have a change of mind up to a certain point. Documents can be redrafted
or destroyed. A draft, even if signed, is not binding. The law has taken the view that delivery is the irrevocable
stage, rather than signature in the solitude of the granter's study. At least, that is the normal rule."
1322 Tennent v Tennent's Trs (1869) 7 M 936 at 948 per Lord President Inglis.
1323 Cf. Sinclair v Purves (1707) Mor 11572 where warrandice from fact and deed was held to exclude a power
of revocation. Analogously, a donation is only revocable up to and until delivery: Erksine III.iii.90.
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animus transferendi be present only on the delivery of the deed? Or must it be continuously
present until intimation? Can the cedent intimate to the debtor prior to intimation of the
assignation that he has revoked?1324 It is not usually suggested that the transferor of
immoveable property could prevent the passage of property to the disponee by intimating the






(ii) Justified revocation (e.g. fraud on the part of the assignee)
(iii) Incapacity supervening between delivery and intimation
(iv) Death supervening between delivery and intimation
Capricious revocation is the type of revocation that the rule on delivery of deeds seeks
to prevent. Justified revocation depends on whether it is actually possible to rescind a transfer
agreement on the basis of unlawful inducement. However, it is thought that, as far as the
transfer agreement is concerned, unilateral rescission will be ineffectual. A judicial reduction
is required. So, if prior to intimation by the assignee, the cedent learns that he was
fraudulently induced into delivering the assignation, he could interdict the assignee from
intimating; or, more likely, bring an action to reduce the assignation. Calling the debtor as a
party will similarly interpel him from paying the assignee. Where the validity of the
assignation is questioned, the debtor must always be protected.1326 Therefore, providing he
can show that he paid in good faith he will be discharged. (It should be remembered that
1324
Interestingly, L. Aynes, Cession de contrat (1984) at 99 suggests that the resolution of a cession will not
have any effect vis-a-vis the debtor. Therefore, '... resolution^] du contrat de cession - lorsque la cession est
conventionnelle - sont, en elles-memes, sans effet sur ces relations, a moins qu'une nouvelle cession -
retrocession - retablisse le rapport cede-cedant. Dans les rapports internes du cedant avec le cessionnaire, la
convention de cession, comme tout contrat translatif, donne naissance a une obligation de garantie, que la nullite,
ou la resolution de la cession aux torts du cedant permet le cessionnaire d'invoquer. Mais elle ne produit aucun
effet sur le droit et l'obligation du cessionnaire envers le cede'.
1325 The question has rarely been focused far less answered. In principle, however, this writer does not see why a
unilateral revocation after delivery of the disposition will be of any avail to the disponer. If the disponer realises
that he has been fraudulently induced to deliver the disposition he could seek to interdict ad interim (pending
reduction) the disponee from registering. However, it seems unlikely that the same result can be achieved
without judicial intervention. Lord Inglis, when Dean of Faculty, once argued that, after delivery of the
disposition, there is nothing the disponer can do to prevent registration: Taylor v Farrie (1855) 17 D 639 at 643
arguendo. Cf. Stair III.ii.3. That the disposition cannot be revoked may not be the end of the world. What the
disponer could do is to grant a dispotion of the same subjects to a company controlled by him and attempt to
register first. There is the doubt that the disponer would be in breach of warrandice or that the second disponee
would be subject to the offside goals rule. However, if the disponer has granted the second disposition in order to
protect himself against fraud, it is unlikely that a fraudster could either seek damages for breach of warrandice or
seek to invoke the offside goals rule.
1326 Hall v Campbell and Gordon (1708) Mor 11350 involved a revocable assignation which was revoked.
However there was no discussion as to the effect of such a revocation on the debtor.
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payment to the assignee on a valid assignation is an equipollent of intimation). It is too much
to ask the debtor to inquire into whether the purported revocation was justified. But leaving
the issue of debtor protection to one side, the legal question remains: can a revocation have
any effect? That a judicial sanction is required for an effective revocation answers the
question: a purported capricious revocation, of itself, has no effect; further, it will not be
upheld by a court. A justified revocation also requires the judicial sanction; and, because it is
justified, the court will give effect to it. Where incapacity intervenes before delivery, the
assignee may have no remedy. The assignee cannot intimate conventionally without a deed of
assignation. There is authority for the view that if the cedent dies before delivery of an inter
vivos assignation, it is revoked by his death.1327 If the cedent becomes incapax, there will be
difficulties in proving that there has been an assignation (especially where it cannot be found)
even if judicial intimation is resorted to. Where incapacity supervenes after delivery there
seems no reason why intimation cannot follow.1328 It is provided by statute that intimation can
follow if the cedent dies between delivery and intimation.1329
Where there is an express power of revocation in the assignation, the position may be
different. For example, in Crockat v Brownmo an assignation which reserved a power of
revocation to the cedent was duly intimated. The right of revocation was subsequently
renounced but not intimated. Although the right to revoke had never been exercised, a
posterior assignee for value duly intimated was preferred. The basis for this decision is
unintelligible. But the general principle should prevail: following delivery of the assignation
there is no power to revoke, whether such a power is conferred in the transfer agreement or
1331
not. In this sense, an assignation, i.e. the transfer agreement, is intrinsically irrevocable.
1327
Stamfield's Creditors v Scot (1696) 4 Br Sup 344. But see n. 1329.
1328 Cf. § 130 II BGB: 'Auf die Wirksamkeit der Willenserklarung ist es ohne Einfluss, wenn der Erklarende
nach der Abgabe stirbt oder geschaftsunfahig wird'.
1329 Confirmation Act 1690, c. 26; APS, c. 56 and the Registration Act 1696, c. 39; APS, c. 41. Registration in
the Books of Council and Session may also follow after the death of the cedent: Summary Registration Act 1693,
c. 15, APS, c. 24. See, again, § 130 II BGB. Strang v Ross, Harper & Murphey (Sh Ct) 1987 SCLR 10 involved
a mandate to pay, not an assignation, as was assumed in argument and by the Sheriff. It was held that the
mandate was revoked by the death of the granter. Had the mandate really been an assignation, the decision
would have been inconsistent with statute.
1330
(1743) Elchies, Assignation No. 5. Compare those cases involving resolutive conditions where the court
invoked the maxim resolutio jure dantis, resolvitor jus accepientis ('The right of the giver having ceased, the
right of the receiver also ceases'): see e.g. Sinclair v Shaw (1739) 5 Br Sup 658; Elchies, Arrestment No. 11;
Kilkerran 36. And see discussion in chapter 5 above, 'the Debtor's Defences', Part VI, 'Fourth Parties'. Cf. K.
Luig, 'Zession und Abstraktionsprinzip', op. cit., n. 1284, 112 at 128, notes 63 and 64; and 130.
1331 Cf. Arklay's Trustees v. Arklay's Testamentary Trustees 1909 2 SLT 120 OH. The cedent transferred his
rights under two insurance policies to trustees for his family: his children in fee and his wife in liferent. He
reserved the right to bonus payments that may have become due under the policies. Some years later - after two
of his four children had died - the cedent purported to renounce the earlier reservation of bonus rights and
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The purported revocation of an assignation can lead to confusion. In Johnstone-Beattie
v Dalzell,m2 the pursuer entered into an ante-nuptial marriage contract with her husband to
which both their fathers were party. The bride's father agreed to transfer on his death a large
proportion of his assets to the trustees. The trustees were directed to pay a sum of £5000 to the
husband, six months after the death of the truster. The husband assigned this right in security
for advances. This was intimated to the trustees. Before the bride's father died, but after
intimation of the assignation, the marriage was dissolved by reason of the husband's adultery.
The bride and her father purported to revoke the transfer to the trustees. After the father's
death, the assignees demanded payment from the trustees. The wife sought declarator that the
assignations were null and void; that the marriage contract was dissolved before the sums
vested; and, that the assignations where subject to the implied condition that the marriage
would not be dissolved by reason of the husband's adultery.1333 The Lord Ordinary (Kinloch)
found that the assignees were entitled to prevail. He was of opinion that the whole purpose of
the arrangement was to aliment the newly-weds. However, 'if [the father] lived
inconveniently long, it might come to be very necessary for them to raise money, in order
simply to get along';1334 he continued, 'At the time of granting the assignation, [the husband]
was under no disqualification or forfeiture. He ex hypothesi validly divested himself at this
time of right in favour of his creditor. The right lay in his person unforfeited and undivested,
and it was assigned as such...It would be ludicrous to say that [the husband] could grant an
assignation, and straightaway render it ineffectual by going and committing adultery'. Had
the assignation not been granted, however, the husband would have been obliged to retransfer
any assets he had received under the marriage contract. This was an obligation personal to
him. The First Division reversed, but the reasons are unclear. While Lord President Inglis
accepted that 'no one doubts that the provisions of £5000 vested in the husband an assignable
interest,' he preceded this comment with this passage:
"It is very important to notice, in the first place, that this is a provision which
stands entirely in the form of an obligation to be performed after [the father's]
death; and, as will be seen, hereafter it is in some degree contingent even
transfer them in pursuance of the first assignation to the trustees. The issue was weather the estates of the two
children who had died in the interim were entitled to the proceeds. It was held that they were.
1332
(1868) 6 M 333. See the earlier proceedings reported at (1865) 5 M 340.
1333 See pursuer's pleas nos. (1), (4) and (6) at 335.
1334 At 338.
1335 At 339. For the law regarding the obligation of a husband to restore the tocher on a divorce on the ground of
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beyond that, because the performance of the obligation at all is dependent on
[the father] leaving sufficient means to discharge it."1337
This dictum is hardly illuminating. The obligation to pay was granted by the marriage
trustees. If the obligation was rendered contingent by the mere fact that the trust funds may
have been insufficient, then all personal obligations are thereby contingent. Lord Inglis'
answer to this was, '[a]ny interest, however contingent, is assignable; but; of course the right
of the assignee depends on what is the right of the cedent'.1338 The first part of this statement
• 1339
is wrong; the second part unhelpfully simplistic. By the marriage contract, the bride's
father bound himself to transfer assets to the trustees. If he had failed to do so, then the
beneficiaries could have required the trustees to sue the truster for implement of the contract.
The only contingency to which the right of the husband was subject was a temporal one: the
money was only payable six months after the truster's death. The right vested. The trustees
had been appointed. There was a debtor to whom intimation was made. Lord Inglis, however,
was ultimately persuaded by the Lord Ordinary's point that the husband, had he not assigned,
would have forfeited his right to the money. The assignee, therefore, could be in no better
position. However, on what basis would the husband have forfeited the right? If the husband
had breached the contract he would have been liable in damages. But how does this affect the
assignee's right of recovery? The assignee is not subject to the obligations of the cedent. In
any event, the pursuers argued that the marriage contract had come to an end, and had been
revoked.
The Johnstone-Beattie case is an example of how discussions of validity can over
complicate matters. Fortunately, Lord President Inglis took a common sense view. Since the
cedent could not have claimed the money, the assignee could not. This is a simple application
of the assignatus rule. The cedent was in breach of an implied term of the contract. The debtor
(the trustees) could therefore retain against the assignees. It was quite unnecessary, however,
to enter into a consideration of the assignation's validity.
1337 At 342.
1338 At 343.
1339 Unless Lord Inglis means assignable in the contractual sense; otherwise it is hard to see how unvested rights
(if this is not a contradiction in terms), which are liable to revocation, and where there is no debtor to whom to
intimate, can be transferred.
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II. General Grounds of Invalidity
A. Void and Voidable Assignations
1. General.
If an assignation is void, it is of no effect. There is no need to bring a reduction. An
action of declarator of nullity is appropriate. A conclusion for an order of retrocession in such
a case is a logical non-sequitur.1340 Assuming the debtor has not paid, if an assignation is void,
restitutio in integrum is irrelevant: the transfer was ineffectual and there is nothing to
return.1341 If the assignee has procured payment from the debtor on the basis of a void
assignation, the debtor is discharged is he was in good faith. But there is no basis on which
the assignee can retain the money: the assignee will have an obligation to pay this to the
cedent.
Vices of consent will render the contract,1342 conveyance1343 or both voidable. It is said
that a voidable contract may be rescinded. Rescission of a voidable contract must be
distinguished from rescission for material breach.1344 It is questionable whether a unilateral
rescission of a voidable contract would be effective.1345 There is House of Lords authority for
the proposition that rescission takes effect from the date of intimation of the rescission rather
than any judicial determination.1346 However the authority is problematic.1347 A completed,
but voidable, conveyance, by contrast, will effect a transfer of the claim. For a unilateral
declaration to effect a re-transfer of property is contrary to principle; in any event, it could be
1340 Cf. Pender v Commercial Bank ofScotland 1940 SLT 306 OH at 308 per Lord Robertson (Ordinary).
1341 Cf. Balls v J & W MacDonald 1909 2 SLT 310 OH where the argument was that the pursuer had no power to
assign an alimentary liferent. If correct, the assignation would have been void. Nevertheless, there was an
(unsuccessful) argument that since restitutio was not offered, there could be no reduction.
1342 See McBryde, Contract, chapter 13.
1343 See Reid, Property para 614 ff. The distinction was recognised in the pleadings in Wood v MacDonald 1970
SLT (Notes) 46 OH.
1344
McBryde, Contract para 13-21, n. 88 highlights the crucial distinction between rescission for material breach
and rescission of a voidable contract: 'Rescission of a voidable contract operates retrospectively. Rescission for
material breach is largely prospective in operation'.
1345 Cf. McBryde, Contract para 13-21: 'It is an unsettled question whether rescission of a voidable contract
requires a court order or merely the act of the party rescinding'. But, at para 20-05, McBryde states that,
'Rescission in cases where the contract is affected by invalidities of consent is an action of the court; following
material breach rescission is the act of the innocent party (and restitutio in integrum is not required)'.
1346 Westville Shipping Co vAbram Steamship Co 1923 SC (HL) 68 at 73 per Lord Atkinson. In the Outer House
in the Westville case (1922 SC 571 at 578), the Lord Ordinary (Hunter) suggested that 'when the [assignees]
definitely intimated rescission, they regained their substantial title, and the decree in the English action operating
as a re-assignation was pronounced before the record in the present action was closed, and all formal objections
were thereby removed'. The conduct of counsel before the House of Lords in the Westville case caused their
Lordships some consternation: see (1923) 15 Lloyd's L Rep 97. Compare Robinson v Robinson 1934 SLT 183 at
186.
1347 See discussion of the Westville case below.
258
The Transfer ofMoney Claims in Scots Law
prejudicial to the party purporting to rescind: the transferor would be reinvested with the
property and continue to hold any price paid for it.1348 A completed voidable conveyance,
therefore, must be judicially reduced. Before reduction, the assignee can assign the claim to
an onerous bona fide transferee who will not be subject to reduction by the original cedent;1349
conversely, if the cedent unlawfully induced the assignee to accept the assignation, the
assignee will lose the right to reduce the assignation if he (the assignee) in turn translates the
right.1350
Before a contract can be rescinded or a conveyance reduced, restiutio in integrum
must be possible.1351 In the case of an assignation, then, if the debtor has paid the assignee on
the basis of a voidable assignation, then restitutio is no longer possible. The claim, (i.e. the
object of the assignation) no longer exists: payment discharged the debt. If the debtor has not
yet made payment, the debtor must be called as a defender in any action of reduction so as to
bring the matter to his attention judicially. Where he has been duly cited and while such a
process is pending, it is thought that the debtor would not be able to pay the assignee in good
faith. He should consign the money into court. Even if the assignation has not been reduced to
1 10 1 "3
writing, reduction probably can, and should, still be pursued. An assignation, like any
other conveyance, can be reduced partially.1354
1348 A point ignored by Lord Atkinson in Westville.
1349
Redfearn v Sommerville (1813) 1 Dow 50. The obiter dicta in McLeod v Kerr 1965 SC 253 which suggest
that a valid rescission by a defrauded seller of the contract of sale will reinvest the seller with ownership are
wrong. See T.B. Smith, Property Problems in Sale (1978).
1350 Westville Shipping Co v Abram Steamship Co 1922 SC 571 at 581 per Lord President Clyde: '[The first
assignees] were precluded, by granting the sub-assignation, from doing anything inconsistent with the right than
to impugn the original assignation upon the validity of which the validity of the sub-assignation depended. In
short, the granting of the sub-assignation deprived the pursuers of their title....' The Westville case is
problematic. Throughout the case, it is assumed that the assignation was a contract which could be unilaterally
rescinded. There is nowhere in the reports any indication that any of the assignations were ever intimated.
Indeed, it is not clear whether there were actually two successive assignations. The Lord Ordinary suggests that
the first agreement might have been a direct sale of goods; in the Inner House the Lord President described the
first agreement as an 'agreement for the original assignation' (1922 SC 571 at 581); while, in the House of Lords
(1923 SC (HL) 68 at 71), Lord Dunedin had described the first agreement as an 'agreement ofassignation'.
1351 See generally J.S. McLennan, 'Restitutio in integrum and the Duty to Restore' (1973) 90 SALT 120 cited by
McBryde Contract para 13-22, n. 1.
1352
According to Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 11 (3)(a) writing is not required; although it
will be necessary to effect an intimation in terms of the Transmission of Moveable Property (Scotland) Act 1862
and at common law.
1353 The authority is conflicting. Brown v Hamilton District Council 1983 SLT 397 at 401 per Lord Justice-Clerk
Wheately; at 410 per Lord Dunpark, followed in M & I Instrument Engineers Ltd v Varsada 1987 SCLR 700
OH holds that partial reduction is competent. The Court in Brown declined to follow the decision of the First
Division in McLean v McLean 1976 SC 11 since the judgment there followed from a concession from counsel.
See also Lennox v Scottish Branch of the British Show Jumping Association 1996 SLT 353 OH. The comments
of the Second Division in Short's Tr v Chung 1991 SLT 472 at 476, that reduction is not appropriate where there
is no deed, were perhaps obiter. In any event there was no argument on the point. The position in Varsada is
preferable to that expressed by Lord Young in McLaren's Tr v National Bank ofScotland Ltd (1897) 24 R 920 at
927 apparently approved by the Lord Ordinary in Boyle's Tr v Boyle 1988 SLT 581 at 583C. Lord Young's
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In discussing so-called vices of consent and real vices it is important to distinguish
two different relationships. The first is the effect of some vice on the present conveyance, i.e.
some imposition upon the cedent. On the other hand, there may be numerous reasons why the
assignation is null which are not the result of any imposition on the cedent. For example, the
cedent may not be the debtor's creditor or the assignation may be forged.1355 Underlying these
distinctions, however, is the position of the debtor. The debtor may be able to validly
discharge the debt though the recipient may not be the debtor's creditor due to the invalidity
of the assignation.
2. Void Assignations.
(a) Nullity: Vices of Consent
Claims are incorporeal. If they cannot be owned,1356 far less possessed, they cannot be
stolen. Theft cannot be a relevant vice for the law of assignation claims.1357 It is probably the
case that force and fear renders an assignation (the real agreement) null.1358 Fraud is a vice of
consent and not a real vice.1359 A pactum illicitum is usually void. But what of a transfer
which follows on an illegal agreement? It has been held that an assignation may be void for
illegality. The classic situation in the sources is where the cedent assigns his rights against a
gambling debtor.1360 The law holds that the underlying gambling debt is void for illegality, as
dictum was directed at an alleged gratuitous alienation. His decision may have been coloured by the fact that
reduction was in the privative jurisdiction of the Court of Session and by the fact that reduction can also be
achieved in such a case by a conclusion for a declarator: see Raymond Harrison & Co's Tr v North West
Securities 1989 SLT 718 at 724L per Lord Clyde (Ordinary).
1354
McConachy v Mclndoe (1853) 16 D 315; Bain v Lady Seafield (1887) 14 R 939; Ball v J & WMacDonald
1909 2 SLT 310 OH; Broadley v Wilson 1991 SLT 69 OH. It is of some interest that § 139 BGB suggests that
partial reduction is not competent under German law. As it happens, partial reduction is competent, providing
severance is possible: the residual part of the transaction (Rechtsgeschaft) must be capable of existing as a
transaction of itself. See generally Palandt, BGB (63rd ed. 2004) § 139, Rn 10 and § 142, Rn 1.
1355 As in William Dick ofGrange v Sir Lawrance Oliphant of Gask (1677) Mor 13944.
1356 See discussion in chapter 1 above.
1357
Moreover, since they are incorporeal, they cannot be possessed, rendering the real vice of spuilzie (for which
see Hay v Leonard (1677) Mor 10286) irrelevant. A blank bond could be stolen. As could a true deed of
assignation with the assignee's name blank. There is no issue of forgery here. Nor is there any vice which
impairs the cedent's expression of intention. Arguably, under the abstract theory of transfer, such an assignation
would not be void. It would be voidable for fraud.
1358 Cf. Stair IV.xl.28 cited by Reid (W.M. Gordon), Property para 615.
1359 Reid (Gordon), Property para 616.
1360 The rule that bonds granted for gambling debts are void was statutory: Gaming Act 1710, (9 Anne c. 19).
The application of the rule can be traced to Bouyer v Bampton (1742) 93 ER 1096; Strange 1155, through the
opinions of Lord Mansfield in Lowe v Waller (1781) 2 Doug 736; 99 ER 470 (a usury case) and Peacock v
Rhodes (1781) 2 Doug 636; 99 ER 402, to their adoption by the Court of Session in White's Tr. v Johnstone's
Tr., 22nd June 1819, (reported in a footnote to Elliot v Cocks (1826) 5 S 40) and Hamilton v Russel (1832) 10 S
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is any bond granted by the debtor to the creditor in a gambling debt.1361 However, it is not
immediately apparent why the assignation (i.e. the transfer) of an unrelated debt in
consideration of the gambling debt is also necessarily void.1362 Some authorities give
countenance to the proposition that the debtor in an assignation would be entitled to plead that
the assignation was made for an illegal consideration against a claim by an assignee.1363 The
debtor can withhold payment against an assignee. But it has nothing to do with the invalidity
of the assignation; rather, it is a simple application of the assignatus rule. The cedent could
not have sued to enforce a pactum illicitum. The assignee can have no greater right. Where the
assignation is exfacie valid, the debtor will be protected if he pays the assignee in good faith.
Although little discussed, there is, in principle, the possibility that an assignation could
be void by reason of error. Professor McBryde has charted the complex history of this
doctrine in the law of contract;1 64 however, error may also affect the validity of the transfer
agreement.1365 With the exception of gratuitous transfers, uninduced unilateral errors are of
little relevance. More important are situations of mutual error, common error and induced
error. There could also be an error in expression.1366 Where the error is such that there cannot
be said to be consent on the part of the transferor, then the assignation will be void. For
example, there is one case where a husband required his wife to subscribe an assignation of a
policy of insurance over the husband's life. This assignation was held invalid (although the
basis of the decision is not clear).1367 This can be distinguished from a situation where the
549. In Bouyer, a bona fide indorsee of a bill granted for a gambling debt was debarred from suing the granter
but was allowed recourse against the indorser.
1361 McKenzie v Hamilton (1745) Elchies, Pactum Illicitum No. 18. In Nisbet's Creditors v Robertson (1791)
Mor 9554; Bell's Octavo Cases 349 it was held that since a heritable bond granted for smuggled goods would be
void against the cedent, so too was it void against the assignee.
1362 Prior to Bouyer v Bampton (1742) 93 ER 1096; Strange 1155, the Court of Session had held that the Game
Act could not be invoked against an onerous indorsee of a bill: Cornelius Nelson (1740) Mor 9507; Elchies,
Pactum Illicitum No. 10; Neilson v Bruce (1740) Mor 9507; Kilkerran 70; Stewart v Hislop and Clerk (1741)
Mor 9507 and 9510; Elchies, Pactum Illicitum, No. 13. Cf. Pringle v Biggar (1740) Mor 9509; Robertson v
Ainslie's Trs (1837) 15 S 1299 and Universal Import Export GmbH v Bank of Scotland 1995 SC 73 (banker's
draft unaffected by fraud of third party). For the history of illegality on contracts generally, see L.J. Macgregor,
'Illegality' in K.G.C. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds.) A History ofPrivate Law in Scotland (2000) II, 129.
1363
Biggar v Pringle (1740) Mor 9509; Elchies, Pactum Illictum, No. 12 found that the plea of illegality founded
on the Gaming Act 1710 was good against an arrester.
1364
Firstly in 'A History of Error' 1977 JR 1, but see now a more nuanced analysis in R. Zimmermann and
K.G.C. Reid (eds) A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol 2, 72 and incorporated into the Law of
Contract in Scotland (2nd ed. 2001) chapter 15.
1365
Unfortunately, in the one case where this issue arose in the context of an assignation there was no
consideration of the effect of the error on the transfer as opposed to the contract to assign: Westville Shipping
Company Ltd v Abram Steamship Co Ltd 1922 SC 571 aff d 1923 SC (HL) 68.
1366 Cf. McBryde, Contract para 8-98 ff.
1367 Scottish Life Assurance Association Co Ltd v John Donald Ltd (1901) 9 SLT 200 OH. The Lord Ordinary
summarised the evidence thus: 'the wife signed a folded paper at the request of her husband, without seeing what
was in it or being told by him what its nature was. Accordingly, so far as she was concerned, the assignation was
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cedent consents to the transfer, but this consent is unlawfully induced. Where consent is so
induced, the transfer will be voidable. These latter situations are considered below.
Common error, i.e. where the parties have a common intention but this common
intention is mistaken, could cover the situation where the parties purport to assign a non¬
assignable claim. This assignation is ineffective for the reason that the claim is not assignable.
However, it could also be said to be void on the ground of common error. As a ground of
invalidity, common error will be relevant where the cedent and the putative assignee
purported to conclude and implement an agreement to assign a claim which did not in fact
exist. The non-existence of a claim will render the cedent liable for breach of warrandice.
Absent any inducement on the part of the assignee, or a stipulation to the contrary, the cedent
will not be able to escape liability for breach of warrandice on the basis of a common error. A
similar position can be envisaged where the parties conclude an agreement to cede a claim
but, before the claim is transferred, assignation of such claims is declared illegal by statute.
(b) Other Instances of Nullity.
Professor McBryde draws attention to the number of statutes which provide that a
purported assignation shall be void and of no effect:1368 pay and pensions in the armed
forces,1369 the police1370 or other occupational pensions;1371 social security benefits;1372 claims
against the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board;1373 incorporeal moveables, rights of action
or negotiable instruments to, or from, an enemy of the Crown, or any transfer on behalf of an
enemy;1374 and the office of the company director.1375 There are also provisions dealing with
not a tested deed; and although she may be held as admitting the genuineness of her signature, her admission
must be taken along with the qualification that her act in signing the deed was wholly unintelligent'. However, it
seems that the assignation was void on the separate ground that it was not, at that time, in a woman's capacity to
alienate a policy which fell under the Woman's Policies of Assurance Act 1880. Today, this case would fall
under the Smith v Bank ofScotland 1997 SC (HL) 111 principle. Bad faith, in terms of the Smith decision, on the
part of the assignee would render the assignation voidable.
1368
McBryde, Contract para 12-54.
1369 Armed Forces Act 1991, s. 16; Army Act 1955, s. 203; Air Force Act 1955, s. 203.
1370 Police Pensions Act 1976, s. 9.
1371 Pensions Act 1995, s. 91, for which see D. Mackenzie-Skene, Insolvency Law in Scotland (1999), 166 at n.
60 and idem, 'Whose Estate is it Anyway? The Debtor's Estate on Sequestration' 2005 JR. 311 at 324. See too
Mulvenna v The Admiralty 1926 SC 842.
1372 Social Security Administration Act 1992, s. 187. This includes pension credits: s. 187(1) (ab) (as amended).
It is thought that, at common law, tax credits would not be assignable.
1373 Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995, s. 7.
1374
Trading with the Enemy Act 1939, s. 4 (see s. 13 for application to Scotland).
1375
Companies Act 1985, s. 308. This is not a paradigm claim to payment. Arguably the purported cession of an
office would be void at common law, being in breach of the principle delegata potestas non potest delegari.
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the purported assignation of by a seaman of his future wages.1376 There are examples in case
law of rights conferred by statute which have been held to be personal to the grantee and
unassignable.1377 Often, statutory provisions will provide that a salary or pension is not
1 178
arrestable. If a claim is not arrestable then it is reasonable to assert that a purported
assignation of it will not be effective. The converse position is more controversial. If it is
provided by statute that particular benefit is not assignable, can it still be transferred by
involuntary assignation, i.e. by arrestment or sequestration? It has been held that, since there
are examples of statutory provisions which expressly proscribe involuntary, as well as
voluntary, assignment,1379 where the statute proscribes only assignment, such a benefit may,
in principle, fall within the bankrupt's sequestrated estate.1380
At common law the most important example of a void assignation will be the
purported transfer of an unassignable right. At common law, where there is delectus personae
in the person of the creditor, the rights against the debtor will not be assignable. The
purported assignation of such a right is invalid and void. An important example is the right
that bears to be alimentary. The accepted view is that alimentary rights can be neither
transferred by assignation nor arrested.1381 But a grant which is stated to be alimentary can
still be validly transferred to the extent that it is not required for aliment.1382 Against this,
there are other authorities which hold that rights which are otherwise alimentary can be
assigned, if for good consideration.1383 Similarly, some older authorities held that the wife's
1376 Merchant Shipping Act 1995, s. 34.
1377
MacKnight, Petr (1875) 2 R 667 at 668 in respect of Trusts (Scotland) Act 1867, s. 14. See now Trusts
(Scotland) Act 1921, sections 22 and 24. Other statutes make specific provision for assignees: e.g. Late Payment
of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act 1998, s. 13. Whether a right is assignable or not will depend on the nature of
the statutory right. Compare Leith Dock Commissioners v Colonial Life Assurance Co (1861) 24 D 64 and
Goodall v Mclnnes Shaw 1912 1 SLT 425 at 428 per Lord Skerrington (Ordinary) (statutory right to object
neither assignable nor exercisable by another by way of a mandate in rem suam).
1378 Cf. J. Graham Stewart, Diligence (1898), 100.
1379
E.g. Police Pensions Act 1921, s. 14 (1); Social Security and Pensions Act 1975, s. 48 (1) and (2); Social
Security Act 1986, s. 2 (7) and (8); Pension Schemes Act 1993, s. 159 (4) and (5); Pensions Act 1995, s. 91 (3);
Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999, s. 11 and s. 13 and Occupational Pension Schemes (Bankruptcy) (No 2)
Regulations 2002, SI 2002/836.
1380 Kresner v Dennison [2001] Ch 76 (CA). See generally Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, ss 36A-36F. There
may, however, be considerable practical difficulties for the trustee in realising future pension rights: see W.W.
McBryde and G.L. Gretton, 'Sequestration and the Spes Successions' (2000) 4 Edin LR 129.
1381 J. Graham Stewart, Diligence (1898) 93 and authority there cited. Cf. W J Hughes v Lord Advocate 1993
SCLR155.
1382 Claremont's Trs v Claremont (1896) 4 SLT 144; Cuthbertv Cuthbert's Trs 1908 SC 967
1383
E.g. Ker's Trs v Weller (1866) 3 SLR 2; Waddall v Waddall (1836) 15 S 151; Rogerson v Rogerson's Trs
(1885) 13 R 154. It has been held that they are not assignable omnium bonorum: McDonnell v Clark, 25th
November 1819 FC. Cf. Erskine III.v.2 and Mackenzie, 19th May, 1791 FC; Mor 10413 and authorities cited in
McBryde, Contract para 12-32 and Graham Stewart, Diligence, 100. See also Juridical Society of Edinburgh,
Juridical Styles (3rd ed. 1794) III, 235 which contains a style assignation of a salary.
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tocher (anglice: dowry) was not assignable by the husband.1384 It is probably the case that
only periodical payments can be held to be alimentary, and the right must have been conferred
gratuitously.1385 An assignation which purports to assign claims which are assignable as well
as claims which are not assignable is valid to the extent of the assignable claims; in other
words, invalid aspects can be severed from the valid transfer.
The prohibition is particularly relevant for creditors. Take the debtor who has a
valuable right against another. He may wish to use this as collateral and assign it in security.
The assignee in security advances the money. Nevertheless, where the right is stated to be
i -> i "2 0*7
alimentary, or granted for love, favour, and affection, the assignation will not be valid.
Alimentary rights are unassignable. This can be seen as an example of delectus personae. The
granter is willing to aliment his errant son, but not his errant son's errant friends or
unscrupulous moneylenders. But, on one view, this could be unjust on a creditor who
advances money in return for an assignation in security of an alimentary right. The
beneficiary of the alimentary right gets his money on the strength of the right. The purpose of
the gratuitous payment (to put the son in funds) is therefore satisfied. Nevertheless, there is
little to commend weeping for the creditor who takes such a right as security. Similar issues
arise where the grantee of an alimentary right becomes insolvent. If such a right is not
assignable, by parity of reasoning, it is not arrestable; it cannot vest in a trustee in
sequestration and it cannot be transferred to a trustee for creditors.1388 As will be discussed
below, there may be a distinction to be drawn between voluntary and involuntary
assignations.
(c) Nullity and the Debtor
1384
Logan v L. Kinblechmont (1623) Mor 4386. But of. Hall ofDouglas v Lorimer (1692) Mor 4387.
1385 J. Graham Stewart, Diligence (1898), 94.
1386 Robertson v Wright (1873) 1 R 237 at 244 per Lord Armillan: 'Affection is necessarily personal. It cannot be
transferred as debt can be transferred from one to another. A gift to one for whom I have an affection cannot be
assigned as to make me donor for one whom 1 have a dislike...the demand that, after payment of a donation to
one I did love, I shall be ordained to pay it a second time to one I do not love, has, in my opinion, no foundation
in reason, equity or law'. For a second payment to be required, as envisaged by Lord Ardmillan, the granter of
the alimentary obligation would have had to have paid the grantee after receiving intimation of an assignation.
1387 Cf. Rogerson v Rogerson's Trs (1885) 13 R 154 and Ba!lvJ& W MacDonald 1909 2 SLT 310 OH.
1388 Clarke v Jas McDonnell, 25th November 1819 FC. But see discussion below with regard to the rights of
creditors to claims which are subject to a pactum de non cedendo.
264
The Transfer ofMoney Claims in Scots Law
There are numerous reasons why an assignation may be void: forgery, force and fear
applied to a previous cedent, or incapacity of the cedent.1389 Where the assignee has
demanded payment on the basis of an assignation which is void and the debtor has paid, the
allegation that the assignation was void is serious: the debtor has paid the wrong person. But,
it must be remembered, invalidity of the assignation must not, in general, prejudice the debtor.
Where the debtor pays one with the apparent right, he will have the defence of bona fide
payment:
"Payment is the most proper loosing of obligations, and therefore retaineth the
common name of solution, [D. 46, 3, 49 and 80], In many cases payment made
bona fide dissolveth the obligation though he to whom it was made had no
right for the time. So payment made to a procurator was thought sufficient,
albeit the procuratory were thereafter improvan, seeing there was no visible
ground of suspicion of the falsehood of it, February 1st, 1665, Elphinstoun v
Lord Rollo and Laird ofNiddery, [Mor. 17018; 1 Stair 262],"1390
3. Voidable Assignations
(a) Effect of reduction.
There has been little consideration of the remedy of reduction in Scots law.1391 In
theory a reduction should only be brought of a voidable conveyance. A void conveyance does
not require a court order to give effect to the nullity.1392 'A declarator of nullity concludes,
that the author had no power to convey the subject; and therefore that the purchaser has no
right: a reduction admits that the subject was conveyed; but, concludes that the purchaser did
wrong in making the purchase, and therefore that he ought to be deprived of the subject'.1393
In practice, however, reduction can be relevantly pled in order to declare a contract or
conveyance void, while a declarator can, on the authorities, be invoked to reduce a
conveyance. Matters are complicated in the case of an assignation because of the presence of
1389 See Alexander v Lundies (1675) Mor 940 approved by Bankton II, 192, 8 where the cedent was not compos
mentis when he granted the assignation. Cf. Donaldson v Jeffrey 1905 13 SLT 379 OH.
1390 Stair I.xviii.3. See also the cases dealing with the right of an executor to pay out to the beneficiaries after a
period of six months in good faith without incurring personal liability to creditors of whom they were ignorant:
Muir v Fleming (1634) 1 Br Sup 86; Sup Vol, Durie 76. There is protection in terms of the Act of Sederunt of
28th February 1662 (still in force). However, the authorities often deal with this right of the executor in terms of
the general doctrine of bona fide payment: Stewart's Trs v Evans (1871)9M810.
1391 G.L. Gretton, 'Reduction of Heritable Titles' 1986 SLT (News) 125. Cf. L. Loewensohn, 'The Action of
Reduction in Scotland: A Comparative View' (1942) 58 Scottish Law Review 4, who deals with the unitary
concept of reduction in Scots law: a decree can be reduced as much as a transaction. This is not the case in many
European legal systems.
1392 See also D.M. Walker, The Law ofCivil Remedies in Scotland (1974), 145.
1393 H. Home, Lord Kames, Elucidations respecting the Common and Statute Law ofScotland (1777), art. 3, p.
12. Kames overemphasises the need for wrongdoing on the part of the transferee. Cf. Ball v J & W MacDonald
1909 2 SLT 310 OH.
265
The Transfer ofMoney Claims in Scots Law
the debtor who is a passive third party. Unlike the position for (Sasine) land,1394 there is no
register for decrees of reduction of conveyances of moveables. To ensure that the assigned
debt is not discharged by a good faith payment by the debtor to the assignee, it is essential that
any action of reduction of an assignation calls the debtor as a party to the action.1395
The effect of a reduction in Scots law has not been investigated. There are at least two
possibilities. The reduction may have catholic (i.e. erga omnes) effect or it may be ad hunc
effectum effectum (i.e. relative effect). The voluntary transfer of heritage in breach of a pre¬
existing inhibition is the best-known example of the latter.1396 The law of reduction is crucial
to private law generally. But for the law of assignation it is particularly regrettable that this
area of Scots law is underdeveloped. For instance, it simply not possible to appreciate fully
the modern laws of cession in France and Germany without an understanding of their
respective doctrines of (in)opposabilite and relative (Un)Wirksamkeit,1397 The idea of a
reduction having only relative effect can be useful. Take the example of an owner of land who
binds himself to grant a standard security. In breach of that obligation he dispones to his wife
for no consideration. To require the disposition to be reduced in toto, for the standard security
to be properly granted, and for an almost identical disposition to be re-granted, is hardly
expeditious. What is required is a simple mechanism whereby the transferee's position is
1394 See Conveyancing (Scotland) Act, 1924, s. 46. The Land Register is a register of title. To some extent,
therefore, it operates outwith the ordinary principles of property law. The reduction of a conveyance registered in
the Land Register may not be of much benefit to the pursuer. The position is complicated: see K.G.C. Reid, 'A
Non Domino Titles and the Land Register' 1991 JR 79; idem, 'Void and Voidable Deeds and the Land Register'
(1996) 1 SLPQ 265; A.J.M. Steven, 'Problems of the Land Register' 1999 SLT (News) 163.
1395 Cf. G.L. Gretton, 'Reduction of Heritable Titles' 1986 SLT (News) 125. A case is reported in The Scotsman,
for 30th March 1948 where there was a purported reduction of an assignation on the ground of undue influence. It
is not clear whether the debtor was called. In Mitchell v Johnston (1703) Mor 8326, the debtor raised a reduction
of a bond he had granted. Suspecting that the creditor in the bond had assigned it, the debtor also called the
alleged assignee as a party to the reduction. Within hours of the assignee being cited, the debtor received a
formal intimation of the assignation. It was held that the effect of the citation was to render the bond 'litigious ad
hunc effectum' and gave the debtor the benefit of the cedent's oath against the assignee. See too Glazier v
Hamilton (1707) Mor 8327 and the remarkable case of Houston v Nisbet (1708) Mor 8329. In modern law, such
cases would be decided in terms of the assignatus rule. Previously, however, it was a rule of proof that debtor's
defences could only be proved by writ or the oath of the cedent prior to intimation; after intimation of the
assignation, the cedent's oath was not admissible. Litigiosity was an exception to this rule. Where the matter had
been rendered litigious before intimation, the cedent's oath could prejudice the assignee: see generally Erskine
III.v. 10.
1396 See G.L. Gretton, The Law of Inhibition and Adjudication (2nd ed. 1996), 129 ff ('Gretton, Inhibition'). On
payment of another's debt, the payer is entitled to an assignation of the creditor's rights against the original
debtor (beneficium cedendarum actionum). Where those rights are secured by a heritable security, and the
creditor is inhibited, an assignation of it to the payer does not breach the inhibition as it is not voluntary act:
Mackintosh v Davidson & Garden (1897) 5 SLT 234 OH.
1397 See, for example, H. Eidenmuller, 'Die Dogmatik der Zession vor dem Hintergrund der internationalen
Entwicklung' (2004) 204 Archiv fur die civilistische Praxis 457; E. Cashin-Ritaine, Les cessions contractuelles
de creances de sommes d'argent dans les relations civiles et commerciales franco-allemandes (2001), 42 :
'L'etude de la notion d'opposabilite en droit franpais est essentielle pour comprendre le mecanisme de la cession
de creance'.
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weighed-down rather than cut-down; in a question with the grantee of the security, the
transferee of the property must acknowledge the former's security right.1398
Although Scots law is underdeveloped, it is likely that a successful action of reduction
will re-invest the cedent;1399 at least where the reduction is brought by one of the parties to the
assignation.
(b) Examples of voidability.
(i) Assignations in breach of arrestment not voidable.
Take a common practical problem: A is a creditor of CI. CI is creditor of D. A arrests
in D's hands. Before CI is notified of the arrestment, CI purports to assign to C2. C2
intimates to the debtor. C2 is in good faith.1400 The debtor is in double distress. By virtue of
the arrestment, D cannot pay the C2; by virtue of the intimation, D cannot pay CI. Until
furthcoming, D cannot pay A . If D wrongly pays C2 in the knowledge of the arrestment, this
payment cannot prejudice the arrester; in other words, D will be liable to make a double
payment to A. A validity question will only arise if, after D pays C2, D becomes insolvent.
Can A then reduce the assignation to C2? Is the assignation voidable?1401 Must the transferee
recognise the arrester's preference? Reducing the assignation to C2 may not be of much
benefit to the arrester if the reduction were catholic: the insolvent common debtor would be
reinvested. Requiring the assignee to recognise the arrester's rights would be of more value.
The point is of some difficulty and the sources are not consistent. Matters are hindered by the
controversy in Scots law as to the effect of an arrestment.1402 If an arrestment (even without
forthcoming) is a judicial assignation, there is no issue. After arrestment, CI has nothing to
1398 Whether a reduction ad hunc effectum can actually affect the property as opposed to the owner of the
property, or the right as opposed to the holder of it, has not been properly focussed in Scots law. The difference
is important. Is a good faith transferee taking from one who has been subject to an ad hunc effectum reduction
similarly bound to give effect to the security?
1399 Ruthven v Gray (1672) Mor 31; Duncan v Miller (1713) Mor 39. These cases also highlight that a
retrocession carries accessory rights.
1400 A gratuitous or male fide transferee must recognise the rights of an arrester: J Graham Stewart, Diligence
(1898), 128 citing Karnes, Principles ofEquity (3rd ed. 1778) II, 189.
1401 J. Graham Stewart, Diligence (1898), 126 says that a conveyance of corporeal moveables in breach of an
arrestment is 'reducible'.
1402 The differing views are discussed in S. Wortley, 'Squaring the Circle: revisiting the receiver and effectually
executed diligence' 2000 JR 325.
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assign. If, however, an arrestment lays a 'nexus' (whatever that might mean) on the arrested
fund, the cedent will still be able to assign.1403
The sources are confused. Stair says that
"...not only will he [the arrestee] be decerned to make furthcoming, though it
infer double payment, but he to whom he paid unwarrantably will be
compelled to restore and satisfy the arrester, the subject having been litigious
by his arrestment before the other party recover the same albeit he have
recovered it bona fide without any fault in him, but by the litigiousness of the
subject."1404
This suggests that the arrester will have rights against the assignee. Graham Stewart, however,
prefers the views of Bankton,1405 Karnes1406 and Bell1407 to the effect that a bona fide
transferee is not bound to recognise the rights of the arrester.1408 With some contradiction,
however, Stewart then interjects that, with regard to incorporeal moveables, 'it is settled
beyond all question that the arrester will prevail over a subsequent assignee'.1409 He cites no
authority. This writer prefers Stair's view. Arrestment will have no effect on the validity of an
assignation in breach of it (at least where the assignation is of claims or other fungibles). The
arrester may have arrested a debt of £10m owed to CI for CI's debt to the arrester of £1000.
There is no reason why a subsequent assignation by CI should be invalid, i.e. it is neither void
nor voidable.1410 Rather, the arrester is preferred for his arrested debt. The arrestment will be
opposable against the assignee even if he had no knowledge of the pre-existing arrestment.1411
(ii) Assignations in breach of trust.
1403 But cf. J. Graham Stewart, Diligence (1898), 125-126. He holds that an arrestment of itself is inchoate; but
that it does operate as a prohibition. Stewart says that any transfer by the common debtor in breach of the
arrestment is voidable.
1404 III.i.40-42. See to IV.xxxv.6.
1405 II, 197, 32. Bankton is here referring to the unusual and irregular situation where arrestment is made in the
hands of the common debtor.
1406
Karnes, Principles ofEquity (3rd ed. 1778) II, 182. It must be observed, however, that Kames' views on the
nature of arrestment are characteristically unorthodox.
1407 Bell, Principles (9th ed. 1889) § 2278. Bell too refers to corporeal moveable property.
1408 See too Turner v Mitchell & Rae (1884) 28 Journal ofJurisprudence 440 at 443 per the Sheriff (bona fide
transferee of poinded property takes free from rights of poinder).
1409 J. Graham Stewart, Diligence (1898), 127.
1410 See, generally, G.L. Gretton, 'Breach of Arrestment' 1991 JR 96.
1411 This situation is another which would benefit from the development of a theory of relative invalidity.
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An assignation made in breach of trust is voidable and not void.1412 Although some of
the older cases treat such a transfer as if it were an illegal transaction and thus void,1413 the
111 1414
position is now ruled by statute.
(iii) Extrajudicial Rescission of voidable Conveyances ineffective.
Unlike voidable contracts, a voidable conveyance cannot be rescinded unilaterally.
Once the conveyance has taken effect a judicial reduction will be required. An extrajudicial
rescission will be ineffective.1415 At most, rescission is the act which gives rise to a personal
obligation on the assignee to retrocede.1416
The clearest statement of the law is found - perhaps surprisingly - in Jacob J's opinion
in Coflexip Stem Offshore's Patent.1417 The case involved a global assignment of intellectual
property rights. The assignment had not been stamped. Instead of subsequently submitting it
for stamping, a second assignment was executed and duly stamped. The parties simply
purported to rescind the first assignment. Mr Justice Jacob explained the problems with such
an approach:
"If a transaction passes property, then it does. If the parties wish to rescind that
transaction, then they can. But this means no more than that if property had passed
under the transaction, it must be passed back. If that requires some formal
1412 Thorburn v Martin (1853) 15 D 845 at 850 per Lord Cockburn (dissenting). Compare Lord Wood: he
seemed to agree that the assignation was not absolutely void: see 851. However, an assignee, who takes in good
faith and for value, will be protected. Cf. Fraser v Hankey & Co (1847) 9 D 415.
1413 Cf. Meff v Smith's Trs 1930 SN 162 OH; Clark v Clark 1989 SC 84 OH cited by McBryde, Contract para
12-57.
1414 Trusts (Scotland) Act 1921, s. 4 (1) (h) and s. 7; Trusts (Scotland) Act 1961, s. 2.
1415 Coflexip Stem Offshore's Patent [1997] RPC 179
1416 Where the contract, transfer agreement, or both are voidable as a result of some wrongful conduct
perpetrated by the party who is now seeking to assign, this may give rise to an obligation to make reparation.
However, it is thought that, until the party who was unlawfully induced to transfer rescinds, there is no
obligation on the recipient to reconvey. That is the significance of the act of rescission. To place the wrongdoer
under an obligation to reconvey, it seems that a verbal rescission could occur. This would rescind the contract.
This would render the transfer agreement sine causa. The assignee will be obliged to reconvey. Where he does
not, however, judicial reduction will be required. This point is important for third parties. It is usually said that a
bona fide onerous transferee will take a good title from a transferor whose title was voidable (see e.g. Reid,
Property para 607 and Conveyancing (Scotland) Act 1924, s. 46(1) cited by Reid, para 607, n. 10). However,
even if the subsequent transferee is not in good faith, why should his title be voidable if the unlawfully induced
party never exercised his right to reduce? Further, would the fourth party's position be assailable if he knew that
the wrongfully induced party had exercised his right of rescission, though no judicial reduction had yet occurred?
There is no statutory provision corresponding to the 1924 Act for the transfer of claims. It is thought - although
the point is not free from difficulty - that, providing the subsequent assignee is in good faith when he enters into
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conveyance, then such conveyance will be needed. The answer to [counsel]'s
point was supplied long ago by Old Khayyam1418:
'The moving finger writes; and having writ,
Moves on; nor all thy piety nor wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a line,
Nor all thy tears wash out a word of if.
Moving fingers wrote [the first unstamped assignment]. Nor all [counsel's piety
nor wit can cancel half a line. He did not try tears but they would not have worked
either. The assignment by the parties to 'replace' [the first assignment] with [the
second assignment] (assuming that is the effect of [the second assignment], which
I am not sure it is) does not mean that [the first assignment] had no effect in law.
It did, and the execution of [the second assignment] does not mean that it did
not."1419
Mr Justice Jacob's opinion is a clear endorsement of the consequences of the abstraction
principle. Where there has been an assignation which is voidable, an attempted unilateral
recission will not reinvest the cedent. The assignee will have to retrocess; in Scots law, that
retrocession being intimated to the debtor (assuming that retrocession is of claims). If the
assignee will not retrocess voluntarily, a reduction will be required. If the assignation was not
of claims, there could be no intimation; but the same principles apply, intimation being
obviated. The principles should also apply to other transfers. For example, a transfer of
ownership in corporeal moveables can be effected by mere intention where the causa is sale.
The transfer of ownership in corporeal moveables on other bases, however, will have to
conform to the common law. This requires an intention to transfer and delivery. So where
there is a transfer of corporeal moveables which is voidable, mere rescission will not reinvest
the transferor. Since any retransfer is not a sale delivery in terms of the common law will be
required.1420
(c) Voidability and the Debtor: can the debtor invoke invalidity?
The general principle is that the debtor will be discharged where he pays in good faith the
person he perceives to be his creditor.1421 Before formal intimation, the only person that the
1418 Omar Khayyam was an influential Persian scholar who died around 1123. His scholarly reputation was
earned from his works on algebra. But he is perhaps better known as a poet from for his collection of epigrams in
distinctive Persian style, first translated into English by Edward Fitzgerald in 1859: Encyclopaedia Britannica
(11th ed. 1911). They have been recently translated into Scots: see R. Wilson, The Ruba'iyat of Omar Khayyam
in Scots (Edinburgh: Luath Press, 2004).
1419
[1997] RPC 179 at 192.
1420 Cf. n. 1286 above.
1421 See chapter 4, 'Intimation', above, and authority there cited.
270
The Transfer ofMoney Claims in Scots Law
debtor can validly pay is the cedent.1422 It has been observed above that in the matter of
transfer, private knowledge is irrelevant: until formal intimation, the debtor is free to pay the
cedent. However, what if, after intimation, the debtor has private knowledge of a fact that
calls into question the validity of the assignation? If the assignation is invalid and the debtor
pays the assignee, then the debtor has, prima facie, paid the wrong person. The debtor must
therefore rely on the defence of good faith payment. There are a number of issues. First, what
private knowledge is sufficient? Second, what grounds of invalidity might be relevant? There
are different types of vices. Some will affect the contract, others the conveyance. The
conveyance may be rendered void, or merely voidable.
Issues affecting the underlying agreement or causa between the cedent and assignee
are of no concern to the debtor.1423 However, if the debtor knows that the conveyance is
invalid, can he invoke the invalidity to refuse payment to the assignee? Is the debtor's right to
invoke the invalidity dependent on the type of invalidity? These are difficult questions. There
is little discussion of these issues in the Scottish sources; perhaps the main reason being the
availability of the multiplepoinding. Any well-advised debtor who is unsure whom to pay will
raise a multiplepoinding, consign the money into court and thus receive his discharge.
Nevertheless, there may be situations where this does not happen. What then is the position?
We can start with absolute nullity. Where the debtor knows that the assignation is
void, it is difficult to see how the debtor can simply ignore this knowledge and pay the
assignee regardless. So if the debtor is aware that the cedent's signature is forged there can be
no valid payment to the assignee.1424 The debtor who pays an 'assignee' on the basis of an
invalid assignation must rely on the rules of good faith payment. The test of good faith is
subjective. But the debtor who has paid the wrong person must be able to show that he was in
good faith. In practice, it is unlikely that a debtor will know whether an assignation is
1422
Although, if the debtor pays the 'assignee' after the assignation but before intimation, his payment is
considered as an equipollent to intimation. As a result, the debtor cannot be required to pay again the cedent.
This equipollent of intimation means that where the assignation is valid, there can usually only be good faith
payment to the cedent: a payment to the assignee after delivery of the assignation but before intimation, being an
equipollent, effects a transfer. There is then no issue of good faith payment: the debtor has paid his creditor.
Where the assignation is invalid, however, and the debtor pays the assignee before intimation, there is a
difficulty. On the one hand he should have waited for formal intimation; on the other, formal intimation cannot
validate an otherwise invalid assignation. This writer's view, then, is that the debtor who pays an 'assignee' even
before formal intimation on the basis of an invalid assignation should nonetheless be discharged.
1423 Cf. F. von Kiibel, Erster Kommission zur Ausarbeitung des Entwiirfes eines biirgerlichen Gesetzbuches
(1882) Absch. I, tit. 4, 'Uebertragung der Forderungen', § 18, at 41 and Erskine III.v.10 who points out that
under the old rules of proof, following intimation, the debtor was entitled to refer to the assignee's oath whether
the assignation had been gratuitous or in trust for the cedent.
1424 See e.g. Dick ofGrange v Oliphant of Gask (1677) Mor 13944 which involved a forged assignation. It is also
cited by Elchies, Annotations on Stair's Institutions (1824), 40.
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valid.14243 It is thought that a suspicion is not enough to prevent the debtor validly discharging
his obligation to the assignee. Where the deed is not void, the debtor who pays on an assignee
intimating a voidable assignation is not concerned with rules on good faith payment. A
voidable conveyance is a good conveyance until reduced. Even after it has been reduced, if
the debtor has not been called as a party to the process, payment may still be validly made to
the assignee. An alternative is that some informal informal notice of the reduction given to the
debtor will be enough to interpel the debtor from paying in good faith.1425 It is thought that it
is more consistent with the traditional approach of Scots law, however, to favour the certainty
that flows from requiring the debtor to be called as a party to the action for his bona fides to
be impaired.
What of the purported assignation of an unassignable right? Say there is a pactum de
non cedendo in the underlying contract.1426 A purported assignation in breach will be invalid.
But suppose the clause was inserted at the behest of the debtor. The cedent purports to assign
in breach of this prohibition. The debtor then pays the assignee. It is thought that the debtor
will be discharged in such a situation. The cedent cannot quarrel his own deed;1427 similarly, it
is always open to the holder of a right to waive it. In other words, in such a situation, the
debtor has the choice to pay either the cedent or the assignee.
I424a It must be observed that if this is the rule, it offends against the presumption that one acts in good faith.
1425 Cf. F. von Ktibel, Erster Kommission zur Ausarbeitung des Entwiirfes eines burgerlichen Gesetzbuches
(1882) Absch. I, tit. 4, 'Uebertragung der Forderungen', § 20, at 42: 'Will der Cedent sich dagegen schiitzen, so
ist es seine Sache, den Schuldner von seiner Anfechtung der Abtretung in Kenntnis zu setzen'.
1426 More of which below.
1427 Erskine II.iii.27. Cf. F. von Ktibel, Erster Kommission zur Ausarbeitung des Entwiirfes eines burgerlichen
Gesetzbuches (1882) Absch. I, tit. 4, Uebertragung der Forderungen, § 20, at 42: 'Der Schuldner hat zwar in
diesem Fall an einen Nichtglaubiger gezahlt, aber er hat es gethan auf Grund einer Erklarung des urspriinglichen
Glaubigers selbst, und diese Erklarung muB der Glaubiger gegen sich gelten lassen'. However, what if the cedent
became insolvent after the debtor's payment? Although the claim is not-assignable, the creditors of the cedent
would still be entitled to the proceeds. Would a trustee in sequestration on the cedent's estate be bound by the
invalid assignation? Burnett's Tr. v Grainger 2004 SC (HL) 19 holds that creditors can do diligence in full
knowledge of competing rights. The trustee, then, is arguably not subject to any bar that would have prevented
the cedent from claiming a second time from the debtor. But that is not the end of the matter. If the cedent were
required to pay again to the cedent, it must be on the assumption that the cession was invalid. If the cession was
invalid, but the debtor paid the assignee nevertheless, the debtor has discharged the cedent's liability in
warrandice to the assignee. The debtor therefore holds a claim in unjustified enrichment against the cedent. As a
result, any claim by the trustee in sequestration against the debtor for a second payment will be met with a set¬
off.
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III: Conditional Assignation - Suspensive and Resolutive Conditions.1428
A. General
At common law property in corporeal moveables passes on the concurrence of delivery and a
concomitant intention to transfer. Sales subject to a suspensive condition are therefore
unproblematic.1429 Under the Sale of Goods Act,1430 which provides that property passes in a
sale of corporeal moveables when the parties intend it to pass, conditional sales were
developed. The buyer could retain title to the goods in respect of all sums due and to become
due to the seller by the buyer.1431 In contrast, in the transfer of immoveable property in
Scotland, transfers subject to a suspensive condition are unknown.1432 What then of claims?
Any condition which is inherent in the claim assigned is unaffected by an assignation. This is
a simple application of the rule assignatus utiturjure auctoris,1433 There is also no problem in
placing a condition in the contract to assign, as opposed to the conveyance.1434 If there is a
suspensive condition in the contract, then it is only on purification of the condition that the
1428 For South African law, see S. Scott, The Law of Cession (2nd ed. 1991), 148 ff, especially at 151: 'The
question whether the cession itself (the transfer agreement) can be subject to a condition has never been
specifically addressed by the South African courts and poses very serious problems'. For potestative conditions
see D. Daube, 'Condition Prevented from Materialising' (1960) 28 TvR 296.
1429 Stair I.xiv.4; Erskine Ill.iii. 11.
1430 First introduced into Scots law by, The Sale of Goods Act 1893. It was actually only passed in 1894: 56 and
57 Vict. c. 71. Exceptionally, it applied retrospectively. The present legislation is the Sale of Goods Act 1979, as
amended.
1431 Armour v Thyssen Edelstahlwerke AG [1991] 2 AC 339; 1990 SLT 891 HL. There is no reason why these
clauses should not have been valid at common law: G.L. Gretton and K.G.C. Reid 'Romalpa Clauses: the
Current Position' 1985 SLT (News) 329; idem. 'All Sums Retention of Title' 1989 SLT (News) 185. The so-
called 'Romalpa clause' will be discussed below.
1432 Cf. Young v Dun (1785) Mor 14191. The same is true in Germany: § 925 II BGB: 'Eine Auflassung, die
unter einer Bedingung oder einer Zubestimmung erfolgt, ist unwirksam'. Nevertheless, transfers subject to a
resolutive condition were common in Scots law. A transfer subject to a reversion is a transfer in which there is an
obligation to reconvey in certain circumstances. The debtor's reversionary interest had to be protected by
legislation: Reversions Act 1469, c. 27, APS c. 3. Prior to the Act, the debtor's reversionary interest could be
defeated where the reversion was not ex facie of the deed. As a result of this 'excellent statute' (Stair II.x.3),
singular successors were subject to the reversion. In other words, reversions were accorded the status of real
rights (Stair II.x.3). The Act also provided for the first instance of registration of heritable rights in Scots law
(see D. Murray, Legal Practice in Ayr and the West ofScotland in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries (1910)
25); further, the Act provided that an extract should have the same force as the principal. It has been disputed
whether registration of the reversion was a constitutive requirement: Sir George Mackenzie, Observations on the
Acts ofParliament ... (1687), 67 states that registration was required where the reversion was not in the body of
the deed (as, indeed, was the case under the 1617 Act); however, Ross, Lectures II, 336 disputes this, though he
agrees that 'it is the first dawning of a record to be met with' in Scots law. On one view, Stair I.xiv.4, also
suggests that registration was a constitutive requirement; but it is more likely that he was referring to the
requirement of registration under the Real Rights Act 1617. See, generally, the discussion in L. Ockrent, Land
Rights: An Enquiry into the History ofRegistration for Publication in Scotland (1942), 65-72.
143 See e.g. Logan v Kilbrackman (1627) Mor 9207.
1434 Cf. Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas (2nd ed. 1707), 18.4.9 who envisages a condition only in the
obligationary agreement. For a discussion of the contractual issues, see J.M. Thomson, 'Suspensive and
Resolutive Conditions in the Scots Law of Contract' in A.J. Gamble (ed.) Obligations in Context: Essays in
Honour ofProfessor D.M. Walker (1990), 126.
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intended transferee has the right to demand that the putative cedent executes and delivers an
assignation. But what is the effect of a condition in the conveyance?1435 For example, what of
an assignation which bears that only on the occurrence of a future uncertain event will the
claim transfer to the assignee, i.e. a suspensive condition; or, on the occurrence of a future
uncertain event the claim will revert to the cedent, i.e. a resolutive condition? The assignation
containing the condition is intimated to the debtor. Matters are complicated by this tripartite
relationship: how is the debtor supposed to know whether the condition has been purified or
not? Despite the presence of a passive party (the debtor) who must be protected, there is no
reason in principle why conditions should not be as effective in the transfer of claims as they
are in the transfer of corporeal moveables.
B. Suspensive Conditions.1436
Although unheard of in practice, there seems nothing wrong in principle with the
insertion of a suspensive condition in the transfer agreement. As far as fourth parties are
concerned (the debtor is a third party, to whom we will return below), the suspensive
condition will be effectual. For example, suppose CI assigns to C2 subject to the condition
that the transfer will only take effect on payment of the full price by C2. On accepting
delivery of the assignation, C2 intimates this to the debtor. If, before payment, CI becomes
insolvent, the claim will fall into Cl's insolvency. Take the same example, except CI remains
solvent. C2, before full payment to CI, assigns in turn to C3. C3 intimates. Now C2 becomes
1435 See generally, T. Hue, Traite theorique et pratique de la cession et de la transmission des creances (1891)
vol 1, 47. The general principle in France is that one cannot by contract fetter the right of an owner to alienate
his property or cede rights held by him (Art. 1594 Code Civil). However, a decision of the Cour de Cassation
(cited by Hue at para 31) sanctioned the insertion of a resolutive condition in the transfer. It is not clear,
however, how this condition would have operated had it been triggered. Cf. Johnstone v Irving (1824) 3 S 163
(NE 110) where there was a purported conditional assignation of a lease.
1436 It is suggested by Professor Gretton, 'Diligence' in SME, vol 8 (1992), para 285 that, 'if money is arrested,
the arrestment is regarded as a conditional assignation to the arrester, to be purified at forthcoming..However,
this analysis is not of assistance in determining the juridical nature of an arrestment. If every arrestment is an
assignation subject to the (suspensive) 'condition' of furthcoming, then this is merely a complicated of way of
saying that an arrestment per se is not a transfer, but arrestment plus forthcoming is. One would not say that a
delivered assignation is a transfer subject to the condition that the assignation is intimated, or that delivery of a
disposition is a transfer subject to the suspensive condition that the disposition is registered. Moreover, if there is
a condition in the transfer agreement, it can only possibly have effect if the transfer agreement has effect. The
transfer agreement only takes effect on registration (heritage) or intimation (claims). Admittedly, an arrestment,
of itself, is effective: an arrestment prior to forthcoming takes precedence over an unintimated assignation. The
crucial question is why?
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insolvent. Until C2's insolvency administrator pays CI in full, there will be no transfer to
C2.1437
What then of the position of the debtor? The debtor receives intimation of an
assignation. The assignation contains a suspensive condition. How is the debtor ever to know
whether the condition has been fulfilled? Sometimes a condition may be worded in such a
way that it will take effect on the expiry of a specific time period. But many more will be in
terms of events about which the debtor cannot reasonably be expected to inform himself.1438
In this regard, as in others, the debtor's interests are paramount. He must not be prejudiced;
nor should he be placed under onerous duties to make enquiries. The general principle of
good faith payment will therefore apply. If the debtor pays the wrong party as a result of his
ignorance as to the operation of a condition, he will be protected. Of course, the debtor who
wishes to ensure the correct party is paid can always raise a multiplepoinding.
C. Resolutive conditions.
Unlike a suspensive condition, a resolutive condition in the transfer agreement has
only personal effect.1439 A transfer agreement subject to a resolutive condition will operate as
a transfer. The claim will pass to the assignee. Should the resolutive condition be triggered,
this merely places the assignee under a personal obligation to retrocede the claim. On
purification, a resolutive condition will not automatically divest a singular successor. It has no
effect on the creditors of the transferee.1440 They can attach the asset after purification of the
resolutive condition as they could have done before. So, if the assignee is sequestrated after
the occurrence of the condition but before he has retrocessed,1441 then the assigned claim will
form part of the assignee's estate.
1437 If C2's insolvency administrator does pay, will the claim automatically transfer to C3? After all, he has
intimated his assignation before C2's insolvency administrator was appointed. However, is so far as C3's
position is based on accretion, or the principle in Edmund v Mags ofAberdeen (1855) 18 D 47 affd (1858) 3
Macq 116, it is accepted that the intervening insolvency of the transferor prevents transfer to C3.
1438 Cf. E. Cashin-Ritaine, Les cessions contractuelles (2001), 44, n. 123.
1439 Bell, Commentaires I, 260 (7th ed. 1870) following Stair I.xiv.5 observes that even if a singular successor has
knowledge of the prior right of another in terms of a resolutive condition, it will not affect the asset transferred.
But see n. 1472 below: fraudulent acquisition by another, frustrating the creditor in the condition could render
the acquirer liable to make reparation. See general discussion in n. 1581 below.
1440 Bell, Commentaries (7th ed. 1870) I, 260.
1441 I.e. an intimated retrocession, for which, see chapter 4 above, 'Intimation'. In the Scottish sources the verb,
'to retrocess', is common: see, e.g., Scottish Law Commission Report No. 197, Report on Registration ofRights
in Security by Companies (2004), 26. However, since one 'cedes' a claim where there is a cession, on
retrocession it seems more natural to say that the assignee 'retrocedes'. But the usage is irregular: the past
participle is 'retrocessed', not 'retroceded'.
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In speaking of sale, Stair questions whether conditions can have 'real' as well as
obligatory effect. For Stair, the general principle is that conditions suspending the passing of
property are real; resolutive conditions take effect only between the parties to the agreement:
they cannot divest singular successors.1442 The reason is clear. Where the condition is
suspensive in nature and the putative transferee purports to transfer to a third party prior to the
satisfaction of the condition, he has no title to transfer.1443 An assignation subject to a
resolutive condition is a transfer nonetheless. C assigns to CI subject to a resolutive condition
if payment is not made within 14 days. If CI, in turn, assigns within that 14 day period, the
assignation is effective. It would be repugnant for a singular successor to be involuntarily
divested as a result of an agreement between prior holders. Subject to the offside goals caveat,
the position of a singular successor is unassailable:
"The doubt remains if such personal conditions with such clauses resolutive be
in the body of the bargain,1444 whether it be effectual against singular
successors, who cannot know their author's rights? And, therefore, are in dolo
et male fide, if they acquire such rights in prejudice of the conditions thereof;
and so ex dolo, at least such clauses will be effectual against singular
,,1445
successors...
Bell summarises Stair's position thus:
"...such conditions have not the effect of a real burden, even when mentioned
in the body of the contract, and where, of course, the condition appears openly;
that they have no effect against creditors taking voluntarily conveyances ex
necessitate, having no other probable way of payment; nor even against
voluntary acquirers, who, if they see the condition, are entitled to consider it as
a jus ad rem, not a jus in re. There may, indeed, be fraud in such a voluntary
acquisition, which may expose the acquirer to a claim of damages; but even
that claim is merely personal and will not pass with the property." 446
1442 Stair I.xiv.5. But what of the assignation of a jus quaesitum (as opposed to a spes successionis) which is
subject to defeasance/return? This problem is less complicated than it first sounds, because the resolutive
condition is intrinsic to the right assigned. As such the debtor (the executor) will always know of its nature. The
situation discussed here is of a condition in the transfer rather than a condition in the right assigned. The tract of
authority dealing with bonds of provision is discussed in Part V below. Cf. William Morton & Co v Muir Bros
1907 SC 1211.
1443 Accretion is considered below.
1444 He assumes in the previous paragraph that conditions which are not in the body of the bargain are not good
against singular successors, but only between the parties themselves.
1445 Stair I.xiv.5. This passage is qualified by three exceptions, viz, (i) where the transfer is involuntary, but in
satisfaction of debt, as by diligence; (ii) where the purchaser is a creditor and there is no other way of obtaining
payment; and (iii) where the acquirer is aware of the resolutive condition but is unsure whether the present right
of the transferor is merely personal or real, the acquirer's right will be good in so far as he will be able to
transmit a good right to a bona fide transferee (i.e. voidable). In the third case the acquirer is fraudulent, but this
being a merely personal obligation he can still transfer a good right.
1446 Bell, Commentaries (7th ed. 1870) I, 260.
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This passage goes a considerable way to support the view that the 'so-called' offside
goals rule is of much narrower compass than some have previously supposed: even a
fraudulent acquirer who seeks to deliberately frustrate the rights of the party is whose favour
the resolutive condition is couched is only bound to make reparation. His title is not subject to
reduction.
D. Roma Ipa Clauses.
In the sale of goods, the so-called Romalpa clause is well-known.1447 'Romalpa clause' can be
used in two senses in Scots law. One is all-sums retention of title; the other, an attempt to
impose a trust on the proceeds of any sub-sale concluded by a buyer in possession. Both
senses fall under an English Romalpa clause. There, the clause, inter alia, additionally
purports to assign to the original seller the proceeds of any unauthorised sale by the buyer in
possession. The buyer in possession is also obliged to hold any proceeds in trust for the seller.
In English law, the equitable assignment can only be understood on the basis of trust law;1448
in Scots law, an attempt by a cedent to hold an asset in trust for X is the converse of
transferring that asset to X. The Court of Session has been hostile to any attempt to impress a
trust in this situation.1449 However, would a clause whereby a buyer in possession undertakes
to assign any proceeds to the original seller be effective in Scots law? While it is often
asserted that no words of conveyance are necessary to effect an assignation,1450 there is an
important distinction between an undertaking to assign and the execution of it. A mere
agreement to assign is not an assignation. In any event, there must be intimation to the
debtor.1451 The question is whether the original seller could validly intimate the assignation
(the clause in the sale agreement) to the sub-purchaser and effect an assignation of the price.
There is an abstract issue about whether intimation to the debtor of an agreement to assign
without intimation of an actual deed of assignation would be sufficient. Such intimation
would not comply with the style in the schedule to the Transmission of Moveable Property
1447 Aluminium Industrie Vaasen BV v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 676. See in particular the
comment by Professor Goode, 'The Right to Trace in Commercial Transactions' (1976) 92 LQR 528.
1448
However, the law in England in this area is unsatisfactory. Such an equitable assignment would create a
registrable charge in English law, but Romalpa clauses are never registered: see R. Goode, Commercial Law (3rd
ed. 2004) p. 608. At p. 459, n. 55, Goode observes that the Romalpa case has, in this respect, 'been distinguished
almost out of existence'. See too Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd [1995] 1 AC 74 PC.
1449 Clark Taylor & Co v Quality Site Development (Edinburgh) Ltd 1981 SC 111 discussed by W.A. Wilson,
'Romalpa and Trust' 1983 SLT (News) 106.
1450 Carter v Mcintosh (1862) 24 D 925 at 933 per Lord President Inglis.
1451 Bank ofScotland v Liquidators ofHutshison, Main & Co 1914 SC (HL) 1.
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(Scotland) Act 1862. While the debtor cannot be prejudiced if he pays the putative assignee
pursuant to this intimation, the assignation is invalid.
IV. Lack of Consideration and Bad faith - the Transfer Consequences.
A. Gratuitous assignations.
While consideration is not necessary for a binding contract in Scots law, where an assignation
is made gratuitously this may have serious transfer consequences. Where an assignation bears
to be for no consideration it cannot compete with an antedated assignation even if the
gratuitous assignation is intimated first.1452 These dicta are consistent with the general
approach in the law of transfer to equiparate lack of consideration with bad faith.1453 Since
bad faith has transfer consequences (for which see the following section) so too does lack of
consideration. Therefore, those rules which apply to male fide transferees, similarly apply to
gratuitous transferees.1454 Bad faith and lack of consideration are, for the purposes of the law
of transfer, one and the same thing. It is of some note that in his discussion of competing
onerous and gratuitous transfers, Bankton discusses the same authorities which form the basis
of his discussion of the off-side goals rule (see below), and indeed his discussion of the actio
Pauliana. Yet, there are some cases which penalise gratuitous transfers which would not fall
to be penalised if the transferee was merely in bad faith. For example, a gratuitous
assignation, it seems, cannot compete with a post-dated and post-intimated onerous
assignation.1455 This would suggest that the rule prior tempore potior jure est applies only to
1452 Frazer v Phillworth (1662) Mor 938; Alexander v Lundies (1675) Mor 940; Blair v Austin (1695) Mor 941;
Hay v Hays (1699) Mor 942 cited by Bankton II, 191, 8; Wilson v Saline (1706) Mor 942; Executors Creditors of
Meldrums v Kinnier (1717) 1 Kames Rem Dec 17. See also Campbell v Riddoch (1675) Mor 1011. The effect of
the insolvency of the granter will, however, have serious consequences which may prevent even the onerous
assignee from receiving a transfer of the claim, for which see 'Offside Goals' below.
1453 See Reid, Property para 699. Cf. Anderson v Lowes (1863) 2 M 100 at 104 per Lord Curriehill: 'The rule
that the fraud of an author is not pleadable against a singular successor does not operate if that successor be
either male fide, or be not an onerous successor. The rule of the civil law is also the law of Scotland. Dolus
auctoris non nocet successori nisi in causa lucrative'. Interestingly, in Le Neve v Le Neve (1747) 1 Ves Sen 64;
27 ER 893, Lord Hardwicke LC states that the doctrine of notice in English law is based on fraud. Whatever
might constitute fraud in modern English law, in Le Neve, Lord Chancellor Hardwick invoked the standard
civilian definition of dolus malus made by Labeo in D. 4, 3, 1, 2. This is the same notion of fraud that allowed
Scots law to develop a wide general principle of fraud, for which see generally McBryde, Contract para 14-02.
1454 Indeed a gratuitous obligation, exceptionally, can be set aside on the grounds of uninduced unilateral error:
Dickson v Halbert (1854) 16 D 586; Mercer v Anstruther's Trs (1871) 9 M 618; Hunter v Bradford Property
Trust Ltd {1960) reported at 1970 SLT 173 HL.
1455 Patrick Finlay v Jhone Park (1621) Mor 895; Hope, Major Practicks VI, 44 § 16; Bankton II, 191, 8. In
Craw v Irvine (1623) Mor 2771, an anterior assignee was required to prove that he had given good consideration
before he could take preference over a posterior arrestment. Cf. Meggat v Brown (1827) 5 S 343.
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rights granted for a good consideration.1456 These cases are not to be confused with those
where the assignations themselves were onerous, but the right or bond assigned bore to have
been gratuitous.1457
In Bells v Mason,1458 Lord Kames, in discussing the evolution of the law of
assignation in Scotland, stated that 'in our later practice an assignation, with respect to deeds
for valuable consideration, has obtained the force and effect of a cessio in jure'1459 and later
he especially observes that 'Obligations for valuable consideration, it is true, are always
transmissible to heirs and assignees'.1460 An obligation granted for no consideration may be
reducible for various reasons. That it has been assigned several times will not make it any less
liable to reduction.
There is one major caveat which must underpin this entire discussion (and that which
will follow on the offside goals rule). As has been emphasised above, issues of validity or
otherwise of the assignation cannot prejudice the debtor. The debtor's position would be
intolerable if, after paying a gratuitous assignee, he was subsequently found liable to pay a
posterior onerous assignee. The debtor must at all times be protected. Providing he pays in
good faith he will be discharged. Therefore the principles discussed in the previous
paragraphs, which regulate the competition between gratuitous and onerous assignees, apply
only to competition between competing transferees where there has been no payment by the
debtor. The most common situation will be where a multiplepoinding has been raised; often,
the real raiser will be the debtor.
B. Bad Faith: Offside Goals.ue,0a
Following Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson's dubious analogy with the beautiful game,1461
Scots private law contains the so-called 'offside goals' rule. The situation is, typically,1462 the
1456 Bankton II, 191, 6: '...and a second assignation, for valuable consideration, first intimated, will be
preferable' (my emphasis). See also Andersons v Lows (1863) 2 M 100.
1457
Hay v Jamison (1672) Mor 1009. Cf. Thomson v Jolly Carters Inn 1972 SC 215 OH where a proof before
answer was allowed. On an averment that the bill had been granted for no consideration, the question arose
whether a countermanded bill of exchange still operated as an assignation of the funds.
1458
(1749) Mor. 6332; 2 Kames Rem Dec 188.
1459 2 Kames Rem Dec 188 at 191 (emphasis added).
1460 Ibid at 191-192.
1460a
f0u0Wjng section appears at 2005 Juridical Review 277.
1461
Rodger (Builders) Ltd v Fawdry 1950 SC 483 at 501 per Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson: '[The transferees]
assumed that their title would be safe once the goal of the Register House was reached. But in this branch of the
law, as in football, offside goals are not allowed'.
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notorious double sale. S contracts to sell property to Al. In breach of that agreement S then
sells to A2. A2 completes the transfer first. If A2 was aware of Al's prior contractual right,
then Al can reduce any conveyance to A2. The analogy with football is imperfect since an
offside goal is never a goal. In the double sale situation, the title of A2 is only voidable.1463 If
he sells to X before Al reduces, and X is in good faith and gives value, X's title is
unimpeachable.
In many respects this rule is exceptional. One of the dogmatic principles of the law of
property is that a transferee is not concerned with the personal obligations of his author.1464 It
is from these foundations that the possibility of a race to the register ensues: where there are
two creditors with contractual rights to property, the first to complete title, i.e. become owner,
is preferred. The offside goals rule flies in the face of these apparent axioms. The recent case
of Alex Brewster & Sons Ltd v Caughey1465 concerned a point raised in obiter dicta in Rodger
Builders. Suppose a buyer contracts in good faith. He subsequently learns of the seller's prior
contract to sell the same property. He runs to the register. Is his title voidable? If so, it comes
very close to saying that transfers of property are to be regulated by the date of the contract to
transfer,1466 or that knowledge of another's contracts may render property rights open to
challenge. Surprisingly, despite the increasing interest in the offside goals rule, its historical
development in the Scottish sources has not been fully explored. This is unfortunate. The
history sheds considerable light on the relative importance of the doctrine to Scots law.
1. History of 'Offside Goals'.
1462 The doctrine may also affect a transferee of property who is aware of pre-existing obligation on the part of
the transferor to grant a subordinate real right, for which see: Bowack v Croll (1748) Mor 1695 and 15280;
Elchies, Fraud No. 18 (I am grateful to Scott Wortley for this reference); Trade Development Bank v David W
Haig (Bellshill) Ltd 1983 SLT 510.
1463 While one would have hoped that no authority would be required for this proposition, see Law 10 of the
Laws of the Game, published by FIFA, at <http://www.fifa.com/en/game/laws.html>: 'A goal is scored when the
whole of the ball passes over the goal line, between the goalposts and under the cross bar, provided that no
infringement of the laws of the game has been committed previously by the team scoring the goal'. A goal
scored from an offside position is an 'infringement' in terms of Law 11. Appropriately, Scott Wortley labels
Roger Builders, 'The Offside Trap, or The Case of the Inappropriate Metaphor' in, 100 Cases Every Scots Law
Student Should Know (2001), 79.
1464 Reid, Property para 688.
1465 2002 GWD 15-506, {'Alex Brewster').
1466 Cf. English equity jurisprudence: J. McGhee, Snell's Equity (31st ed. 2005) para 5-25: 'Equity looks on that
as done which ought to have been done'. It may be that South African law is not of great assistance in this area,
as the doctrine of notice there developed under a strong English influence. In the most recent case in the
Supreme Court of Appeal, a majority of the judges suggested that the doctrine is based on equity: Wahloo Sand
Bk v Trustees, Hambly Parker Trust 2002 (2) SA 776 at 788D-E per Cloete JA. But compare the opinion of
280
The Transfer ofMoney Claims in Scots Law
The problem of double sales in Scots law is old. The Parliament of Scotland found it
necessary to pass the Stellionate Act as early as 1540.1467 Older still is the voluminous
continental literature on the subject.1468 Indeed, according to the preamble of the Registration
Act of 16 1 7,1469 the main motivation behind the creation of the Register of Sasines was the
problem of the seller who, 'concealing of sum privat Right', sought to sell the property again.
(a) Stair.1470
Stair treats the offside goals rule in the context of the effect of a resolutive condition
(pactum legis commissoriae) on the transfer of an asset. As he perceptively points out, it is not
possible for a resolutive condition to have 'real' effect. The transfer of property is unitary and
(probably)1471 abstracted from the provisions of the agreement which it may implement. The
effect of such a condition is, therefore, only personal: on the occurrence of the event, the
transferee may be subject to a personal obligation to reconvey to the seller. With regard to the
effect of a singular successor's knowledge of a prior right, Stair makes an important
distinction. On the one hand is private knowledge. Where a subsequent transferee has prior
knowledge of a prior right this may give rise to an obligation of reparation, i.e. A1 may have a
personal right to damages. On the other hand, is certain knowledge, i.e. knowledge which A2
has acquired as a result of some legal interpellation, such as citation. Only in this (perhaps
unusual) situation will there be a right of reduction for Al. He also states that creditors doing
diligence need not be in good faith1472:
"These who acquire such rights without necessity, and see therein such
conditions in themselves personal, though having resolutive clauses, do not
Olivier JA, especially at 791I-J, who warned that to appeal to 'equity' as the basis of the rule would 'degenereer
ons reg tot 'n kasui'stiese, arbitrere en sisteemlose benaderingswyse'.
1467
APS, c. 23; \2mo, c. 105.
1468 For a full survey, see R. Michaels, Sachzuordnung durch Kaufvertrag (2002). The genesis of the rule,
however, remains obscure: see Michaels, 107.
1469
Cap. 16 (same chapter number in both APS and 12mo).
1470 Stair I.xiv.5. Unles otherwise indicated, all references are to D.M. Walker's Tercentenary edition. This is
essentially a reprint of the second edition of 1693.
1471 Whether Scots law subscribes to the Abstraktionsprinzip or to the doctrine of justa causa traditionis is
somewhat controversial. Compare McBryde, Contract para 13-01 ff. and Reid, Property para 608. D.L. Carey
Miller, Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law (1991) para 8-06 and idem, 'Systems of Property: Stair and Grotius'
in D.L. Carey Miller and D.W. Meyers (eds) Comparative and Historical Essays in Scots Law (1992), 28-30
concludes that Stair adopts the abstract theory.
1472 This has always been accepted in principle. But the authorities were conflicting and the point was
authoritatively confirmed only recently: Burnett's Tr. v Grainger 2004 SC (HL) 19 at para 141 per Lord Rodger
of Earlsferry.
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thereby know that the third party1473 hath the right jus in re, but jus ad rem\
and, therefore, if they acquire such rights, the property is thereby transmitted.
And though there may be fraud in the acquirer, which raiseth an obligation of
reparation to the party damnified by that delinquence, yet that is but personal;
and another party acquiring bona fide or necessarily, and not partaking of that
fraud is in tuto. [***]1474 But certain knowledge, by intimation, citation, or the
like, inducing malem fidem, whereby any prior disposition or assignation made
to another party is certainly known, or at least interruption made in acquiring
by arrestment or citation of the acquirer, such rights acquired, not being of
necessity to satisfy prior engagements, are reducible ex capite firaudis, and the
acquirer is the partaker of the fraud of his author, who thereby becomes a
granter of double rights; but this will not hinder legal diligence to proceed and
be completed and become effectual, though the user thereof did certainly know
any inchoate and incomplete right of another." 475
On examination of the third edition of the Institutions, we find an important additional
passage:
"But for the matter of the fraud itself, tho' in equity, private knowledge may be
sufficient to infer reparation; yet, in many cases, positive law, and our custom,
respects not private knowledge, but such only as by publick acts, which is
specifically allowed in the law; and, therefore he who knows another to have
an imperfect right, doth yet validly acquire in prejudice thereof, as he who
knows an assignation unintimated, and takes another, is preferred June 15th
1624 Adamson.1476 Nor doth the private knowledge of an assignation supply
intimation to the debtor, March 14th 1626, Westraw,XA11 Had[dington] Jan 10th
1611, Graham147 : and he who knows another to have a disposition of lands
without publick infeftment, if he acquire right, and be first publically infeft, is
preferred, Feb 24th 1636, Oliphant,1479 Neither is an executor obliged to call the
debtor of a defunct having done no legal diligence, but may safely pay to other
creditors doing diligence, tho' the executor had paid him a part of the debt. July
16th 1629 Telzifer.
Useful1482 reference may often be had to the third edition of Stair. The editors liberally added
to the text of the second edition from the manuscripts of the Institutions1483 on which Stair
1473 I.e. the original seller: on the occurrence of the specified event, the property will not automatically revert to
the original seller. Admittedly, this passage is not easy to follow.
1474 The text as quoted here is from the second edition. As will be seen below, some of the later editions insert
additional text in this bracketed part.
1475 1.xiv.5. Emphasis added. This passage is quoted from D.M. Walker's Tercentenary edition, 1981, essentially
reprinting the second edition of 1693, the last completed by Stair himself.
1476 Adamson v McMitchell (1624) Mor 859.
1477 Westraw v Williams and Carmichael (1626) Mor 873.
1478
(161 1) Mor 13089.
1479
(1636) Mor 10547; Spotiswoode 233.
1480 Sub nom Telfer v Wilson (1629) Mor 2190 and 3868.
1481 J. Gordon and W. Johnstone (eds) Stair's Institutions (3rd ed. 1759), I.xiv.6. This passage is reproduced in
italics in More's (5th ed. 1832) edition.
1482 The adjective is Professor Walker's: see his 'Introduction' to the Tercentenary edition, at 45.
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apparently had been working before his death and which were deposited in the Advocates'
Library.1484 Stair looks to the law of assignation as his paradigm example of transfer.
Assignation is a particularly slippery word in the Scottish sources. It is not merely limited to
the transfer of claims without the consent of the debtor (cession de creance\
Forderungsabtretung), but may be applied to the transfer of incorporeal heritable rights,
corporeal moveables,1485 as well as to a universal disposal of assets (as in a cessio omnium
bonorum). Two of the authorities cited by Stair (Westraw and Graham) hold that the debtor's
mere private knowledge of an assignation by the cedent is insufficient to prevent the debtor
from lawfully paying the cedent. Transfer only occurs on legal intimation of the
assignation.1486 Put another way, the debtor is interpelled only by a formal legal act; private
knowledge is irrelevant. Stair seeks to apply the same principles to the double sale situation
by analogy.1487 It is often said that the double sale is fraudulent. This is certainly consistent
with the very general concept of fraud in Scots common law. But a double sale is also a
breach of warrandice. The obligation to repair this wrong is personal to the wrongdoer, the
contract-breaking seller. However, unless there is some legal interpellation bringing the pre¬
existing contractual obligation to A2's notice, the latter's position is unassailable. This holds
true both for assignations (Adamson) and for land (Oliphant). Thus the importance of this
passage, if genuine,1488 cannot be overstated: Scotland's foremost institutional writer deprives
the so-called 'offside-goals' rule of almost all practical effect. And there is good reason to
consider the passage authentic. It bears a considerable resemblance to Stair's discussion of
real rights:
1483 The addition of this text, like others, is vigorously attacked by Brodie in his (4th ed. 1826) edition, I.xiv.6,
note b, 148-149. As Professor Walker points out, however, Brodie was equally guilty of innovating on Stair's
text, despite his assertions to the contrary: see Tercentenary edition, 'Introduction', 47. The text added in the
third edition does, at least, seem to be written very much in Stair's style.
1484 A detailed comparison of the various manuscript copies of the Institutions remains to be done. This is
unfortunate, as many passages in Stair appear contradictory. Of a later passage (I.x.16, for which see n. 952
above), George Joseph Bell, Commentaries (2nd ed. 1810), 150, note n, observes - with some irritation - 'There
are passages in Stair's work which are deformed with a sort of confusion and rambling, that suggests the notion
of having been originally put down amidst the hurry of business, to be afterwards more fully considered, and
correctly written, and, from carelessness, having found their way into the hands of the printer.'
1485 See e.g. Erskine III.v.l and J. Craigie, Scottish Law of Conveyancing: Moveable Rights (1894), 250 ff.
1486 See also the authority cited in the note to H.L. MacQueen et al (eds) W.M. Gloag and R.C. Henderson, The
Law ofScotland (11th ed. 2001) para 38-06, which has remained unchanged since the first edition of the work.
1487
Although, as Erskine II.i.28 points out, the analogy is not a perfect one: the debtor in an assignation is not a
competing transferee. Cf. Bairdy v Henderson (1688) Mor 8395 where it was successfully argued that private
knowledge, even if acquired before A2 contracted with S, is not relevant.
1488 And the point may be debateable. Stair covers the issue of supervening knowledge expressly (see nn. 61 and
62 below). This would be a strange thing to do if the offside goals rule was not part of the law at all. But it
should be remembered that Stair was not always consistent: see Bell's comment at n. 1484 above. Further,
although it could be argued that the excised passage was deliberately omitted by Stair, the contrary can be argued
with equal force: this was a passage that he wanted to include but was lost.
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"This right [to fruits] is only competent to possessors bona fide, who do truly
think that which they possess to be their own, and know not of the right of any
other.1489 But private knowledge upon information, without legal diligence, or
any other solemnity allowed in law, at least unless the private knowledge be
certain, is not to be regarded, nor doth constitute the knower in male fide,
March 14, 1626, Nisbet and Westraw v Carmichael [Mor. 859]."1490
For Stair, then, transferees are required to take cognisance only of public information or
formal legal acts.1491 Admittedly, it is not evident what Stair means by 'unless the knowledge
be certain'. One would have thought that an equivalent to such a solemnity would at least be
required; for instance, a copy of the deed, on which the competing party founds, being
produced to A2. The moment up to and until such a notice can be effectually made will be
discussed below.
(b) Bankton.
Andrew McDouall, Lord Bankton, published his Institutes in 1751-53. Like Stair,
Bankton first encounters the question of private knowledge of a prior right in the context of
the pactum legis commissoriae:
"...according to the dictates of the civil law, the paction in sale, whereby, 'if
the price is not paid in or on or before a precise day, the bargain may be voided
by the seller', is Pactum legis commissoriae. The nature of this paction is, that
the property indeed passes in virtue of the sale and delivery, but may thereafter
be revoked by the seller, upon the buyer's not paying the price at the day;
therefore it is only personal upon the buyer, and will not affect singular
successors in the case of lands purchased, unless upon a lucrative title, or that
the matter was rendered litigious, or the provision duly recorded as a reversion,
or ingrossed in the seisin duly registered: nor is it effectual against one who
purchases from him, who bought species of goods upon such condition, by the
often mentioned rule, that mobilia non habent sequelam."XA92
Bankton's approach is fascinating. His view of the effect of a resolutive condition on
singular successors and creditors is almost identical to Stair's approach in the omitted
1489
Citing D. 50, 16, 109.
1490 II.i.24.
1491 It is notable that Wahloo Sand Bk v Trustees, Hambly Parker Trust 2002 (2) SA 776 (SCA) both parties held
only a jus ad rem: A1 obtained an interim interdict preventing registration of the conveyance of the property to
A2. Therefore, although A2 alleged that he was in good faith at the time of the conclusion of the contract, he
took subject to the servitude that the S had bound himself to grant to Al. Scots law is not clear. Some statements
by the institutional writers suggest that where the matter has been rendered 'litigious', i.e. registration is
prohibited by legal process, A2 will be bound by Al's prior right. The question remains open, however, whether,
and on what basis, Al could properly interdict A2 from registering where A2 has contracted in good faith.
1492 Bankton I, 417, 31.
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passage. Even where the resolutive condition has been purified, thus giving rise to the
personal obligation to reconvey (jus ad rem), any knowledge of this prior personal right has
no effect on a singular successor; unless, that is, the knowledge is certain (the matter has been
rendered litigious;1493 the reversion is registered1494) or the successor is a gratuitous transferee.
Bankton returns to the lack of consideration when, like Stair, he discusses the law of
assignation. Again, private knowledge of a prior right is immediately addressed in this
context. After speaking of the assignatus utitur iure auctoris rule, he continues:
"And, for the same reason, if the second assignation be gratuitous, tho' first
intimated, it must yield preference to the first; for the objection that lay against
the cedent, of granting double rights,1495 is good against the second gratuitous
assignee, without distinction whether the first assignation was gratuitous or not,
since the first assignee is creditor to the cedent, by the express or implied
warrandice in the right. (Alexander July 15th 1675);1496 and no creditor can be
prejudiced by a subsequent gratuitous deed in relation to the same subject,
which is manifestly fraudulent."1497
Importantly, Bankton makes the link between the offside goals rule and the actio Pauliana
(the action accorded to creditors to reduce gratuitous alienations or unfair preferences). The
offside goals rule can be invoked where A2 is in bad faith or where he has given no value.
While many cases dealing with the actio Pauliana deal with single gratuitous alienations,
several involve the classic double grant: the claimants in a multiplepoinding, one holding a
gratuitous and the other an onerous assignation of the same claim.1498 Admittedly, there are
1493 As far as land is concerned, only an inhibition or adjudication can bring about litigiosity: Morison and
Company v Allardes (1787) Mor 8335; Duchess ofDouglas and Walter Scot, Competing (1764) Mor 8390.
1494 Post-1617 when the Register of Sasines was instituted. By virtue of the Reversion Act 1469 singular
successors were subject to reversions, although it has been disputed whether registration was necessary where
the reversion was not in the body of the deed: see n. 1432 above. Prior to the 1469 Act, it seems that a singular
successor was bound by a reversion in the body of the deed; but not by an extrinsic one. Interestingly, therefore,
where a purchaser contracted in good faith for the transfer of property and only subsequently learned of the
reversion on examination of the deeds, the purchaser would nevertheless be bound by the reversion though he
learned of it only subsequently.
1495 See, APS 1540, c. 23; 12mo, c. 105.
1496 Alexander v Lundies (1675) Mor 940.
1497
II, 191, 8. At II, 243, 8, Bankton compares the position to that in the English counties of York and Middlesex
where registration had been introduced for the transfer of land (Land Tax Act, 1707, 6 Anne c. 35; and
Middlesex Registry Act, 1708, 7 Anne c. 20) as does Henry Home, Lord Karnes, Principles ofEquity (3rd ed.
1778) II, 41. Kames cites Merry v Abney and Kendal (1663) 1 Chan Cas 38; 1 Eq Cas Abr 330, Ch 42, Sect A, §
1; 21 ER 1081 and 22 ER 682; Ferrars v Cherry (1700) 1 Eq Cas Abr 331; Ch 42, Sect A, § 5; 2 Vern 384; 21
ER 1081; 23 ER 845; Blades v Blades (1727) 1 Eq Cas Abr 358, Ch 47, Sect B, § 12; 21 ER 1100. The writer is
indebted to Scott F. Dickson for these references. Blades was approved in Le Neve v Le Neve (1747) 1 Ves Sen
64; 27 ER 893 by Lord Hardwicke LC and in Agra Bank Ltd v Barry (1874) LR 7 HL 135 at 148 per Lord
Cairns LC. See also the opinion of Lord Shand (Ordinary) in Stodart v Dalzell (1876) 4 R 236 at 240 who cites
Le Neve and Holmes v Powell (1856) 8 De G M & G 572; 44 ER 510 in 2 White and Tudor's Leading Cases in
Equity p. 37 especially at 64. Le Neve was cited in Roger (Builders) v Fawdry 1950 SC 483.
1498 See references in n. 1452, above; and Ireland v Neilson (1755) 5 Br Sup 286 (Kilkerran) and 828
(Monboddo). Ireland was cited by Lord Monboddo in his dissenting opinion in the well-known case of Mitchells
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differences between the actio and the offside goals rule. For example, proof that an alienation
was made for good consideration is generally a good defence to action based on the actio
Pauliana. Knowledge of other creditors' rights is not relevant; knowledge of insolvency is.1499
Where a transfer is alleged to be in breach of the offside goals rule, however, a plea of good
consideration, apparently, will be of no avail. The cases on the actio Pauliana, however, are
relevant in so far as they demonstrate that a gratuitous alienee is presumed to be a party to the
fraud of the granter of double rights, even although he may have been totally oblivious to the
insolvency of the granter.1500
More generally, where an assignation is made gratuitously this may have serious
transfer consequences. In a competition (most likely in a multiplepoinding), the holder of an
antedated assignation can reduce a posterior gratuitous assignation, even if the gratuitous
assignation was intimated first.1501 These dicta are consistent with the general approach of the
law on insolvency to equiparate lack of consideration with fraud:1502
"It is likewise the common law that a prior gratuitous alienee is intitled to
reduce a second disposition granted to another for a lucrative1503 cause who
was first infeft, in the same manner as a first onerous disponee, last infeft, is
preferable to a second gratuitous disponee first infeft. This shall hold even tho'
the disponer, at the time of granting these rights, was solvent, in respect that
the second disposition, in both cases is fraudulent (July 15th 1675 Alexander
[Mor. 940]; December 11th 1695 Blair [Mor. 941]; February 7th 1699 Hay
[Mor. 942]); for a first disponee, tho' gratuitous is creditor in the warrandice
express or implied and therefore intitled to reduce the second fraudulent right:
but if the second disposition was onerous, and made to a bona fide purchaser,
he, being first infeft, is preferable even to a prior onerous disponee, unless the
granter was bankrupt at the time, and inchoat diligence used against him
(December 11th 1695 Blair [v Austin Mor. 941]; February 5th 1671 Blair [v
Blair Mor. 940] ; July 23rd 1662 Lord Fraser [Mor. 938]; January 24th 1706,
v Ferguson (1781) 3 Ross LC 120. See also Executor Creditors ofMeldrum v Kinnier (1717) 1 Kames Rem Dec
17; Elliot v Wilson, February 9th 1826 FC and Meggat v Brown (1827) 5 S 343. Cf. Stair III.i.6 and Bankton I,
265, 90 for the effect of a gratuitous deed. Interestingly, Kames also draws the parallel between stellionate and
gratuitous alienations on bankruptcy: Principles ofEquity (3rd ed. 1778) II, 202-205.
1499 See discussion of the actio Pauliana in Street v Mason (1672) Mor 4911 and Bateman and Chaplane v
Hamilton (1686) Mor 1067. Someone attempting to acquire a security in the knowledge that the debtor is
insolvent is rightly viewed as 'particeps fraudis'. It is an unfair preference.
1500 Bankton I, 259, 65; I, 264, 84-85 and I, 265, 90.
1501 See authorities cited in n. 1452 above. In Craw v Irvine (1623) Mor 2771, a multiplepoinding, an anterior
assignee was required to prove that he had given good consideration before he could be preferred to a posterior
arrester. There are authorities which suggest that a post-dated, post-intimated onerous assignation is to be
preferred in a competition to an anterior intimated assignation which was gratuitous: Patrick Finlay v Jhone
Park (1621) Mor 895; Hope, Major Practicks VI, 44 § 16; Bankton II, 191, 8. Cf. Meggat v Brown (1827) 5 S
343 and Anderson v Lows (1863) 2 M 100.
1502 See Reid, Property para 699. Cf. Anderson v Lowes (1863) 2 M 100 at 104 per Lord Curriehill. See too, for
English law, n. 1453 above.
1503 In Scots law, 'lucrative' means gratuitous: see Stair III, title 7: 'Lucrative Successors'.
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Neilson1504-, and all objections competent against the author are good against
his gratuitous successor."1505
In other words, where a conveyance dated second is completed first, but is gratuitous, that
second transfer may be reduced by the holder of an antedated conveyance.1506 Knowledge is
not relevant. Bankton discusses the same authorities which form the basis of his discussion of
the offside goals rule, and indeed his discussion of the actio Pauliana}501 The cases on
bankruptcy in Scotland contain many references to debtors defrauding creditors. Indeed, until
1790,1508 simply becoming bankrupt within three days of accepting goods without payment
was deemed fraudulent.1509 While Bankton makes an analogy with the actio Pauliana and
gratuitous transfers, there is little discussion of the relevance of mere knowledge of prior
rights. In the insolvency situation it is readily understandable that dispositions for no
consideration should be attacked. All the good faith in the world is no comfort to the
bankrupt's creditors. What is important is whether there has been payment for the transfer. If
the transferee has paid for the disposition or assignation, then, in the insolvency situation, it
seems that a transferee who knew of a prior right but who completed the transfer first will not
be prejudiced by his knowledge (provided always that he has given good consideration and
the transfer or security did not amount to an unfair preference). Indeed, in a double sale
situation, even if A2 were to attack A1 this is likely to be of little assistance on S's
insolvency. Any reduction will benefit only S's creditors.1510 And there is no reason that A2
should have any preferential claim on S's estate.
What then of the double sale where S is solvent? Bankton clearly bases the doctrine on
fraud. Wortley discounts 'fraud' as a relevant basis for the doctrine on the basis that 'mere
1504 Not found.
1505 Bankton I, 265, 90. Cf. Erskine II.iii.27, who notes that a cedent cannot even expressly reserve the right to
sell to another: 'a clause exempting the granter from warrandice in the most express terms, is not sufficient to
secure him if he shall afterwards grant an inconsistent deed; for no agreement, let it be ever so explicit ought to
protect against the consequences of fraud or deceit'.
1506 See too Stair III.i.6 to the same effect.
1507 Bankton I, 259, 65; I, 264, 84-85 and I, 265, 90.
1508
Jeffrey vAllan, Stewart & Co (1790) 3 Pat App 191; 2 Ross' Lead Com Cas 585 rev'g Stewartv Creditors of
James Stein (1788) Mor 4949.
1509 See in particular Inglis v Royal Bank ofScotland (1736) Mor 4936; 5 Br Sup 193; Elchies, Bankrupt No.9.
This was also the basis for the decisions in Prince v Pallet (1680) Mor 4932; 2 Stair 823 (cited with apparent
approval by Stair I.ix. 14) and Main v Keeper of the Weigh House Glasgow (1715) Mor 4934.
1510
Assuming the reduction is catholic. Cf. the almost contemporary view of R.J. Pothier, Traite des obligations
(1761) § 153, in M. Bugnet (ed.) Oeuvres de Pothier (1861) vol 2, 72. Where the defender contracted for the
transfer of property in the knowledge of the seller's obligation to grant a subordinate real right over it to another,
any reduction here would be ad hunc effectum.
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bad faith' is sufficient; this, he argues, is of some lesser degree than fraud in modern law.1511
However, according to Bankton, mere knowledge on the part of the seller that he is breaching
a pre-existing obligation is also fraudulent. In so far as A2 is aware of the breach of this
obligation, then 'his [A2] perfecting of the right will not avail him; for he is accessory to the
party's granting double rights, which not only is a ground for annulling the second as
fraudulent but likewise subjects the offenders, and all accessories, to the guilt of
stellionate'.1512 A2's position is one of 'statutory presumptive fraud'.1513
Stellionate was indeed a crime.1514 The criminal was the seller, not the transferee.1515
As for the transferee, what is so fraudulent about knowledge of a prior right? Providing A2
has paid good consideration where is the prejudice to Al? S is manifestly in breach of
contract but should now be in funds. Al has a good claim for damages against S.1516
(c) Bell.
1511 S. Wortley, 'Double sales and the offside trap: some thoughts on the rule penalising private knowledge of a
prior right' 2002 JR 291 at 301 citing Petrie v Forsyth (1874) 2 R 214 and Morrison v Sommerville (1860) 22 D
1082. Compare the statement in Battison v Hobson [1896] 2 Ch 403 at 412 where, in a case dealing with the
English doctrine of notice, Stirling J characterised fraud as that which carried 'grave moral blame'. But, in Scots
law, fraud has a much wider meaning: '.. .the Scottish courts, with a background of civilian texts, applied a wide
definition of fraud which looks at practical result rather than to the precise nature of the act. The motive is
probably irrelevant and it is not necessary to show an intention to cheat': McBryde, Contract para 14-02.
1512 Bankton II, 192, 9. In French, the seller who makes a double sale is labelled 'stellionataire': G. Ripert, La
regie morale dans les obligations civiles (4th ed. 1949) para 171 cited by G. Cliopath, 'Quelque problemes
relatifs a la double vente, specialement en matiere immobliere' (1970) 66 Schweizerische Juristen-Zeitung 49
and 65 (2 parts) at 50, n. 6. Le Grand Robert de la languefrancaise (2nd ed. 2001) vol 6, 712 records the first use
of the term 'stellionataire' in 1655; and 'stellionate' in 1680. 'Stellionataire' was used in the original Art. 2059,
Code Civil in the context of personal arrestment. It denominated fraud in general. The article was repealed in
1868. Their earliest reference to the Latin, 'stellionatus' in France is given in Le Grand Robert as 1577. It is not
clear when Scots law began to use the term. It is used by Sir George Mackenzie, The Laws and Customes of
Scotland, in Matters Criminal (1678) I.xxviii.l and is adopted by Erskine, Principles (21st ed. 1911) IV.iv.41.
See too OED (2nd ed. 1989) s.v. 'stellionate'. Both authors use the term in a general sense to denote any type of
innominate fraud; as well as more specifically to mean the double sale. The HMSO, Chronological Table of the
Statutes (2001) part II, p. 2218, for example, refers to the 1540 Act as the 'Fraud' Act, not the Stellionate Act.
The term stellionatus is found in the Digest: D. 47, 20 de stellionatus; and the Code: C. 9, 34; see H.G.
Heumann, Handlexicon zu den Quellen des romischen Rechts (5th ed. 1879), 550. Erskine, IV.iv.79, says that the
etymological root of 'stellionate' is 'stellio': 'a serpent of the most crafty kind'; but he refers only to Pliny, and
that reference appears to be incorrect.
1513 Bankton I, 264, 85. Although he is here referring to the 1621 Bankruptcy Act (cap. 18, APS c. 18), Bankton
states that the basis of the 1540 Act is the same: I, 259, 65.
1514 Until 1964: Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1964, schedule 1.
1515 Act 1540, cap. 105; APS, c. 23.
1516 S's liability, being based on fraud, is one from which he will not be discharged through bankruptcy:
Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, s. 55(1 )(c).
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Brief mention can also be made of Bell's treatment of the offside goals rule in the context of
resolutive conditions. In preference to some loose statements in Erskine,1517 Bell adopts
Stair's analysis1518:
"...such conditions have not the effect of a real burden, even when mentioned
in the body of the contract, and where, of course, the condition appears openly;
that they have no effect against creditors taking voluntarily conveyances ex
necessitate, having no other probable way of payment; nor even against
voluntary acquirers, who, if they see the condition, are entitled to consider it as
a jus ad rem, not a jus in re. There may, indeed, be fraud in such a voluntary
acquisition, which may expose the acquirer to a claim of damages; but even
that claim is merely personal and will not pass with the property.'
Again, this passage is consistent with both Stair and Bankton. Bell does not mention
gratuitous transferees. Importantly, however, Bell's contribution is to extend protection for a
singular successor: where A1 assigns to A2, and A2 is bad faith (i.e. has private knowledge of
S's right by resolutive condition in his agreement with Al), A2's title is good, however, it
seems, that knowledge was acquired. At most A2 has a personal obligation to make
reparation.
2. Alex Brewster.
Wortley's article followed the decision in Alex Brewster,1520 That case revisited an
issue of principle which was raised obiter in Rodger Builders: if, after the conclusion of the
missives with A2, A2 learns of the pre-existing obligation on the part of the granter to dispone
1 S91
to Al, and A2 registers first, is A2's title voidable in terms of the offside goals rule? These
facts seem to illustrate a classic, perhaps paradigm, race to the register. Yet, the obiter dicta of
Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson, followed by the Lord Ordinary in Alex Brewster, suggest that
private knowledge of a pre-existing obligation acquired after the conclusion of the missives is
sufficient to render a following transfer voidable.1522 There are major difficulties with such a
1517 III.iii.l 1. See too Lord Ivory's criticism of Erksine's text: (5th ed. 1824), 648, n. 108.
15181.xiv.5.
1519 Bell, Commentaries (7th ed. 1870) I, 260.
1520 2002 GWD 15-506.
1521
Roger (Builders) Ltd v Fawdry 1950 SC 483 at 500 per Lord Jamieson; at 501, per Lord Justice-Clerk
Thomson. Cf. Alex Brewster, transcript, para [71]. The facts of Alex Brewster were complicated. See the caveat
at n. 83 below.
1522 Alex Brewster, ibid. There are a number of possibilities for the moment after which the offside goals rule
cannot apply: missives, payment, delivery of the disposition etc. These possibilities are discussed in Part V,
below.
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suggestion.1523 The axiomatic principle of Scottish property law is that ownership of heritable
property passes only on recording or registration. 524 It is this basic rule which gives rise to
the possibility of a 'race to the register'. Leaving involuntary transferees out of the equation
(such as trustees in sequestration), the effect of the Lord Ordinary's decision is to say that the
only legitimate race to the register is a blind man's race: one in which one of the participants
has no idea whom he is racing or even whether he is racing at all. According to the Alex
Brewster case, if A2 learns that he is indeed running a race to the register with one who holds
a prior personal right (i.e. Al), his title is subject to reduction. With respect, such a view is
undesirable. The offside goals rule is an exception to the principle prior tempore potior jure
est}525 In Scots law, competition of titles is regulated in terms of the date of transfer:
recording or registration (immoveables); delivery (corporeal moveables at common law) and
intimation of delivery of the transfer agreement (claims). Where A2 contracts to buy property
in good faith, pays the price and receives a disposition in ignorance of a pre-existing
obligation, why should he be prejudiced by subsequent knowledge? Stair, more than once,
resolves the issue of subsequent knowledge clearly, concisely and in accordance with
principle:
"...But certain knowledge, by intimation, citation, or the like, inducing malem
fidem, whereby any prior disposition or assignation made to another party is
certainly known, or at least interruption made in acquiring by arrestment or
citation of the acquirer, such rights acquired, not being of necessity to satisfy
prior engagements, are reducible ex capite fraudis, and the acquirer is the
partaker of the fraud of his author, who thereby becomes a granter of double
rights..."1526
"...fraud is not competent by exception but by reduction ... fraud being of a
criminal nature, it is not relevant against singular successors, not partakers of
the fraud, but only against the committers of the fraud, and these representing
them, especially as to feudal rights: for so it is expressly provided by the fore-
mentioned statute; the reason whereof is, to secure land rights, and that
purchasers be not disappointed; and therefore no action can be taken effectual
against them, upon the fraud of their authors, unless they were accessory
1523
Although it does seem to be consistent with Professor Carey-Miller's important contribution, 'Good Faith in
Scots Property Law' in A.G.M. Forte (ed.) Good Faith in Contract and Property Law (1999) at 109, with which
this writer would disagree.
1524 Abolition of Feudal Tenure (Scotland) Act 2000, s. 4. In parenthesis, it is interesting to note that both
Bankton II, 243, 2 and Karnes, Principles ofEquity (3rd ed. 1778) II, 41 referred comparatively to the counties of
England which had introduced registration for the transfer of land, see n. 36 above.
1525
Or, for those who like to summarise principles in Latin maxims, Qui primus jus suum insinuaverit
praeferetur. See A. Menzies, Lectures on Conveyancing {1856), 243.
1526 1.xiv.5, emphasis added. An edited version of this passage, importantly including the italicised part, is quoted
by Reid, Property para 695, n. 8. The italicised passage is emphasised by Reid in para 697, n. 1.
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thereto, at least by knowing the same when they purchased: but supervenient
knowledge will notpre-judge them."15 1
These passages fit neatly with the passage attributed to Stair by the editors of the third
edition:1528 private knowledge is insufficient; only certain legal interpellation will prejudice a
second purchaser. So, creditors doing diligence are not affected by private knowledge. This is
again in line with the Scots law of assignation, where private knowledge is not relevant in the
matter of payment by the debtor to the cedent after delivery of the assignation to the assignee
but prior to intimation.1529 While some sources would admit private knowledge,1530 there is no
reason why the passage of Stair dealing with supervening knowledge is not still good law.1531
3. English Law
At the outset of this paper, it was mooted that the decision in Alex Brewster comes close to
regulating the transfer of heritage by the date of the contract, since 'equity will hold as done
that which ought to have been done'.1532 Yet, even the law of Equity in England would be of
no assistance to A1 in the Alex Brewster situation.1533 In English law, priorities are also
regulated by the well known equitable principle: qui prior tempore est, potior jure est. But
equity converts agreements to transfer into transfers. Therefore, it is the date of the contract
that is relevant. However, this principle is subject to an exception in the case of the bona fide
purchaser without notice. So, where A1 contracts for the sale of property and pays the price, S
becomes a constructive trustee for Al. If A2 then contracts with S for the sale of the same
property and pays the price in good faith and without notice of the prior sale to Al, then he is
also entitled to Equity's protection. The equities are equal; and, where the equities are equal,
the law should prevail.1534 A2 will 'prevail over a prior equity if he subsequently gets into a
legal estate, even if he then has notice of the equity. Between himself and the owner of the
1527 Stair IV.xl.21, my emphasis. Logically, there is the possibility that Stair could be referring here only to
knowledge acquired after recording of the disposition. However, while this is a possible explanation, it is not
consistent with the traditional Scottish approach to the 'race' to the register.
1528 But cf. the caveat in n. 1488 above.
1529 See n. 1486 above.
1530 See e.g. Erskine II.i.28; Bankton I, 265, 90; Clark v Loudon (1856) 18 D 499 at 505 per Lord Justice-Clerk
Hope. Cf. McGowan v Robb (1862) 1 M 141.
1531 Cf. the position in modern French law: P. Simler and P. Delebecque, Droit civil, les suretes: la publicite
fonciere (3r ed. 2000) para 749: 'S'il n'a ete informe de l'existence d'un acte anterieur non publie que
posterieurement, mais avant d'avoir lui-meme procede...le premier acte lui est inopposable'.
1532 See n. 1466 above.
1533 It should be noted that, following the Land Registration Act 2002, equitable rights have a far smaller role to
play. Equitable principles remain important, however, in the transfer of personal property.
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prior equity, the equities are equal, and there is no reason why the purchaser should be
1535
deprived of the advantage he may obtain at law'.
4. Cut-off Point for the Offside Goals Rule
There remains one question. Stair says that supervening knowledge of a prior right will not
prejudice a bona fide second purchaser. However, what does Stair mean by 'purchaser'? He
does not elaborate. Like 'assignation', 'purchase' can mean many things: conclusion of the
missives;1536 delivery of the disposition;1537 payment of the price;1538 transfer of the keys; or
transfer of dominium or of a claim. This brings us back to an evaluation of the constituent
three-stage (in the case of immoveables and the assignation of money claims in any event)
process of transfer. What if A2 contracts in good faith, but before delivery of the disposition
learns of the prior contractual right in favour of Al? Until A2 has a disposition, he cannot run
the race to the register. If, after contracting good faith, A2 subsequently learns of a prior
agreement between S and Al, can A2 nevertheless demand delivery of the disposition in
terms of his second contractual right? All A2 is doing is exercising his contractual rights. If
A2 has contracted in good faith, why should he be prejudiced by subsequent knowledge? Al
might never register. After all, there is no normative requirement that a disponee must record
or register. The same is true of a grantee of a heritable security. Certainly failure to register
will have thoroughly deleterious consequences; but the law does not impinge on a creditor's
prerogative to waive his rights. If Al neglects to register, more fool him: vigilantibus non
dormientibus jura subveniunt.
This approach can be seen in Stair, who suggests that A2's position may only be
attacked where A2 has received an assignation or disposition 'not being of necessity to satisfy
1534 Snell's third maxim of Equity: J. McGhee (ed.) Snell's Equity (30th ed. 2000) para 3-08; (31st ed. 2005) paras
4-03 ff. Cf. Glasgow Feuing and Building Company v Watson (1887) 14 R 610 at 619 per Lord Young.
1535 J. McGhee (ed.) Snell's Equity (30th ed. 2000) para 4-16; cf. (31st ed. 2005) para 4-03. As English law
evolved, unregistered land moved away from the position stated in Le Neve v Le Neve (1747) 1 Ves Sen 64; 27
ER 893: see Wyatt v Barwell (1815) 19 Ves Jr 436; 34 ER 578; Chadwick v Turner (1866) LR 1 Ch App 310; Re
Monolithic Building Co Ltd [1915] 1 Ch 643. The policy arguments for this approach are articulated by Lord
Wilberforce in Frazer v Walker [1967] 1 AC 569 at 582. However, see now the Land Registration Act 2002, s.
28(1).
1536 Sale of Goods Act 1979, s. 17 and s. 18, rule 1. This seems to be the cut-off point for the doctrine of notice in
South African law, although the point is not clear: Wahloo Sand Bk v Trustees, Hambly Parker Trust 2002 (2)
SA 776 (SCA) at 787 H per Cloete JA. Like Scots law, South African law uses similarly ambiguous language:
Frye's (Pty) Ltd v Ries 1957 (3) SA 575 (A) at 582 C-D per Hoexter JA ('bought').
1537 Cf. Gibson v Hunter Home Designs Ltd 1976 SC 23 and Sharp v Thomson 1995 SC 455 rev'd 1997 SC (HL)
66.
1538 Lord Advocate v Caledonian Railway Co 1908 SC 566 at 575 per Lord President Dunedin.
292
The Transfer ofMoney Claims in Scots Law
prior engagements'.1539 In other words, where A2 has in good faith entered into a contract for
the transfer of the asset prior to learning of the prior right, he will not be prejudiced by this
knowledge. Delivery of the disposition to A2 is necessary to satisfy a prior engagement. Such
an approach reduces the role of the offside goals rule to what must be an unusual situation
where A2 enters into a contract in bad faith, knowing that there is a prior agreement to
transfer between S and A1.
In any event, it is not clear why, in the case of an onerous disposition, A2's title
should ever be rendered voidable by virtue of mere knowledge acquired after he has
contracted in good faith. This brings us to a more general point. The offside goals rule has
always been limited to the case where the granter, with the acquiescence of the grantee, does
that which he has bound himself not to do.1540 As the discussion of resolutive conditions
demonstrates, merely knowledge of contingent rights in favour of another are not relevant;
moreover, even where a resolutive condition is purified (giving rise to a personal obligation to
reconvey), this will not render the title of the singular successor voidable, provided the
contract was entered into in good faith. The rule in Scotland is not as wide as the so-called
doctrine of notice in English law.1541 To enlarge the Scottish rule would be counter¬
productive. It would introduce considerable uncertainty. The idea that mere knowledge of
prior contractual rights may form a basis to attack a transferee's position is subversive. It is at
odds with the traditional Scottish focus on certainty on transfer and competition. Particularly
with regard to heritable property, almost every buyer of any asset will have some vague and
uncertain knowledge of previous, and perhaps future, contracts that others may have entered
into with regard to the property. It is simply not intelligible, however, why, or how, such
knowledge can impugn property rights.1542
1539 1.xiv.5.
1540 G.L.F. Henry, 'Personal Rights' (1961) 2 Conveyancing Review 193 properly suggested that the rule could
only apply to rights that were capable of being made real, founding on Mann v Houston 1957 SLT 89. One
problem with this formulation, however, is that the offside goals rule applies equally to the double assignation of
a personal right. A right to payment is not capable of becoming a real right in anything. It is not immediately
clear how to resolve a competition where the competitors hold only personal rights to demand a transfer, and
they both contracted in good faith. Arguably, there is no competition for property law to resolve. The court can
order specific implement though implement would require a breach of contract: Plato v Newman 1950 SLT
(Notes) 29. Cf. B. Beinart, 'Fideicommissum and Modus' 1968 Acta Juridica 157 at 21 In and Kames, Principles
ofEquity (3rd ed. 1778) II, 194: 'In these cases, I cannot discover a rule for preference; nor can I extricate the
matter otherwise than by dividing the subject between the competitors. And, after all, whether this may not be
cutting the Gordion knot instead of untying it, I pretend not to be certain'.
1541 For which see, for example, P.S. Atiyah, Introduction to the Law of Contract (2nd ed. 1995), 389,
'Obligations running with Property'.
1542 Cf. Andrew Melrose & Co v Aitken, Melrose & Co Ltd 1918 1 SLT 109 at 110-111 OH per Lord Cullen
(Ordinary): "A is not bound by a personal obligation granted by B to C merely because he knows B has granted
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5. Conclusions.
The offside goals rule does not sit easily with Scots law. The principle has evolved from one
that, though long discussed in Scots law, was perhaps not well-known until the football
metaphor was employed in Rodger Builders. Since then the rule has taken a more leading role
in the development of the Scots law of property.1543 There is much to be gained from the
institutional writers' approaches. They show that the principle is not as wide as the modern
authorities assume. Certainly Stair, Bell and, in some passages, Bankton accord little
relevance to private knowledge. It is not clear why damages should not be sufficient for the
disappointed buyer. In any event, subsequent knowledge acquired after A2 has contracted in
good faith is irrelevant. In football terms, runs made after the ball is kicked cannot be offside.
Providing A2 is in good faith when he enters into the contract, he can set off toward his
ultimate goal - in the case of land, the register - without regard to any private knowledge that
may subsequently come his way. In this limited respect,1544 the Alex Brewster case was
incorrect and should not be followed.
Whether this writer's view is accepted or not, it is incontrovertible that the offside
goals rule is distinct from the English doctrine of notice. This poses difficulties in interpreting
United Kingdom statutes that are framed in terms of the English doctrine of notice.1545
V. Contractual Prohibitions on Assignation.
A. General
The general principle is that all claims are assignable with the exception of those which are
inherently personal to (i.e. there is delectus personae in) the putative cedent.1546 Delectus
it. And if, in this knowledge, A acquires from B all his assets, I cannot see how this can entitle C to sue A on B's
personal obligation."
1543 See Burnett's Tr. v Grainger 2004 SC (HL) 19 at para 67per Lord Rodger of Earlsferry.
1544 There is little to fault the Lord Ordinary's treatment of the complicated facts. The writer's analysis assumes
that A2 contracts in good faith. In Alex Brewster, there was a suspicion that A2 (a limited company) was nothing
more than a corporate veil used by the defender to defraud the pursuers (see para [57]). There was the further
suspicion that the missives, under which A2 claimed to have obtained his rights, were dishonestly antedated (see
para [60]).
1545
See, for example, Sale of Goods Act 1979, s. 25(1) and Re Highway Foods International Ltd [1995] 1 BCLC
209: would this case be decided the same way if a Scottish court interpreted s. 25 (1) in terms of the offside goals
rule? See too Patents Act 1977, s. 33.
1546 See chapter 2 above. See too, so-called 'change of control' clauses. Such a clause provides that should the
majority of a contracting party's share capital be acquired by a third party, the other party will have the right to
terminate the contract. Here there is delectus, but not in the personae of the other party: the personality of the
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personae proscribes transfer. But it is possible to express in words what, in other situations,
the law would imply. An express restriction can therefore be placed in the contract out of
which otherwise assignable claims may arise, i.e. a so-called pactum de non cedendo,1547
In Scots law, 'a purported assignation of an unassignable right is ineffective either to
invest the assignee or divest the assignor'.1548 The purported transfer is invalid erga omnes,
although the underlying contract may subsist; if so, the cedent may be liable to the assignee
for breach of warrandice.1549 It has been held that it makes no difference whether the rights
arising out of the contract can be said to have 'accrued'.1550 Yet, if a party to a contract has
sued and obtained decree, there seems no reason to assume why the right to payment under
the decree cannot be assigned, even if the underlying contract contained a prohibition on
assignation. It is too late for the debtor to raise defences which he might have been able to
raise against the other party that he might not have been able to raise against an assignee.1551
company remains constant, only the shareholders that have changed. See generally, M. Muller-Chen,
'Abtretungsverbote im internationalen Rechts- und Handelsverkehr' in I. Schwenzer and G. Hager (eds.),
Festschriftfur Peter Schlechtriem (2003) 903 at 906, n. 20.
1547 James Scott Ltd v Apollo Engineering Ltd 2000 SC 228 following English authority; Marquis of
Breadalbane v Whitehead (1893) 21 R. 138; Duke ofPortland v Baird & Co (1865) 4 M 10. Duke ofPortland
was referred to with approval by the House of Lords in the English appeal of Linden Gardens Trusts Ltd v
Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85 at 107. For English law, see R. Goode, 'Inalienable Rights?'
(1979) 42 MLR 553; B. Allcock, 'Restrictions on the Assignment of Contractual Rights' (1983) 42 Cambridge
LJ 328; G. McMeel, 'The Modern Law of Assignment: public policy and contractual restrictions on
Assignability'[2004] LMCLQ 483.
1548 W & A Geddes Ltd v Ewen Stewart 1991 GWD 13-752 OH per Lord Coulsfield (Ordinary) (transcript
available on Lexis-Nexis). See too the authorities in the preceding note. The earliest example in Scots law seems
to be Abbot ofKilwinning v Auchinleck (1533) Mor. 827; Balfour, Practicks p. 205 § 130. Scots law is, in this
respect, similar to German law (see § 399 BGB) and unlike French law. For comparative discussion, see U.
Goergen, Das Pactum de non cedendo (2000) 42 ff (Germany) and 116 ff (France) and references there cited.
For a helpful introduction to Austrian law in English, see F. Raber, 'Contractual Prohibition of Assignment
Clauses in Austrian Law' (1989) 64 Notre Dame LR 171. A pactum de non cedendo does not, of itself, prevent
sub-contracting: Rochead vMoodie (1687) Mor 10392.
1549 It is open to question whether a contract, the obligationary agreement, to transfer an unassignable right is
void for impossibility. The doctrine of frustration in Scots law applies to supervening (as opposed to antecedent)
impossibility. In McBryde's view, 'if the subjects are inalienable, a contract for their sale is void': McBryde,
Contract para 3-07. He cites Magistrates of Kirkaldy v Marks & Spencer Ltd 1937 SLT 574 at 577 per Lord
Jamieson (Ordinary). But these remarks were obiter. Further, they did not address the underlying rationale for
such a rule: in the civilian tradition, specific implement was the primary remedy for non-performance; so a court
would not compel the impossible. There was never any such rule in English law, where specific performance
was an equitable remedy; contracts to do the impossible could, therefore, be treated as valid with damages being
awarded for non-performance: see generally Sir Guenter Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeur (2nd ed. 2004)
paras 1-001 to 1-002. As it happens, German law was amended in 2002 so that a contract to do the impossible is
not void; but no order for implement can be made: §§ 31 la and 275 I BGB. Scots law is somewhere between the
traditional civilian position and the English: specific implement is awarded as of right; but, where performance is
impossible, the pursuer has no right to implement. This writer would suggest that in Scots law a contract to
assign an unassignable right would be valid; the cedent being liable in damages for non-performance. For a
different view, see McBryde, Contract para 20-11.
1550 Linden Gardens Trusts Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85 at 105A per Lord Browne-
Wilkinson.
1551 See R.M. Goode, 'Inalienable Rights?' (1979) 42 MLR 553 at 555 to similar effect.
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Some, however, have expressed reservations as to such a rule on the ground that it has
the potential to undermine the free circulation of assets. The abolition of prohibitions on
transfer has been identified as one of the aims of the French revolution.1552 The ability to
freely transfer one's assets being one of the fundamental tenets of individual liberty;
consequently, the contractual prohibition on the transfer of a right cannot be given effect:
« Or la propriete individuelle est la base principale de notre organisation
sociale. Son attribut constitutif est la liberte de disposer ; done toute convention
qui tendrait a detruire ou meme seulement a restreindre cette liberte en dehors
des cas autorises par la loi doit etre consideree comme radicalement nulle. Pour
consequence, dans la vente, tout clause qui tendrait a restreindre dans la
personne de l'acheteur la liberte d'aliener a son tour serait nulle et de nul
effet. »1553
Modern French law continues to take this approach.1554 But does it apply to claims? It
could be argued that the pactum de non cedendo was not an evil which the revolution sought
to remedy. The proscription on free alienation is primarily concerned with land. Nevertheless,
it must be remembered that in French law - in this respect like Scots law - cession was then
common. It was seen as just one type of sale. It is perhaps, therefore, not sufficient to argue
that the pactum de non cedendo can be treated differently than provisions seeking to restrict
the transfer of immoveables. Other jurisdictions give effect to contractual prohibitions in
general;1555 but refuse to accord validity to such stipulations in commercial contracts.1556
Scholars have voiced the concern that the cost of giving effect to contractual prohibitions, the
1552 H. Kotz, Europaisches Vertragsrecht (1996) § 14, 416 (trans. T. Weir, European Contract Law (1997), 273)
1553 T. Hue, Traite theorique et pratique de la cession et de la transmission des creances (1891) vol 1 para 34.
The same author concedes (at para 37) that different considerations apply to a gratuitous obligation : 'on peut
admettre en effet que dans les contrats a titre onereux la situation des parties est egale; chacun defend sa position
et la clause illicite parait etre l'oeuvre des deux contractantes. II n'en pas de meme dans les dispositions a titre
gratuit. L'auteur de la liberalite impose sa loi; la beneficiaire la subit'.
1554 Cass.com, 21 November 2000, D. 2001, 123, noted by V. Avena-Robardet. Cf. Art. 544 Code Civil: Ta
propriete est le droit de jouir et disposer des choses de la maniere la plus absolue, pourvu qu'on n'en fasse pas un
usage prohibe par les lois ou par les regalements'. Would claims (creances) be regarded as 'propriete' in French
law? Cf. S. Ginossar, Droit reel, propriete et creance (LGDJ, 1960). Similarly, U. Goergen, Pactum de non
cedendo (2000), 118, states that in French law, all claims are, in principle, freely transferable, referring to Art.
1598 Code Civil. This article of the Code Civil merely states that 'tout ce qui est dans le commerce, peut etre
vendu lorsque des lois particulieres n'en ont pas prohibe l'alienation'. However, that one can enter into a
contract of sale in respect of a claim does not mean that a purported cession in breach of a contractual
prohibition will necessarily be effectual. This is one of the problems of the causal system. Similarly problematic
is the location of 'cession' in the Code Civil under the title of sale. Cf. § 137 BGB which is in similar terms. The
provisions on cession under § 399 BGB (which allow a prohibition on cession to take effect) are seen as a
derogation from the general principle that the power to alienate assets cannot be circumscribed by contract: see
Georgen, Das Pactum de non cedendo (2000), 49.
1555 See e.g. § 399 BGB.
1556
§ 354a HGB. This amendment was introduced in 1994. See generally, M. Muller-Chen, 'Abtretungsverbote
im internationalen Rechts- und Handelsverkehr' in I. Schwenzer and G. Hager, Festschrift fur Peter
Schlechtriem (2003), 903.
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free circulation of claims, is a price not worth paying. Free circulation, they argue, is crucial
to economic development, is a price not worth paying.1557 This point, though often repeated,
can be overstated. Bills of exchange, for example, are always available to facilitate free
circulation.
Hue's approach is similar to that taken by Bankton1558 and Erskine.1559 They refer to
an important tract of Scottish authority for the proposition that a prohibition on assignation is
ineffective; at any rate ineffective to prevent an onerous assignation. These authorities seem
to have been forgotten.1560 They are collected in Morison's dictionary under a title that is not
immediately obvious: 'Fiar, absolute, limited'. The cases deal with so-called 'bonds of
provision' which contained resolutive clauses. Such clauses were borrowed from the feudal
system, to signify 'the granter's intention, that the succession shall not be altered to his
prejudice, but that the subject shall return to him, when the heirs named are exhausted'.1561 It
is one of these causes that Forbes cited for the wide proposition that 'even bonds secluding
1Sft.~) * • •
assigneys may for onerous and necessary causes be assigned'. However, the authorities
cited for this proposition deal with something that is quite separate: substitution. A pactum de
non cedendo renders a voluntary assignation in breach of it invalid; a substitution is evacuated
on an inconsistent conveyance by the initial grantee:1563
"A clause of return, is that by which a sum in a bond or other right, or any part
of it, is provided in a particular event to return to the granter and his heirs: It is
therefore truly a species of substitution, by which the granter provides, that the
right shall, in default of the grantee, go, not to a third person, as in a common
1557 See, in particular, H. Kotz, Europaisches Vertragsrecht (1996) § 14, 416-417 (trans. T. Weir, European
Contract Law (1997), 274); R. Goode, 'Inalienable Rights' (1979) 42 MLR 553.
1558 III.i.20.
1559 III.viii.38-45. See too, Y.M.J.V. Boon, Assignment of Contract: a Study in Comparative Law (Unpublished
M. Litt. Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1972), 170, citing D.M. Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law
(1970) vol 2, 1505.
1560 For example, none were cited in the most recent decision on the subject: James Scott Ltd v Apollo 2000 SC
228.
1561 Karnes, Elucidations, Art. 12, 79. Other cases (e.g. Woollen Manufactory at Haddington v Gray (1781) Mor
9144) involve a husband granting a contingent liferent in favour of his wife in bonds, should he predecease her,
which he then assigns. These cases are interesting in so far as they suggest that it is possible to have a liferent in
a debt. It must be assumed that this is a reference to an improper liferent.
1562 W. Forbes, Bills ofExchange (2nd ed. 1718), 80 citing Strachan v Barclay (1683) Mor 4310; W. Forbes, The
Institutes ofthe Law ofScotland (Edinburgh, 1722), Part III, Book 1, Chapter 1, Title 2, § 1.2.
1563 Sinclair v Sinclair (1738) Kilkerran 192; Mor 4344 See e.g. the arguments in Boswell v Arnott (1759) Mor.
12578 at 12579. Wauchope v Gibson (1752) Mor 4404 suggests that a substitution can even be evacuated by a
gratuitous assignation. Cf. the decision of the Cour de Cassation, Civ. 1st June 1853, D.P. 1853.1.191 where the
advocate general made reference to the law of substitution in a case dealing with an apparent prohibition on
cession. In French law, substitution - in the strict sense: restraint on voluntary alienation by the grantee during
his lifetime - was prohibited following the revolution: see Art. 896 Code Civil. See also Arts. 900-1 ff. For a
helpful, simple introduction to the idea of substitution in Scots law, see D.R. Macdonald, Succession (3rd ed.
2001) para 10.36. Cf. Erskine III.viii.44.
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substitution, but to himself. And the known rule of simple substitutions, That
the institute can defeat the substitution, even by a gratuitous deed, hath been
applied to clauses of return... Where a bond is granted for an onerous cause,
though it should contain a provision of return, the creditor is not barred from
altering the destination, even gratuitously; because such clause is considered as
proceeding from the will of the creditor alone, and so is of the nature of a
special destination....1564 But where the sum contained in the obligation flows
from the granter, as in bonds of provision, donations, &c, or where there is any
other good cause for the provision of return in his favour, the creditor's right of
fee is limited , so that he cannot frustrate the return gratuitously1565."
Admittedly, the cases are not consistent.1566 It has been held that a clause 'secluding
assignees' in a bond of provision does not apply to legal assignations.1567 Some of the cases
only go so far to hold that an assignation in breach of a 'clause of return' will be ineffectual if
the assignation is gratuitous;1568 but that an onerous assignation in breach of the clause will be
valid.1569 However, there are examples of a substitution being defeated by a gratuitous
assignation.1570 In McKay v Campbell's Trs, Lord Medwyn observed that the decisions were
conflicting and could not be rationalized. Instead, he suggested, following Karnes,1571 that the
following principles should be applied:1572
(i) Where a grant or conveyance is onerous or necessary,1573 the clause of return is
considered gratuitous; consequently, it may be defeated gratuitously {a fortiori,
one would imagine that it can be defeated onerously).
(ii) If the grant or conveyance is gratuitous and voluntary,1574 a clause of return cannot
be defeated by a gratuitous grant of the donee (no mention is made, however, as to
whether it can be defeated by an inconsistent onerous conveyance).
1564
Referring to Murray v Murray (1680) Mor 4339; Robertson v Mackenzie (1737) Mor 9441.
1565 Erskine III.viii.45, referring to Drummond v Drummond (1679) Mor 4338; College of Edinburgh v
Mortimer, Scot and Wilson (1685) Mor 4342.
1566 See e.g. Lawrie v Borthwick (1683) Mor 4339.
1567 Strachan v Dumbar (1714) Mor 4312.
1568 Home v Lord Justice-Clerk (1671) Mor 4377; Grahame v Laird ofMorphie (1673) Mor 4305; 2 Stair 206;
Drummond v Drummond (1679) Mor 4338; Drummond v Drummond (1683) Mor 4341; Macreadie v
Macfadden's Exrs (1752) Mor 4402; Stewart v Stewart (1669) Mor 4337; Lowis v Lawrie (1736) 5 Br Sup 161;
Boswell v Arnott, 7th February 1759 FC; Mor 12578; Duke ofHamilton v Douglas (1762) Mor 4358.
1569
E.g. Napier and Johnston v Johnston (1740) Kilkerran 192; Mor 4344; Nairns v Creditors of Nairn of
Greenyards (1749) Mor 4348; Weir v Drummond 28th November 1752 FC; (1752) Mor 4314. This is consistent
with Hue's position quoted in n. 1553 above.
1570 Lowis v Lawrie (1736) 5 Br Sup 161.
1571
Kames, Elucidations, Art. 12, at 81.
1572
(18 3 5) 13 S 246 at 250.
1573 On the facts of the case, the conveyance was in pursuance of a marriage contract, which Lord Glenlee
described as 'the most onerous of all contracts'.
1574 These requirements seem to be cumulative.
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(iii) If the clause of return is not in favour of the granter himself, but a third party, 'it is
held to be' gratuitous and defeasible by the grantee or substitute
(iv) Even if the grant or conveyance is gratuitous, where there are intervening
substitutes, any clause of return may be defeated gratuitously by the grantee.
This analysis, though not without its problems, does at least provide a starting point. To
recapitulate, then, a pactum de non cedendo renders a purported assignation in breach invalid.
A clause of return or substitution does not invalidate an inconsistent assignation invalid where
the grant was onerous; where the grant was gratuitous, however, the clause of return is viewed
as an intrinsic condition of the grant; as a result, an inconsistent assignation will be invalid.
B. International Developments.
In the Principles ofEuropean Contract Law, the general principle is that contractual
prohibitions are effectual.1575 However, this is subject to two important caveats. An assignee
who did not know (and could not have known) of the prohibition is protected.1576 Importantly,
1 577
contractual prohibitions will not have effect if the prohibition relates to a future payment.
Interestingly, however, the UNCITRAL convention,1578 and the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts1579 both deny effect to contractual
prohibitions on assignation.1580 The free movement of claims and their ready utilisation as
collateral is seen as a preferable policy to that of freedom of contract. There is, however, some
incongruency between the provisions in these instruments, which seek to render such a
contractual prohibition ineffective, and the provisions which allow the debtor to raise all
defences against an assignee which he could have raised against the cedent. Admittedly, the
pactum de non cedendo is only triggered on a purported transfer in breach of it. But it could
give rise to a defence against the cedent. Suppose the debtor becomes aware that the cedent
1575 Art. 11:301(1).
1576 Art. 11:301(1) (b).
1577 Art. 11:301(1) (c).
1578 Arts. 11, 19 and 20 (3).
1579 Art. 9.1.9 (1), (2nd ed. 2004). See too the provisions of the American UCC to similar effect: § 9-318(4); §§
9-406-408 UCC. Discussed in J.A. Stuckey, 'Louisiana's Non-Uniform Variations in UCC Chapter 9' (2002) 62
Louisiana Law Review 793 at 849
1580
Compare the German position under § 161 BGB.
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intends to assign in breach. The debtor would be able to call on the cedent to refrain from
breaching this term of the contract; ultimately, an interdict could be obtained.
Moreover, the more fundamental policy of freedom and enforcement of contract can
be offered to meet the economic arguments preferred by these international instruments. It is
surprising that instruments which seek to expedite commercial transactions do so by
subverting the most basic legal principle of a commercial society: that people are entitled to
assume that contracts freely entered into will be honoured. Nonetheless, the law's failure to
give effect to a contractual prohibition on assignation could, arguably, be circumvented.
Instead of a prohibition on assignation, a resolutive condition could be inserted. This would
be triggered on any attempted transfer of a claim. The assignation is valid, but empty: the
underlying obligation is discharged by the purported assignation and the assignee obtains
nothing. This argument is controversial.1581 However, the courts do give effect to resolutive
conditions in Scots law, in the form of irritancy clauses in leases. There is one case where an
irritancy for breach of a prohibition on assignation of a lease was upheld.1582 The combined
effect of such a clause is to invalidate not only the purported assignation, but also the
underlying right which was to be assigned.1583 In the law of leases, there is no right to purge a
1581 R. Goode, 'Inalienable Rights' (1979) 42 MLR 553 at 557 pre-empts this argument. In his view, such a term
would amount to an 'unconscionable forfeiture' (but see A.W.B. Simpson, 'Penal Bonds and Conditional
Defeasance' (1968) 82 LQR 392). This is not part of Scots law. In any event, forfeiture clauses are apparently
common in employee pension schemes, the forfeiture taking effect on the employee's bankruptcy: In re Malcolm
[2005] ICR 611. Moreover, the balance of opinion is of the view that as a matter of contract, Scots law gives
effect to resolutive conditions, unlike in Roman law (where certain pacta legis commissoriae were held to be
contra bones mores). They will be strictly construed. Admittedly, the sources are not consistent. At I.xiii. 14 and
I.xiv.4, Stair says that clauses irritant are allowed in pledges; at II.x.6 and IV.xviii.5 he says the opposite: irritant
clauses are prohibited in pledges; but allowed in sales: II.x.6. As he rightly points out, however, in sales such a
condition has no 'real' effect: Stair I.xiv.5. Erskine Il.viii. 14 allows them, but not where they are penal. See too
Erskine, Principles (21st ed. 1911) II.vii.5. Bankton I, 417, 29 says that irritancy clauses are allowed in securities,
although they are purgeable until declarator. Bell, Commentaires I, 260 (7Ih ed. 1870) follows Stair in so far as
resolutive clauses have no real effect in sales; and at II, 270 says that such clauses 'have always been
discountenanced in Scotland'. Like the institutional writers, W. Ross, Lectures, vol II, 341 refers to an Act of
Sederunt of 1592 (see A.S. 27th November, 1592) requiring such conditions to be strictly construed. Writing in
his retirement from the Lord Presidency, Sir Ilay Campbell said that this Act of Sederunt was an example of the
'various instances [in which] the Court made declaratory acts connected with the decision of particular causes, in
order that the rule of decision might be better known, and followed as a precedent in time coming': Sir Ilay
Campbell, Remarks on the Acts ofSederunt (1809), 9.
1,82
Lyons v Irvine (1874) 1 R 512. See too Dlythswood Investments (Scotland) Ltd v Clydesdale Electrical
Stories Ltd (in receivership) 1995 SLT 150.
1583 Cf. A. Mackenzie Stuart, 'Irritancies' in Lord Dunedin et al (eds) Greens Encyclopaedia of the Laws of
Scotland, vol 8 (1929) para 985 states: 'A condition frequently fenced with an irritancy is the usual prohibition
against assigning and sub-letting. The addition of the irritancy is designed to enable the landlord not only to
avoid the assignation or sublet in virtue of the prohibition but also to cut down the assignee's right'. This is
wrong on two counts. First, the assignation is void, so the assignee takes nothing; second, the effect of the
irritancy is to cut down the cedent's right, not the assignee's (the assignee, as a result of the void assignation, has
no right to cut down). A similar passage, but with these corrections, is in G.C.H. Paton and J.G.S. Cameron, The
Law ofLandlord and Tenant in Scotland (1967), 231: 'The exclusion [on assignation/subletting] may be fenced
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conventional irritancy, and any performance already rendered by the cedent cannot be
recovered by way of unjustified enrichment.1584 Admittedly, the law is regarded as
unsatisfactory; but this extends only to the consequences of irritancy in leases of land.1585
There has been no suggestion that, as a matter of general principle, resolutive conditions are
repugnant.
C. Effect of a Pactum de non cedendo on Creditors.
The general principle is that what is transferable by assignation is arrestable; what is
not assignable cannot be arrested. However, if a pactum de non cedendo is valid against
creditors, the consequences would be serious: by virtue of a mere agreement with a third
party, the bankrupt can ensure that the general body of creditors takes nothing.1586
Unassignable claims cannot vest in a trustee in sequestration, it has been held,15863 because
1587
vesting is the equivalent of an intimated assignation in security in favour of the trustee.
Some deeds attempt to bring about the same effect by the insertion of a clause in the
assignation that the claim is not attachable by creditors.1588 This is clearly ineffectual. But
what if such a clause is inserted in the underlying claim which a trustee in sequestration may
wish to realise? It seems to this writer that it would be repugnant to the principles of Scottish
bankruptcy law, not to say basic fairness, to allow the rights of creditors to be frustrated by
such a simple device. Consequently, prohibitions on transfer in the original contract out of
which the assigned claim arise, as well as purported prohibitions in the transfer agreement,
cannot prejudice creditors: 'A man's property may be effected by diligence', says Lord
Karnes, 'whatever private obligation he is under'.1589 In the same vein, Lord Deas has asserted
that, 'No one is entitled so to protect his means against his own onerous obligations and the
claims of his lawful creditors'.1590 This would suggest that a pactum de non cedendo, even if
with an irritancy clause the object of which is not only to prevent the assignation or sublet but to cut down the
right of the cedent'.
1584 Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd v CIN Properties Ltd 1992 SC (HL) 104 (where the outlays amounted to
some £22 million). The decision on unjustified enrichment is reported at 1998 SC (HL) 90. Cf. Steadman v
Drinkle [1916] 1 AC 275, where a resolutive condition was treated as an illegal penalty clause.
1585 Which were already ameliorated by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1986. See
recommendations of the Scottish Law Commission, Report on Irritancy in Leases ofLand (2003), No. 191.
1586 ££ g 851 ZPO and L. LoPucki, 'The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain' (1994) 80 Virginia L. Rev. 1887 at
1891.
1586a
Mulvey v Secretary ofStatefor Social Security 1996 SC 8 affd 1997 SC (HL) 105.
1587
Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, s. 31.
1588
E.g. Juridical Society of Edinburgh, Juridical Styles (3rd ed. 1794) III, 247.
1589 Hastie & Jamieson v Arthur (1770) Hailes 380 at 381.
1590 Ker's Tr. v Justice (1866) 5 M 4 at 10.
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it is effective to render an inter vivos assignation in breach of it invalid, cannot have any
effect on involuntary assignations.1591 In other words, such debts remain arrestable by
creditors;1592 further, they will fall into the sequestration of the cedent.1593 Admittedly, it is
common practice in leases to exclude not just voluntary assignees, but also legal assignees.1594
This writer would doubt the efficacy of such a term. In any event, they can be distinguished.
Leases are exceptional. They involve mutual rights and obligations. The landlord is wary of
having a tenant forced upon him.1595 But would a provision in an ordinary contract excluding
legal, as well as conventional, assignees be effective to prevent the vesting of a claim in a
trustee in sequestration?1596 This writer is of the view that such a provision cannot be regarded
as effective. It must be conceded, however, that there is considerable authority for the
contrary view, particularly with regard to leases.1597 But it must be remembered that, on
bankruptcy, the debtor, by definition, cannot give effect to his obligations; that being so, it is
hardly rational to provide that the one stipulation granted by him which can be given full
effect, is the one that succeeds in depriving his creditors even further.
D. Some Interpretation Issues.
Does a pactum de non cedendo prohibit the purported creation of a trust in favour of
the putative assignee? Two recent cases in England seem to have answered this in the
negative;1598 but they have been trenchantly criticised.1599 In Scots law, where the cedent
1591 Cf. P.M. Nienaber, 'Cession' in W.A. Joubert et al (eds.) The Law of South Africa, 2nd edn, vol 2, Part 2,
(2003) para 37. It should be remembered that contractual prohibitions in the contract out of which the claim
arises is not always effective in South African law; but see Durban County Council v Liquidators, Durban
Icedrones Ltd 1965 (1) SA 600 (A) at 612.
1592 For example, Sir George Mackenzie, Inst. (2nd ed. 1688) Il.viii at 165-166 observes that reversions could not
be voluntarily assigned where they did not bear to assignees; irrespective of whether they bore to assignees,
however, they could still be apprised (i.e. arrested) by creditors. Erskine Il.viii.7 makes the same point.
1593 Cf. Krasner v Dennison [2001] Ch 76 at 99C per Chadwick LJ: 'The starting point, as it seems to me, is the
long established principle that it is contrary to the public interest to allow a party to contract out the operation of
the bankruptcy code'. For an unsuccessful argument that vesting of annuity was a breach of the bankrupt's
human rights, see In re Malcolm [2005] ICR 611 CA.
1594 For example, Dobie v Marquis ofLothian (1864) 2 M 788.
1595
Paradoxically, such a tenant would be particularly credit worthy: the trustee will be personally liable for any
lease he adopts. This liability extends to arrears of rent: Dundas v Morison (1857) 20 D 225.
1596 See e.g. Juridical Society of Edinburgh, Juridical Styles (5th ed. 1881) I, 638.1597 See J. Rankine, The Law ofLeases in Scotland (3r ed. 1916), 177 and authority there cited. The point does
not seem to be settled in England: Cf. In re Landau (A Bankrupt) [1998] Ch 223 at 237B-C and Krasner v
Dennison [2001] Ch 76 at 99H-100A.
1598 Don King Productions Inc v Warren [2000] Ch 291; Foamcrete (UK) Ltd v Thrust Engineering Ltd [2002]
BCC221.
1599
See, above all, the commentaries by Professor A.M. Tettenborn, 'Trusts and Unassignable Agreements'
[1998] LMCLQ 498; idem., 'Trusts and Unassignable Agreements - Again' [1999] LMCLQ 353 (both on Don
King)\ idem, 'Prohibitions on Assignment - Again' [2001] LMCLQ 472 (Foamcrete).
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becomes a trustee, this has the opposite effect from assignation. As trustee, the cedent remains
creditor. The beneficiary has only a personal right against the trustees; he has no rights against
trust debtors.1600 As a strict matter of interpretation, therefore, a prohibition on assignation in
Scots law will not cover a trust.1601
Does a prohibition on assignment of the contract prohibit assignation of the rights
arising out of it without the debtor's consent?1602 In this writer's view it does not. Contracts
cannot be assigned without the consent of the original parties to the contract. A clause
prohibiting assignment without the consent of the debtor merely expresses what the law
already implies. Indeed, because assignment of contract can only occur with the consent of
the original parties, that consent can always supersede the original contract terms. Assignment
of claims is different. Such an assignation is not covered by the prohibition: expressio unius
exclusio alterius. Of course, such an issue is a question of interpretation. Questions of
interpretation turn on the facts of the case. However, a pactum de non cedendo is a restraint
on alienation. Freedom of alienation is one of the basic incidents of transactional autonomy.
Consequently, any purported limitation on this freedom will be construed strictly. That the
preferred interpretation empties a clause prohibiting assignment of the contract of all content
is no answer: contracts and conveyances regularly contain superfluous or meaningless
clauses.1603
Scots law in this area can be summarised thus:
(1) A pactum de non cedendo renders a voluntary assignation in breach of it
invalid.
(2) A pactum de non cedendo does not prevent the claim being attached by
creditors or other involuntary assignation of it.1604
1600
Compare the position in English law. There the most common assignment is the equitable assignment.
Claims like debts are 'legal' interests. To obviate the formalities of a legal assignment, the equitable assignment
is usually relied upon. However, the rights of an equitable assignee cannot be understood without reference to
the trust. The assignor becomes a trustee for the assignee. Only where there is a double assignment of the same
debt is the trust basis rendered inadequate. As a result, first good faith notification to the debtor will effect a
transfer. Equitable interests can be transferred in equity without notification and at law if the formalities of the
Law of Property Act 1925, s. 136 are complied with.
1601 Which is not to say that a truster-trustee trust over proceeds of a claim will always be valid; especially where
the trust is used to frustrate the claims of lawful creditors. But this is a general issue and not particular to
circumvention of prohibitions on assignation.
1602 See e.g. Bawejan Ltd v M C Fabrications [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 377 CA where the clause ran: 'The
contract is not transferable or assignable by either party without the written consent of the other party'.
1603 Cf. Ross, Lectures, II, 165 quoted by Reid, Property para 641, n. 4 and reproduced in chapter 3 above, n.
548.
1604 Forbes v Forbes (1740) Mor 10404; Kilkerran 396.
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(3) Alimentary provisions are neither arrestable nor assignable in so far as they
are genuinely alimentary,1605 even if they are expressly granted to
1606
assignees.
(4) Where a grant includes a 'return' clause, this should be interpreted as a
substitution. As a result, it can evacuated by a voluntary disposition for
good consideration; but not if the assignation is gratuitous.
(5) Prohibitions on alienation will be strictly construed.
VI. Accretion.
Where there has been a purported transfer by one who is not entitled, but that
transferor subsequently becomes entitled, the doctrine of accretion can operate. The asset is
transferred without the need for a new conveyance. The law implies what the granter is bound
to do by the warrandice in the a non domino transfer.1607 It has, however, been doubted
whether the doctrine of accretion applies to moveables.1608 There is little discussion of the
application of the doctrine to the assignation of a money claim. On the authority of Stair
himself, however, it seems that, in principle, accretion is equally applicable to the assignation
of personal rights as it is to transfers of other assets:
"In both dispositions and assignations, the disponer or cedent is called author,
and the acquirer is called singular successor, and in both, this common brocard
takes place, jus superveniens authori accresit successori, that is, whatever right
befalleth to the author after his disposition or assignation, it accresceth to his
successor, to whom he had before disponed, as if it has been in his person
when he disponed, and as if it has been expressly disponed by him.. ,"1609
The First Division has also confirmed that the doctrine of accretion is applicable to
assignation,1610 and the applicability of the doctrine to assignation has also been accepted by
1605 See authority cited in n. 1383. Cf. Irvine v Crawfurd (1705) Mor 10397 and Calder v Relict and Children of
Kenneth Mackenzie (1776) Mor, 'Personal and Transmissible' App. No. 1; Kames Sel Dec 187.
1606
Urquhart v Douglas (1738) Mor 10403.
1607 See Bell, Principles (10th ed. W. Guthrie, 1899) § 881: 'the law doing what the granter is bound to do',
quoted in Reid Property para 677.
1608
Reid, Property para 678; G.L. Gretton, 'The Assignation of Contingent Rights' 1993 JR 23. See also the
dictum of Lord Low in Burnett's Trs v Burnett 1909 SC 223 at 226: '...a right cannot be assigned unless the
assignor had that right vested in him'.
1609 Stair III.ii.1 (emphasis added). See also Erskine II.vii.3.
1610 Smith v Wallace (1869) 8 M 204 at 211 per Lord Kinloch: 'I cannot accede to the doctrine that the principle
of accretion only operates to support an infeftment. I think it equally operates to support a mere personal right'.
See also per Lord Ardmillan at 216: 'I give the pursuer the benefit of the accretion; for I retain the opinion which
I expressed in the case of Swan [v Western Bank (1866) 4 M 663], that accretion is not so much a rule of
conveyancing, or a principle of feudal law, as a principle of equity introduced as a remedy against a wrong, and a
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the House of Lords in the context of an assignation of a patent.1611 The classic case of
accretion by title is well known. A purports to transfer to B property which is in fact owned
by C. B records his disposition.1612 Thereafter, C transfers the property to A. By virtue of the
doctrine of accretion, B becomes owner ipso hire. It is probably the case that accretion in this
classic sense can apply to the assignation of claims. However, matters are more problematic
due to the presence of the debtor. Assignation must be completed by intimation to the debtor.
If the debtor receives intimation of an assignation which was granted by someone who was
never the debtor's creditor, the debtor will - and ought to - refuse to pay.
Suppose Paul is indebted to X. On day 1, Y purports to assign X's claim against Paul
to Richard. Richard intimates to Paul on day 1. On day 2 X assigns to Y. On day 3, Y
intimates to Paul.
manuiment to the title arising out of the warrandice.' Lord President Inglis also concurred in this opinion at 217.
Compare the report of Inglis' opinion at (1869) 7 SLR 122 at 127.
1611 Buchanan v Alba Diagnostics Ltd 2004 SC (HL) 9 at para 19 per Lord Hoffmann. For criticism see R.G.
Anderson (2005) 9 Edin LR 457.
1612 In the case of land registered in the Land Register, the position is different: B will become owner if he is
registered as the Land Register is a register of title.
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On general principles, Richard's intimation on day 1 will be ineffectual: X had
nothing to assign. Moreover, the debtor, Paul, will not only not know the putative
assignee, Richard (which is normal), but he will never have heard of the cedent.
According to the doctrine of accretion, on day 3, the law implies a transfer from X-Y-
Richard. The legal effect is achieved on the transfer from the true creditor, X, to Y. As
a result, Paul ought to pay Richard, not Y; though on day three the intimation that
Paul receives will be from Y, not the true creditor, Richard. And Y's intimation is
likely to say nothing about Richard. The issue of debtor protection is somewhat
separate from the question of whether accretion can operate in principle in an
assignation. However, since it is likely to give rise to the greatest problems, we will
deal with it first.
Is there good faith protection for Paul if he pays:
(a) Richard on day 1 ?
(b) X on day 1 ?
(c) Y on day 1 ?
(d) Richard on day 2?
(e) X on day 2?
(f) Y on day 2?
While the debtor should be protected from having to make onerous enquiries, he will
not be protected for paying someone he knows is not his creditor. The debtor should
not, therefore, be protected in case (a): the debtor has no defence if he pays someone
waving an assignation in his face that patently bears to have been granted by someone
who is not his creditor. On day 1, X is still Paul's creditor. So in (b) there is no issue
of good faith payment. Paul is simply paying his creditor. Similarly, in case (c), Y is a
complete stranger to the debtor, so there should be no good faith protection here. On
day two, however, the debtor has received a second intimation. Where there are
competing intimations, the first is preferred.1613 But this presupposes that the
intimations are good. While lawyers can work out who ought to have been paid in this
situation (by virtue of the doctrine of accretion) the question for debtor protection is
1613 The complexities of the offside-goals rule will be ignored here.
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whether, in the confusion, the debtor should be protected; even if, from a lawyer's
perspective, his actions are irrational. In case (d) there is no issue of good faith
protection: Richard is the creditor by virtue of the doctrine of accretion. However,
since the matter has become complex, arguably the debtor should be protected
providing he can show that whomsoever he paid, he did so in good faith. The test
must be subjective. If the debtor has taken legal advice, then it seems unlikely that the
good faith defence can be relevant. The lawyer, one would hope, would properly
identify the true creditor. But it would be a brave lawyer who advised that, in our
example, Richard should be paid because of the operation of accretion. The obvious
advice is to raise a multiplepoinding.
As was suggested above, there seems no reason to hold that accretion cannot
apply, in principle, to assignations. The above has demonstrated, however, that there
will be considerable problems in ensuring that the debtor pays the correct person.
Moreover, even if there can be an application of the doctrine of accretion, there
remains the question of the intervening insolvency of the first cedent. It is clear that
the accretion is merely 'the law doing what the granter is bound to do'.1614 It is based
on the personal obligation in the warrandice. As a result, where the cedent, through
whose patrimony the claim must pass, becomes insolvent, the doctrine of accretion
cannot operate. In Buchanan v Alba Diagnostics Ltd,1615 there are dicta from Lord
Hoffmann which suggested a contrary result. But these dicta are unintelligible and
cannot be correct.
Accretion and Future Rights.
Accretion is of further importance to the law of assignation. It has long been
suggested that accretion can be applied analogously to the assignation of future rights.
The idea seems to be based on dicta of Lord Rutherford Clark in Reid v Morrison:
"An expectant cannot sell the property to which he hopes to succeed, or
any interest in it, nor can he exercise any power over it. He can sell no
more than a chance - his chance of becoming proprietor; but it conveys
nothing, in as much as he has nothing to convey. It becomes effectual
1614
Bell, Principles (10th ed. 1899) § 881. It should be noted in passing that Bell's treatment of the law
in § 882 (2) has been superseded: see Swan v Western Bank of Scotland (1866) 4 M 663; Smith v
Wallace (1869) 8 M 204.
1615 2004 SC (HL) 9; 2004 SLT 455.
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by accretion alone. Till then it is nothing but a mere agreement to
convey the subject of the expectancy when it shall vest."161
This dictum is unhelpful. On the one hand, 'an expectant cannot sell'; on the
other, the effect is that there is 'nothing but a mere agreement'. Although not all
agreements are sales, all sales are certainly agreements. There is therefore
considerable overlap in what Lord Rutherford Clark says is permitted and what is
prohibited. Moreover, Lord Rutherford Clark suggests that the purported assignation
of future rights is ineffectual and is 'nothing but a mere agreement to convey' which
'becomes effectual by accretion alone'. This is simply wrong. After all, if there were
no more than a personal obligation to grant a disposition then the doctrine of accretion
could not apply. It is a principle of property law. For accretion to operate there must
be a purported disposition or assignation followed by either registration or intimation.
The disadvantages are two-fold: first, the chances of the debtor actually paying the
person who is the true assignee are slim; second, there will be no protection for an
assignee if there is an intervening insolvency of one of the cedents. The operation of
accretion in assignation is therefore uncertain and, for the intended assignee, insecure.
As a basis for the large scale transfer of book debts, or indeed other commercial
transactions, it will therefore be very much a doctrine of last resort.1617
1616 Reid v Morison (1893) 20 R 510 at 514 per Lord Rutherford Clerk.
1617 It is of some interest that the accretion argument was largely ignored in two recent Sheriff Court
decisions: Bank of Scotland Cashflow Finance v Heritage International Transport Ltd 2003 SLT (Sh
Ct) 107 and Nigel Lowe Holdings Ltd v Intercon Construction (Pty) Ltd 2004 GWD 40-816. Cf.
Tayplan Ltd v D &A Contracts Ltd 2005 SLT 195 OH.
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Conclusion
Despite its everyday importance, the Scottish law of assignation has, hitherto,
been the subject of little analysis. Nevertheless, much of Scots law is clear. The
principles have evolved over many centuries. The greatest problems have arisen
comparatively recently, in particular, with the failure to properly distinguish an
assignation from other legal institutions. Some of these difficulties no doubt emerged
from the confused picture that has been drawn of the history of assignation in Scots
law (and perhaps the law of cession throughout Europe). Shed of a misleading picture
of the history of the law on the transfer of claims, practically important institutions,
such as the transfer of entire contracts, may now be ripe for more detailed
development.
Although this thesis has been primarily concerned with the transfer of the
paradigm money claim, Scots law has had a remarkably liberal attitude to
assignability. Yet always has focus remained - even if that focus has not always been
as sharp as would have been desirable - on two important related issues: (1) the
position of the debtor who is a passive party to the operation; and (2) the effect of a
purported assignation on creditors.
Scots law has sought to strike a balance: the need encourage the free transfer
of claims on the one hand; and the need to protect creditors and the debtor on the
other. The result has been formal rules on intimation. Many will feel that these
intimation requirements go too far, that there is an imbalanced conservatism. There is
no doubt that the intimation requirements are, compared to some other legal systems,
relatively onerous. But it is for this reason that the Scottish rules avoid many of the
problems which must arise in other legal systems. The law of
assignation/assignment/cession cannot ignore the fact that there is a debtor who exists
and who must be protected. Intimation is not, of course, the only way to do so. But if
Scots law is to be reformed in this regard,1618 alternative methods must be found to
address the same issues. Many legal systems, as well as the most modern international
instruments, concede that communication with the debtor is, on occasion,
1618 As seems likely: see Scottish Law Commission, Seventh Programme ofLaw Reform (SLC No. 198,
2005) para 2.31.
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unavoidable; yet provide no rules or simplified form in which such communication
ought to occur.
The effect of the contractual prohibition on assignation has proved as
controversial as the constitutive role accorded to intimation. Again, however, it is
difficult to see why parties should not be free to enter into contractual prohibitions.
After all, commercial people have a simple and time-honoured way of ensuring that
claims are 'clean' and free from any of the debtor's defences: the negotiable
instrument. The apparent decline in this instrument is unexplained.
Finally, questions of validity are complex. Many of the issues raised are not
peculiar to the law of assignation. They raise questions for the law of transfer in
general. In some aspects, Scots law has been found to be comparatively
underdeveloped. While traces of doctrines of inopposabilite, or relative
Unwirksamkeit can be detected, they are meagre.
One scholar has written of the feeling of standing on the shore of an ocean in
his research on Scottish history;1619 a metaphor that is apposite to much of the study
of Scottish private law and certainly to the law of assignation. No mention, for
example, has been made here of the assignation of future claims to payment, of global
assignments or scuritizations; the transfer of incorporeal heritable rights such as
leases, liferents or writs; not to mention intellectual property rights or the ever
increasing thickets of ad hoc statutory licences. The list goes on. But it is only with an
understanding of the principles applicable to the assignation of the paradigm money
claim that these more sophisticated topics can be addressed.
1619 M. Fry, The Scottish Empire (2001) vii.
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